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The area of interest in which this Study is set is the linking of a 
company's business strategies with its strategic planning for IT 
(information technology). The objectives of the Study are: to 
investigate how the IT planning environment is changing for business 
enterprises in South Africa; to establish how successfully South African 
companies are managing IT strategically; to propose a new approach to 
strategic IT decision making that will help South African management deal 
with the major issues; to propose a way of implementing the approach. 
In Chapter 2, conclusions are drawn from an examination of the key 
strategic IT planning literature. It appears that fundamental changes 
are indeed taking place, and are producing significant shifts in the way 
researchers, consultants and managers think about IT. 
The survey of South African management opinion is described in Chapter 
3. The opinions analyzed range over environmental trends, strategic 
decision making practices, and what an acceptable strategic IT decision 
making framework would look like. The need for a new, comprehensive 
approach to strategic IT decision making in South Africa is clearly 
established. 
In Chapter 4, a theoretical Framework is proposed as a new, comprehensive 
approach to strategic IT decision making. The Framework covers five 
strategic tasks: analysing the key environmental issues; determining the 
purposes and uses of IT in competitive strategy and organizational 
designs; developing the IT infrastructure, human systems, information 
systems, and human resources to achieve these purposes and uses; 
implementing the strategic IT decisions; and learning to make better 
strategic IT decisions. 
In Chapter 5, ways of implementing the Framework in practice are 
.identified. A means of evaluating its acceptability in a specific 
company is also proposed. 
The general conclusions of the Study are presented in Chapter 6. 
The Framework developed in this Study is intended for use, not directly 
by the IT decision makers themselves, but by the persons responsible for 
designing the IT decision making processes of the company. It is not, 
however, offered as a theory or a methodology. The aim is· simply to 
provide a conceptual "filing system", to help designers uncover and 
classify the IT strategy problems of their own company, to identify the 
tools their decision makers need, and to put appropriate problem solving 
processes in place. 
i 
"Today we have naming of parts. Yesterday, 
We had daily cleaning. And tomorrow morning, 
We shall have what to do after firing. But today, 
Today we have naming of parts." 
Henry Reed, 
"Lessons of the War" 
"In a general way it may be said that to 
think in tenns of systems seems the nost 
appropriate conceptual response so far 
available when the phenomena un:ler study -
at any level and iri any domain - display the 
character of being organized, arrl when 
un:lerstanding the nature of the 
interdeperrlencies constitutes the research 
task." [Emery & '!Wist, 1965: 21] 
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I. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The area of interest in which this Study is set is the linking of 
a company's business strategies with its strategic planning for 
IT (information technology). 
Even where the development of information systems strategies for 
business is the explicit subject matter in the literature., the 
correspondence between business strategy concepts and those of IT 
planning is seldom made clear. Part of the problem seems to lie 
in the fact that few writers deal comprehensively with a wide 
enough range of strategic IT management issues. Few also 
recognize that an IT infrastructure is a matter of strategic 
capability, which can and should be planned independently and in 
advance of particular application systems. 
McFarlan observes that IT planning research has hitherto been 
done by information systems professors and professionals "without 
the perspectives of corporate strategy formulation, 
organizational behavior, and general management", while the 
business planning research has been done by people "with only a 
cursory understanding of information technology, its issues, and 
their impact on the organization." [McFarlan, 1985: 309] 
To bridge the conceptual gap between business thinking and IT 
thinking, many writers [e.g. Bakopoulos & Treacy, 1985; McFarlan, 
1984; Parsons, 1983; Porter & Millar, 1985) are now using 
Porter's [1980; 1985) concepts of competitive strategy and 
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competitive advantage to obtain insights into ways in which IT 
can be applied in the company's strategies. 
At the same time, insights into the relative importance of 
different technologies in different industries are arising out of 
research such as Collier's (1983] investigation into the 
automation of the Service Sector, Chorafas• (1983] study of 
information systems in Japanese financial institutions, and the 
Life Office Management Association (1981] study of evolving 
trends in communications technologies. Together with an analysis 
of the firm, either as a chain of value activities and linkages 
[Porter and Millar, 1985], or as a resource life cycle [Ives & 
Learmonth, 1984], such insights can lead to the identification of 
good IT investment opportunities for the company. 
There are also aids to creative thinking, such as IBM's 
"S*P*A*R*K" (Ives, Sakamoto & Gongla, 1986]. This is a prototype 
of an expert system capable of citing from its knowledge base 
cases in which IT has been applied to strategic purposes in 
situations similar to that of the enquirer. 
Recognition is one thing, readiness is another. While 
recognizing the opportunities for using different kinds of IT in 
business strategies is in itself a siqnificant achievement, it is 
not enough to guarantee successful implementation. What is also 
needed is a company-wide IT infrastructure, and an accompanying 
decision making process, built to guarantee that likely future 
technologies will be evaluated, implemented and assimilated 
rapidly and cost-effectively, so that market opportunities will 
not be lost in long development lead times. 
Two similar approaches to developing and building such an 
infrastructure have been proposed by practitioners. One is 
Online People's "B+OL+D" methodology (Benjamin, Seminar E-01] for 
formulating the architecture of a company's "corporate-wide 
information technology environment" or "CWITE". The other is 
Nolan, Norton & Company's "computer technology architecture", 
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described in the Technology Management Series video training 
courses [Advanced Systems Inc., 1985]. 
A second requirement for a successful IT strategy is that both 
the business and the IT managers in the company should learn to 
make the relevant decisions with increasing effectiveness as 
their, and the competition's, experience grows. This is 
"organizational IT learning", and it is a success factor at two 
levels of management (Raho, Belohlav and Fiedler, 1987]: 
Firstly, Nolan, Norton & Company [Advanced Systems Inc., 
1985: Course 3935] describe six stages in the overall 
development of the company ~s a user of IT, and a 
"discontinuity" between the three early stages and the 
three advanced stages that must be managed in a structured 
manner. They warn against attempting advanced stage IT 
strategies before the necessary infrastructure is in place, 
and before the quality of management thinking is ready for 
them. 
Secondly, it has been suggested [McKenney & McFarlan, 1982; 
Cash & McCleod, 1985] that there are phases in the 
introduction of a particular new technology into an 
operating unit of the company that must be managed, each in 
a different way. 
There is considerable debate in the empirical literature as to 
the validity of these learning models (see, for example, 
Benbasat, Dexter, Drury & Goldstein [1984], Drury [1983], King & 
Kraemer [1984], Raho, Belohlav & Fiedler [1987]), but they seem 
to have been widely accepted in practice and in university 
teaching. 
At both levels of learning, significant differences of 
background, knowledge and motivation between people in the 
business world and in the IT world (Benson & Parker, 1985: 8; 
Cougar & Zawacki, 1979] add to the uncertainty as to what 
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transfers between the business and IT fields of expertise are 
feasible and desirable. For example, an attempt to rephrase IT 
strategy issues in a business strategy language will misfire if 
the business managers of the company are unfamiliar with the 
jargon of the particular strategic framework chosen. 
In practice, the learning problem reduces to the development of 
mutual understanding through a "dialectic of implementation" 
[Churchman & Schainblatt, 1965]. The problem is dialectical 
precisely because applying IT to the business strategy can and 
often will change that strategy. 
"[Enterprise-wide infonnation management] results in the 
alignment of Infonnation Tedmology with the enterprise 
plans, ani the alteration of the enterprise goals through 
the use of Infonnation Tedmology." (Benson & Parker, 1985: 
Abstract] 
••'Ib see that an infonnation system is a [strategic 
.infonnation system) , we need to lll'Xierstarrl how infonnation 
systems are used to support or shape the finn's c:::onpetitive 
strategy. '!his ability to see ani mrlerstan:i I call 
strategic infonnation systems vision. 11 [Wiseman, 1985 (1) : 
' 
9] 
This, then, is the major theme running through the theoretical 
Framework described in Chapter 4: dialectic, learning, and 
adaptation of company goals. 
In a survey of 25 existing methodologies, IBM's Enterprise-wide 
Information Management (EwiM) researchers found not one that 
addressed the linking of business and IT strategic decision 
making at all comprehensively (Benson & Parker, 1985: 27-28; 
1986(1)]. Nevertheless, they felt able to suggest that a 
conceptual linking of Porter's (1985) value chain concept to the 
financial justification of IT could be what "will provide the 
great 1eap forward for evaluating the financial impact of 
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information technology as it permeates the enterprise" (Benson 
and Parker, 1986(2): 10]. 
This is the second theme of the theoretical Framework: the 
purposes of IT in competitive strategy, its uses in 
organizational design, and its justification in terms of 
competitive advantage. 
Even without the availability of proven analytical techniques, 
there is still much that can be done to develop strategic IT 
decision makers in both the business and the IT worlds, as people 
with a useful variety of knowledge and skills and capable of 
different but complementary insights into the critical issues. 
The decision making processes of the company can be adapted to 
help these people, individually and collectively, to arrive at 
effective answers to the critical questions of IT strategy: 
In this industry, ho~can IT be applied to make a company 
more profitable]~ 
/ 
In this company, what kinds of error in applying IT would 
be fatal? 
"Although large finns seldcm die, some errors are 
extraordinarily costly relative to others. '!he 
measure of cost is usually years of eanrlngs losses as 
well as decline in market share. Often it is 
disappearance in an acquisition. Only seldcm is 
bankruptcy the outcome." [Bower, 1982 (1) : 38 n.] 
How can this company's management team learn to make the 
right applications and avoid the errors? 
What is critical will depend on the situation and the particular 
strategy being attempted, but the attributes of a process that 
will expose the relevant issues can be specified. 
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This Study is intended to contribute towards an understanding of 
company-wide strategic IT decision making, at all levels of 
company management involved in formulating, implementing and 
controlling IT strategy. 
The Study does not depart too far in either direction from the 
interface between business decision making and IT decision 
making. The problems at this interface are enough to justify 
such concentration. 
II. TERMINOLOGY 
Appendix C provides a Glossary of words and phrases which belong 
to other authors, or which are in general use but are used in a 
special way in this study. Since these terms are used without 
explanation in the text, a quick preliminary scan of Appendix c 
is advised. 
III. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the Study are: 
A. To investigate how the IT planning environment is changing 
for business enterprises in general and for South African 
companies in particular, and whether these changes call for 
new approaches to strategic IT decision making. 
B. To establish whether and how successfully South African 
companies can be said to manage IT strategically, and what 
.is needed to improve the quality of their strategic IT 
decision making. 
c. To propose a new approach to strategic IT decision making 
that will help South African management deal with the 
fundamental issues underlying the environmental changes and 
develop effective IT-based business strategies. 
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D. To propose a way of implementing the Framework in South 
African practice, which will address the key issues and 
lead to an improvement in the quality of strategic IT 
decision making. 
Methodologically, the Study makes its contribution primarily as 
an exercise in systems analysis and design, although a certain 
amount of empirical research has been carried out in order to 
meet objectives B. and D. The acceptability of the approach in a 
Study such as this is argued in Chapter 3. 
IV. LIMITATIONS 
The Framework developed in this Study is intended for use, not . 
directly by the IT decision makers themselves, but by the persons 
responsible for designing the IT decision making processes of the 
company. In the first place, the Framework has to be 
"customized" for particular organizational, cultural and other 
characteristics. In the second place, it is expressed in generic 
terms that have to be "instantiated", i.e. translated into 
concrete details, in order to arrive at specific IT action plans. 
It is not, however, offered as a theory or a methodology. The 
aim is simply to provide a conceptual "filing system", to help 
designers uncover and classify the IT strategy problems of their 
own company, to identify the tools their decision makers need, 
and to put appropriate problem solving processes in place [cf. 
Benson & Parker, 1985: 22-28: 1986(3): Thomas, 1984]. · 
As explained in Section 1.I .• , the Study is concerned with 
information technology management, and not information management 
as such. The latter subject is well covered in the existing 
literature (see, for example, Gane & Sarson [1977], International 
Business Machines [1984], Lucas [1985(1): 140], Ross & Bracket 
[1976], Teichroew & Hershey [1977]. 
The discussion is in terms of a profit seeking company, but with 
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appropriate changes of terminology an·d transposing of success 
criteria it could be made to apply to almost any kind of 
organization. The discussion is also in terms of a company with 
multiple business units, but it is intended to apply also to 
companies where there is only one business unit, or where the 
notions of a business unit and central services do not arise at 
all. There is no logical restriction as to the size of the 
company, but the focus is on medium- to large-scale enterprises. 
The rate of response from the smaller companies surveyed (Section 
3.III.A.) .was very low, and it may be true that such companies do 
not feel the need for an elaborate decision making Framework. 
V. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
In Chapter 2, conclusions are drawn from an examination of the 
key strategic IT planning literature. It appears that 
fundamental changes are indeed taking place in both the external 
and internal planning environments of companies. These changes 
are producing significant shifts in the way researchers, 
consultants and managers think about IT and its purposes and uses 
in a company. The literature relates largely to overseas 
experience, and it is necessary to investigate the South African 
situation as part of the field study. 
The survey of South African management opinion is described in 
Chapter 3. The opinions analyzed range over: 
Managers• perceptions of environmental trends and the 
importance of these to their companies. 
Companies' strategic IT decision making practices and how 
successful these are deemed to be. 
The features of an acceptable strategic IT decision making 
framework. 
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The need for a new, comprehensive approach to strategic IT 
decision making in South Africa is clearly established. 
In Chapter 4, a theoretical Framework is proposed as a new, 
comprehensive approach to strategic IT decision makin9. When 
customized and instantiated, the Framework will help management 
carry out five strategic tasks: 
Identify and bring into consideration the key environmental 
issues in strategic IT decision making. 
Identify the content of strategic IT decisions, i.e. the 
purposes and uses of IT that create competitive advantage. 
Define and develop the IT infrastructure, human systems, 
information systems, and human resources that will achieve 
these purposes and uses. 
Implement effective processes for carrying out strategic IT 
decisions. 
Ensure that the organization learns through experience to 
make better strategic IT decisions. 
In Chapter 5, to assist in planning the implementation of the 
Framework, the major constructs are identified and mapped to 
IBM's wEwiM Action Plan"~ They are then reviewed in the light of 
the findings of the field survey, and a framework for evaluating 
their acceptability in a specific company is proposed. 
The general conclusions of the Study are presented in Chapter 6. 
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guide much of my thinking. The insight is his that IT 
infrastructure is a matter of strategic capability, which a 
company can and must control before it can use IT as a 
"competitive weapon" in a sustained, effective way. If this is 
true, then it follows that IT can confidently be used to shape 
company mission and strategy. 
The notion of "impact IT strategy" this brings to business 
thinking belongs to Marilyn Parker and Bob Benson of IBM's 
Enterprise-wide Information Management (EwiM) research. So too 
does the clarification as a concept of the fundamental difference 
between the business decision making domain and the. IT decision 
making domain in a company, on which the dialectical approach to 
strategic IT decision making proposed in the Framework hinges. 
I am grateful to these people, and to the other academics, 
consultants and practitioners who spent valuable time with me, or 
in filling out the very lengthy questionnaire. I acknowledge my 
debt to them and to the other authors cited or paraphrased in the 
Study, especially those listed in Section 2.1v., but I accept 
full responsibility for errors I may have made in the way I use 
their ideas. 
Except where the contrary is stated, I believe this Study to be 
my own work. Most of it arises out of what I have learned in the 
course of formulating and implementing IT strategy at Old Mutual. 
I have presented some of its ideas in papers read at the 
IFIP/CSSA Conference, held in Johannesburg, in April, 1987, and 
at the NACCA Third International Symposium, held in Johannesburg, 
in September, 1988. In its totality, however, the Study has not 




PERSPECTIVES OF IT STRATEGY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The four objectives of the Study are stated in Section 1.III. 
The view of the business and IT management literature described 
in this Chapter is aimed specifically at the first objective: 
A. To investigate how the IT planning environment is changing 
for business enterprises in general and for South African 
companies in particular, and whether these changes call for 
new approaches to strategic IT decision making. 
The study of strategic management and of IT management as 
disciplines in their own right is, in both cases, not much older 
than 30 years or so [Ansoff & Brandenburg, 1967: B~219; McFarlan, 
1985: 309; Steiner, Kunin & Kunin, 1983: 12]. Nevertheless, each 
has already accumulated a vast literature. For useful overviews 
on the business side, see Ansoff & Brandenberg [1967], Camerer 
[1985], Schendel & Hofer [1977: 1-22], and Thomas [1984]. On the 
IT side, see Boynton & Zmud [1987], Mason [1985], and Wiseman 
[1985: Appendix A]. Payne [1986] provides an overview of trends 
in the strategy consulting arena. 
In strategic management, the literature ranges from philosophical 
and methodological issues, through mathematical explanations of 
market and business dynamics, to "cookbook" guidelines'for 
formulating and implementing business strategy. In IT 
manageJDent, it ranges from "classical" issues - e.g. the role and 
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organization of the information systems function; the planning of 
application systems; the management of data as a corporate 
resource - to the "modern" issues - e.g. how IT can be applied, 
as a business technology, to the creation of competitive 
advantage; the part played by organizational learning in gaining 
and sustaining such advantage; company-wide "systems 
architecture". 
The literature search for the present study was by no means 
exhaustive, yet it is clear from the list of references given in 
Appendix F that a fair amount of ground had to be covered. A 
number of the practitioner-orientated journals in the fields of 
information systems and business strategy over the last six or 
seven years, and a number of standard textbooks, were scanned, 
but most of the material actually used was tracked through 
citations. No such IT support as Dialog or SABINET was used, nor 
was any such rigorous processing method as content analysis. 
Thus the selection of basic concepts was informal and intuitive, 
but it was steered by the argument developed in Section 2.II., 
the framework-building requirements described in Section 2.III., 
and the design principles described in Section 4.1.III. 
II. THE CHANGING FOCUS OF SYSTEMS THINKING 
As a company becomes more competitive through its use of IT, it 
grows increasingly dependent on this technology for survival and 
success. The internal processes and external relationships of 
the organization grow more complex, and IT assumes a new and 
critical significance as a core technology of the enterprise. 
The rate of innovation in this technology has become so great, 
however, that many business planning assumptions are certain to 
be invalidated before medium-term objectives, and often even 
short-term goals, can be realized. This dilemma alone makes it 
necessary to re-examine the way in which the technology is being 
managed in companies that depend on it. 
' 
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Traditionally, the role of IT has been seen to lie in the 
automation of processes, management information and decision 
support, within the organization. Systems crossing the company 
boundary have usually still had an inward-looking orientation, 
e.g. the processing of order entries, goods consigned and 
accounts receivable, and access to publicly available information 
services like Reuters and Dow-Jones. 
Within the company, applications development projects have 
usually followed the existing departmental boundaries. Where it 
is acknowledged that systems "integration" will be needed some 
time in the future, little or nothing is provided in the system 
designs to ensure that this will turn out to be feasible. 
''Unfortunately it is not often that irrleperrlently 
developed systems coalesce into larger, nicely interlock:inJ 
aggregations. It usually happens that later, after 
detennin:ing how sare things (if not everything) should have 
been tied together, a major systems overhaul or CCillplete 
redo must be undertaken to achieve meanin;Jful integration. 11 
[Blumenthal, 1969: 23] 
Traditional IT development plans have also tended to have short 
horizons, and cost/benefit evaluations have been carried out on a 
per-project basis. The piecemeal acquisition of technologies has 
resulted in unconnected "islands of automation" in many companies 
[McKenney & McFarlan, 1982]. 
In countries of the First World, where the availability of the 
requisite technological and human resources is not a fundamental 
issue, fragmented and short-term IT planning can lead to success, 
even though with some loss of efficiency. There is no question 
whatever about the continued supply of hardware and software, and 
indeed a company can sometimes take provisional action until the 
technologies it needs become available [Blauman, 1987]. 
Similarly, while complaints about the world-wide scarcity of IT 
skills have become a cliche, many companies seem able to 
:' 
Page 14 
press ahead with major, resource-intensive IT strategies in spite 
of it. The falling price/performance ratio of IT is another fact 
of First World life, as is the decline of hardware costs relative 
to other IT costs. 
In South Africa, however, thanks to international sanctions, the 
brain drain, the fall in the value of the Rand, and the political 
and social specifics that are the root cause of most of these 
problems, the cost and availability of human and IT resources are 
fundamental, strategic problems. In this country, serious effort 
has to be given to "doing it right the first time". 
) 
In these and the many other environmental pressures, IT is 
sometimes the cause of the problem, sometimes the means of 
coping, and always a source of business opportunity and threat. 
The dilemma here is that IT is at one and the same time an 
essential means for, and a critical constraint on, a South 
African company's strategy. This makes it absolutely essential 
to re-examine the way in which the technology is being managed. 
It can be argued that in conditions of such uncertainty and 
ambiguity, it is essential for management to develop some shared 
vision of an ideal operating environment, set well beyond the 
ordinary planning horizon, in which IT would be optimally applied 
in the business strategy. The ideal_~ay well be unattainable, 
but a well-communicated management belief that progress towards 
it is possible during and after the period planned for (Ackoff, 
1981: 63] provides the crucial direction and motivation needed in 
formulating and implementing effective IT capability in the 
company. The argument will be most convincing if it can be shown 
that progress can take place incrementally, i.e. in well-managed 
stages and without premature commitment of specific resources. 
If, moreover, the vision is to be truly implementable as 
effective operating capability, given the necessary time and 
'*'- resources, it must (must} be expressed in constructive terms that 
could lead to feasible implementation projects. 
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In the following Sections, traditional views of the role and 
management of IT in business are contrasted with new views that 
are now emerging. The aim is to expose some of the difficulties 
involved, firstly, in arriving at a shared vision and, secondly, 
in capturing it in an architecture for incremental 
implementation. 
A. The Traditional Perspective 
Wiseman [1985: 201-225] sketches the history of traditional 
perspectives in information systems thinking. Much of this 
thinking was based on Anthony's [1965] framework for the analysis 
of strategic planning, management control and operational control 
in business. 
"Strategic systems" were equated with the strategic planning 
level in Anthony's framework, and emphasis was shifted away from 
the automation of operational and control processes towards 
"decision support" and "management information" as the proper 
areas for strategic applications. 
Applications "portfolios" were conceived in strategically neutral 
terms, e.g. the six categories generated by the three levels of 
Anthony's framework and the two conventional application classes, 
"automating basic processes" and "satisfying information needs" 
[Wiseman, 1985: 213]. The original Nolan, Norton & Company 
framework for computer opportunity identification [Nolan, 1982: 
77-92] was an elaboration of this very simple model. 
Writers offering "a general scheme for relating systems to the· 
jobs they are really supposed to do" [Zani, 1970: 95], have 
interpreted the strategic purposes of information systems at 
various levels of generality, ranging from "support for corporate 
objectives", through "support for top m~nagement decision 
making", down to actual methods of use, such as "access to 
strategic data", or "monitoring critical costs". 
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When attempts have been made to link such levels analytically, 
e.g. the TRW Systems Group's "requirements tree" [McLean & Soden, 
1977: 128-131], the emphasis has usually been on the anaiysis of 
data and application systems, or on the problems of managing the 
information systems function. The technology per se would 
typically be confined to a brief introductory overview [for 
example, Davis and Olson, 1985], or brought in at the end of the 
discussion as a physical constraint on some supposedly optimal 
logical design [e.g. Holland, 1983]. On the other hand, when the 
technology was treated in detail the insights into its role in 
business strategy were typically sparse [e.g. Champine, 1978]. 
The impacts of IT on the organization have always been an avowed 
concern of management and employees. Concerns have been 
expressed regarding human rights and job security, user rights 
and roles in system development, "human factors" and the 
man-machine interface, and the effect of systems on personal 
efficiency and effectiveness. These are concerns for the 
individual, which have been at the core of much of the marketing 
efforts for office automation and decision support products. 
Concerns for the company as a whole have focused on the internal 
factors of the organization, and usually on only some of them at 
a time - automating or eliminating specific jobs, workgroups, 
processes and skills at the functional level, e.g. personnel, 
marketing, manufacturing; or supporting decision making in 
certain product-market segments of the organization, e.g. cash 
management accounts, commercial insurance, small goods division, 
investments management. 
Traditionally, information systems management concerns have 
revolved around three major issues: the requirements for good 
technical management, in both operations and development; the 
internal organization and staffing of the information systems 
function(s); and the appropriate location of these in the 
official organization structure. 
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There is a vast literature exploring_ the information systems 
management issues in detail at the operational, management 
control, tactical planning and functional strategy levels. 
Examples are Blumenthal (1969]; Burch & Strater (1974]; Davis & 
Olson (1984]; Inmon (1983]; International Business Machines 
[1981]; Lucas (1985]; McLean & Soden (1976]; Murray (1984]; Nolan 
[1982]. 
It is only recently that any of the above three areas of concern 
- applications, organization and IT management - have been 
specifically related to business or corporate strategy topics. 
Typical ·of this new perspective are Alloway (1987]; the Butler 
Cox Foundation Report Series; Cash, McFarlan & McKenney (1983]; 
Chorafas [1986]; Keen [1986]; Meyer & Boone [1987]; the Nolan, 
Norton & Company Technology Management Series video training 
courses [Advanced Systems Inc., 1985]; Selig [1983]; Strassman 
[1985]; Tapscott, Henderson & Greenberg [1985]; Wiseman [1985]. 
B. The New Perspective 
In this new work, there has emerged a point of view from which IT 
and an IT infrastructure are seen as matters of the company's 
strategic capability, which can and should be planned in advance 
of particular business strategies and indeed in advance of 
particular application systems and organization structures (cf. 
Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes, 1976: 71). 
In such thinking, great emphasis is placed on being clear about 
the strategic purposes of IT in the company. And, because the 
thinking takes place in advance of particular strategies and 
application requirements, it is necessary to express these 
purposes in generic terms - generic competitive strategies, 
generic organizational and data structures, generic human and 
information systems, generic decision making roles and processes. 
Wiseman [1985:6], for example, suggests a strategically 
"aggressive" generic framework for identifying systems 
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opportunities, to replace the neutral approach referred to 
above. In Wiseman's model, there are 15 categories, generated by 
three "strategic targets" - supplier, customer, competitor - and 
five •strategic thrusts" - differentiation, cost, innovation, 
growth, alliance. 
Porter & Millar [1985] and Ives and Learmonth [1984] offer two 
different but complementary generic views of a company's 
organizational structure. The former views the company or 
business unit as a chain of value activities, which can be 
analyzed in terms of their respective contributions to overall 
company performance. The latter views the customer's business as 
a resource life cycle, at many points of which the company can 
interlock its own systems to improve the customer's business 
performance, thereby securing its loyalty. Both views are 
capable of providing the link between the analysis of strategic 
purpose and the design of organizational forms and information 
systems. They could, for example, serve as the procedural goals 
and sub-goals in an information control net analysis of company 
processes [Ellis, 1983: Fig. 1]. 
Clearly, the effort to analyze and manage the company's strategic 
IT capability in these terms must entail a new understanding of 
the purposes and scope of information systems in business. 
Internally, applications requirements analysis must now take a 
macro view if not of all company processes then at least of a 
complete strategic business unit fOhmae, 1982: 144-148]. A well 
defined and practical subset of human systems and associated 
information systems must become the unit of business systems 
analysis, so that the ways in which human jobs and computer 
processes can be better aligned to create IT capability can be 
studied. 
It is already apparent in the competitive weapon stories that 
applications are being designed and installed with fundamental 
impacts on the company's productivity, flexibility and 
competitiveness [McFarlan, 1984; Porter & Millar, 1985]. 
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Externally, a macro view of business systems analysis encompasses 
entire organizations, to be planned for as inter-communicating 
wholes. Networks are being implemented that transcend company 
boundaries (Cash & Konsynski, 1985] and are capable of 
"dis-intermediating" entire business sectors (cymbala, 1986]. 
All of this requires a much broader view than is traditional of 
the role and responsibility of the information systems function. 
The information systems management issues referred to above 
remain, and indeed become more critical, but the emphasis now 
shifts to the reformulation and regrouping of information systems 
functions, and to their redistribution throughout the 
organization. 
Redistribution may mean centralization or decentralization, 
depending on the circumstances (see, for example, Ein-Dor & Segev 
(1982]; Olson & Chervany (1980]; Zmud [1984]). In the Framework 
developed in Chapter 4, IT support functions are treated 
generically, and the IT organization structure realized in 
practice will be a means, not an objective, of IT strategy. 
Sometimes, it is found in practice, the information systems 
department can be structured as a strategic business unit in its 
own right (see, for example, the cases of British Leyland 
[Kransdorff, 1982], Boeing [Rifkin, 1986], and Morgan Stanley 
[Cook R., 1986]). Such units will have internal transfer pricing 
arrangements of varying degrees of complexity, and 
infrastructures capable of selling their services in the open 
market. 
Conceptualizing systems opportunities and their management in 
this new perspective brings the analysis of external and internal 
environmental forces, and their impacts on company strategies, . 
structures and processes, squarely into the purview of strategic 
IT decision making. IT planners move significantly beyond their 
former preoccupation with the technical issues and closer to the 
world of corporate planning. This shift in perspective presents 
a particularly strong challenge to South African decision makers 
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to widen their frames of reference to include a synthesis of 
business and IT environmental issues [cf. Anderson, 1985]. 
World-wide Political and Economic Forces: The increasing 
isolation of South Africa from the world community, and the 
performance of its mixed First World/Third World economy, 
hold crucial implications for both business and IT 
planning. 
Global Competition: Shifts in international competitive 
positions hold opportunities for expanding the geographical 
scope of South African companies' markets (e.g. through 
data communications technology), as well as threats (e.g. 
the U.S.A. bringing pressure to bear on Japan to stop its 
indirect supply of IT to South Africa through Germany and 
other countries). 
Structural Changes in the National Economy: Deregulation 
and privatization of Post Office and other Government 
monopolies have obvious implications for IT strategy. 
Also, the ability of the country to create and maintain an 
indigenous IT industry is affected both by world-wide 
forces (e.g. the supply of base technology) and national 
political and economic structures (e.g. the effect of 
Government policy on the location and viability of the new 
industries). 
Production Economics: Changes in the costs of IT relative 
to other resources (up in South Africa, down in other 
countries) affect the viability of proposed IT 
applications, and add economic force to the moral question 
of what constitutes appropriate automation in a country 
with South Africa's demographics. On the other hand, new 
processes, products, life cycles, and markets are made 
feasible by new levels of functionality and capacity in 
IT. This could in turn lead to the creation of jobs, 
possibly by making businesses viable on a much smaller 
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scale than was conventionally thought necessary [cf • 
.'. 
Schumacher, 1974: Ch. 5]. This is a crucial issue for 
South African decision makers, and it requires levels of 
insight and intention that are by no means widely 
distributed in the population. 
Thus the new perspectives on IT management open up vast new 
ranges of opportunities and threats that IT decision makers can 
and should consider, as the technology permeates the company's 
internal processes and external relationships. In South Africa 
especially, great management vision is necessary and great effort 
is justified in achieving consensus and commitment to it. It is 
only being realistic to suggest that the vision should be 
formulated in precise and practical terms, as a common ideal 
towards which all IT decision makers can work. 
To do this, IT decision makers need a frame of reference that 
treats the development of an IT infrastructure as a matter of 
strategic capability to be managed well ahead of particular 
business strategies, and which places strategic IT decision 
making firmly into the context of the company's ordinary business 
planning processes 
III. THE NATURE OF THE FRAMEWORK 
Conceptual "models" and "frameworks" are both simplified 
representations of situations in the real world, but they have 
different purposes. 
The main purposes for which conceptual models are built are 
analysis and prediction [Koutsoyiannis, 1983: 3]. In analytical 
models, a set of assumptions is used to derive "laws" that 
describe and explain "with an adequate degree of generality" the 
attributes of and relationships among the entities modeled. 
Predictive models aim at forecasting the consequences of changes 
in the attributes and relationships of the entities modeled. In 
both kinds of model, definitions and derivations are logically 
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rigorous, are often formulated in mathematical terms, and are 
always based on considerable prior understanding of the situation 
being modeled. 
A framework, on the other hand, is a more informal guide to 
thinking. It is aimed at bringing some sort of conceptual 
structure to problem definition, i.e. at creating the prior 
understanding that is needed before formal analytical or 
predictive modeling, or any other solution process, can begin. 
While the logic of a framework must be sound, its ability to 
spark creative thinking and to get people from different 
backgrounds talking on the same wavelength is far more important 
than its mathematical rigour. Its output is not theorems or 
predictions, but the insight and mutual understanding that 
clarify complex problems and prompt productive activity towards 
consistent, sustainable solutions. 
"Or to say it another way, you can catch phet"lCmma in a 
logical box or in a mathematical box. '!he logical box is 
~.but strong. '!he mathematical box is fine grained 
~- ~imsy. '!he mathematical box is a beautiful way of 
wrapping up a problem, but it will not hold the phenomena 
mll.ess they have been caught in a logical box to begin 
with." [Platt, 1964] 
Two broad classes of framework aim at clarifying the problems of 
strategic IT planning: 
Analytical Frameworks: These help in breaking down the 
detail of a specific problem area. Well-known examples 
are "Business Systems Planning" (BSP) (International 
Business Machines, 1984], for identifying IT application 
areas and company data structures, and Nolan's "stages 
theory" [Nolan, 1982: 6] for bench-marking the company's 
stage of development in IT decision making. 
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Dialectical Frameworks: These help in assembling and 
synthesizing several problem areas in an effort towards 
some sort of holistic solution. Dialectical frameworks are 
as much concerned with problem solving process as with 
problem content, with assumptions and opinions as with data 
and facts. With regard to problem content, examples of 
these frameworks are the "B+OL+D" methodology for 
developing the "corporate-wide information technology 
environment" [Benjamin, Seminar E-01], and Nolan, Norton & 
Company's "computer architecture strategic planning" 
[Advanced Systems Inc., 1985: Course 5055]. With regard to 
process, examples are the Delphi and nominal group 
techniques (Delbecq, Van de Ven & Gustafson, 1975] and the 
technique of dialectical enquiry (Mason & Mitroff, 1981: 
Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979]. 
Ch~pter 4 presents a dialectical, conceptual Framework aimed at 
sorting and clarifying the problems of strategic IT decision 
making, and at exposing linkages between assumptions and data, 
and between one problem and another. 
IV. THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES 
The structure of the Framework relies heavily on the following 
sources: 
For fundamental concepts of company-wide information and 
information technology manage~ent: IBM's "enterprise-wide 
information management (EwiM)" (Benson & Parker, 1985: 
1986]: the Tapscott, Henderson & Greenberg (1985] 
.. strategic framework for integrated office systems". 
For the notion of systems architecture as a vehicle for 
business strategy: Nolan, Norton & company's "computer 
architecture strategic planning" [Advanced Systems Inc., 
1985: Courses 3947 and 5055]]. 
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For the technical constructs of IT architecture and the IT 
support organization: the "B+OL+D" methodology [Benjamin, 
Seminar E-01]. 
For competitive strategy as a framework in which to analyze 
the purposes of IT in business: Porter's concepts of 
"competitive forces", "generic strategies" and "competitive 
advantage" [Porter, 1980; 1985; Porter & Millar, 1985]. 
For systems-orientated views of company organization 
structure as the link between competitive strategy (IT 
purposes) and human/information systems planning (IT uses): 
Porter's concept of the "value chain" [Porter·, 1985; Porter 
& Millar, 1985]; Ives & Learmonth's concept of the 
"customer resource life cycle" [Ives & Learmonth, 1984]; 
the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center concept of "information 
control nets" [Ellis, 1979, 1983; Ellis & Nutt, 1979]. 
For practical applications of contingency theory in 
strategic IT decision making: McFarlan's "strategic grid" 
[McFarlan, McKenney & Pyburn, 1983], and "portfolio risk 
model" [McFarlan, 1982]. 
For the organizational development (OD) framework within 
which to manage the long-term, company-wide transitions 
entailed in implementing IT strategy: Beckhard & Harris' 
[1977] application of OD principles to the change 
management process in large, institutional systems. 
For practical models of organizational IT learning: Nolan, 
Norton & Company's "stages theory" of IT development 
[Advanced Systems Inc., 1985: Courses 5050 and 5051; Nolan, 
1982: Ch. 2]; McKenney & McFarlan's "technology 
assimilation model" [Cash & McCleod, 1985; McKenney & 
McFarlan, 1982]. 
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The philosophical underpinnings of the framework owe debts to: 
Ackoff [1981]: the notions of "interactive planning" and 
"idealized design", which are the main justifications of 
the "target environment" concept. 
Argyris [1977]; Argyris & Schon [1978]: the concepts of 
"single-loop", "double-loop" and "second-order" learning, 
which allow the organizational dialectic between the 
business and IT domains to be structured in such a way that 
incremental implementation of a target environment becomes 
a feasible proposition. 
Benjamin [Seminar E-01]: the "external" and "internal" 
views, and the "meta-", "macro-" and "micro-" levels, of 
systems architecture, which in this Study are used to 
define the "levels of discourse" that make the concepts of 
incremental implementation and organizational IT learning 
practical propositions. 
Benson & Parker [1985]: the recognition that there are 
distinct business and IT decision making "domains" in the 
company, on the particular strengths of which an 
organizational dialectic and a participative decision 
making process can be built; also, the distinction between 
"impact" and "alignment" IT strategies, which isa crucial 
consideration in IT positioning. 
Bower [1982(1); 1982(2)]: problem solving and boundary 
setting as the essence of business policy, to which there 
is the corollary that IT architecture and IT positioning 
are the essence of IT strategy. 
Etzioni [1967]: the synthesis of rationalist-comprehensive 
and incrementalist modes of strategic thinking, which makes 
the concepts of target environment and incremental 
implementation consistent, and plausible to a wider range 
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of planners than either on its own would be. 
Mackenzie [1986]: the concept of organizational 
I 
congruency, which provides the focus for a dialectical 
enquiry into the purposes and uses of IT in business 
strategy. 
Mason & Mitroff (1981]; Mitroff & Emshoff (1979]: 
resolving conflicts between current company mission and 
desirable IT opportunities through dialectical thinking. 
Wiseman [1985: Appendix B]: the fundamental distinction 
between the "functions" and "uses" of information systems, 
which leads to the more general distinction between "uses" 
and "purposes" of IT, and hence to a simple and practical 
way of linking IT applications to competitive strategy -
the "strategic option generator". 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the sources listed in the preceding Section, 
that a dialectical Framework aimed at linking fundamental issues 
in.a new perspective of IT strategy will contain much that is 
unfamiliar to current management thinking. 
It is also clear that the assumptions and experience underlying 
most of the available literature refers to other countries. Some 
of these may not apply in South Africa. There are also 
significant issue~ in South Africa that arise only marginally in 
this literature, in some such context as "multinational planning" 








THE FIELD STUDY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The four objectives of the Study are stated in Section l.III. 
The field study was aimed specifically at the second objective: 
B. To establish whether and how successfully South African 
companies can be said to manage IT strategically, and what 
is needed to improve the quality of their strategic IT 
decision making. 
Some of the problems of field research into the business use of 
IT are discussed in Section 3.II., and an explanation is given as 
to why an opinion survey is deemed an to be an acceptable 
approach in the present study. 
Section 3.III. provides an explanation of the survey 
questionnaire itself, and.a discussion of the results presented 
in the Tables (Appendix G) • 
Section 3.IV. concludes the Chapter with the implications of 
these results for objectives c. and D. of the Study, to which 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively are devoted. 
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II. FIELD RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND STRATEGY 
A. The Problems 
Research into business practices that is based solely on 
attitudes - opinions, beliefs and perceptions, espoused theories, 
avowed assumptions - cannot be enough to determine what is 
actually being done and what is still needed in strategic IT 
decision making. 
At best, the attitudes expressed will represent sincere beliefs 
about IT and its importance in a company's business strategy. At 
worst, they will reflect wrong or wishful thinking. Whatever the 
case, the researcher still needs to get to the realities, such as 
the application development plans the company actually has in 
progress, the financial and human resources it has actually 
committed to IT, and the operational success of systems already 
installed. 
"People have theories that they use to plan ani cany out 
their actions. • . • Yet we fourrl that few people are aware 
that they do not use the theories they explicitly espouse, 
arrl few are aware of those they do use." [Argyris, 1977: 
119] 0 
Often, the researcher will not have access to the relevant data 
of the installation. For example, estimates of project cost, 
benefit and risk are frequently not recorded or not made at all. 
Similarly, much of the data needed to evaluate how effectively an 
operational system or service is responding to the hopes the 
company had for it exists in computer operational records, which 
may not be retained for very long and, while they are retained, 
may be confidential. 
Even if all the necessary hard data were available, research into 
strategic IT decision making support would still be confronted by 
two major problems: the first relates to quantification and the 
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second to feasibility. 
Some strategic IT decisions can be quantified, e.g. the expected 
impact of a proposed system on turnover, costs, margin, market 
share, and other measures of corporate success. Others cannot 
be, e.g. whether the proposed system will entail a shift in 
company mission or operating philosophy, or whether one approach 
to participative IT decision making would be better suited to the 
corporate culture than another. 
Some strategic IT decisions are believed to be quantifiable, but 
either no metric has yet been generally agreed, e.g. the overall 
productivity of the IT function, or the underlying concepts are 
not yet clear enough to facilitate measurement and analysis, e.g. 
a complete cost, benefit and risk characterization of one 
information system or service relative to another. 
The problem of feasibility arises out of the fact that, ideally, 
useful hypotheses about effective IT decision making support 
would be tested in either of two ways. Firstly, a longitudinal 
study can be undertaken of IT decisions actually made, in many 
companies, over a number of years, both before the support system 
was introduced and after. An attempt may then be made to 
evaluate the improvement, if any, in decision success rate due to 
the introduction of the system. Alternatively, a cross-sectional 
study can be made of current IT decision making activity, with 
one group of companies using the support system and another not 
using it. The improvements in decision making behaviours and 
processes attributable to the system may then be evaluated. 
In either case there is the practical problem of separating the 
effects attributable to the system from the host of extraneous 
factors among which they will be mixed. It would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to design a satisfactory control 
into a company-wide IT decision making experiment. The 
credibility problems described by Van Maanen [1979] will also 
arise - i.e. the difficulty of separating fact from fiction in 
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what is observed and interpreted in organizational behaviour, and 
of decidin~which fictions in organizational attitudes are indeed 
facts relevant to the research. It will be seen in Chapter 4. 
that the decision making Framework itself is vitally concerned 
with the role of assumptions and beliefs in strategic IT decision 
making. 
Clearly, neither of the ideal research approaches is feasible 
within the practical constraints of the present Study. In fact, 
McFarlan [1985: 317-320] shows that, in general, University 
research programs in strategic IT decision making are likely to 
make slow progress. Firstly, there are not many 
multi-disciplinary research programs covering both the business 
and the IT domains. Secondly, qualitative, multi-year, 
multi-person research into "messy" problems is unpopular. 
Thirdly, it is difficult and expensive to sustain co-operation 
between business firms and faculty members over lengthy periods. 
Finally, since the rate of change in IT is so rapid, the research 
subject itself presents a "moving target". 
In spite of these difficulties, a number of things can usefully 
be accomplished in a limited Study, and these are described in 
the following Section. 
B. The Strategy 
1. Theoretical Work 
It is possible to build a dialectical, conceptual Framework to 
support strategic IT decision making based on information 
obtained from a fairly limited number of sources (e.g. the 
literature, consultants, practitioners). The effort goes more 
into the logical sorting and inter-linking of problems and 
techniques which, taken separately, are already known to exist, 
than into the discovery of new information and particular 
solutions. 
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"Estimati.rg (variances] on J:elatiooships that have been 
reoognized to be true sirx:le biblical times is not a 
contribution • • • But identifyi.rg new problems arx:l 
describi.rg them in an onierly way provides a c:hanoe for the 
whole field to DKWe fo:tward. I..al:ge sanples are not 
needed. '!he Hawthorne experiment involved one small group 
of wanen.•• [Baoler, 1982(2): 637] 
Kennedy [1979] gives guidelines for ensuring valid generalization 
of research conclusions when only one case, or a small number, 
has been studied. In such studies, the conclusions refer to a 
population believed to be 11sufficiently similar11 to the sample, 
not necessarily one just like it. The actual extent of the 
population cannot be known to the researcher, but there is ample 
precedent in the legal and clinical fields for leaving users to 
judge whether or not their cases belong to it. The researcher 
provides sufficient supporting information to enable the user to 
make that judgment. The generalization is from case to case, 
rather than from case to population. 
The Framework presented in this Study is generic in that it is 
meant to be useful in a variety of companies, through the process 
defined as 11 customization11 • It is left to potential users (i.e. 
those responsible for designing the IT decision making processes 
in their companies) to make two important judgments, based on the 
conceptual description of the Framework given in Chapter 4: 
whether it can usefully be customized for their companies, and 
whether the expected advantages to be gained by using it justify 
the effort and expense of implementing it. 
Supporting information to enable users to make these judgments is 
provided in several forms: the references to the literature in 
Chapter 2; the design principles described in Section 4.1.III.; 
and the response profiles discussed in Section 3.III.C.1. 
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2. Validation 
To make the theoretical effort worthwhile, it has to be 
determined that a reasonable number of users will in fact make 
the evaluation judgement in favour of using the Framework. 
Stated another way, the framework has to be designed so that it 
will satisfy the known needs of a reasonable number of users. 
From either point of view, the problem can be interpreted as one 
of marketing research, for which an opinion survey is a generally 
accepted modus operandi. 
"Attitude measures can be used to help learn Widl 
features of a new product concept are acx::lept:able or 
una.cx::lept:able, as well as the perceived strengths am 
weaknesses of conpetitive altel:natives. Insights can be 
gained into the process by Widl dloioe decisions are 
made: What altel:natives are knc::Mn am considered? Why are 
sate rejected? What problems are encountered with the 
products or services that are used?" [Aaker & ray, 1983: 
205]. 
•. 
In the context of this study, the "new product" is the proposed 
decision making Framework, and the "competitive alternative" is 
whatever the respondent's company currently uses in strategic IT 
decision making. 
It then follows from objectives B and D that the opinion survey 
should be aimed at finding out: 
What South African managers believe their companies are 
currently doing to manage the strategic IT decision making 
process. 
Whether they believe their companies are doing it 
successfully. 
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What more they believe the company should be doing, and 
what decision making support they require. 
Bow South African circumstances differ from what is 
portrayed in the overseas literature. 
What generic concepts, processes, techniques and tools 
should be included in the proposed decision making 
Framework to satisfy a reasonable range of requirements. 
Bow likely it is that the Framework will be judged 
potentially useful and worth the effort, and whether there 
are any factors that can be followed up to improve its 
"genericness". 
III. THE OPINION SURVEY 
This Section describes the opinion survey that was carried out to 
meet the above aims. 
A. The Population Surveyed 
In November, 1987, the Computer Users Council of South Africa had 
'124 member organizations ("computer users"), classified as 
follows: 
Class A: 50 data processing employees or more. 
Class B: 10 to 49 data processing employees. 
Class C: Less than 10 data processing employees. 
Class ~: Educational organizations, e.g. Universities, 
Technikons, private training establishments. 
Selected Class A, B and c members, as shown in Appendix A, were 
polled. These are all profit seeking companies, as explained in 
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the Limitations (Section 1.IV.). The survey questionnaire and 
its covering letter are shown in Appendix B. In each company, 
the opinions of three Types of respondent were obtained: ·· · 
~ A: A business executive not involved in strategic IT 
decision making. 
~ ~= A business executive involved in strategic IT 
decision making. 
~ c: An IT executive involved in strategic IT decision 
making. 
Types B and c are close to the interface between business and IT 
decision making referred to in the Background to the Study 
(Section 1.I.), and thus the opinions come from either side of 
the interface. The opinions of Type A respondents were obtained 
as a control on Type B, to see whether and to what extent changes 
in business opinions are associated with close IT contact. 
The range of opinions obtained is therefore not symmetric - it 
does not include the views of IT professionals who are not 
involved in strategic IT decision making. It was felt that, in 
the nature of the profession, these views were likely to be too 
technical and too distant from the business/IT interface to be 
directly usable in the present, limited Study. 
B. The Design of the Questionnaire 
Question 1 identifies the "Type" of manager responding - "A", 
"B", or "C" - as defined in Section J.III.A. 
Questions 2 to 11 ask for company data. The results are 
presented in Tables 1 to 5. Because of the very uneven distri-
bution of responses by industry (see Table 1), there was not much 
point in using the answers to Question 4. Questions 10 and 11 
were also not used, because many respondents left them blank. 
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Questions 12 to 27 ask for objective characteristics of the 
internal planning environment of the company. Responses were 
requested from Types B and c because it was deemed prudent to 
compare perceptions of "reality" from both sides of the 
business/IT interface. Since Type A respondents were unlikely to 
be familiar with the issues raised, they were not asked these 
questions. The results are presented in Table 6. 
Questions 28 to 61 ask for opinions about the importance of a 
variety of topical IT planning issues, and how the company is 
perceived to be managing them. The questions are based partly on 
the five Components of the theoretical Framework, and partly on 
the results of a Delphi survey of IS executives and corporate 
general managers conducted by the MIS Research Center of the 
University of Minnesota [Brancheau & Wetherbe, 1987]. All three 
Types of respondent were asked to reply, and the results are 
given in Tables 7 and 8. A comparison of the South African and 
American ratings is given in Table 9. 
Questions 62 to 75 seek respondents• opinions regarding the 
important elements in making sound strategic IT decisions, while 
Questions 76 to 91 ask for opinions regarding the quality of the 
• actual IT decision making in their companies. The questions are 
based partly on the five Components of the Framework, and partly 
on McFarlan's "Strategic IS Grid" [Cash, McFarlan & McKenney, 
1983: 216-222]. All three Types of respondent were asked to 
reply. The results are presented in Tables 10 and 11. 
Questions 92 to 107 seek respondents• perceptions of 
participative IT decision making in their companies, and of the 
relative centralization or decentralization of IT management 
responsibilities. The questions are based partly on the five 
Components of the Framework, and partly on Buchanan & Linowes• 
[1980] "IS responsibility spectra". Since Type A respondents 
were unlikely to to be familiar with the issues raised, they were 
not asked these questions. The results are given in Table 12. 
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Questions 108 to 142 are aimed at finding out what IT decision 
making tools and techniques are known andjor used in the 
respondents' companies. Only the Type B and c respondents are 
strictly relevant, but the questions were also asked of Type A 
respondents to see how widely it may be known that there are 
indeed tools and techniques in this area of company decision 
making. The results are given in Table 13. 
Questions 143 to 154 ask for opinions on how successful the 
respondents believe their companies to be in managing IT 
strategically, according to criteria that are, at least in 
principle, quantifiable. The opinions of all three Types of 
respondent were sought. The results are given in Table 14. 
Questions 155 to 173 ask what the respondents believe the 
purposes of IT to be in the business strategies of their 
companies, and how well they think their companies are exploiting 
IT in these ways. The opinions of all three Types of respondent 
were sought. The results are given in Table 15. 
Questions 174 to 180 are related to Questions 155 to 173, and aim 
at finding out which uses of IT in organizational design the 
respondents believe to be congruent with the different kinds of 
competitive strategy. The questions are about as far as one can 
go without asking respondents to reveal specific company 
strategies. Because of the technical nature of the questions, 
only Types B and c respondents were asked to reply. The results 
are given in Table 16. 
Questions 181 to 184 are administrative and were asked of all 
respondents. 
Questions 185 to 188 were intended as additional clues to the 
effort that would be needed to market the concepts of the 
Framework in South African practice. All respondents were asked 
to reply. The results are given in Table 17. 
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C. Discussion of the Responses 
1. General Principles 
There is no reliable evidence to indicate what proportion of all 
South Afric~n computer installations and employees the cue 
membership represents, but the Council believes it covers about 
75% of employees and almost all major sites. In any case, the 
responses received (see Table 1) are clearly not a representative 
sample of even just the cue membership. For this reason, the set 
of responses will be referred.to as the "pool" rather than the 
sample. Inferences beyond the pool have to be made on a 
case-by-case basis, in the manner suggested by Kennedy (Section 
3.II.B.1.). 
Moreover, there are manifestly too few data points to justify the 
use of sophisticated data analysis techniques based on the 
analysis of variances. The discussion of the responses relies, 
therefore, only on elementary comparisons of averages and 
percentages. 
Questions 28 to 57 and 155 to 171 include a 1-to-10 rating of 
importance or likelihood. Only ratings of 5 or higher are 
discussed, which is consistent with the instructions given for 
responding to these questions. 
Questions dealing with how well the respondent believes the 
company copes with an issue are based on a 5-point "very 
poorjvery good" scale of -2 to +2, labeled according to the sense 
of the questions concerned. The responses received are 
summarized in the corresponding tables as percentage 
distr1butions over the 5-point scales. A mainly negative or 
mainly positive distribution is regarded as indicating a 
genera1ly held opinion or perception: more than half of the 
responses positive or negative is regarded as a weak indication, 
and more than two-thirds positive or negative as a strong 
indication. 
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With regard to the responses from an individual company, the 
absolute difference between a Type A response and a Type C 
response, or between a Type B response and a Type C response, 
ranges from 0 to 4. An absolute difference greater than 1 is 
regarded as indicating a noteworthy difference of opinion between 
the IT person and the business person concerned, since this 
implies either that the one is positive while the other is 
negative, or that the one is strongly positive or negative while 
the other is at most neutral. Since a full set of Type A, B and 
C responses was not received Lrom each company, it was not 
practical to calculate a consistent set of percentages of 
companies reflecting "large differences of opinion" per 
question. Instead, an arbitrary cut-off point of 5 bas been 
used, i.e. any question in which more than 5 of the 20-odd 
available respondent pairs show differences greater than 1 calls 
for comment. 
2. Response Profiles 
Ignoring the outrider with 200 000 employees, it will be seen 
from Tables 1 and 2 that the pool of respondents is dominated by 
Finance and Class A (large) companies. The Industry sector is 
the catch-all for companies that did not fall into any of the 
other categories, and its response rate is very low relative to 
Finance. One may wonder why this disparity should be, bearing in 
mind that these are all members of the cue with an avowed 
interest in the strategic issues of IT. Part of the reason may 
be a lower estimation of the importance of IT in Industry than in 
Finance, and possibly less patience with tedious "theoretical" 
exercises. It is interesting to note that two of the six 
industrial companies that did respond are motor car companies 
with a Japanese background, both highly competitive on a global 
scale, and with very strategy-minded managements. No responses 
at all were received from the mines. 
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It was felt that the only way to get reliable explanations for 
non-response would be personal contact, but this step was beyond 
the resources of the Study. 
In spite of the sparseness of Table J, it can be seen that, while 
the dominant company organization in the pool is Multiple 
Business Units, the dominant IT organization is Single Unit. 
Where decentralization does exist, it is more often operations 
than development that is decentralized. (The single respondent 
in column D reported centralized operations and systems analysis, 
with decentralized business analysis.) Hence, in this pool, 
strategic business decision making seems to have been 
decentralized to the point where it is reflected in the official 
organization structures, while strategic IT decision making 
retains a centralized focus. 
Excluding the two outriders, Table 4 shows that there is wide 
variation in the ratio of Total Employees per IT Employee. 
Because the pool is so small it is difficult to draw any general 
conclusions from this, except to note that the ratio does vary 
somewhat with size of company. With a bigger pool, it may be 
possible to investigate the presence of such factors as the 
minimum viable size of an IT installation, and economies of scale 
and scope. There is also wide variation in the ratio of 
Development Employees per Operations Employee. Again, with more 
data it may be possible to investigate how this ratio varies 
according to the strategic importance of IT. 
Table 5 shows a similar picture of wide variation in these 
ratios, according to business sector. With a bigger pool, it may 
be possible to explore how the above factors - minimum viable 
size, economies of scale and scope, and relative availability of 
development employees - are related to the kinds and variety of 
applications that are likely to arise in the different 
industries. One might, for example, expect that the ratio of 
Development Employees per Operations Employee would be higher in 
the Financial sector because of its supposedly higher strategic 
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dependence on new applications, but no such inference can be 
drawn from the present data. 
While the spread of companies and industries represented in 
Tables 1 to 5 is smaller than one would wish, nevertheless a 
fairly wide range of volumes and ratios is displayed. This 
should permit many potential users of the Framework to judge 
their companies "sufficiently similar" to the pool so that they 
may meaningfully compare their own opinions with those reflected 
in the other Tables. There is, of course, a strong bias towards 
centralized IT in the pool. It should be noted, however, that 
although the Framework specifically advocates company-wide 
participation in IT decision making, it makes no assumptions 
regarding the official IT organization structure. There is no 
empirical evidence to indicate whether participative decision 
making is easier or harder to achieve when IT is centralized, and 
an a priori case for either view could be argued. 
3. The Internal Planning Environment 
Table 6 shows the number and percentage of respondents in the 
Business and the IT domains who state that the listed planning 
elements exist in their companies, and the number of responses 
(out of 21) where the replies differ. 
The number of differences is remarkable - in the first place, the 
listed factors are all observable phenomena which are not usually 
subject to interpretation: in the second place, the respondents 
are all Types B and c in companies where IT is predominantly 
centralized, i.e. they presumably work together in a single forum 
of strategic IT decision making. Inspection of the underlying 
data reveals that nearly a third of the 21 pairs of respondents 
differ on more than 5 of the 16 items. 
The occurrence of these differences cannot be associated with 
business sector or organization structure, on the basis of the 
available data. For example, 48 of the 84 differences occur in 
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the Finance sector, which is not inconsistent with the distri-
bution of responses shown in Table 2. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that there are significant communication gaps between business 
and IT decision makers in this pool. They occur on a scale that 
indicates a market in need of a decision making Framework that 
promotes better management of assumptions and data. 
The high rates of Yes responses to "Formal corporate planning 
exists" (Question 12), "IT decision making process exists" 
(Question 13), "Corporate and IT planning interact" (Question 
14), •A documented IT strategy exists" (Question 21) and "Senior 
IT steering committee exists (Question 22) suggest that many 
companies in this market are already attempting to put some 
structure into their strategic problem solving activity, both 
corporate and IT. Interestingly, more business respondents than 
IT respondents believe that an "IT decision making process 
exists" (Question 13). 
It should be noticed, on the other hand, that where the Yes rate 
is lowest- "IT costs cycle exceeds 1 year" (Question 15), "IT 
strategic benefit is measured" (Question 16), "Operations costs 
are charged back" (Question 19), "IT liaison posts exist" 
(Question 23), IT R&D/technology posts exist" (Question 24) and 
"Business analysts/IT O&M posts exist" (Question 25) - the number 
of differences is high, except for (Question 15), so that it is 
doubtful whether these elements exist even to the extent 
indicated. Yet these are just the elements one would expect to 
find in place in companies with well developed strategic IT 
decision making processes - a firm grasp on measurements at the 
aggregate level, sophisticated communication mechanisms, and a 
tight linking of information systems and organizational 
processes. These observations suggest three further decision 
making needs: help in identifying and quantifying those elements 
of IT strategy that are in fact measurable, help in structuring 
and inter-linking appropriate decision making roles, and help in 
better matching information systems to the jobs and processes 
they are intended to support. 
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If, as a number of business respondents believe, "IT expenses 
grow faster than sales·" (Question 17), while few believe that "IT 
strategic benefit is measured" (Question 16), then a feature of 
the Framework that should find favour is its integration of 
Porter value chain analysis and competitive advantage 
calculations into application portfolio planning. To this end, 
companies need to give more attention to business analysis and 
IT-orientated o & M studies than the responses to "Business 
analysts/IT O&M posts exist" (Question 25) indicate. 
Finally, given the difficult South African planning environment, 
much more attention needs to be given to IT R&D and technology 
management, in the manner proposed in the Framework, than the 
responses to ''IT R&D/technology posts exist (Question 24) 
indicate. 
4. Strategic Issues Management 
Since no respondents volunteered additional issues in the space 
provided for this purpose (Questions 58 to 61), it must be· 
assumed that, for this pool, Table 7 covers all the important 
strategic IT issues. It will also be seen that most of these are 
indeed deemed by the respondents to be important - the only 
issues not rated more than 5 for importance by at least 
two-thirds of any of the three Types are: 
29 "Cooperating with CUC, CSSA''. 
30 "Cooperating with SAPO". 
36 "Inter-organizational systems". 
37 "Exploiting new technologies". 
47 "Buy Rather than make software". 
It is important to realize that, besides "Disaster and security 
plans" (Question 28) and "Vendor relations and supply" (Question 
31), these are precisely the areas in which one would expect 
outward-looking decision makers intent on managing their 
company's IT planning environment to be actively engaged. It 
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should also be noted that, while "Shorter application lead-time" 
(Question 39) is rated more than 5 for importance by the majority 
of all three Types of respondent, an important means of achieving 
this, viz. "Developing IT infrastructure" (Question 38), is rated 
this important by barely two-thirds of the IT respondents and 
only half the business respondents. One may conclude that in 
many companies a fair degree of education and marketing will be 
required before the principles of interactive planning and 
idealized design advocated in the Framework (Section 4.1.III.) 
will be understood and accepted. This in turn should help 
managers grasp the idea of a target environment architecture as a 
basis of IT strategy, which the Framework also advocates. 
Two-thirds or more of the IT respondents give importance ratings 
of more than 5 to all the issues except the 5 listed above, and 
there are only two items where significantly less than two-thirds 
of either of the business Types concurred. The first is 
"Developing IT infrastructure" (Question 38), which has already 
been referred to, and the second is "Reduced paper handling" 
(Question 43) where, surprisingly, far fewer Type B respondents 
than Type A respondents seem to feel strongly about the 
importance of the issue. 
In general, it can be concluded that in this pool the business 
and IT respondents are reasonably in accord as to what the 
important strategic IT issues are. 
With re~ar<:'l __ ~o ho~ well the issues are believed_!._o_~e be managed, 
a strong bias to~~~ right is evident in most of the percentage 
---~-· - -. - -- - •• - - - - & - ~ --- -- --
distributions of the Poorly/Well scales. The only issues where 
-
appreciably less than two-thirds of relevant respondents (i.e. 
those rating the importance of the issue more than 5 for 




-~·~~asuring the IT contribution"1 
"Exploiting new technologies" 
"Developing IT infrastructure" 
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39 "Shorter application lead time" 
42 "Organization adapted to IT" 
43 "Reduced paper handling" 
47 "Buy rather than make software" 
48 "Managing IT human resources" 
49 "Project costjbenefitjrisk" 
50 "Measuring IT effectiveness" 
51 "Include IT in business plans" 
53 "Controlling overall IT costs". 
Questions 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 47 and 48 are related to the 
creation of organizational capability through IT. Negative 
scores may indicate a need for better understanding of what a 
"strategic business system" (as defined in Section 4.3.III.B.l.) 
entails for companies hoping to develop distinctive strategic 
competence based on IT. 
With regard to Question 37, none of the distributions shows a 
strong bias one way or the other. This result, considered 
together with the relatively low percentage of respondents who 
rate the issue more than 5 for importance, suggests that many 
companies in the pool may not yet have developed a vigorously 
entrepreneurial attitude to the opportunities offered by IT. 
This impression is confirmed in Table 10, by the high rates of 
disagreement with "IT can alter company objectives" (Question 68) 
and "Exploit any feasible IT opportunity" (Question 75). 
Questions 33, 50, 51 and 53 refer to way the company takes IT and 
its quantifiable benefits into account in its business plans. 
Negative scores may indicate a need for better understanding of 
the potential impact of IT on the business strategy and the ways 
in which this can be measured. 
It appears, on the whole, that in this pool the.business and IT 
· respondents are reasonably in accord, not only as to what the 
important issues are in strategic IT decision making, but also as 
to how well (or poorly) they believe the issues are being managed 
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in their companies. Inspection of the underlying data reveals 
very few issues where the absolute difference of opinion between 
a business respondent and the IT respondent in the same company 
is greater than 1. The only issues where more than 5 of the 
responding companies show such large differences are: 
~~-
33 "Measuring the IT contribution" 
49 "Project cost/benefit/risk" 
50 "Mea,suring IT effectiveness". 
---------
Ranking the Strategic Issues 
Tables 8 and 9 show how the strategic issues rank in importance 
(1 is high, 30 is low) according to the respondents in the pool, 
. I 
and how these ranks compare with the results of a survey of 
senior IT executives and-corporate general managers in the U.S.A. 
" [Brancheau & Wetherbe, 19.87]. _. 
In Table 8, the ranks are assigned according to the average of 
all the importance ratings submitted (1 to 10) per issue, per 
respondent Type, and per business sector (Financial vs. Other). 
Clearly, the reasonable accord between business and IT 
perceptions that is apparent in Table 7 does not carry through to 
Table 8. The differences here are many and varied, and they 
certainly provide food for.· thought. Because of the sparseness of 
the data and the informality of the ranking process, however, it 
would be dangerous to draw far-.rea~hing conclusions from them. 
The overall impression given by Tables 7 and 8 is encouraging. 
I 
It suggests that companies wishing to adopt a more structured 
approach to IT decision making, such as that proposed in the 
Framework, need not spend very much time in identifying the 
issues, since these are already largely agreed on. They can move 
briskly on to structuring them for debate, determining their 
relative urgency and evaluating their potential impact on IT 
strategy (Section 4.2). 
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Table 9 compares the South African ranks with the American, which 
were derived from a Delphi survey that took place about two years 
earlier than the questionnaire survey of the present Study. The 
comparison is thus not strictly valid, and once again care must 
be taken in drawing conclusions. Nevertheless, two of the 
apparent differences between the American and South African ranks 
call for comment. 
Firstly, the Table indicates important differences in management 
assumptions, as between the two countries, and thus confirms the 
need for caution when studying overseas business and.IT 
literature (Section 2.V.). For example, there is no comparable 
American ranking for "MIS/decision support" or "Operational 
quality", perhaps because these are now taken for granted by the 
American respondents and hence are no longer regarded as 
strategic issues. They are still ranked very high by the South 
African respondents. 
Secondly, with two notable exceptions ("Competitive advantage" 
and "Organizational learning") the five highest South African 
ranks go to issues typical of alignment IT strategy (Section 
4.3.I.) - "Operational quality", "Security", "Data as a corporate 
resource", "Multi-vendor integration", "MIS/decision support", 
"Software development", "Human resources". It may well be that 
that these ranks reflect a conservative attitude to IT planning 
that is appropriate in the South African planning environment, 
where factors such as the availability of human skills and 
reliability of technology supply introduce far more uncertainties 
and risks into IT strategy than in, say, the U.S.A. It is 
tempting to believe that the importance many South African 
respondents seem to attach to "Competitive advantage" is tempered 
by a healthy regard for the issues of "Organizational learning", 
such as the implications of "stages of company development" for 
successful IT strategy (Section 4.6.III.). Few, however, of the 
business respondents and less than one would expect of the IT 
respondents report much familiarity with Nolan's Stages Theory 
(Question 116 in Table 13). 
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The highest American ranks largely go to the issues that are 
characteristic of impact IT strategy- "Strategic planning", 
"Competitive advantage", "Organizational learning", "IS's role 
and contribution", "Place of IS in the organization", "End-user 
computing" - while traditional items like "Office automation" and 
"Decision support" no longer rank in the first 20. 
From the above discussion, there appears to be good reason to 
believe that an appropriate Framework for strategic IT decision 
making in South Africa muss emphasize two facts: that successful 
strategy formulation depends critically on the awareness and 
competence of the decision makers, and the quality of the 
dialogue between the business and IT domains (Section 4.2.I.); 
and that successful strategy implementation depends critically on 
the planning and carrying out of feasible transition stages 
(Section 4.5.II.). 
6. Importance and Quality of IT Decision Making 
It can be seen in Table 10 that for 8 out of the 14 elements of 
strategic IT decision making shown (Questions 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 
69, 70, 74), more than two thirds of each of the three Types of 
respondent agree on the importance - very often, they strongly 
agree. Moreover, except for Question 68 and possibly Question 
67, the distributions of the business responses are very similar 
to those of the IT responses. 
Such strong agreement on "Survival depends on existing systems" 
(Question 62), "Survival depends on new systems" (Question 63) 
and "Operational planning is critical" (Question 64) suggests 
that these respondents believe their companies to be in the 
"strategic box" of McFarlan's Grid (Section 4.3.IV.A.). 
Inspection of the data underlying this Question reveals that the 
belief pervades all the business sectors listed in Table 3. This 
being so, one could perhaps have expected a greater measure of 
disagreement with "IT does not constrain company goals" (Question 
67) than the Table in fact shows. 
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It is difficult to reconcile the high rates of approval for "IT 
strategy must be long term" (Question 65) and "Build 
infrastructure before systems" (Question 70) with the relatively 
fewer responses in which "Developing IT Infrastructure" (Question 
38) is rated more than 5 for importance, as shown in Table 7. 
Possibly, as with "Organizational learning" (Table 10), 
respondents recognize the issue but are unsure about what is 
involved - hence also the considerably lesser degree of 
enthusiasm that is evident for "Base strategy on a target 
environment" (Question 71). Indeed, the responses to "Build 
infrastructure before systems" (Question 70), "Base strategy on a 
target environment" (Question 71) and "Implement IT strategy 
incrementally" (Question 72), taken together, indicate the need 
for much education and marketing before the Framework's concept 
of "directed incrementalism", on which the implementation 
strategy of a target environment architecture hinges, will be 
accepted. 
The responses to "Good business/IT dialogue is critical" 
(Question 66) and "Strategic IT decisions must be formal" 
(Question 69) indicate that many respondents already recognize 
the importance of good, formal dialogue among business and IT 
decision makers, or "good dialectic" to use the terminology of 
the framework. 
The high rates of agreement with "Base IT strategy on business 
strategy" (Question 74) and of disagreement with "Exploit any 
feasible IT opportunity" (Question 75) are not unexpected. They 
indicate the focus on alignment IT strategy discussed in the 
preceding Section and, possibly also, a level of caution in the 
difficult South African planning environment. 
The relatively high rate of disagreement with "Involve many 
people in IT decisions" (Question 73) can be interpreted in two 
ways. It could indicate a valid concern that participants in 
strategic IT decision making should be carefully chosen (Sections 
4.2.II. and 4.4.V.). On the other hand, it could indicate a 
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failure to recognize that intuitions leading to strategic IT 
opportunities can arise at any level of the organization and in 
any quarter. 
The relatively high general level of agreement among the three 
respondent Types that is evident in Table 7 does not carry 
through to Table 10. Inspection of the underlying data reveals 
that for six out of the 14 questions, there are more than 5 
companies where the absolute difference of opinion between a 
business respondent and the IT respondent in the same company is 
greater than 1- i.e. Questions 67, 68, 71, 72, 73 and 75. For 
two of these questions, the number of companies with such 
differences of opinion is remarkable: 
67 - "IT does not constrain company goals" - 12 out of the 
21 B/C pairs 
/ 
72 - "ImpleJ;~tent IT strategy incrementally" - 10 out of the 
21 B/C pairs. 
In both questions, it is most often the Type C respondent who 
disagrees with the assertion and the Type B who agrees. 
Table 11 shows the distribution.of responses to Questions 76 to 
' 91, all of which refer to the quality rather than the importance 
of strategic IT decision making in the company. These results 
should be compared with those shown in Tables 7 and 10. 
For example, as far as Types A and B are concerned the level of 
disagreement with "Little or nothing done about environmental 
risks" (Question 76) is consistent with their responses to 
"Disaster and Security Plans" (Question 28), as reflected in 
Table 7. The apparent inconsistency of the two distributions for 
Type C is noteworthy. 93% disagree with Question 76, i.e. they 
do not agree that they are doing little to cover themselves 
against environmental threats, but only 54% agree with Question 
28, i.e. that contingency plans against environmental threats are 
well managed in the company. This may be an indication that many 
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IT managers believe they are doing the best they can but are not 
getting good enough support from the business domain. If this is 
so, then careful environmental analysis performed jointly by 
business and IT decision makers, as proposed in the Context 
component of the Framework (Section 4.2) would be well justified. 
Only a third of all respondents agree with "No business direction 
to IT planning" (Question 77), while even fewer agree that "IT 
managers have a poor grasp of business" (Question 78). On the 
other hand, most respondents believe that "Few non-IT people 
understand IT" (Question 86). If these perceptions are correct, 
then there is little ground for advocating that business still 
"needs a new breed of DP man~ger". There is, on the contrary, 
good reason to believe that joint IT decision making based on 
either the "communication" or the "mutual understanding" position 
(Section 4.4.V.B.3.) has every chance of succeeding. 
It has been seen that all three Types of respondent are strongly 
in agreement with the strategic importance of both new and 
existing systems and with the criticality of good operational 
planning (Questions 62 to 64 in Table 10). Less than two thirds, 
however, agree that their operational systems meet objectives, 
and even fewer believe that their companies already have all the 
necessary systems in place (Questions 79 and 80). The concerns 
that underlie these responses may well be the reason for the high 
ranks of "Operational Quality", "MIS/Decision Support and 
"Applications Portfolio" that emerge among South African 
respondents in Table 9. 'on the other hand, it should be noted 
that very few respondents believe that their companies lag behind 
the rest of their respective business sectors (Question 87). 
There is no overwhelming tendency one way or the other in respect 
of respondents' perceptions of the goodness of fit between 
application systems and the jobs they support (Question 81), 
which is consistent with their responses to "Office/Factory 
Automation" (Question 34) and "Organization Adapted to IT 
(Question 42), as reflected in Table 7. This suggests a possible 
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need for some such unify~ng concept as the Framework's definition 
of a "strategic business system", which tightly links the 
applications portfolio to the Porter value chain (Section 
4.3.III.B.l). 
"The IT team is stable" (Question 82), "The IT managers are 
competent" (Question 83), "IT technical staff are competent" 
(Question 84) and "Few systems failures in recent years"_ 
(Question 85) all refer to the "baseline" issue - is the IT 
function of the company capable of carrying out its IT 
strategies? For the most part, respondents appear to agree that 
this is so in their companies. Not surprisingly, however, fewer 
business than IT respondents agree that the IT team is stable. 
Interestingly, while fewer business than IT respondents believe 
that the technical staff are competent, most business respondents 
believe that their companies possess the necessary skills to 
engage in inter-organizational systems (Question 88). 
The distributions of responses to "IT contribution effectively 
measured" (Question 90) are not entirely consistent with those of 
the responses to "Measuring the IT contribution" (Question 33)·, 
as reflected in Table 7. The apparent uncertainty here, as well 
as in regard to "Satisfactory investment in IT R&D" (Question 89) 
and "IT effectiveness is measured" (Question 91) may indicate a 
need for procedures and criteria with which to evaluate and 
monitor the overall IT investment (Section 4.5.IV.). The 
importance attached to this issue is indicated by the large 
percentages of ratings greater than 5 in respect of "Project 
cost/benefit/risk" (Question 49), "Measuring IT effectiveness" 
(Question 50) and "Controlling overall IT costs" (Question 53), 
as reflected in Table 7. 
Inspection of the underlying data reveals that for 11 out of the 
16 questions of Table 11, there are more than 5 companies where 
the absolute difference of opinion between a business respondent 
and the IT respondent in the same company is greater than 1 -
i.e. all questions except 82, 83, 84, 85 and 88. For no 
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question, however, are there more than 9 such companies. 
Table 12 shows respondents• views regarding the location of IT 
decision making in their companies, and there is an overall 
impression of much centralization. Remarkably, inspection of the 
underlying data reveals no significant differences between the 
distribution of responses from companies where IT organization is 
decentralized and those where its is centralized. 
Almost without exception, "Selecting mainframes 11 (Question 92), 
11Selecting mainframe software11 (Question 95) and 11 Deciding 
mainframe capacity11 (Question 103) are Very Centralized. This is 
not surprising in view of the relatively low incidence of costs 
charged back, as shown in Table 6 (Questions 18 and 19), and the 
fact that user accountability for capital expenditure is much 
rarer in practice than user responsibility for computer running 
costs. It does suggest, however, that most companies in the pool 
have some way to go before participation in formulating overall 
It strategy (Question 107) can carry with it a meaningful 
responsibility for controlling the overall level of IT expenses. 
This control requires the linking of capacity planning to 
computer cost charge-backs. The critical link is the capital 
budget (Section 4.5.III.B.), and involving more people in 
••Forecasting capacity needs 11 (Question 105) can help in 
establishing it. 
The beginnings of a trend towards decentralization is discernible 
in all the applications-related issues: ••selecting application 
packages•• (Question 96), 11 Planning the database 11 (Question 97), 
"Selecting application systems" (Question 98) and "Planning 
application systems 11 (Question 99). Once again, inspection of 
the underlying data reveals that IT organization has little to do 
with the matter - in fact the few perceptions of Very 
Decentralized that emerge do not all come from companies with a 
decentralized IT organization. 
Inspection of the underlying data of Table 12 reveals that for 6 
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out of the 15 questions there are more than 5 companies where the 
absolute difference of opinion between the business respondent 
and the IT respondent in the same company is greater than 1 -
i.e. questions 96, 98, 99, 100, 102 and 105. For no question are 
there more than 8 such companies. 
7. Decision Making Tools and Techniques 
Of the 35 tools and techniques listed in Table 13, only the 
following 14 have at least been tried by at least half of at 
least one of the respondent Types (which are indicated): 
108 Brainstorming A B c 
109 Business strategy model B c 
110 Business Systems Planning (BSP) B c 
111 Cost/benefit evaluation model B c 
112 Critical Success Factors Technique c 
/ 
113 Environmental scanning B 
114 Feasibility studies A B c 
115 . . ~ 11' A B c F1nanc1a mode 1ng 
116 Nolan Stages Theory c 
118 PERT, Critical Path, etc. A B c 
121 Project management systems A B c 
122 Service level agreements A B c 
132 Change management processes c 
142 Priority setting methods A c 
In each of the instances where Type A does not show, with the 
sole exception of cost/benefit evaluation, roughly two thirds or 
more of these respondents have either never heard of or never 
' -tried the tool or technique: Where ~ype B does not show, about 
two-thirds or more of these respondents have either never heard 
of or never tried it. Nearly 60% of the Type C respondents have 
'\ 
never heard of or never tried environmental scanning. Nolan's 
Stages Theory and Rockart's Critical Success Factors Technique 
appear to be all but unknown to the business respondents. 
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One may conclude that the range of strategic IT decision making 
tools and techniques with which respondents seem to be familiar 
is limited and consists mostly of the old and the conventional. 
The few modern techniques that do appear seem to be much less 
familiar to the business participants in decision making than to 
the IT participants. The few techniques apparently known to Type 
A respondents are not particularly IT-orientated. 
With regard to the apparently lesser known techniques, the 
following should be especially noted: 
The majority of respondents have never heard of Nominal 
Group Technique (Question 117), and almost none have tried 
it. By inference, dialectical enquiry can be assumed to be 
equally unknown. Given the popularity of brain storming 
{Question 108) and the requirement for more formality in IT 
decision making (Question 69 in Table 10), however, the 
Framework's proposal for the use of dialectical enquiry 
{Section 4.2.III.) may be marketable. 
Few respondents have heard of or tried Porter "strategic 
forces" (Question 119) or "value chain" analysis (Question 
120). Hence the Framework's adaptation of Wiseman's 
"strategic option generator" (Section 4.3.) and its 
integration of value chain analysis into application 
portfolio planning (which has already been referred to in 
the context of Questions 16 and 17) should provide 
practitioners with the fresh insights intended. There also 
appears to be little familiarity with other analytical 
approaches to application requirements definition, e.g. 
strategy set transformation (Question 123), BIAIT (Question 
128), BICS (Question 130), and Customer Resource Life Cycle 
(Question 133). Even IBM's BSP (Question 110) and South 
Africa's own Tetrarch (Question 124) appear to be less well 
known than one might have expected. The relative lack of 
familiarity with applica~ion portfolio approaches 
(Questions 127 and 141) should also be noted. 
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Techniques and approaches such as B+OL+D (Question 129), 
EwiM (Question 135) and innovation management (Question 
137), which are geared to company-wide development of IT 
capability, appear to be relatively unknown. This could be 
part of the reason why concepts like "Developing IT infra-
structure" (Question 38 in Table 7), "Base strategy on a 
target environment" (Question 71 in Table 10), and 
"Implement IT strategy incrementally" (Question 72) gain 
relatively low support. Given respondents' agreement, in 
spite of the above, that IT infrastructure is a matter of 
strategic capability that can and should be addressed 
before application systems, the Framework's advocacy of an 
incrementally implemented target environment architecture 
(Section 4.4.) may be both novel and marketable. 
Taken overall, Table 13 shows that respondents make little or no 
use of many of the tools and techniques that are specifically 
intended to help strategic IT decision making in the new 
perspectives described in Chapter 2. Part of the reason for this 
is, of course, the fact that many respondents are not yet aware 
of th~ new perspectives, as has been seen in Tables 7 to 12. 
8. The success of IT Decision Making 
Table 14 summarizes the distributions of responses relating to 
the perceived success of strategic IT decision making in the 
companies concerned. Two broad areas of success are shown, 
Decision Product (Questions 143 to 149) and Decision Making 
Process {Questions 150 to 154). 
As in Table 7, a strong bias to the right is evident in most of 
the percentag~ distributions of the PoorlyjWell.scales. 
For all Product outcomes, at least two-thirds of all respondents 
give their companies zero or positive scores. It appears, 
therefore, that most respondents are reasonably satisfied with 
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their success in achieving their IT decision making goals. The 
justifiability such widespread optimism can, of course, be 
questioned, in view of the apparent difficulty many companies 
have in measuring the benefits of their IT investments - see, for 
example, Questions 15 and 16 in Table 1, Questions 33 and 49 in 
Table 7, and Question 90 in Table 11. 
The only Process Outcomes where appreciably less than two-thirds 
of respondents give their companies zero or positive scores are 
the following: 
150 "Co-ordination/consensus" c 
151 "High quality dialogue - strategic" c 
153 "Quick response to needs" A B c 
154 "High quality dialogue - operational A B 
The overall picture in this part of the Table is one of modest 
satisfaction with the existing decision making processes, with 
indications of room for improvement in areas the Framework has 
been designed to address. Moreover, in only two questions (147 
and 154) are there more than 5 companies where the difference of 
opinion between a business respondent and the IT respondent in 
the same company is greater than 1. 
9. The Purposes and Uses of IT 
As can be seen from the response rates.in Tables 15 and 16, most 
respondents made the effort to work through an undoubtedly 
laborious section of the Questionnaire - almost all got through 
the questions relating to IT purposes (Questions 155 to 171), and 
almost as many carried on through the questions relating to IT 
uses (Questions 174 to 180). This level of perseverancecould be 
an indication of respondents' agreement that the two central 
issues of strategic IT decision making are indeed: understanding 
and agreeing the purposes of IT in company strategy; and 
understanding and agreeing the uses to which IT can be put in 
serving those purposes. Everything else in strategic IT decision 
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making is aimed either at achieving this understanding and 
agreement or at giving successful effect to them. 
Table 15 shows the average and maximum importance ratings of 
various strategic purposes, separately per respondent Type and 
per business sector. Transport has been left out in order not to 
compromise the confidentiality of the single responding company 
in this sector. The ranks are based on average scores and should 
be interpreted only as very broad indications of the perceived 
priorities, i.e. no great significance should be attached to 
ranks that differ by only a few places. The "How Exploited 
Scales" have not been analyzed in this study, since they were not 
entered with sufficient regularity for meaningful comparisons to 
be made. 
Two things can be noticed immediately: firstly, the purposes 
with the highest importance ratings (those ranked 1 to 6, say) 
are quite different in the four sectors; secondly, in Finance 
and Oil there is a large measure of agreement as to what the most 
important purposes are, which is not apparent in the other two 
sectors. 
Finance: For all three respondent Types, "Add value to our 
product" (Question 155), "Tie customers to us" (Question 
156), "Become low-cost leader" (Question 157), "Distinctive 
product/image" (Question 163), and "Organizational 
effectiveness" (Question 164) rank in the first six. For 
Types A and c, "Block existing competitors" (Question 165), 
and for Type B, "Block new entrants - complexity of 
product" (Question 167), rank in the first six, 
The high ranks simultaneously given to "Add value to our 
product", "Tie customers to us" and "Become low-cost 
leader" raise the question as to whether respondents have 
sufficiently thought through the incompatibilities of 
productjservice differentiation and price/performance 
leadership strategies, and the risk of being "stuck in the 
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middle", as Porter [1980: 41] puts it. 
Moreover, one would have expected the.high ratings of "Add 
value to product" and "Tie customers to us" to have been 
accompanied by similarly high ratings for the "Discourage 
substitutes" Questions (i.e. 169 to 171), but this emerges 
only for Type A. One must therefore wonder whether 
respondents have given sufficient thought to the changes in 
product and market boundaries that are taking place within 
the financial sector, and the implications of these for the 
strategic purposes of IT in their companies. 
Oil: Interestingly, the overall picture for Oil is not 
very different from that of Finance. The only differences 
in the six highest ranking purposes are: for Type A, 
"Block new entrants - exclusive alliances" (Question 168) 
and "Discourage substitutes - pricejperformance" (Question 
170) rank instead of Questions 156 and 165; for Type B, 
"Discourage substitutes - pricejperformance" (Question 170) 
ranks instead of Question 168. For Type c, the top six are 
the same. 
Industry: The overall picture is quite different from that 
of any other sector, and there is little consensus across 
the three respondent Types. The only purpose ranking in 
the top 6 for all Types is "Suppliers conform to us" 
(Question 160), which does not rank in the top 6 in either 
Oil or Finance and only for Type B in Retail. 
For both busine~s Types, the most important purpose by a 
fair margin is "Organizational effectiveness" (Question 
164), which did not rank in the first 6 for Type c. For 
the latter, the top ranking purpose is "Suppliers conform 
to us." 
Retail: Once again, the picture is quite different from 
that of any other sector. There are two purposes that rank 
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in the first 6 for all three respondent Types: "Add value 
to our product" (Question 155) and "Distinctive 
product/image" (Question 163). This is the top ranking 
purpose for Type A, while for Types B and C the top ranker 
is "Organizational effectiveness" (Question 164). 
The clear message of Table 15 is that decision makers in 
different industries have different views of the strategic 
purposes of IT, and often decision makers in the same company 
will differ. Moreover, a given decision maker's views will no 
doubt change as circumstances change. Since strategic purpose is 
the core concept in strategic IT decision making, it follows that 
no one decision making framework can be specified in detail that 
will be equally suitable for all companies and industries at all 
times. The principle of contingency (Section 4.1.III.D.J.) that 
underlies the present Framework is, therefore, appropriate, as is 
the insistence on dialectical debate, incremental implementation, 
and learning and adaptation. 
Each row in Table 16 shows the numbers of respondents who rated 
the relevant strategic purpose more than 5 for importance and 
indicated that it was best served by the corresponding uses of IT 
(columns A to G). Although Table 16 is only sparsely populated, 
several important observations can be made. 
Firstly, the column totals can be considered as "votes" for each 
of the seven uses. It will then be seen that the most popular 
strategic uses of IT vary according to business sector: 
Finance: For both the business and the IT respondents, the 
most popular uses are "Automation of office processes", 
"Inter-organizational systems", "Automating the client 
interface" and "Management information/decision support". 
Industry: For both the business and the IT respondents, 
the most popular use is "Automation of office processes". 
For the IT respondents, "Management information/decision 
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support" ties for first place, while for the business 
respondents second place goes to the not very different 
"Professional support". 
Oil: For the business respondents, the most popular use is 
"Automation of office processes", while for the IT-
respondents it is, interestingly, "Automating the client 
interface." 
Retail: For both the business and the IT respondents, the 
most popular uses are "Management information/decision 
support" and "Automating the client interface". 
Respondents• emphasis on "Automating office processes" and 
"Automating the client interface" is not inconsistent with the 
South African ranking of the issues in Table 9. It lends 
credence to the Framework's focus on complete business systems, 
as contrasted with management information systems. This 
orientation will be seen both in the "inside vs. outside the 
system" dimension of the decision maker framework (Section 
4.2.II.B.), and in the strict definition of a strategic business 
system as a tight coupling of information (application) systems 
and human (organizational) systems (Section 4.3.III.B.l.). 
On the other hand, the emphasis on "Inter-organizational systems" 
in Finance is not at all consistent with the low percentage of 
Finance respondents who rated such systems more than five for 
importance in Question 36 (Table 7) (as revealed by inspection of 
the underlying data). 
Subject to the uncertainty indicated by such inconsistencies in 
the responses and also to the sparseness of Table 16, the latter 
does provide some sort of indication of respondents• approaches 
to application opportunity selection. For example, in the 
Finan~e Sector, the votes of both business and IT respondents for 
"Automating office processes" suggest that this is wherethey 
believe the competitive weapons for "Become low-cost leader" and 
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"Organizational effectiveness" will be found. For "Add value to 
our product", they will probably be found in "Professional 
support" and "Automating the client interface". 
It can also be seen that the perceived match between purpose and 
use varies to some extent according to business sector and 
decision making domain. With more data, it should be possible to 
develop well grounded guidelines for the fourth and fifth steps 
of the "strategic option generator" (Section 4.3.III.B.2.). 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Specific conclusions have been drawn during the discussion of the 
Tables in the preceding Section, although most of them are only 
tentative in view of the sparseness of the data. They will now 
be summarized in terms of the survey aims set out in Section 
3.II.B.2. 
What is currently being done to manage the strategic IT decision 
making process in South African companies? 
From Table 6 it appears that many of the accepted strategic 
management processes are already in place in responding 
companies. The differences between the perceptions of the 
business and the IT respondents raise some doubt as to how 
effective these processes sometimes are, while the high 
incidence of centralization reflected in Tables 2 and 12 
suggests that participation in them is often not wide. 
Table 13 clearly shows that most respondents do not use 
many of the tools and techniques that are available to help 
in strategic IT decision making. Those used tend to be 
conservative and were not designed to encourage'aggressive 
approaches to the exploitation of IT in business strategy. 
Little familiarity is evident with McFarlan's adaptation of 
Porter's competitive strategy analysis to IT planning, or 
with Nolan's contribution to organizational IT learning. 
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Do respondents believe they are doing it successfully? 
Table 7 shows what respondents apparently regard as the 
important strategic issues. For the most, their views are 
that the issues are well managed in their companies. Among 
the exceptions are those issues that relate to the creation 
of strategic capability through IT, which is consistent 
with respondents• apparent lack of familiarity with many of 
the relevant tools and techniques. 
Table 14 gives an overall impression of modest satisfaction 
with what respondents believe their companies are doing. 
What more should be done, and what support do decision makers 
need? 
Table 6 shows a requirement for better quantification of 
the costs and benefits of strategic IT applications, while 
Table 7 shows the need already referred to for better 
approaches to creating strategic IT capability. Table 7 
also shows that most respondents perceive their current 
business/IT dialogue and IT management skills to be just 
adequate. These three factors together can be taken as 
indicative of a need for better linking of decision maker 
competence and company strategic competence in the manner 
proposed by·the Framework. 
Table 11 shows a number of specific aspects where the 
quality of strategic IT decision making needs improvement. 
One difficulty, from the point of view of the proposed 
Framework, is that respondents appear to be unaware of some 
of the most urgent requirements - for example, more broadly 
based participative IT decision making, more attention to 
the goodness of fit between the competitive purposes and . 
the organizational uses of IT, and a better understanding 
of what constitutes superior performance in applying IT to 
business strategy. 
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Certainly, Table 13 shows that many respondents are unaware 
aware of significant decision making tools and techniques 
that are already available, and where these fit into the 
overall strategic IT decision making process. Better 
awareness would undoubtedly lead to a richer appreciation 
of strategic possibilities than is reflected in Table 16. 
How do South African attitudes differ from overseas? 
Certain major differences between American and South 
African attitudes are shown in the ranks of Table 9. A 
similar comparison between South African and British or 
European attitudes was not attempted in the present study. 
The most obvious differences are the considerably higher 
priorities given by South African respondents to human 
resources and security and control. 
The Table also suggests that there are other important 
differences between the assumptions of the American 
decision makers and those of the South Africans. The 
information systems function's role, contribution and 
placement in the organization rank more highly among the 
American respondents, which is consistent with their high 
ranking of strategic planning and competitive advantage. 
With the exception of the anomaly of their ranking of 
I 
competitive advantage as already discussed, the apparent 
South African priorities are more conservative than the 
American, and the IT respondents are even more conservative 
than the business respondents. 
What generic concepts, processes, techniques and tools should the 
strategic IT decision making Framework include? 
Several conclusions about needs the Framework may fulfil 
have been drawn in the course of the discussion of the 
Tables. The following are additional observations. 
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Two apparent gaps in current strategic IT management 
thinking that the Framework may address can be seen in 
' Table 6: more attention to IT-orientated organizational 
planning, and the inclusion of IT-orientated research in 
the corporate planning processes. 
Table 7 and the ranks in Table 9 suggest a requirement for 
much education regarding the concept of impact IT strategy, 
where IT is used to reshape the goals and strategies of the 
enterprise, and to the concept of organizational IT 
learning, through which decision makers come to understand 
how such reshaping can be an appropriate and feasible 
extension of their business strategy. 
A point that must be made in this regard is that a 
misunderstanding of what Peters and Waterman [1982: 292] 
meant by "sticking to the knitting" could kill many 
creative proposals for IT-based strategies. To stay within 
the scope of decision maker and company competence does not 
necessarily mean that the scope must be restricted. On the 
contrary, uses of IT that extend the scope of competence in 
decision making and task performance are precisely those 
that will extend the strategic competence of the company. 
At the same time, the strong positive responses given to 
all the "McFarlan strategic grid" questions of Table 10 
suggest a lack of sufficient insight into the nature of a 
company's strategic dependence on IT, how this varies with 
circumstances, and how the IT positioning of the company 
should vary accordingly. 
Will the Framework be judged useful? What can be done to improve 
its "genericness"? 
The low response rates to the questionnaire survey shown in 
Tables 1 and 2, and the general unfamiliarity with modern 
tools and techniques shown in Table 13, are certainly not 
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encouraging signs. 
On the other hand, there is at present no tool, technique 
or methodology available in the South African market that 
covers the content, structure and process of strategic IT 
decision making comprehensively (as Tapscott, Greenberg & 
Henderson's "strategic framework for integrated office 
systems", Nolan, Norton & Company's "computer architecture 
strategic planning" [Advanced Systems Inc., Courses 3947 & 
5055] and Benjamin's (Seminar E-01] "B+OL+D" methodology 
taken together do). There is none that assists in exposing 
and synthesizing decision makers' assumptions (as Mason & 
Mitroff's (1981] "dialectical debate" and Delbecq & Van de 
Ven's [1975] "nominal group technique" do). And there is 
none that places the formulation and implementation of IT 
strategy into the context of organizational development and 
organizational learning (as the Nolan, Norton and Company 
consultancy does). 
Consequently, a decision making Framework aimed at bringing 
the best of all these techniques to bear in an orderly 
manner should, if appropriately presented, be found useful 
by people charged with the responsibility to vitalize the 
IT decision making processes of their companies. It has 
been established that skilled facilitators for the 
"principal disciplines" of all Components of the Framework 
(Section 4.6.II.) are available in South African companies, 
consultancies and Universities. 
If Table 17 is to be believed, interest in the issues 
raised by the survey is reasonably high since, except for 
\ 
Type B respondents in non-financial companies, not much 
more than a third of the respondents found the task of 
completing the questionnaire tedious. On the other hand, 
the number of respondents who claimed to have gained few 
new insights by doing so is remarkably high, considering 
the results reflected in, say, Table 13. 
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As regards improving the genericness of the Framework, 
several remarks have been made about what could be done if 
more data were available. In particular, since Table 15 
shows that the perceived strategic purposes of IT are 
highly contingent on circumstances, an industry-specific 
opportunity generator grounded in good data would be a 
valuable addition to the arsenal of tools and techniques 
With regard to objective B of the Study, the overall conclusion 
,that can be drawn from the opinion survey is that many, if not 
most, of the respondents have already made progress in coming to 
terms with the important issues of strategic IT decision making 
and are, in general, modestly satisfied with the results 
obtained. There remain, however, many areas where additional 
support is required to improve the quality of the decision 
making, particularly from points of view characteristic of the 
new perspectives of IT strategy and infrastructure described in 
Section 2.II.B. 
There is much diversity of perceptions, opinions and beliefs 
among the respondents. As regards objective D of the Study 
(Chapter 5), it is clear that evaluating the Framework for 
acceptance into a company, deciding on its aims and priorities, 
and getting decision making going in terms if it, will also be 
complex problems. The requirements will vary according to 
business sector, as between companies in the same business 
sector, and probably also, at least initially, as between domains 
in the same company. It is also clear that the South African 





THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 OVERVIEW AND DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The four objectives of the Study are stated in Section 1.III. 
The theoretical Framework for strategic IT decision making 
described in this Chapter is aimed specifically at the third 
objective: 
c. To propose a new approach to strategic IT decision making 
that will help South African management deal with the 
fundamental issues underlying the environmental changes, 
and develop effective IT-based business strategies. 
To help in understanding the logic of the Framework, this Section 
gives an overview, and an outline of the design principles. 
II. OVERVIEW 
A. Components and Parts 
The Framework consists of the five Components shown in Figure 1, 
each of which consists of a number of Parts. The Components are 
based on Ackoff's phases of "interactive planning". Although 
there is a logical sequence to their presentation in this Study, 
they are in fact highly inter-related. In practice, a company 
will usually have several optional seqpences of implementation. 
"'nlere is no way of putting the ~ on paper without 
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orderilq them. '!his is unforb.mate because there is no 
necessary order to them. 'lbey are interdeperrlent aspects 
of a systemic process, each feedin;J ani fed by the others, 
particularly in oorrtinuCAls plarmin}. None of them, 
like the process as a ~le, shall.d ever be oc:arpleted, ani 
they may be started in any order." [Ackoff, 1981: 74] 
For example, a move towards more formal IT decision making often 
begins with business managers' concern about rising levels of 
computer costs. IT managers often cite rising user demand for 
service and functionality as the reason for this. The first step 
towards a more formal approach might then be an improvement in 
the capacity planning and accounting processes (Decision Making 
Process). This step could lead to a restructuring of all the IT 
decision making roles and responsibilities in the organization 
(Decision Structure- Human Resources). 
Examining the aims of different constituencies of decision makers 
could then lead to better understanding of the role of IT in the 
business strategy (Decision Content) and of the need to develop 
the company's IT capability (Decision Structure - IT 
Infrastructure). As understanding grows of the opportunities and 
inhibitors influencing IT strategy (Organizational IT Learning), 
more formal and detailed analysis of the IT planning environment 
could be called for (Decision Making Context). 
1. Decision Making Context 
This Component is described in Section 4.2. It is the first of 
the three that deal with the formulation of IT strategy. The 
external and internal environments of the company are examined to 
determine the strategic purposes and uses of IT. The Component 
corresponds to Phase 1 of interactive planning: 
"Fonnulating the mess: the system of threats arx:l 
q:porbmities that face the organization." [Ackoff, 1981: 
74] 
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There are three Parts to this Component: 
Identifying the IT decision making domains in the company, 
and their significance in the organizational dialectic. 
A dialectical enquiry process that accepts and exploits the 
inevitability of conflict and contradiction in IT planning, 
and of a fundamental relationship between dialectic and 
development. 
"Gcxxi dialectic is nJt a matter of stOOOthness of 
operation or elimination of error. On the contrary, 
its gocx:1ness is inherent in the ways in which error is 
continually interpreted am corrected, i.ncaJ:tpatibility 
am incongruity are continually engaged, am conflict 
is continually confronted am resolved." [Argyris & 
Schon, 1978: 146] 
"Where contradiction is at work, there is the force of 
developnent." [Cornforth, 1976: 54] 
An approach to environmental data analysis that supports 
this process. 
The product of this Component is one or more "Corporate IT 
Scenario(s)". 
2. Decision Content 
This Component is described in Section 4.3. It deals with the 
decision making involved in determining the role of IT in the 
company's business strategy. It corresponds to Phase 2 of 
interactive planning: 
"Errls planning: specifyin:J the errls to be p.IrSUed. It is 
in this phase of planning that a desirable future is 
designed." [Ackoff, 1981: 74] 
.. ' ~ ~-
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The Component has four Parts: 
Defining the purposes that should be served by IT in the 
company's competitive strategy. 
Defining the uses of IT in organizational design, and 
linking purposes and uses in the concept of a "strategic 
business system." 
Stating the company's "IT positioning", which serves as a 
set of well-defined corporate constraints (policies, 
limitations, criteria) on the translation of purposes and 
uses _into feasible IT strategy. 
The IT strategy will have two distinct but interdependent 
elements: 
An IT technology strategy, expressed in terms of an 
architecture for an ideal "target environment" in 
which the desired purposes and uses of IT would be 
fulfilled. The Structure Component deals with this 
element in detail. 
An IT management strategy, expressed in terms of an 
organizational development, through which the Target 
Environment Architecture is implemented, incrementally 
and adaptively over time. The Process Component deals 
with this element in detail. 
The product of the Content Component is the "IT Positioning 
Statement". 
3. Decision structure 
Section 4.4. deals with the Structure Component. It describes 
the "structure" of a strategic IT decision in terms of an 
architecture that is required to guide the building of the target 
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environment. This Component corresponds to Phase 3 of 
interactive planning: 
"Means plann:irg: sel~ or creatirg the means· by tmich 
the specified ems are to be p.m;ued. It is in this ];ilase 
of plannin;J that ways of awroximatirg the desirable future 
are invented." [Ackoff, 1981: 74] 
The Parts of this Component are the four dimensions of the Target 
Environment Architecture: 
IT Infrastructure: The generic structures and policies to 
be developed as infrastructure in anticipation of future 
strategic business systems. 
Human Systems: The organizational elements of strategic 
business systems - the generic structures and functions 
through which people commission, develop, use and operate 
IT. 
Information Systems: The technological elements of 
strategic business systems - the generic data resources and 
application systems delivered by the IT infrastructure to 
support the human systems. 
Human Resources: The generic decision making roles through 
which people bring competence (i.e. knowledge, skills and 
attitudes) to the decision making tasks, and accept 
responsibility for carrying them out successfully. 
The product of this Component is the "Target Environment 
Architecture". 
4. Decision Making Process 
In this Component, described in Section 4.5, the focus shifts 
from the formulation to the implementation of IT strategy, i.e • 
.. - -
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from IT technology strategy to IT management strategy. The 
Component covers Phases 4 and 5 of interactive planning: 
"Resource plarming: det.enni.nin:J tmat resau:ces will be 
zequired, tr.nen they will be required, am llc:M to OOtain 
those that will not otherwise be available." 
"Design of inplementation am control: detet:minirg who is 
t:o do what, tr.nen, am where: am how the inplementation 
am its consequences are to be controlled, that is, kept an 
track." [Ackoff, 1981: 75] 
There are three Parts: 
Identifying the cultural, political, organizational and 
technological changes needed to carry the company towards 
its target environment, and structuring them as strategic 
thrusts in a company-wide organizational development 
programme. 
Defining the medium-term and short-term plans needed to 
accomplish the strategic thrusts and transition stages. 
Co-ordinating and controlling the progress of the 
transition stages, which includes evaluating aggregate 
costs and benefits of the IT strategy and controlling the 
required resources on a company-wide basis. 
The product of this Component is the "Master Transition Plan". 
5. Organizational IT Learning 
Organizational learning is implicit in Phase 5 of interactive 
planning, and is treated elsewhere in Ackoff's book. This 
Component, described in Section 4.6, deals with the creation of 
the learning systems a company needs to formulate and implement 
IT strategy effectively. 
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The Component has three Parts: 
Analyzing the nature of organizational IT learning from 
several perspectives, in order to determine the important 
factors in the design of learning systems. 
Identifying historical stages in company development, to 
ensure congruency between these stages and the planned 
transition stages of the IT strategy, and to ensure that 
the learning systems themselves develop as the company 
develops. 
Synthesizing the company's organizational IT learning 
requirements into specific learning systems, both the 
development and use of which are imbedded in the transition 
stages. This includes systems for managing technology 
innovation and assimilation in the company. 
A variety of learning systems and adaptive mechanisms constitute 
the product of this Component. 
Figure 2 shows three kinds of Link that can arise among the 
Components and Parts of the Framework. 
B. Links 
1. Type I - Dialectic 
In each Component and Part, these Links bridge the conceptual gap 
between the business and the IT decision making domains. They 
are called dialectic because the conceptual gap is a significant 
source of conflict (among decision makers) and contradiction 
(among decisions), and thus an important reference point for 
organizational dialectic. For example, decision makers in the 
marketing department usually push for early delivery of 
application systems, because they fear that market opportunities 
will be lost through delay. IT decision makers press for more 
- ·:. 
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time to ensure that the systems are well designed, programmed and 
tested. 0 & M specialists introduce yet another set of aims when 
they insist that additional time be taken to revise organization-
al processes and retrain workers in accordance with the new 
requirements. One way of resolving such conflicts is to combine 
the marketing planners, systems analysts and methods analysts 
into a single team, charged with the responsibility to identify, 
design and implement feasible business opportunities. 
Similarly, an elaborate and expensive access control system may 
be the "right" technology for IT management purposes but not the 
"right" answer for business purpose~ as currently understood, 
which may simply require inexpensive dial-up access. One way of 
resolving the contradiction would be to extend the scope of the 
business to include the sale of value-added network services to 
other parties who also need them but cannot afford them on their 
own. 
2. Type II - Contingency 
These are the Links between one Component and another. They show 
how managing a given issue depends strongly on how issues in 
other Components are managed. Solving an IT strategy problem 
depends not only on business purpose (Decision Content), but also 
on the business environment (Decision Making Context), on the way 
the problem is analyzed (Decision Structure and Decision Making 
Process), and on the competence of the decision makers for the 
task (Organizational IT Learning). 
For example, whether it is "right" to increase the information 
intensity [Porter & Millar, 1985: 153] of particular jobs, thus 
reducing the labour intensity, depends not only on the economics 
of the problem but also on the weights given to effectiveness 
(match with the product, market and technology assumptions of the 
company), profitability (match with the financial objectives of 
the company) and morality (acceptability in the social, political 
and economic environment) [Bower, 1982(2): 632]. 
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3. Type III - Feedback 
As the company becomes more dependent on the use of IT to sustain 
its competitive position, its strategic IT capability must be 
developed accordingly. The human and information systems, and 
the IT infrastructure that support these, must grow in their 
ability to respond to the demands being made on them. At the 
same time, the IT decision makers themselves must grow in their 
ability to manage increasingly complex tasks of organizational 
design and business strategy. 
Prompt and effective resolution of conflicts and contradictions, 
i.e. good organizational dialectic, is the essential precondition 
for both kinds of development. Organizational IT learning is the 
process through which the quality of organizational dialectic 
improves. 
Type III Links, shown in Figure 3, bring organizational IT 
learning into operation as the feedback of experience from 
current to future cycles of strategic IT decision making. The 
adaptation of IT strategies and plans resulting from such 
feedback takes place through the complementary processes of 
"organizational IT learning" and "incremental implementation". 
Both processes become feasible through the definition of "levels 
of discourse" (Section 4.1.III.D.4.). 
c. Decision Packets 
The Components, Parts and Links of this Framework emphasize 
decision making as a process, rather than decision taking at a 
moment in time. They support the point of view that strategic IT 
decisions are manufactured, over time and in a number of 
inter-related sets of actions, by managers with positive 
decisional roles, and with the use of a variety of decision 
making aids [cf. Minkes, 1987: 40-42]. 
The Framework thus provides a means of logically sorting out the 
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many facets of strategic IT decision making, and recombining them 
,into rational and practical "decision packets" with well-defined 
contents, boundaries and interfaceso The idea is not to force a 
decision into the mold of some Component, Part or Link of the 
Framework. It is rather to build the Components, Parts and Links 
of the decision packet itself, in such a way that the aggregate 
of all decision packets is still a meaningful and consistent 
super-system of Components, Parts and Links. 
The Framework is primarily intended to be used in the "large" 
situation, the formulation and implementation of a company's 
overall IT strategy. The strategic thrusts and action plans 
described in Section 4.5 are, in fact, large-scale decision 
packets. The Framework could equally well be used in "small" 
situations, such as the selection a particular software package 
or the design of a particular departmental process. 
III. DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
The main sources on which the Framework relies are listed in 
Section 2.IV. Their influences on basic principles and concepts 
of the Framework are described in the present Section, while 
their influences on its structure will emerge in Sections 4.2 to 
4.6. The format of this Section follows Ackoff's [1981: 63-76] 
"operating principles of interactive planning". 
A. Interactive Planning and Idealized Design 
Interactive planning is the fourth of the four basic orientations 
to planning described by Ackoff [1981: 52-64]: 
Reactivism: The planning aim is to restore a desirable 
previous state by reversing the effect of changes. 
Decision makers rely on experience and usually 
authoritarian organizational forms. They are generally 
hostile to change and to technology. 
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Inactivism: The aim is to preserve things as they are by 
preventing change. Corporate survival and stability are 
the key issues, and bureaucracy is the style. Problems are 
handled piecemeal as they arise. 
Preactivism: The dominant management style in the United 
states. Planning, based on predicting the future, is aimed 
at accelerating change and exploiting the opportunities 
that it brings. Modern technology is welcomed, but is 
applied in terms of outmoded "machine age" concepts. 
Interactivism: Interactive planning rests on the belief 
that the future depends as much on what is done between now 
and then, as on what has happened until now. The planning 
aim is "the design of a desirable future and the invention 
of ways to _bring it about" [Ackoff, 1981: 62]. The impact 
of technology will depend on how it is applied, and how 
well it is applied will depend on humanistic as well as 
scientific considerations. 
This is an interactive planning Framework, which describes how 
participative decision making and an entrepreneurial view of 
environmental data (Sections 4.2 and 4.3: see also Kanter [1983: 
27-35]) can be combined in an organizational dialectic aimed at 
creating a desirable IT future for the company. 
The Framework is constructed in terms of Ackoff's definition of 
three types of ends that decision makers can pursue - goals, 













B. The Participative Principle 
"MEt planners am consumers of plans believe that the 
priooipal benefit of pl~ cx:.aoos fran its product, a 
plan. '!be interactivist denies this. He asserts that in 
pl~, process is the mst inpo:rtant product. 
'lherefore, the prin:ipal benefit of it derives fran 
en;Jaqin;J in it. II [Ackoff, 1981: 65) 
According to Ackoff, it is through participation in interactive 
planning that members of an organization can best develop. They 
acquire that understanding of the organization that makes it 
possible to serve its ends more effectively, and this in turn 
facilitates organizational development. 
But coping with the multiple levels of abstraction and domains of 
knowledge inherent in strategic IT decision making places severe 
demands on the competence and accountability of the decision 
makers. The principle of "adequacy" is therefore fundamental -
the adequacy (level of understanding and competence) of the IT 
decision makers to the kinds and levels of decision they·are 
accountable for, and the adequacy of the Framework to support 
them. 
"When the level of the :knc:1tler is not adequate to the 
level (or grade of significance) of the abject of 
knc:Mledge, the result is not factual error, but something 
much ll'Ore serious: an inadequate arrl · inqxwerished view of 
reality. 11 [Schumacher, 1977: 53] 
More specifically, 
"''he problem is that ''What management shoold be • is not 
i.meperrlent, of 'what management can be' or ''What 
management wants to be. • Policy research should have 
taught that the selection of erx3s tums critically on whidl 
neans a management is capable of prrsuing. In tmn, a 
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selectim of means tums critically m the skills of the 
mmage.IIeiit ooalitim that shaped oo:rporate goals." [Bower, 
1982(1): 631] 
This is a dialectical Framework, and the development of a 
company's strategic IT capability is deemed to consist of two 
inseparable parts - the development of the company's distinctive 
competence in deploying IT as a strategic resource, and the 
development of its managers as rational planners, implementors 
and users of information systems. 
The dialectical method of strategic problem solving - "the habit 
of unfettered discussion" [Russell, 1961: 111] - is suitable 
where enough knowledge and information is already in existence to 
reach the right conclusions about, say, competitive strategy and 
organizational design, but where "conditions for error" (e.g. 
inaccessibility of individual views, vagueness and ambiguity, 
mistaken assumptions, lack of individual knowledge and insight, 
incompatible aims) [Argyris & Schon, 1978: 59] prevent the best 
logical use being made of what is known. 
Hence questions such as "What is an effective IT application?", 
"What is competitive advantage?", "What business are we in?" are 
well suited to the dialectic method. Terms like these are used 
freely in discussion and in the literature, but managers need to 
examine the ways in which they are used in and around the 
organization, and agree on definitions that will best suit the 
organizational dialectic in their own company. Without such 
precision and consensus, any "shared vision" of the business 
future would be a myth. 
C. The Principle of Continuity 
The target environment is an ideal that may never be fully 
attained, at least not as it is envisaged at any given moment, 
and its architecture will be continuously reformulated as 
organizational learning takes place. 
~. . . . ~- ~ . 
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Commitment to implementation, and priorities, will be asked for 
only a piece at a time, as business and technological objectives 
are reevaluated in medium- and short-term planning. Always, 
however, decisions will be made in the language of the 
architecture. Sometimes the architecture will be maintained and 
the decision altered accordingly; sometimes it will be the other 
way around. Always, the potential long-term consequences will be 
analyzed. It must be acknowledged, however, that continuous 
planning and incremental progress towards a non-reachable target 
are not concepts that most managers will easily comprehend. 
Traditionally, frameworks for organizational decision making, 
including the IT project management methodologies, have~een 
built on the supposition that all decision making can be broken 
down into time-serial phases, with a beginning, a middle and an 
end. (See, for example, Huber [1980: 8] and Mintzberg [1979: 58] 
for the general business case, and Inmon [1983: 58] for the IT 
version.) This almost universally accepted view has its origins 
in more general techniques of "heuristic" problem solving, which 
set out stages such as "understanding the problem", "devising a 
plan", "carrying out the plan", "looking back" [Polya, 1957]. 
Witte [1972], however, found in a major investigation into over 
200 cases of complex decision making processes, carried out over 
several years, that the "phase theorem" was not supported by the 
facts. His research revealed that: 
•• (1) A oc:mplex, innovative decision is a nulti-operational, 
multi-tenporal process; 
(2) A oc:mplex decision-maki.n;J process does not have only 
one final decision, but consists of a plurality of 
sulXiecisions; the maxinn.nn JllliiiJer of these choices 
occurs at the ern of the total process; 
(3) '!he theorem's claim of infonnation-gatherirxJ, 
altemative-developirxJ, arrl altemative-evaluatirxJ 
Page 81 
operations can be fourd in decisiOn--makirg processes 
in large nuniJers; h<Jv.1ever, they do not 01lminate in 
distinct }ilases in time, blt rather are distribrt:.ed 
over the total duration of the process." [Witte, 1972: 
177] 
Company-wide, strategic IT decision making is certainly complex, 
innovative, multi-operational and multi-temporal, and it cannot 
be broken down into one, or even a few, sequences of stages. 
Instead, in this Framework, it is represented as multiple ongoing 
cycles of organizational development and learning, in which both 
formulation and implementation of strategy are incremental and 
never concluded. 
Witte's general conclusion captures the rationale of the 
Components, Parts and Links of the Framework: 
"We believe that human beings carmot gather infonnation 
without in sane way simultaneously developirg alternatives. 
'Ihey cannot avoid evaluating these alternatives 
ilmnedi.ately, am in doirg this they are forced to a 
decision. '!his is a package of operations, am the 
suocession of these packages over time oonstitutes the 
total decision-making process." [Witte, 1972: 180] 
D. The Holistic Principles 
Ackoff [1981: 6-24] sees the present era of environmental 
turbulence as a period of transition in which a "Systems Age" is 
emerging "dialectically" from a "Machine Age". 
In the Machine Age, problem solving proceeds from analysis to 
synthesis - divide the thing to be understood into its 
constituent parts, try to understand each part, and then try to 
assemble this understanding into an understanding of the whole. 
The underlying philosophies are reductionism (the belief that 
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complex ideas can be completely understood in terms of their 
simpler parts or components), determinism (the belief that all 
events stand in a cause-effect relationship with other events), 
and mechanism (the belief that all phenomena, including 
organizations, can be explained in mechanical terms). 
In the Systems Age now emerging, problem solving proceeds from 
synthesis to analysis - identify a containing whole (system) of 
which the thing to be understood is a part, explain the behaviour 
or properties of the containing whole, and then try to explain 
the thing to be explained in terms of its purposes and uses in 
the containing whole. 
Here the underlying philosophies are expansionism (the belief 
that understanding is increased by expanding the systems to be 
understood, not by reducing them to their elements), a 
producer-product view of the world (which replaces the search for 
the sufficient conditions of a cause-effect relationship, with a 
search for necessary conditions in the environment of the product 
to be explained) and teleology (which makes it possible to look 
at systems in an output-orientated way - choice, purpose, goals, 
objectives, ideals - rather in the input-orientated way of 
determinism) • 
As explained in Section 4.1.II.C., the Components, Parts and 
Links are not intended as a means of analyzing some problem - a 
given strategy, an organizational design, or an information 
system - into a set of isolated constituents. Their purpose is 
rather to help in synthesizing a useful picture of the "whole" 
that contains the strategies, structures and systems of the 
company. 
For this reason, the conventional universe of discourse in 
systems planning is expanded to include such matters as 
organizational design and development, management development, 
management accounting, and organizational learning. The purposes 
and uses of IT are investigated, not bottom-up from the 
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characteristics and functionality of the constituent 
technologies, but top down from the environment in which the 
company and its systems operate. 
Four holistic principles are built into the Framework. Three of 
these derive from Ackoff [1981: 71-74], and the fourth from 
Benjamin [Seminar E-01]. 
1. Integration and Differentiation 
With regard to Process, the Framework aims at integrating all 
facets of strategic IT decision making through the notions of 
Components, Parts and Links, while at the same time 
differentiating the IT decision making roles according to the 
various management domains in the company. It does this in a way 
that can accommodate quite different business strategies and 
business systems developed by different business units of the 
same company. The overall scheme is closely related to Tapscott, 
Henderson & Greenberg's [1985: 7] "Components of an Integrated 
Systems Plan", and to Nolan, Norton & Company's "Computer 
Architecture Blueprints" [Advanced Systems Inc., Course 5055]. 
The principles of integration and differentiation are also 
relevant in the Content and Structure of strategic IT decisions. 
On the business side, the seminal work is Lawrence & Lorsch's 
[1967] "organization and environment" approach to analyzing 
organization structure and functioning. A useful overview and a 
synopsis are readily available in Pugh [1984: 87-105] and Pugh, 
Hickson & Hinings [1983: 44-49]. 
"It is in o:rder to cope effectively with their external 
environments that organizations llUlSt cane to develop 
segmented units, each of Widl has as its major task the 
problem of dealin} with sate aspect of the oorxtitions 
outside the finn. '!his differentiation of function ard 
task is ac:x:xmpanied by differences in cognitive ard 
a:rotional orientation anag the managers in different 
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mrl.ts, am differerXJeS, too, in the fonnal. st:ructure of 
different deparbnents. II [PUgh et al. I 1983: 44] 
•In spite of this, the mganizatiat is a system llihl.c:h has 
to be co-ordinated so that a state of oollaboratiat exists 
in order to obtain for netiJp..rs the benefits of effective 
transactions with the environment. '!his is the required 
integration ani it, too, is affected by the natw:e of 
external oc:nlltions. 11 [PUgh et al., 1983: 45] 
Thus the Framework insists, firstly, on the recognition of 
different IT decision making domains, consisting of people with 
disparate cognitive, emotional and other orientations (Section 
4.2.II.). Secondly, it defines a "strategic business system" as 
a recombination of organizational processes and information 
systems, aimed at extending the cognitive, emotional and other 
bounds of rationality of the individuals and workgroups whose 
various purposes it serves (Section 4.3.III.B.). Finally, it 
provides, through the "quadrants of IT strategy" (Figure 9 and 
Section 4.3.I.), a way of integrating different views of the 
Content of an IT decision. With regard to Structure, the major 
integrative devices are the Target Environment Architecture, and 
the definition of both a "strategic business system" and an 
"applications portfolio" in terms of Porter's [1985] "value 
chain" concept (Section 4.4.). 
2. Co-ordination 
The Framework co-ordinates strategic IT decision making across 
the business units of the organization in two ways. Firstly, it 
indicates which aspects of IT strategy are suitable for 
autonomous decision making by the business units and which are 
more appropriately the subjects of central or joint 
responsibility and action. Secondly, it suggests staff 
functions, decision making processes and co-ordinating committees 
that are needed to unify IT strategy on a company-wide basis. 
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From Lawrence & Lersch's "organization and environment" point of 
view, these are further examples of "integrative devices", and 
how elaborate and extensive a particular company requires them to 
be wil1 depend on the degree of differentiation in the company 
[cf. Pugh et al., 1983: 46]. 
3 • Contingency 
McFarlan, McKenney & Pyburn [1983: 149-156] show that the 
importance of IT varies widely between different companies. The 
kind of IT support required, the financial and human resource it 
is worthwhile to commit to it and the effort that will be spent 
on IT decision making depend on circumstances. Even within a 
given company, a decision may be strategic from one point of view 
but not from another, or strategic at a certain time but not at 
another. 
"It should be noted that no type of decision is 
inherently strategic; decisions are strategic only in 
CX>Iltext. II [Mintzberg I 1979: 6Q] 
For example, a decision to apply IT to save company operating 
costs, i.e. to improve the efficient use of resources already 
allocated, would .not ordinarily be regarded as strategic. But it 
would be so if company survival depended on conservation or 
reallocation of resources. 
Similarly, a decision to acquire a database system based on 
purely technical grounds, e.g. more efficient retrieval of data, 
may be regarded by technical managers as a strategic matter, e.g. 
machine capacity and service reliability, but not by business 
managers, who may only become aware of the issue if the cost is 
high. If, however, the decision is aimed at enhancing a product 
or service of the company in a way that distinguishes it from the 
competition, it would be strategic to business management, but 
possib1y not to technical managers, who may not even be aware of 
the purposes the system serves. 
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4. Directed Incrementalism 
This is a general purpose Framework, which is meant to support 
strategic IT decision making in many different situations, across 
all three planning levels and timeframes, and through many stages 
of implementation over time. It is, in a sense, a "total systems 
approach" [Blumenthal, 1967: 23], which must be described and 
understood in its entirety before decision makers can be asked to 
accept it. Nevertheless, it is neither possible nor desirable 
that all of it should be specified in detail before any kind of 
implementation begins. 
Similarly, the Target Environment Architecture and the Master 
Transition Plan must be described and understood, at least in 
overall terms, before managers can be asked to commit to them as 
the IT strategy of the company. Here too, however, complete 
details cannot, and should not, be specified in advance. 
To overcome these problems, four broad "levels of discourse" are 
identified, as illustrated in the Boxes of Figure 3 (cf. Hunter, 
1971: 3]: 
The Conceptual Level: This is the level at which generic 
strategies and broad architectural options are discussed. 
e.g. "There are two aspects to the role IT can play in a 
company's business strategy: firstly, the purposes it 
will serve in the competitive strategy; secondly, its 
uses in organizational design. Various kinds of 
purpose and use can be identified, and some uses will 
be better suited to some purposes than to others." 
"In interactive planning, based on the principles of 
idealized design, an IT technology strategy can be 
expressed in terms of a Target Environment 
Architecture." 
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This is the level at which the Framework can be described 
in overall terms, as in this Study. It is represented by 
the upper Box of Figure 3, and provides a common language 
in which the issues of strategic IT decisions can be 
discussed by managers from different backgrounds. 
'"llle key is the urrlerst:an:iiJ that before you can 
have a strategy you liilSt have a target that has 
adrleved oo:r.porate consensus, am before you can have 
such a tal:get, you ll'D.lSt have a :framework - a clear 
vocabulcu:y that provides a basis for cx:rnrmmi.cation, 
classification, an1 plani'linJ." [Benjamin, seminar 
E-01, Section 2, Page 1] 
The Meta-Architectural Level: The Framework must be 
customized to meet the particular technical, organizational 
and cultural requirements of the company concerned. Its 
Components, Parts and Links are selected and adapted as 
necessary. In particular, the Structure Component becomes 
the meta-architecture of the Company's own target 
environment. 
The meta-architectural level is concerned with long-term 
ideals, and its terms of reference are much the same as 
those of the conceptual level. An effort should be made to 
reformulate the selected elements in company-specific 
terms. It has been found in practice that strategies and 
architectures offered in the "vanilla" terms of a 
conceptual framework tend to be rejected as "motherhoods" 
and "theories" by those who are asked to implement them. 
The Macro-Architectural Level: This is the level at which 
different classes of IT strategy and architectural 
approaches are discussed. 
e.g. "We can use inter-organizational systems in a strategy 
of productjservice differentiation aimed at our 
' 
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customers, in order to increase the cost to them of 
switching their business from us." 
Incrementally over time, parts of the meta-architecture of 
the target environment will be instantiated as a growing 
macro-architecture, with sufficient detail being brought in 
at each stage to lay down attainable objectives for the 
current medium-term tactical plans. 
The Micro-Architectural Level: This is the level at which 
specific statements of IT strategies and architectures are 
made. 
e.g. "We will install computer terminals on our customers' 
premises, at our own cost, giving them direct access 
to our product catalogues and order-entry system and 
thereby encouraging them to place x% or more of their 
business with us." 
"We will give the design departments of our customers 
direct access to our inventory system, via their own 
CAD/CAM equipment, to ensure that at least x% by value 
of their product content is sourced from us." 
The micro-architecture of the target environment will 
specify complete details and goals for realization in 
short-term action plans. 
It may now be seen how the organizational IT learning loops, are 
the converse of incremental IT strategy implementation. In 
Figure 3, the arcs to the left of the Boxes represent the three 
levels of IT strategy implementation - customization, 
instantiation and realization. The arcs to the right represent 
the levels or loops of organizational IT learning. 
Whenever strategic IT decisions are made, they are evaluated 
against the next higher level shown in the Figure, so that errors 
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can be identified and eliminated. If, in some action plan, an 
apparent error in the micro-architecture (Section 4.4.I.) can be 
corrected either in the micro-architecture itself or in the 
macro-architecture (Section 4.4.I.), the organization can 
continue with its business vision for IT as currently understood, 
and single-loop learning is said to have occurred. If, however, 
the error can only be corrected by re-instantiation of the 
macro-architecture (e.g. because some assumption was mistaken, or 
because the role of IT in the business strategy has changed in 
some way), double-loop learning is said to have occurred. If 
correcting the error requires re-customization of the 
meta-architecture (e.g. because decision makers' ideas about 
creativity and the management of innovation have changed, or 
indeed simply because the decision making framework is to be 
changed), then second-order learning is said to have occurred. 
In this way, the learning loops provide the essential adaptive 
mechanisms that make incremental implementation of a Target 
Environment Architecture feasible, and justify "directed 
incrementalism" as an acceptable principle in strategic IT 
decision making. In practice, the loops will be imbedded in 
formal learning systems (Section 4.6.IV.) and in implementation 
control processes (Section 4.5.III.). 
The levels of implementation, architecture and learning are also 
useful in analyzing Types I and II relationships. For example, a 
systems designer may strongly believe that a set of online 
dialogue screens should be structured in a certain way (Structure 
Component- Information Systems). The intended user may 
disagree, believing that it will not match the way the 
department's work is organized (Structure Component - Human 
Systems), and conventional wisdom will dictate that the user's 
view must prevail. Both the designer and the user are, however, 
creatures of their circumstances and neither has an automatic 
claim to being right about what the future will require. 
Tracking each party's argument up the levels of discourse, 
ultimately to the concepts of "strategic business system" and 
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"purpose" (Section 4.3), will determine which view is the correct 
one, if either is. 
IV. TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES 
A great many tools and techniques for specific purposes in 
strategic IT decision making have been proposed. It is an aim of 
this Framework to show how they can be brought together as a 
practical tool-kit, and to encourage IT decision makers into new 
ways of thinking with the help of these tools. 
It is beyond the scope of this Study to offer anything like a 
complete listing of them, nor is it possible to prescribe some 
subset as being applicable to all or even most companies. The 
tools and techniques mentioned in Chapter 4, in Appendixes c, D 
and E, and in Questions 108 to 142 of the Survey Questionnaire 
(Appendix B) have been selected for their special relevance to 
the line of thinking developed in this Framework. 
0000000 
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4.2 DECISION MAKING CONTEXT 
I. THE IT PLANNING ENVIRONMENT 
Uncovering the key issues in a company's strategic IT planning 
environment requires much more than simply postulating an age of 
"chaos", "turbulence" or "transition" through which IT is to help 
the company pass, profitably and securely, to a more stable and 
better understood future - an "information society" [Naisbitt, 
1984: Ch. 1], or a "systems age" [Ackoff, 1981: 13], or an age of 
"electronic cottages" in a "global economy" [Toffler, 1981: 204, 
335]. 
Change, turbulence and the global spread of a company's operating 
environment have been facts of business life since the breakdown ' 
of the feudal system. Indeed, business cannot survive 
''without ex>nstantly revolutionizing the i.nst.nnoonts of 
production, arrl thereby the relations of production, arrl 
with them the Yhlole relations of society. Constant 
revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted distw:banoe of 
all social ex>rrlitions, everlasting tmeertainty arrl 
agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch fran all earlier 
ones. '!he need of a ex>nstantly exparrling market for 
its products chases the bourgeoisie CNer the Yhlole surface 
of the globe." [MarX & EnJels, 1848: 207] 
Strategic IT decision makers must probe beneath appearances to 
uncover the underlying forces shaping the company's environment. 
They must also examine their own underlying beliefs and 
assumptions, which determine their view of the world, before they 
can come up with a reasonably objective list of "critical success 
factors" [Boynton & Zmud, 1984; Bullen & Rockart, 1981; Rockart, 
1979], or a "SWOT" list (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats),-that is significant enough to hold the keys to 
successful competitive performance through the use of IT. 
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" the real validity of a plan depems as nuch on the 
relevancy of the partirul.ar assunpti.ons that management 
brin:]s to bear on the prd>lem as it does on the accuracy of 
the logical process enployed. Consequently, the inportant 
research questions bpcmp: 'Ha.rl might we expose 
management IS urxierlyin;J assunpti.ons? I an:l 1Ha.ri might we 
stinul.ate management to adept a broader an:l nore CX>IlSide.red 
view of the plarmin;J prd:>lem?" [Mason, 1969: B-404] 
Recent research reported by Ireland, Hitt, Bettis & De Porras 
[1987] confirms Lawrence and Lersch's [1967] basic thesis, that 
different tasks at different levels of the same organization 
cause managers to focus on different indicators of strengths and 
weaknesses. Their planning assumptions differ, and they view the 
operating environment differently. The aim of the decision 
making process must, therefore, be to help them understand how 
their assumptions affect the way they interpret the environmental 
data, and how the fact their interpretations differ from those of 
other decision makers confronted by the same data results in a 
variety of world views within the same management team. 
It is this variety of world views [Mason & Mitroff, 1981: 172, 
188], and the interactions among them, that constitute the 
Context of strategic IT decision making. 
Mackenzie's [1986] concept of "organizational congruency" 
provides a theme around which to organize the study of these 
inter-relationships, and an appropriate frame of reference for 
the dialectical enquiry described in Section 4.2.III. 
"'!here are two main types of CO:n:Jnlency. '!he first is 
called structural/functionaljenviromnental (SFE) 
congruency. SFE CO:n:Jnlency describes the fit anDTg the 
enviromnents, the mission, goals, strategies, an:l tactics 
of the organization, the organizational Technology an:l 
results. • • • '!he secon:i type of congruency is called 
bonii.rg 001gruency. Borxlirg congruency describes the fit 
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between the organizatim am its assooiates. n [Mackenzie, 
1986: 73] 
The application of this concept in the present Framework is 
illustrated in Figure 4: 
First Row: The environmental data and the current IT 
strategy, as reflected in existing operational systems and 
development projects, can be analyzed in a dialectical 
enquiry or "structured debate" [Mason, 1969:· B-408] to 
expose the beliefs and assumptions that must have 
influenced the way managers interpreted the data in 
arriving at this strategy. The aim is to produce a new 
synthesis of data, interpretations, assumptions and 
strategies, which can be organized into a system of 
opportunities and threats, strengths and weaknesses, and 
critical success factors, on which to build a business 
strategy that exploits IT. 
Second Row: Competitive strategy and organizational design 
are complementary activities, in the same way that 
entrepreneurial effectiveness and administrative efficiency 
are complementary management attributes [Drucker, 1979: 
43-45]. Congruency between strategy and structure is not, 
however, an automatic consequence of strategic decisions -
it has to be planned, organized, implemented, controlled, 
differently according to circumstances: 
"Fadl generic strategy jnplies different skills am 
requi.renelts for success, which cc.amrv;:ml.y translate 
into differences in organizational stzucture am 
rul.ture. Cost leadership usually jnplies tight 
control systems, overhead minimization, prrsuit of 
scale ecx:>nanies' am dedication to the lecu:nirg 
cw:ve: these could be oounte:rproductive for a finn 
att:.e.npti.n;J to differentiate itself through a constant 
stream of creative new products." (Fbrter, 1985: 23] 
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'11Jhe failure to develq> a new internal structure, 
like the failure to resporrl to new external 
cgx:>:rbmities am needs, [is] a CXI'lSeqllellOe of 
over-oonoentratian an q>eratianal activities by the 
executives :responsible for the destiny of their 
enteJ:prises, or (of] their inability, because of past 
t.rainirg am Erlucatian am present position, to 
develq> an entrepreneurial a.ttlook." [Olarrller, 1962: 
15-16] 
The driving force for congruency between strategy and 
structure in IT decision making can come from either of two 
directions - from an innovative use of IT in competitive 
strategy that demands corresponding changes in 
organizational structures and processes, or from an 
innovative use of IT in organizational design - jobs, 
workgroups, business units and the inter-relationships 
among them - that creates new opportunities for competitive 
strategy. 
In this Framework, therefore, it is suggested that an 
innovative use of IT can be analyzed in two complementary 
ways - as an impact on the company's competitive strategy 
and organizational design, and as a widening of the "limits 
of rationality" [Bakopoulos & Treacy: 1985, 5-7] that will 
permit managers consciously to research, design and 
initiate such impacts • 
This leads to a second kind of congruency in IT strategy -
that between the competence of the company as a competing 
organization in its industry and market places and the 
competence of its IT decision makers, individually and 
collectively. 
Third Row: The "distinctive competence" of a company (Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978: 25-26] has two parts: a competitive part, 
i.e. the company's potential for superior performance in 
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bringing its resources to bear in its market activities; 
and an organizational part, i.e. its potential for superior 
performance in utilizing its resources in the creation of 
its product. These potentials can only be realized to the 
extent that strategic IT decision making is in the hands of 
a management team who are, collectively, competent 
entrepreneurs, administrators and IT planners. 
"Ten years ago, rdxxly was very interested in doirq 
info:nna.tion t.edmology strategies. Today, the vast 
majority of large c:xxrpanies have tried to do it -am 
failed. 'lhis is not because it can't be done - it's 
because the wron;;r people are doirq it, the wrong way, 
in the wrong ti.meframe, am with the wron;;r 
oojectives. II [Benjamin, Seminar E-ol: Section 2-2] 
It is through carefully planned processes of organizational 
development, and the body of behavioural science knowledge 
and techniques available to support them, that the required 
congruency between company development and decision maker 
development can be achieved. This would, in turn, require 
a realization by the management team that competitive 
strategy and organizational design call for different 
decision making skills, and hence a rearrangement of their 
strategic problem solving processes around this reality. 
In short, the conditions for both company and decision 
maker development have to be created. 
"An integral part of the c:banJe project could be an 
examination am c:hanJe in the O:rgani.zatiOJ'l IS problem 
hanllirq or management. 'lhrough a relatively small 
additional investment in time am effort, the char¥Je 
effort could do double duty - :resolvin;J the "problem" 
at ham am providirq an owortunity to develc:p, 
practice, am evaluate inproved organizational problem-
hamlin;} styles. II [Beckhard & Harris 1 1977: 89] 
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Fourth Row: Achieving and sustaining the above two kinds 
of congruency requires that a company possess some means of 
ensuring it adapts strategy and structure as the operating 
environment changes, and that its managers learn, 
individually and collectively, to become increasingly 
effective in making IT decisions. 
The problem can be seen as that of ensuring that individual 
1earning does indeed become organizational. In this 
Framework, it is suggested that this can be achieved by 
developing an explicit set of "shared images and maps", 
embodying a common management vision for the future of the 
company, the role of IT in creating that future, and the 
way in which the company should progress towards that 
vision over time. 
The role of IT can be analyzed in terms of the purposes it 
serves in competitive strategy and the uses to which it is 
put in organizational design. If a third kind of requisite 
congruency is accepted - that between the purposes and uses 
of IT - then managing IT strategy can be seen as a matter 
of learning to manage purposes and uses. Creating new 
insights into the purposes of IT in competitive strategy 
will be the focus of entrepreneurial competence, and 
translating these into appropriate uses of IT in 
organizational design will be the focus of administrative 
competence. 
Figure 4 is in essence a new look at the traditional formulation 
and implementation steps of strategic problem solving [cf. Bower, 
1982(2)]. Horizontally, the rows depict the three major 
congruencies (objectives) that have to be created and managed 
between the categories represented by the boxes; vertically, the 
columns depict the matches or fits (constraints) that have to be 
achieved between these categories. The aim is to provide a 
platform for a radically "new management point of view" 
[McFar1an, 1984: 102-103] in strategic IT planning, based on the 
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understanding that interactive planning in general, and strategic 
IT decision making in particular, is a complex task full of 
contradictions and pitfalls. 
"· •• strategy fonrul.ation is a negative activity in the 
sense that it requires a testin;J of the p:emises on whidl 
the organization is qlerati..n}. 'lhi.s dlal.lerge is a 
socially disruptive foroe. social ~zatian resists 
dlanJe, an:i its study an:i introducticm can interfere with 
the executive's role as leader •••• the activities that 
constitute exploiti..n} the strength of the organization an:i 
those that represent a testin;J of strength against the 
qp:>rttmities an:i risks posed by a ~:in;J envi.ronnw:mt. aie 
hard to distirguish. 
"If one seeks to be too systematic, it is easy to focus oo 
a tiny piece of activity that is obviously strategic an:i 
lose the inportance of the wole pattent, the seminal 
elements of which aie seldan systematic." [~, 1982 (1) : 
630] 
The relationships between dialectic and development portrayed in 
Figure 4 are not historical or inevitable processes in a Hegelian 
or Marxian sense. They depend entirely on the quality of 
management thinking, vision and effort, and on the reliability of 
the analysis of externai and internal environmental data: There 
are, unfortunately, many reasons why the relationships can fail 
in practice. 
"When sareone is asked how he would behave urner certain 
c:ircumstances, the aJlS\\1er he usually gives is his espoused 
theory of action for that situation. '!his is the theory of 
action to which he gives allegiance an:i whidl, upon 
n!qllest., he oanmunicates to others. However, the theory 
that actually governs his actions is his theory-in-use, 
mi.ch may or may not be OCilJlatible with his espoused 
t:heOry; furthenrore, the inti vidual may or may not be 
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aware of the ilxxmpatibility of the two theories." [Argyris ··· 
& SchOn, 1978: 11] 
Moreover, people do not always speak the t~th as they know it 
when communicating their espoused theories: 
"First, the :researc:ber can be misled because pecple want 
it that way. People lie, evade, ard ~ deceive the 
field~rker in rn.nnerous ard inventive ways •••• 'lhe secx:ni 
way a researdler can be misled in et:hnograply is when cme • s 
info:rmants are themselves misled ard Wl:'Ol'g about matters of 
their oonoezn. • • • 'Dle third way an et:1mograp1er can be 
misled is because info:rmants are saret.ines totally unaware 
of certain aspects urxierlyin;J many of their own 
activities. Like fish who are presumably unaware of the 
water in which they swim ••• " [Van Maanen, 1979: 544-546] 
A third difficulty is the unsuitability of generally available IT 
problem solving techniques to the "ill-structured" problems of IT 
strategy. Ill-structured problems have one or more of the 
following characteristics [Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979: 1; cf. 
Ackoff, 1981: 52]: 
The problem can be clearly stated, but decision makers 
cannot agree on an appropriate solution or strategy. 
They cannot agree on a methodology for developing such a 
strategy. 
They cannot agree on a clear formulation of the problem 
(objectives, controllable variables, uncontrollable 
variables). 
In particular, strategic IT decision making is an organizational 
ill-structured problem, in that it requires the commitment of 
many people to strategy formulation, implementation and control. 
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Four criteria for a good approach to analyzing the IT planning 
environment can be inferred from the above discussion [Mason, 
1969: B-406; Wood, 1981: 195]: 
It should expose the assumptions underlying a proposed plan 
so that management can reconsider them. 
It should suggest new and more relevant assumptions upon 
which the data may be re-interpreted and the planning 
process can proceed. 
It should expose fictitious espoused theories, and either 
eliminate them from the debate or accept them as realities 
of the organizational situation - what Van Maanen (1979] 
calls "the facts of fiction". 
The data analysis should not rely solely on formal 
truejfalse logic, but also on a model of change, conflict 
and development in an organization that "is simultaneously 
trying to realize an ideal for itself and to discover what 
ideal it wants to realize" 
The Hegelian dialectic provides precisely such a model. It is, 
however, crucially important to have a very competent facilitator 
to conduct the process, since 
"everything deperrls on the details of its execution, on 
lihether the 'life of the content • really displays 
dialectical inter-connections am t.errlencies, am on how 
well the practitioner of the dialectical nethod is able to 
establish eadl specific connection am transition by good 
arguiients." [Wood, 1981: 199] 
The Marxian prescription for the resolution of conflicts and the 
transformation of organization structures, i.e. revolution, is 
not of course advocated in this Framework. Here, the analogues 
of class and revolution are the decision making domains described 
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in the following Section and the transition stages described in 
Section 4.5.II. Implementing the Framework in practice, as 
described in Chapter 5, can be structured in terms of the four 
categories of "dialectical activity" shown in Figure 4 • . 
II. DECISION MAKING DOMAINS 
A simp1e test (the Vroom-Yetton model) shows that under the 
conditions described in the preceding Section, the most effective 
decision making style is as follows: 
-You share a problem with your subordinates as a group. 
Together you generate am evaluate alternatives am attenpt 
to :reach agreement (consensus) on a solution. Your role is 
1lllCh like that of chainnan. You do not try to influ~ 
the group to adopt •your • solution arrl you are willing to 
accept arrl inplement any solution that has the SlJR)Ort of 
the entire group." [V:rcx:xn, 1974: 67] 
The essential point is that strategic IT decision makers from 
different backgrounds bring different contributions to the 
process, and through dialectical enquiry generate new insights 
that culminate in a shared vision of an ideal company-wide IT 
environment. The architectural blueprints and action plans per 
se are of secondary importance. 
Strategic IT opportunities, i.e. good matches between purpose and 
use, can be sought an~·found in any part of the organization. 
For example, the American Hospital Supply Corporation order-entry 
system [EDP Analyzer, January, 1984: 4] was originally conceived 
as an operational and management control response to business 
strategy. Its effect on the company's market share apparently 
came as a surprise to management. In general, 
• . . . research irrli.cates that strategically oriented 
infonnation technology applications can be generated at all 
organizational levels. In fact, JOOSt of the effective 
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cg>lications -we have seen have been developed spontaneously 
at lower levels within the ozganizatiat." [Benjamin, 
Rockart, Scott !ok>rton & Wyman, 1984: 5] 
Since almost anyone with some insight into the business can 
participate in dialectical enquiry, some selection principles are 
evidently called for. Figure 5 shows four decision making 
"domains" in an organization, from each of which participants can 
be drawn for the different contributions they can make. 
A. Business and IT 
The two vertical columns of Figure 5 are based on Benson & 
Parker's (1985: 8] concept of a "business" and a "technology" 
domain. 
In the business domain, strategic issues tend to reflect 
management's responsibility for clarifying the direction and 
goals of the business, in a turbulent social, economic and 
political environment. In the IT domain, they reflect the 
responsibility to understand the business strategy and to be 
ready with timeous, stable support, in a rapidly changing 
technological environment. 
The environmental variables scanned in the two domains relate to 
different kinds of issue, have different rates of change, and are 
measured in different ways. For example, market opportunities 
have to be grasped within very short time frames, often a matter 
of months. Projected costs and revenue can be precisely 
calculated and discounted, to arrive at an investment decision. 
IT applications, on the other hand, tend to have long development 
lead times, cost impacts that will be felt many years after 
implementation, and, except in the simplest cost-displacement 
types of application, benefits that are quite difficult to 
quantify and project. 
Clearly, problems expressed in the language of one domain are 
unlikely to be understood by people in the other domain. A 
significant IT decision could be made by default, or by the wrong 
person, with no perception at the time that a strategic decision 
is in fact being made - as when the selection of crucial database 
management software is left to relatively junior technical 
people, or wheq business management enforces unrealistic 
development deadlines to the detriment of system quality. 
Problems of this kind can usually be diagnosed by comparing a 
company's stated business plans with its actual IT expenditures. 
Not enough resource may be invested in IT overall, or in 
applications identifiable as strategic, or in relation to what 
the competition is investing. Conversely, a company may be 
spending heavily on IT to differentiate itself and its products 
in the eyes of buyers, while at the same time trying to compete 
on price. Or it may be providing extensive end-user programming 
facilities, with no means of measuring the increase in 
organizational effectiveness this is intended to produce. 
The communication gap between the business and IT domains is in 
part a matter of functional area orientation and responsibility, 
but it arises out of quite fundamental differences of personal 
background, training and point of view. Nolan [1982: Ch. 22] 
suggested that business needs a "new breed" of DP manager with 
sufficient grasp of both the business and IT domains to resolve 
these differences. It seems unlikely, however, that such people 
can be developed in sufficient numbers, in south Africa at any 
rate, to make this a credible generic human resource strategy for 
IT. 
Instead, the acceptance of separate business and IT domains as a 
fact of life can provide a basis for effective, company-wide IT 
decision making. Conflict and contradiction - in ends, ways, 
means and priorities - are accepted as organizational realities, 
and indeed welcomed as the stuff of dialectical enquiry and a 
source of innovative solutions. 
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The kind of conflict that arises out of role confusion is another 
matter. What contributions to IT decisions have to be made by 
-
whom, when, and on the basis of what knowledge, is a crucial 
issue that has to be cleared up before productive dialectic can 
take place. The problem is particularly important in companies 
where decentralization of IT responsibilities has led to the 
I 
emergence of "business systems departments", "user programmers" 
and a variety of new jobs whose incumbents see themselves as IT 
experts of one kind or another. 
B. Inside and Outside the System 
The "competitive weapon" stories of the IT literature invariably 
show that the purposes of strategic applications go far beyond 
conventional notions of "user needs". For example, a company may 
install an inter-organizational order-taRing system to cause its 
clients to place more orders with it, or to make it difficult for 
the client to switch to another supplier. The information 
supplied to the client is the means, not the end, of the system. 
Similarly, 
"In testinony before the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 
Frontier Airlines alleged that United Airlines, 
developer-owner of AroU.O, a widely used reservation 
system, was enjoying unfair carrpetitive advantage by 
m:mitoring loading factors of carrpetitors ani then using 
the system to either lower prices or broadcast special 
nessages to travel agents." [cash & I<onsynski, 1985: 135; 
Harvard Business School, 1983] 
The purpose of such applications is primarily to modify the 
behaviour of users and operators, who work within the context of 
the system, in the manner needed to serve the aims of the owners 
and developers, who work outside the system. 
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c. The Four Domains 
The above pairs of categories, taken together, lead to the four 
domains shown in Figure 5: 
OWners: Decision makers who determine company strategy. 
They have the authority to commission projects for the 
development of IT infrastructure and business systems (i.e. 
organizational processes together with the information 
systems that support them), to allocate the financial, 
human and other resources the projects require, and to set 
priorities. 
Developers: Decision makers who develop and implement IT 
architecture. They have the responsibility for designing 
and building IT infrastructure and business systems, 
planning the utilization of resources allocated for this 
purpose, and managing implementation. It should be noted 
that organization and methods (O&M) specialists are 
specifically included in this domain, since this Framework 
does not permit the separation of organizational process 
design from information system design. 
Users: Decision makers who determine how the infrastructure 
and application systems will be used, and in fact use 
them. They have the responsibility for ensuring that the 
proper match between organizational process and information 
system is maintained, and that both remain congruent with 
the strategic purposes for which they were designed. 
Operators: Decision makers who manage the infrastructure 
and run the application systems. These are the data 
processing managers, computer operators, network 
controllers and so forth who deliver the ongoing 
development and production services of the infrastructure. 
They acquire resources in accordance with policies and 
budgets, and administer their utilization. 
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An architecture for generic IT decision making roles, tasks and 
responsibilities, based on these four domains, is described in 
Section 4.4.V. It will be seen there that, as far as individual 
tasks are concerned, the domains are not mutually exclusive. For 
example, an applications programmer would be a developer relative 
to the information systems dimension of the target environment, 
but a user relative to the infrastructure dimension. The 
important point is that the four domains represent different 
roles, responsibilities and interactions with the environment, 
and hence different world views and goal systems [Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967: Ch. 2]. 
The criteria suggested for choosing participants in the 
dialectical enquiry of this Component are adapted from similar 
criteria for selecting participants in information systems design 
[Anderson, E.E., 1985]: 
Business Domain: Persons with sufficient knowledge and 
experience of IT and its applications to be able to 
contribute meaningfully to the enquiry. 
Owners: Senior managers who· are willing to become 
involved in IT decision making, and to make available 
the time and other resources needed for productive, 
participative decision making. 
"In order for IS to become a viable CCITipErt:itive 
weapon, senior managenent nrust urrlerst.an:i hc::M IS 
may inpact the oc::anpetitive envi.romnent am 
strategy of the business. SUch an urrlerst.an:ling 
will enable managers to direct IS resources to 
the finn's IIDSt inp:>rtant targets. 11 [Parsons, 
1983: 4] 
Users: Persons who can perceive and evaluate the job, 
inter-personal and organizational changes that are 
likely to flow from the decisions. 
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IT Domain: Persons with insight into business issues 
generally and the company's business in particular. 
Developers: Persons who can put sufficient structure 
into problems to allow enquiry to begin, overcoming or 
absorbing special departmental arrangements. 
Operators: Persons with a willingness to allow 
non-technical people a substantial influence in 
determining technical directions. 
Guidelines for forming and conducting working groups in 
dialectical enquiry can be taken from the Nominal Group 
Techniques (Delbecq, Van de Ven & Gustafson, 1975] and from Mason 
& Mitroff's [1981: 112-122] "dialectical debate". 
III. DIALECTICAL ENQUIRY 
Russell (1961: 109-111] defines "dialectic" as a method of 
seeking knowledge by question and answer. 
"IDgical errors are, I think, of greater practical 
inportanoe than many people believe; they enable their 
perpetrators to hold the c::nnfortable opinion on every 
subject in tmn. Any logically cx:herent body of doctrine 
is sure to be in part painful am oorrt:rary to current 
prejudices." [Russell, 1961: 11o-111] 
The two particular dialectical techniques proposed for the 
analysis of the environmental factors are: 
Mason's "dialectical debate" [Mason, 1969; Mason & Mitroff, 
1981; Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979]. This technique derives 
from the "thesis, antithesis, synthesis" paradigm commonly 
associated with Hegel, through which "successively richer 
definitions [are generated] by exhibiting each of them as 
solving the particular difficulties inherent in the one 
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which precedes it." [Wood, 1981: 198] 
Bayes• [1985] "means-ways-ends" inversion of the 
conventional "ends-ways-means" paradigm of strategic 
planning. 
The former is the logic proposed for exposing and analyzing the 
underlying assumptions of strategic IT decision makers. The 
latter is the logic proposed for the complementary analysis of 
environmental data, as described in Section 4.2.IV. 
A. The Aims of the Method 
The Mason & Mitroff method addresses three major weaknesses 
commonly encountered in strategic IT decision making: 
Failure to consider in a systematic and explicit way 
strongly differing alternatives for IT policies and 
projects. 
Organizational self-sealing, which makes it difficult to 
challenge preferred policies and traditional ways of 
selecting and implementing IT. 
Superficial criticisms directed at the surface 
characteristics of an IT proposal (e.g. whether it is 
consistent, complete and well-documented - although these 
are obviously important issues), but not at challenging the 
underlying assumptions (e.g. why this proposal and not 
another- indeed why an IT solution at all?). 
[cf. Mitroff & Emshoff, 1979]. 
The same difficulties that arise in IT strategy research (Section 
3.II.A.) make it impractical for managers to test proposed 
policies and projects empirically. The best course that is 
normally available is systematically to develop and challenge 
radically different alternatives. The strongest challenges would 
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be expected to come from counter-proposals that penetrate deepest 
to the underlying assumptions. 
Conflict and contradiction are needed to generate maximally 
opposing proposals, and to ferret out and challenge the 
underlying assumptions of each proponent. Commitment is needed 
if the participants are to make the strongest possible case for 
their respective points of view. Flexibility and vision are 
needed to perceive and accept solutions that synthesize 
apparently contradictory proposals. 
Strongly opposing standpoints can, however, result in such a 
polarization of opinions that neither synthesis nor compromise is 
possible. If this happens, participative decision making fails, 
and leadership must revert to one of the other styles in the 
Vroom-Yetton model [Vroom, 1974: 67]. 
In summary, the objectives of dialectical enquiry may be stated 
as follows: 
To help surface for explicit examination the assumptions 
that underlie proposed IT policies and projects. 
To compare and evaluate these assumptions. 
To examine how the proposals are related to the 
assumptions, and the assumptions to the available data. 
To formulate new, originally unforeseen strategies, based 
on originally unseen assumptions, and, possibly, on a 
better understanding of the data. 
B. Generating Alternatives 
Typically, the process begins where some, probably not many, of a 
company's managers have a vague idea that the company needs an IT 
strategy. Often, several IT policies and strategic applications 
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will already have been implemented, ad-hoc and piecemeal. 
The four steps of the method are shown in Figure 6. 
Step ~ - Surfacing current Assumptions: This Step works 
backwards from strategies to assumptions. 
What are the original strategies? Assess the-· 
significant elements of existing IT strategy, as 
revealed in existing infrastructure, policies, 
application systems, organizational processes and job 
designs, human resource plans, and IT management 
processes. 
What are the relevant data for these strategies? 
Identify and evaluate the critical environmental 
factors (Section 4.2.IV.). 
What are the underlying assumptions? Identify the 
assumptions decision makers must have held which, 
considered together with the data, allow the existing 
strategy to be deduced as a consequence. The 
identification of differences, contradictions .. and 
conflicts is the crucial element - e.g. differences 
between organizational and personal goals, between 
theories-in-use and espoused theories, and between the 
business domain and the IT domain. 
The success of this step will depend critically on the 
skill of the facilitator in drawing out assumptions and 
revealing contradictions. 
Step 2 - Dialectic: In this Step, each of the assumptions 
previously identified is reformulated as a counter 
assumption that negates the spirit of the original 
statement. The point here is that plausible counter 
assumptions can be used, deductively, to identify entirely 
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new business and IT strategies, in the presence of exactly 
the same environmental data. It is clear from Mason's 
[1969: B-410] examples that negating the spirit of an 
assumption is much more subtle than simply inserting "not" 
into the original statement. 
Step 3 - Integrating Assumptions~ This is the logical 
continuation of the Dialectic Step, the synthesis that 
follows negation. At the start of the Step, a large pool 
of original and new strategies will have been obtained. By 
a process similar to that of Step 1,· the subset of original 
and negated assumptions is identified which, when coupled 
with the data, allows the strategies in the pool to be 
deduced as consequences. 
Thus, instead of trying to resolve contradictions between 
the alternatives directly at the resultant level of 
strategy, the process concentrates on negotiating a pool of 
assumptions that the decision makers are willing to accept 
as given conditions for the formulation of new but 
apparently acceptable IT strategies. 
It was found in the relevant research that by dealing on 
the level of assumptions decision makers were able to reach 
agreements that would not otherwise have been obtainable. 
There can be no guarantee, however, that a significant pool 
of acceptable assumptions will always emerge. If it does 
not, then synthesis is not possible by any means, short of 
imposing one person's view on all others. 
Step 4 - The Business Vision for IT: The final Step is the 
creation of a composite set of alternative strategies and 
the identification of a "best strategy". The output of 
this Step is a new view of the company's IT strategy 
alternatives, expressed in broad, intuitive terms. Since 
it ·is thoroughly grounded in an agreed set of acceptable 
assumptions and a closely corresponding analysis of the 
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critical environmental data, it constitutes appropriate 
input to the Content Component of the Framework. 
In the Content Component, conventional, deductive 
management techniques can be used to develop an exact, 
operational formulation of the "the business vision" of the 
purposes and uses of IT in the company. This formulation 
will, in turn, be used as input to the Structure Component, 
where IT tools and techniques will be used to develop the 
architectural blueprints.of the target environment. 
Mason & Mitroff [1981] provide detailed guidelines for carrying 
out a dialectical enquiry exercise. Whether and how the groups 
participating in the exercise will continue to be involved in the 
other Components of the Framework is a matter of company choice, 
and the way it manages the broader issues of organizational 
dialectic, development and learning. General guidelines are 
discussed in Section 4.4.V. (Human Resource Architecture) and 
Section 4.5.III. (Management Structures and Processes for 
Transition) • 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL DATA 
Scanning the business environment and analyzing environmental 
variables is a major task in any organization with a commitment 
to planning. Two additional tasks are called for in this 
Framework: a sharpening of focus on the specifically IT-related 
issues and their potential impacts on the business, and a shift 
in emphasis from predicting the likely future to shaping a 
desirable one. 
The details of scanning and analysis can be carried out by 
corporate planning staff, supplemented as required by the IT 
support organization described in Section 4.4.V.C.2. The results 
of the analysis, however, enter the dialectic enquiry as the 
"Data" in each of the four Steps of Figure 6, and as background 
in the resulting Corporate IT Scenario(s) (Section 4.2.IV.C.) •• 
I 
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The method described below is based on: 
Hayes• [1985] "means-ways-ends" paradigm for strategic 
planning. 
Bates' [1985] "MAP" for monitoring, analyzing and 
predicting environmental variables. 
Etzioni's [1985] synthesis of the incrementalist and 
rationalist-comprehensive approaches to strategic planning 
into a third approach he calls "mixed scanning". 
A. Generic Environmental Categories 
There are many ways to classify environmental variables. In 
practice a company will choose a model that has some affinity 
with its own corporate culture and management practices. The 
schema shown in Appendix D is based on a number of sources and 
may be regarded as a set of generic environmental categories. 
The following Sections are then a method of customizing and 
instantiating the schema. 
B. Analyzing the Environmental Data 
The problem is to select from a vast range of rapidly changing 
environmental factors those few that are critical to the company, 
and to introduce them effectively into the dialectical enquiry. 
1. The Aims of Environmental Analysis 
Hayes [1985: 112] argues that, under certain circumstances, the 
methodology of formal strategic planning and the organizational 
attitudes and relationships it cultivates can impair a company's 
ability to compete. The problems stem from the traditional 
"ends-ways- means" paradigm: 
" ••• establish oo:rporate objectives (et'Ds) : given those 
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objectives, develop a strategy (ways) for att:ainir¥] them: 
then marshal the resources (means) necessary to i:aplement 
the strategy o II (Hayes, 1985: 112) 
His criticisms of this model as it is usually carried out are 
particularly relevant to IT strategy: 
Ends: Companies often choose goals that are too short-term 
and hence tend to be episodic. Also, goals tend to be 
highly quantitative and they encourage managers in the 
belief that anything not quantitative is not important, and 
that the same goals have the same values for all employees 
at all levels of the organization. 
Ways: Short term goals back companies into modes of 
thinking based on forecasts (what management thinks is 
going to happen) rather than on visions (what management 
wants to happen). Planning horizons become short and much 
more time is spent on "hard", measurable effort, e.g. new 
capital investment, or changing the organization chart, 
than on "soft" corporate culture issues, e.g. the rationale 
of executive appraisal and reward systems, or changing the 
organization's concept of "quality" 
Means: Strategic planning tends to devote most of its 
attention to just one resource, finance, since this is 
readily transferable and convertible into other resources. 
Other resources, however, such as technology, market 
position, and organizational skills, are crucial precisely 
because they are not readily transferable, and a strategy 
based on buying them at short notice is seldom feasible. 
Logic: The logic of ends-ways-means assumes that the world 
of competition is predictable: that reasonable objectives 
can always be achieved through purposeful activity, wi.th 
measurable rates of progress: that organizational values 
and needs will remain stable over the planning period: that 
.., _. ~. '•: - "•" .. ' '. . . .. :-· ~ . 
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· managers can assemble resources in the required timeframe; 
and that responsibility for organizational success rests 
primarily on the shoulders of top management. 
Hayes• [1985: 118] proposal is "to turn the ends-ways-means 
paradigm on its head: "means-ways-ends" In the context of the 
present Framework, his explanation can be interpreted as follows: 
Means: A company should begin by investing in its IT 
capabilities along a broad frorit. It should invest in IT 
infrastructure and general-purpose applications that would 
be useful across a range of business activities. At the 
same time, IT decision makers should be developed in the 
specifics of their own domain and in a general appreciation 
of the other three domains. The company should acquire and 
experiment with new IT to an extent it believes it can 
afford, focusing funds and activity on a few critical 
technologies and systems but spreading them more widely 
throughout the organization. 
Ways: As these capabilities develop, and as IT and market 
opportunities appear, the company should encourage managers 
and employees at all levels of the organization to identify 
and exploit congruencies between IT purposes and uses. Top 
management's job is "to facilitate this kind of 
entrepreneurial activity, provide it with resources from 
other parts of the organization, and where feasible 
encourage cooperative activities." 
Ends: To develop business plans and then to seek IT 
capability will seldom succeed as a strategy, because of 
the uncertainty of resources and long development lead 
times. Instead, the company should selectively build IT 
capability in anticipation of likely business plans, and 
then encourage innovative ways of exploiting it. According 
to Hayes [1985: 118], the guiding force will not come from 
directives and controls, but rather from a balance between 
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integration and direction. The former arises out of a sense 
of organizational unity and camaraderie, and the latter out 
of shared values rooted in a long-term vision of the kind 
of company its people want it to become. 
Thus the aim of environmental analysis is to uncover external 
opportunities and internal strengths that can be turned into 
means and ways (qualified by the need to manage threats and 
weaknesses) for a variety of ends that have at least some 
likelihood of arising in the future. 
2. The Process of Environmental Analysis 
Bates• [1985] framework covering the three stages of 
environmental analysis - monitoring, analyzing and predicting 
("MAP") - is adapted in this Framework and extended to include 
both the internal and the external environment. ·In the 
Monitoring (or scanning) stage, environmental information is 
sorted into: 
Environmental Variables: A first sorting of the information 
(i.e. customization of the schema in Appendix D) by 
corporate planning staff produces a list of all the factors 
that affect the company in some way. 
Relevant Variables: A second sorting reduces the list to 
variables that have substantial influence on company 
strategies. These include "enabling" technologies with 
potential application in the organization, as well as 
"limiting" technologies which are unavailable or inadequate 
for company objectives. Participants in the dialectical 
enquiry are involved in this sorting, since it is closely 
related to their assumptions. 
Critical Variables: Finally, a short list is produced of 
those relevant variables in which changes are expected to 
have a critical influence on the company in the period 
Page 116 
under consideration. This is instantiation, which involves 
assigning values and rates or directions of change to the 
variables • 
.,;.. 
(A fourth class contains "essential variables" - those 
which it is essential to consider,. but which are not 
expected to change substantially in the period under 
consideration.) 
Clearly, the classification of a variable can change over time, 
or as a result of changes in other variables, or as a result of 
changing assumptions. Also, at the start of the dialectical 
enquiry the classification of a variable from the business point 
of view may be quite different than from an IT point of view. 
In the Analysis stage, the attempt is made to understand how the 
environment works, so that likely futures can be anticipated and 
desired futures planned for. Three kinds of relationship are 
examined: 
Between Critical Variables and Global Variables: Are the 
critical variables affected by different political, 
economic, international and other global states? Do they 
have different impacts on the company according to the 
global states? 
Among the critical Variables Themselves: Changes in some 
critical variables may be associated with changes in 
others, a fact that would be of significance to planners. 
Between the Critical Variables and IT Strateqy: How and to 
what extent do the critical variables impact the potential 
purposes and uses of IT in generic competitive strategies 
and organizational designs? 
It follows from the means-ways-ends logic, that these 
relationships are examined not simply to predict future trends, 
• 
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but more importantly to discover levers through which the 
/' 
variables may be controlled, when they can be controlled. 
Ein-Dor and Segev (1978], exploring the relationships between 
organizational context variables and the "success" of management 
information systems, highlight the significance of the 
controllability of a variable. An IT proposal (for a policy or 
project) should be rejected if the uncontrollable variables add 
up to a "hostile" environment for the proposal, or if the 
partially controllable variables are not sufficiently tractable 
to create an at least partly "benevolent" environment. Hence, in 
the Prediction Stage of the adapted MAP process, future trends in 
the critical variables are predicted and such levers for 
controlling them as exist are specified. 
It should also be remembered that environmental variables are 
often uncontrollable only in the short term, or for a given 
proposal, or under certain general conditions. IT itself can 
make the relevant variables more controllable, by making it 
possible to tailor the planning information to the company's 
planning orientation [Ewusi-Mensah, 1985: 113-114], and by 
expanding the ~'bounds of rationality" of the planners [Bakopoulos 
& Treacy, 1985: 5-7]. 
Bates [1985] gives a number of diagrams to show how changes in 
critical variables are associated according to the three kinds of 
relationship listed above. In addition, Figure 7 of this 
Framework presents a schema for simplifying the environmental 
changes into a few "forces of change", •which may then be analyzed 
using a technique such as the "force field analysis" of 
organizational development [Thomas, 1985]. 
The logic of Figure 7 is as follows: 
The Boxes labelled A., B., c. and D. represent relevant 
variables in the four generic categories of Appendix D, 
with the critical variables represented by the inner Boxes. 
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The practical assumption underlying the Figure is that the 
forces of environmental change can usefully and validly be 
resolved into a flow line linking the four Boxes. 
Political, Social and Economic Forces: These represent 
changes in the external system of opportunities and threats 
(Appendix o, Section I.A.) that will have so significant an 
effect on the company that they should be considered 
critical variables. 
Pressures for IT Solutions: Many of these changes demand 
IT solutions, or challenge the effectiveness of IT as a 
source of solutions. For example, some marketing plans are 
feasible only on the assumption that certain levels of 
computing power and functionality will be available. On 
the other hand, the threat of political sanctions has to be 
taken into account when devising the IT support plan. 
Technological Forces: To the pressures for IT solutions 
must be added the opportunities and threats that arise in 
the technological world itself (Appendix D, Section I.B.). 
Much of the turbulence in the business environment is 
attributable to these very forces [Anderson G.G., 1985: 
Cymbala, 1984]. 
External Environmental Pressures: These represent the 
combined effect of changes in the business and IT external 
variables on the critical internal organizational 
variables. The line flows from Box B because, in this 
Framework, the pressures are considered only in terms of 
their IT significance. The line flows to Box c because, in 
this Framework, pressures on the IT domain are considered 
only in the overall context of organizational design. 
Internal Business Forces: These represent changes.in the 
internal system of strengths and weaknesses (Appendix D, 
Section II.A.) that will have so significant an effect on 
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the organization that they should be considered critical 
variables. Some of these changes are generated by the 
external pressures, and some by changing assumptions and 
conditions within the company. 
Organizational IT Learning Pressures: Many - often, most -
of these changes demand IT solutions, and challenge the 
competence of the IT domain to provide the required 
support. Since decision makers in the IT domain have the 
power to enhance or inhibit the three kinds of congruency 
identified in Figure 4 - competitive strategy and 
organizational design; distinctive competence and decision 
making competence; the purposes and uses of IT - the 
pressure is on them to develop their own "adequacy" 
(Section 4.1.III.B.) in pace with company development. 
Internal IT Forces: To these organizational learning 
pressures must be added the forces that arise within the IT 
support functions themselves (Appendix D, Section II.B.). 
Much of the turbulence here is attributable to changes in 
traditional IT job designs and careers induced by the new 
technologies, and to the increasing numbers of 
non-technical people who are becoming involved in decisions 
that traditionally were regarded as the preserve of IT 
specialists. 
3. The Rationale of Environmental Analysis 
To what extent can decision makers indeed shape the company's IT 
future, and to what extent are they compelled to follow a course 
set by forces beyond their control? In considering questions 
such as these, Etzioni [1967: 385] describes two extreme points 
of view that give different weights to the conscious choice of 
decision makers: 
Rationalistic models: According to these models, decision 
makers have a high degree of control over their decision 
Page 120 
·making situation - problems can be defined, goals set, 
alternatives weighed, and the best course chosen [Minkes, 
1987: 60-62]. 
Clearly, such a model cannot work when the problem is 
ill-structured. Moreover, it is not usually possible to 
collect and process in the time available all the detailed 
information necessary for a completely rational decision. 
Incrementalist Approach: The "science of muddling through" 
or "logical incrementalism" described by Lindblom [1959] 
and others [Minkes, 1987: Ch. 4: Quinn, 1984] prescribes 
the handling of problems as they arise, a step at a time. 
The approach is closely related to Simon's [1976] theory of 
"the limits of rationality" that bound the ability·of 
administrative man" to make rational decisions. Its aim is 
to adapt decision making to the limitations of the decision 
makers, and to reduce the scope and cost of collecting 
information. Decision makers do not attempt to survey and 
evaluate all alternatives, but focus only on.those policies 
that differ incrementally from existing policies. 
Incrementalism cannot, however, be applied to "large" or 
fundamental decisions, such as the commissioning of a major 
IT project. 
Neither approach in its extreme form is likely to satisfy 
managers who are determined to create, as far as they may, their 
own IT future, but who nevertheless understand the realities both 
of rapid and complex environmental changes and of the limits to 
their own problem solving ability [Simon, 1976: 39-41] 
Etzioni proposes instead a "mixed-scanning" approach to 
environmental analysis, which combines several levels of 
scanning, including a broad, comprehensive level (so that no 
major option will be left uncovered) and a highly detailed level 
(so that the selected option can be explored as fully as is 
feasible)." [Etzioni, 1967: 389] 
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In a mixed-scanning approach to environmental analysis, it is 
essential to distinguish fundamental from incremental decisions. 
Fundamental decisions are made in response to the main 
alternatives perceived, but without details and specifications. 
Incremental decisions are made within the context set by-the 
fundamental decisions, on the basis of detailed specifications. 
This approach to environmental analysis is consistent with the 
principle of "directed incrementalism" described in Section 
4.1.III.D.4. 
c. The Effects of Corporate Culture 
The internal political and cultural factors of the company will 
affect several critical aspects of strategic IT decision making: 
The quality of the business and IT managers• participation 
in the dialectical debate. 
The quality of their business vision for IT, and the range 
of potential purposes and uses of IT they are capable of 
generating. 
Their evaluation of the strategic importance of IT, the 
focus of the IT investment, and the kind and scale of 
competitive advantage aimed at. 
The acceptability of the notion of a target environment, of 
systems architecture and its incremental implementation, 
and of company-wide participative decision making. 
The quality of the implementation plans business and IT 
managers are capable of carrying out, and their ability to 
grow as competent strategic IT decision makers. 
In this Framework, the specific strategic task with regard to 
these factors is to create conditions of internal "organizational 
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health• (Section 4.5.I.) that will permit IT strategy to be 
formulated in good dialectic and implemented as a planned, 
company-wide organizational development effort. The following 
conceptual frameworks can help in carrying out this task: 
Miller and Friesen's (1977] analysis of "organizational 
archetypes", as a basis for assessing what the management 
attitude is likely to be to the notion of IT-induced 
changes in company strategy, and how acceptable 
participative strategic decision making is likely to be. 
Schein's (1984] three levels of culture - visible 
artifacts, values, and underlying assumptions - as an aid 
in uncovering the factors that determine success or failure 
in defining the Target Environment Architecture and in 
setting the course and pace of organizational development 
and learning. 
Argyris' (1971] discussion of the roles of rationality and 
emotionality in managerial behaviour. Some people do not 
accept the practicality of "big picture" comprehensive 
planning, or "synoptic formalism" [Camillus, 1982]. Others 
feel threatened by the encroachment of IT into all corners 
of the organization [Business Week, 1983]. 
Deshpande & Parasuraman's [1986] mapping of Deal & 
Kennedy's "corporate tribes model" to the Boston Consulting 
Group's growth/share matrix and the traditional 4-stage 
business/product life cycle (Section 4.3.IV.A.; Figure 12). 
D. Corporate IT Scenarios 
In the Context Component, decision makers• assumptions and 
critical environmental data are synthesized into sets of options, 
through dialectical enquiry. In the Content Component, one of 
these sets of options will be sel~cted, and from it an IT 
strategy will be built. 
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"''he f'urDamental activity of cx:>J:porate plannirg is the 
initial choice of which strategic projects are to be 
urdertaken. ~ that has been detenni.ned, all subsequent 
activities within the strategic process fran the i.iwent.im 
of relevant objectives to the fonllll.atioo of detailed 'WOlX 
decisioo." [Hoffman, 1985: 66] 
The purposes and uses to which all the IT resources of the 
company will eventually be put "are uniquely determined at the 
point where certain environmental opportunities are accepted, 
while others are rejected." 
In this Framework, one or more Corporate IT Scenarios document 
the major option sets. The approach is much the same as that 
generally found in business planning practice [Hoffman, 1985: 
Klein & Linneman, 1981: Leemhuis, 1985: Linneman & Klein, 1979, 
1985: Zentner, 1982]. The focus, however, is on the purposes and 
use of IT in the company's strategy, and the planning orientation 
is interactive rather than preactive (Section 4.1.III.A.). 
If multiple scenarios are prepared, one of them should be the 
"reference scenario" [Ackoff, 1981: 101]. This is a scenario 
based solely on the predictions of the MAP process, i.e. 
excluding the levers of control. It describes the future the 
company would most likely have if it continued on the basis of 
the apparent assumptions underlying its current IT policies and 
projects, and if it did nothing to attempt to control its 
environmental variables, internal or external. The other 
scenarios represent likely futures if assumptions are changed 
andjor environmental variables controlled. They are bases for 
the "idealized design" [Ackoff, 1981: App. 2] of a target 
environment. 
Possible contents of a Corporate IT Scenario include: 
Business Background: A summary of the critical variables 
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in Box A. of Figure 7, and the corresponding assumptions. 
This describes a potential operating environment, and 
management assumptions and aims relevant to it. 
IT Background: A summary of the critical variables in 
Boxes B. and c. of Figure 7, the "Pressures for IT 
Solutions", and the "External Environmental Pre!!?sures 11 , 
together with the corresponding assumptions. This 
culminates in a broad outline of technologies and business 
systems likely to be feasible and profitable to this 
company in this environment. Reasons are given for 
excluding some technologies and including others, with 
assumptions relating to future technological advances. 
IT Competence Profile: This is a list of the company's 
major IT-related strengths and weaknesses, rated with 
respect to its strategic targets - suppliers, allies, 
customers and competitors. The competence profile is a 
basic reference document in the development of a truly 
feasible IT strategy. 
Ansoff [1968: 89-93] gives general guidelines for the 
contents of a competence profile. In the present 
Framework, these can be reduced to a summary of the 
critical variables in Box D. of Figure 7, and of the 
"Organizational IT Learning Pressures", i.e. what is being 
asked of people in the IT and business domains, what they 
are currently capable of delivering, and what they yet have 
to learn if the environment envisaged in this scenario is 
to be realized. This part of the scenario can'be prepared 
either as input to or as part of the assessment of the 
company's historical stage of development (Section 
4.6.III.). 
The material is best presented in a form to which managers and 
employees can readily relate, e.g. a narrative describing "A Day 
in the Life of an Insurance Consultant". "Business theatre" is 
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also being used effectively (e.g. by IBM) to dramatize the 
impacts of IT on office and factory situations. 
The picture may also be presented at different levels of detail. 
Beck [1982: 17] describes how the Shell approach has evolved in 
this direction. This company has swung increasingly away from a 
mechanistic methodology and centrally-set forecasts, towards a 
more conceptual or "qualitative" analysis of the forces and 
pressures impinging on the industry as a whole and on particular 
areas of decision making within particular business sectors. 
Shell planners try to identify the key elements pertaining to a 
particular area of decision making, and to translate these into a 
framework for individual judgment. The higher the level of 
management, the more interested they are in "global scenarios" of 
world-wide developments. The focus becomes narrower as one 
proceeds into the more specialized functions, divisions and 
business sectors. 
The Corporate IT Scenario is the crucial link between the Context 
and Content Components. Success in strategic IT decision making 
as envisaged in this Framework will be proportional to the care 
and trouble taken to prepare an effective scenario. The reasons 
for this are twofold. 
Firstly, the kind of decision making envisaged in the Framework 
aims at restructuring the strategic posture of the company 
through the use of IT, to meet the restructuring of the 
competitive environment brought about in large measure by IT. 
The essentials of what a Corporate IT Scenario should help 
managers understand and do can be summarized in Anderson G.G.'s 
[1985] terms as follows: 
Appreciate the competitive value of environmental 
information: learn to sense weak signals of change and 
qain as much lead time as possible to respond with new 
policies or actions: extend the span of sensitivity to 
sources of change, opportunities and threats: take into 
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account the blurring of dividing lines between industries 
and markets. 
Put enough resource into long-range R&D, bearing in mind 
that other companies can emulate, develop, licence or 
~cquire competitive technologies. 
Recognize the fact that information is an increasingly 
important element in all products and services of the 
company, and that consumers will need co-operation and 
training in making use of these added features. 
Restructure the strategic decision making process to reap 
the full· benefits of participation and evaluation. Build a 
technology infrastructure and management procedures to 
ensure that information can flow easily among the company's 
operating units. 
Establish a centrally defined focus, but decentralize 
responsibility for the details and the carrying out of 
strategic IT decisions. 
Secondly, the ultimate aim of the Framework is to "help 
individuals unfreeze and alter their theories of action so that 
they, acting as agents of the organization, will be able to 
unfreeze the organizational learning systems that also inhibit 
double-loop learning" [Argyris & Schon, 1978: 4]. This will 
happen when managers accept that a strategic IT decision making 
exercise is not a single programme with clear-cut functional 
responsibilities and cause-effect solutions, but a never-ending, 
company-wide multiplicity of processes, based on producer-product 
relationships that are not "environment free" but rather 
"environment full" [Ackoff, 1981: 21]. 
oooOooo 
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4.3 DECISION CONTENT 
I. THE BUSINESS VISION FOR IT 
The Corporate IT Scenario produced· by the dialectical enquiry of 
the Context Component helps in visualizing what an appropriate IT 
strategy for the company should be, but it does not represent a 
strategy statement in and of itself. Rather, it is like a 
skeleton to which must be added connecting muscle and tissue to 
produce completed strategy statements [cf. Hofer & Schendel, 
1978: 42]. 
Following the Hofer & Schendel guidelinep, completed IT strategy 
statements can be said to have four necessary characteristics: 
They should describe each of the major components of the 
business strategy as it is affected by IT. 
They should indicate how IT will help achieve the company's 
planning ends (ideals, objectives and goals). 
They should be stated in generic rather than physical 
terms, so that they cover all three planning timeframes and 
are not merely a short-term plan for specific goals. 
They should be as precise as possible, so that they provide 
meaningful directives for action plans. 
Statements at the meta- and macro-architectural levels of 
discourse (Section 4.l.III.D.4.) are both generic and precise. 
They define the boundaries of the problem, have many implications 
for further analysis and planning, but leave the detailed 
micro-architectural statements to emerge in time. 
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The Content Component provides a framework - the "quadrants of IT 
strategy" shown in Figure 8 - to help IT decision makers flesh 
out the skeleton of the preferred Corporate IT Scenario, and 
develop a single, unified business vision of the role of IT in 
the company's business strategy. 
Both Figures 7 and 8 have been suggested by the way EwiM links 
the concepts of decision making domains, environmental pressures 
as opportunities and inhibitors in IT strategy, and "impact" vs. 
"alignment" IT strategy [Benson & Parker, 1985: Figs. 10, 11, 
12]. 
All three of these concepts are brought into the Framework, but 
the strong association EwiM makes between impact IT strategy and 
external pressures, and between alignment IT strategy and 
internal pressures, is not made here. Instead, all the critical 
environmental pressures are linked along the flow line of Figure 
7. ·The distinction between impact and alignment strategy is seen 
as a matter of management choice, i.e. the extent to which they 
will allow the decision making context (external or internal 
environment, data or assumptions) to change the mission, business 
strategy and organizational design of the company. 
The point is illustrated in Figure 9. The distinctive competence 
of a company relative to its competitors lies in the way it makes 
and markets its product, administers the organization, and 
deploys its IT and other resources. 
In alignment strategy, the role of IT is functional or tactical 
it supports a business strategy that has been laid down 
relatively independently of IT considerations. To the extent 
that a technology strategy specific to IT can be said to exist in 
the company, it would be a functional area strategy [Hofer & 
Schendel, 1978: 29], not a corporate strategy. The elements of 
which it is composed, e.g. positioning, infrastructure, systems, 
all focus on improving the effectiveness of the organizational 
structures and processes as already configured. IT management 
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will itself have tactical plans which, at a lower level of the 
organization, represent the strategies of decision makers in the 
technical sub-areas. Even in alignment strategy, these 
management strategies are critically affected by the "External 
Environmental Pressures" of Figure 7. 
In impact IT strategy, on the other hand, environmental pressures 
in general and IT pressures in particular alter the way the 
company deploys its resources, administers the organization, and 
makes and markets its products~ Hayes• means-ways-ends inversion 
(Section 4.2.IV.B.l.) becomes a significant consideration, and IT 
technology strategy thereby becomes an integral part of the 
business strategy itself. The architecture of the target 
environment (Section 4.1.II.A.3.) extends beyond the issues of IT 
infrastructure and application systems to cover also: 
The organizational design, i.e. a configuration of_generic 
organizational structures, processes and jobs that ideally 
fits the mission and competitive strategy. 
The human resources, i.e. an ideal structuring of generic 
decision making roles and responsibilities in IT strategy. 
The organizational and technical strategies for managing IT 
remain functional, but are now a level nearer in importance and 
visibility to top management. 
Returning to Figure 8, the significance of the quadrants of IT 
strategy may be described as follows: 
External Pressures: Either IT developments themselves 
cause the external pressures, or it is to IT that the 
company turns for the means of coping with the impacts. 
Appropriate management response is required in both the 
business and the IT domain, and this is represented by 
Boxes A and B. 
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Box A - Competitive.- Strategy: Prob!ble points of 
impact on the company will have been described in the 
Corporate IT Scenario, and company mission, objectives 
and competitive strategy must now be analyzed in this 
context. This should lead to an understanding of the 
generic purposes to be served by IT in supporting the 
company's competitive strategy (alignment IT strategy) 
or in shaping it (impact IT strategy). 
Box B - IT Positioning: Defining IT purposes requires 
an evaluation of the relative importance to the 
company of IT in general, and of specific information 
technologies. The result of this evaluation is an "IT 
Positioning Statement". IT positioning [Jarvis, 1985] 
is closely related to the marketing strategy concept 
of "product positioning" [McCarthy, 1978: 249] and the 
strategic management concept of "business' unit 
positioning" (Robinson, 1986: 494-497]. It is part 
(or, in some industries, the whole) of a company's' 
overall technology positioning, which specifies 
exactly which technologies are envisaged in the 
definition of its business, and at what stage of the 
technological life cyc'le the company 'will usually want 
to adopt innovations [Ansoff, 1987]. 
In the case :of IT,' which is a general purpose 
technology, the major business·areas·on which the IT· 
investment programme will focus must be stated, as 
well as the kind of competitive advantage it is hoped 
to gain thereby, i.e. the unique position the company 
will develop vis-a-vis its competitors, through the 
pattern of IT skill and resource deployments [cf. 
Hofer & Schendel, 1978: 25]. 
Internal Pressures: Following the flow line of Figure 7,· 
internal pressures can be seen as partly·· the" consequend~i;; t 
of external pressures,. and. -partly . the results of internal 
' :~·· . 
•."'>, 
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changes in management and staff assumptions as to how the 
company should be administered. In either case, the demand 
is for a better match of internal human, financial and IT 
resources to business objectives. Appropriate management 
action is required in both the business and the IT domain, 
and this is represented by Boxes c and D of Figure 8. 
Box C - Organizational Design: Once again, likely 
points of impact on the organization will have been 
described in the Corporate IT Scenario, and analysis 
of the organizational design in this context must 
follow. A more precise understanding of how different 
generic organizational designs best support different 
generic strategies will be sought. This should lead 
to an examination of the generic uses of IT in 
supporting effective organizational designs (alignment 
IT strategy) or in shaping them (impact IT strategy). 
These in turn define the IT contribution to the 
company's strategic capability, in terms of 
technological infrastructure, organizational 
structures and processes, application systems, and 
decision makers• competence. 
Box D - IT Strategy: The strategy to achieve 
competitive advantage through IT falls into two parts: 
a technology (or capability) strategy, expressed in 
terms of a Target Environment Architecture tobe 
implemented incrementally; and a management strategy, 
expressed in terms of the stages of organizational 
transition through which the company must pass in its 
progress towards the target environment. 
In summary, the quadrants of IT strategy shown in Figure 8 
indicate four major, inter-related tasks for IT decision makers: 
To apply IT in support of the company's competitive 
strategy, in innovative ways. 
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To use it to enhance the effectiveness of the company's 
organization, in a manner that anticipates, i.e. foresees 
and aqts in advance of, future competitive strategies. 
To position the company to exploit and assimilate IT as 
appropriate to these needs. 
To manage the IT functions and resources, and their 
application to organizational design, effectively and 
efficiently. 
II. COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
There are many ways of defining strategy in business (see, for 
example, Hofer & Schendel [1978: Ch. 2]). In their effort to 
arrive at a general framework for research into the co-ordination 
of IT and business strategy, Bakopoulos & Treacy [1985] propose 
three levels of strategy that can be supported or shaped by IT: 
Business Portfolio Strategy: The choice of industries to 
compete in, and positioning the company to do business in 
those industries. 
Competitive Strategy: Competitive moves within the 
industry in which the company does business. 
Internal Strategy: The development of an efficient and 
effective organization for achieving objectives and goals. 
Because of the particular concepts of business strategy used in 
this Framework (Porter's [1980] "strategic forces" and "generic 
competitive strategies", and his [1985] "business unit value 
chain"), portfolio strategy is included in "competitive 
strategy", and internal strategy goes under the name 
"organizational design". Competitive strategy and organizational 
design together constitute the business strategy. 
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This quadrant, therefore, represents the first step in defining 
the role of IT in the business strategy. It requires a detailed 
analysis of the critical environmental influences agreed on in 
the Corporate IT Scenario, in order to uncover the underlying 
economic and management principles on which the strategy is to be 
built. Using these principles, either intuitively or in a 
procedure such as King's (1978] "strategy set transformation", 
strategic options for the deployment of IT in the competitive 
strategy can be "generated" [Wiseman, 1985: 57]. The selected 
options are defined to be the "purposes" of IT in supporting the 
competitive strategy (alignment IT strategy) or in shaping it 
(impact IT strategy). 
A. Strategic Impacts of IT 
Accounts of the use of IT as a "competitive weapon" have 
proliferated in the literature in recent years (see, for example, 
Barrett & Konsynski [1982]; Benjamin, Rockart, Scott Morton & 
Wyman [1984]; Business Week [1984(1), (2)]; Crowston & Treacy 
[1986]; EDP Analyzer [1984(1); 1984(2)]; Harris [1985]; Harvard 
Business School [1983]; Ives & Learmonth [1984]; Life Office 
Management Association (1984]; McFarlan [1984]; Meyer & Boone 
[1987: Part 2]; Orzell [1983]; Parsons (1983]; Porter & Millar 
[1985]; Wiseman [1985]; Wiseman & MacMillan (1985]). 
When studying such stories systematically, it soon becomes clear 
that there are four ways in which IT can have a fundamental 
impact on a company: its core purpose or mission; its market 
share and growth; its economic role as a creator of value; and 
its wider role in the social, economic and political context. 
1. The Core Purpose of the Company 
IT can enhance or extend a company's products, services and 
markets beyond its traditional range, and thus alter the core 
purpose of the company. In South Africa, for example, IT has 
already extended Old Mutual's range of products and services 
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beyond the traditional insurance, pensions, investments and 
property lines to include the provision of information (e.g. the 
Beltel services), administrative services (e.g. administration 
systems for pension scheme clients) and technology (e.g. software 
and data communications for brokers). 
IT can also cause a shift away from the existing product line to 
something else entirely. For example, Dun & Bradstreet developed 
from a credit reporting company to become one of the largest 
information services corporations in the world, controlling inter 
alia the McCormack & Dodge software house and forming alliances 
with other IT suppliers, such as IBM, Lotus and Multimate 
[Wiseman, 1985: 10-15]. 
It follows from the above that the current organizational 
structures and processes of the company are not infallible guides 
to the information systems that may be required in the future, 
and consequently that the findings of conventional information 
systems requirements analysis (see Davis (1982] and Yadav (1983] 
for overviews of current techniques) may well be out of date 
before systems implementation is completed. 
Strategic IT decision making must consider quite fundamental 
organizational constructs if it is to provide the company with 
the capability to assimilate new technologies and develop new 
systems for business strategies that have yet to emerge.- At the 
very least, the decision makers will revisit the basic questions: 
"What industry are we in? What markets do we serve? How are 
these likely to change? What will the effects be on the way we 
do business?" These questions lie as much in the field of 
strategic IT decision making as they do in the areas of business 
unit definition and productjmarket portfolio planning where they 
originate [Abell, 1980; Porter, 1980: Ch. 7; 1985: Ch. 7; 
Robinson, 1986: Chs. 2 & 18]. 
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2. Market Share and Growth 
IT creates conditions for a market to be intensely competitive on 
the basis of frequent product or service innovation, and for 
successful companies to grow across either a narrow or a broad 
range of customers and distributors. This effect stems largely 
from the fact that data processing and communication technologies 
allow information to be aggregated and transactions to be 
consummated virtually instantaneously, regardless of time, place 
or organizational and industry boundaries. Naisbitt [1984: 
22-26] refers to this as the "vanishing information float". 
For example, the financial services industries are growing and 
changing at prodigious rates, overseas [Mackenzie, 1986: 74-77] 
as well as in South Africa. Boundaries are continually shifting 
both internally (e.g. the merging of banking, broking, life 
insurance and savings services) and externally (e.g. the entry of 
retailers like Sears Roebuck into the market). competition is 
intense on the basis of integrated accounts and services in which 
complex transactions are concluded in a matter of seconds. 
To be successful-under such conditions, the company has to be 
both reactive and proactive in its business strategies. It must 
react rapidly and effectively to changing customer needs, and 
indeed to changing definitions of who the customers are. At the 
same time, it must anticipate these changes and take positive 
steps to place existing rivals at a disadvantage, block new 
rivals and substitute products, and bind its customers and 
distributors to it • 
• 
IT applications used for such purposes will extend beyond the 
boundaries of the company, supporting backward integration into 
the supplier chain, forward integration into the distribution 
chain, strategic alliances with other organizations, and the 
gathering of market intelligence [Cash & Konsynski, 1985]. 
Insurance companies in South Africa, for example, are forging 
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IT-based relationships with distributors (e.g. the broker network 
project of the Life Offices Association), with end users (e.g. 
information services through Beltel), with the sources of 
business information (e.g. the Reuters database, the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange), and with financial clearing services (e.g. the 
Automated Clearing Bureau of the commercial banks). 
Different kinds of system linkages can be established - for 
example, simple data exchange between a supplier and a buyer, or 
a shared, jointly funded data processing installation, or a joint 
customer network, such as airline reservation and electronic 
funds transfer systems. 
A company embarking on an inter-organizational system as a basis 
for growth and extending market share has to take into account 
the high potential for conflict of interest between itself and 
the other participants in the system, who have the same 
objectives. For example, a consortium of the S.A. Post Office 
and a number of financial institutions had for some years been 
planning the introduction of a joint network of automatic teller 
machines, SASWITCH. It would seem that at a certain stage some 
of the participants re-evaluated the progress of the-project, the 
market opportunities as they saw them, and their own IT 
capabi1ities compared with those of the other partners. They 
came to the evidently correct conclusion that they could steal a 
march on their partners/competitors by establishing their own 
network, MULTINET, well ahead of the SASWITCH launch. 
Thus a company will enter into a joint IT venture with suppliers, 
distributors, customers or competitors because of the match it 
perceives with its strategic objectives (e.g. market share and 
growth), and with its criteria for cost, benefit, risk, and 
operating effectiveness. The other parties will have similar 
objectives and criteria, and these must clash sooner or later 
with the company's own. If the partners are competitors, the 
conflicts will be more than simply technical or operational. 
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It is clear, then, that strategic IT decision makers need to 
analyze the competitive strategy and external operating policy of 
the business, and assess whether the risks of market-orientated 
extensions of the IT infrastructure are justified by the expected 
gains [cf. Hofer & Schendel, 1978: 194-195; Porter, 1980: 44-46]. 
3. The Creation of Value 
The ultimate aim of any competitive strategy, whether based on 
product~differentiation -and-~a premium priceor -on low cost 
leadership and a competitive-price, must be to give the customer 
better-tha!l-ma~ket_ .. average _value~ for money and the company 
better-than-industry-avera9e ret:1.:1rn __ on_t_o~t.a~l~j:iRi:tj:il_employed. 
Porter & Millar (1985] have shown how IT can be an effective 
means of achieving these ends: 
In the Market: By creating a more responsive organization 
that delivers product and service more effectively, or by 
controlling the distribution channels ("downstream value"). 
In the Industry: By creating an operationally superior 
organization that deploys its IT and other resources more 
efficiently, or by controlling the supply lines ("upstream 
value"). 
There is, however, the risk that the company will run into 
financial problems if it invests heavily in IT but fails to 
achieve these effects. Depending on the intensity of competition 
in a given market (financial services, for example), all the 
players may be reaching for ever higher levels of distinctive 
competence, but using essentially the same information 
technologies. As a result, the mandatory level of a company's 
investment in IT may rise sharply in relation to its human and 
other resources as it attempts to maintain technological parity 
with the competition. 
According to the law of variable proportions in microeconomics 
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(Koutsoyiannis, 1979: 82], time, development of the human 
resource, and a commensurate growth in the scale of operations, 
may be needed before a company can expect an acceptable rate of 
return on its strategic investment in IT. But this development 
and growth may fail to materialize, if, for example, the company 
is less effective than others in developing its human resources 
to the extent required to restore optimum technological returns 
to scale. Moreover, two companies may have comparable IT and 
administrative human resources, and hence the same technological 
returns to scale, but different relative levels of output (i.e. 
sales) owing to differences in entrepreneurial and marketing 
effectiveness. 
It is clear that the use of IT as a strategic tool to create 
value calls for an investigation into the production economics of 
the company. Porter and Millar [1985) discuss the concept of 
"information intensity", i.e. the contribution of the information 
systems relative to the human systems and other components in the 
creation of products and services. A strategy that depends on 
increasing the information intensity of either the production 
process or of its end product demands a clear understanding of 
the underlying (microeconomic) production functions - for 
example, whether returns to scale are increasing, decreasing or 
constant, and what the implications are of changing the various 
factor intensity ratios (Koutsoyiannis, 1979: 84]. 
4. The Social and Political Context · 
Every company has a role to play in the political, economic and 
social development of the country in which it operates. ·This is 
inherent in the generally accepted meaning of the phrase "issues 
management" (Zentner, 1984], and it has a particular relevance in 
IT issues management (as characterized by, for example, Boynton & 
Zmud [1987], and Dansker, Hansen, Loftin & Veldwisch [1987]). 
In South Africa, discriminatory regulations (particularly those 
relating to education and residence) severely restrict the 
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recruitment sources available in both the business and the IT 
domain. In the the business domain, some of the challenge can be 
• 
met through innovative uses of IT in: 
creating and delivering products and ~ervices, on a 
profitable basis, to lower-income market segments that 
might not otherwise have been able to afford them. 
Providing bridging education for new entrants into job 
markets to which they have previously been denied access, 
and for which their school career has not prepared them. 
Providing tools and processes that raise human productivity 
and service levels (minimally as prostheses, optimally by 
enhancing human potentials). 
"In the South African context, it is inp:>rt.ant that 
ocmp.rt:ers shoold enhance productivity arrl service, arrl 
inprove the viability of businesses. '!hey should 
create jabs rather than replace them." [Vander 
Horst, 1986] 
In the IT domain, bridging education can be aimed at bringing 
candidate development and operational personnel to the point 
where they can enter the ordinary technical training courses on 
equal terms with others. Initiatives in this direction have 
already begun, such as those of the Computer Users Council of 
South Africa, the Infogold Division of the Anglo-American 
Corporation, and Zukheni, a Johannesburg-based self-help 
organization for programmer training. 
There can be no doubt about many employees' sense of frustration 
and alienation (i.e. domination by the system and separation from 
business ideals [cf. Wood, 1981: Ch. I]) brought about by acts of 
-
political, social and economic discrimination over which the 
company has no control. It would be appropriate in a dialectical 
approach to organizational development and computer manpower 
-
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planning to explore whether and to what extent genuine 
participation in the transformation of the "production relations" 
[Wood, 1981: 66-87] of the company - its economic production 
functions (or value chains), its generic organizational 
processes, and the relationships among the decision making 
domains - can help overcome alienation. 
B. Strategic Purposes of IT 
1. Company Mission and Objectives 
Company mission and objectives can be interpreted in two ways: 
firstly, as the social and economic purposes society establishes 
for enterprises and, secondly, as the purposes of the company 
that its managers explicitly or implicitly determine [Steiner & 
Miner, 1977: 99]. In a healthy organization operating in a 
healthy business environment, the latter would flow from the 
former, so that, ordinarily, practical IT decision making can 
focus on the latter interpretation. In South Africa, however, it 
is always necessary to test strategic decisions against the 
former interpretation. 
In this Framework, to ensure that the analysis does not extend 
too far from the specifically IT issues it is recommended that 
the company's mission and its long-term ideals be considered 
together. In many companies, indeed, there is no documentation 
of long-term ideals separate from the mission statement, and in 
such cases it is important not to mistake medium-term objectives 
and short-term goals for ultimate ideals. 
By definition, both mission and ideals are set beyond the short-
and medium-term planning horizons. Strictly speaking, they are 
not achievable since they are not bounded. 
11
• ~ • it is never possible to maximize profits as there 
always will be sane profitable options that might have been 
plrSUed that \o1ere not. Similarly, one can never achieve 
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survival, since bankruptcy am death are always 
possibilities in the fl$lre." [Hofer & SCherxiel., 1978: 21] 
In precisely the same way, the ideal target environment of the IT 
strategy is unbounded and unachievable, but remains nevertheless 
a valid and practical concept in the planning process. 
Taken together, mission and ideals do reflect the purposes of the 
company, and it is clear from the four key points of impact 
discussed in the preceding Section that the purposes of IT will 
be closely interwoven with these. Five elements of company 
mission and ideals, which may or may not be explicitly 
documented, need to be analyzed (cf. Bower, 1982(2): 632: Pearce, 
1982: 171: 
The Definition of the Business: The portfolio of products 
and services (customer functions), the consumers and 
markets served (customer groups), and the alternative 
technologies, including IT (Abell, 1980: Ch. 7]. 
The Production Economics: The way the company uses its 
technologies (IT in particular) and other resources to 
produce its product and deliver it to the markets. 
The Maturity of the Company: The company's experience in 
its line(s) of business and in the strategic deployment of 
IT, as well as the competence of its strategic IT decision 
makers. 
The External Operating Policy: The way the company does 
business with suppliers, distributors and customers, 
cooperates with allies, and handles competitors. 
The Success Criteria: The generic organizational, 
financial, social and other criteria that reflect the 
company's intention to survive and develop, effectively, 
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morally and profitably. 
2. Generic Competitive Strategy 
Many frameworks have been proposed for characterizing competitive 
strategy, and useful overviews are given by Belohlav & 
Giddens-Emig [1987], Galbraith & Schendel [1983], Gluck [1985], 
Herbert & Deresky [1987], Hofer & Schendel [1978: Cbs. 4 and 5]r 
Karnani [1984], Payne [1986], and White [1986]. The present 
Framework relies on Porter's concepts of "competitive forces" and 
"generic strategies". 
According to Porter [1980: 4], there are five generic 
competitive forces that determine a company's ability to attain 
its strategic objectives: the bargaining power of its suppliers; 
the bargaining power of its buyers (i.e. customers and 
distributors); the intensity of rivalry among existing firms in 
the industry; the threat of new entrants into the industry; and 
the threat of substitutes for its products or services. 
From these generic forces, Wiseman [1985: 52-57] derives three 
"strategic targets", at which-the-competitive strategy of a 
company must be aimed: 
Suppliers: For example, raw materials, parts, finished 
goods, organized labour, finance, accommodation, transport, 
utilities, insurance and other.services. 
customers: Both the end-users and "channel" users, e.g. 
distributors, assemblers and resellers. 
Competitors: Traditional rivals already in the market 
(competing for the same customers) or in the industry 
(competing for the same factors of production); potential 
new entrants into the market or industry; and companies 
threatening substitute products. 
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By posing questions about the uses of IT such as those suggested 
by McFarlan [1984: 99-101] and Parsons [1983: 7-10], it is 
already possible at this first level of analysis to gain 
intuitive insights into the possible purposes of IT in 
competitive strategy. 
Suppliers: Can IT change the balance of power in supplier 
relationships? For example, applications such as "just in 
time" delivery systems, or using IT as an alternative to 
highly priced labour, or linking computer-assisted design 
systems to supplier databases, can place the company at a 
distinct advantage in its negotiations with suppliers. 
customers: Can IT build in switching costs? For example, 
it may be a relatively simple matter for a customer to 
start using an online order entry system. As more and more 
of its features and functions are used, however, complexity 
grows and with it an extreme reluctance to start learning 
the equivalent systems of competing suppliers. 
Competitors - Traditional Rivals: Can IT change the basis 
of competition? For example, a company can gain on its 
rivals by using a system that provides better market data 
or denies rivals access to market data. Similarly, a 
system may improve the efficiency of a company's 
distribution channels (alignment strategy), or 
fundamentally change the entire distribution concept 
(impact strategy), as when automatic teller machines 
brought commercial banking services into the street, on a 
24-hours-a-day basis. 
The technological lead per ~ may be short-lived, but the 
gain in competitive position can be sustained if the early 
move down the experience curve [Robinson, 1986: Ch. 9] 
gives the company lasting cost leadership. Cases have also 
been reported [McFarlan, 1984: 100] where IT has enabled 
product features to be changed so radically from the 
\ 
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existing line that they cause the prevailing generic 
competitive strategy in the market to change permanently, 
for example from cost leadership to differentiated product 
features. 
Competitors - New Entrants: Can IT build barriers to 
entry? A further effect of ensuring.customer loyalty 
through complex and costly "value-added" systems features 
is that it makes it difficult and expensive for new 
competitors to tool up for effective entry into the market. 
Competitors - Substitute Products: Can IT generate new 
products? By changing the information intensity of a 
product or service, IT can induce such radical improvements 
in quality, features, production economics, delivery ti~e, 
and so forth, that the outcome is effectively a new item. 
Sometimes, the global effect is to eliminate an entire 
industry, as when electronic calculators replaced 
electro-mechanical calculators [Parsons, 1983: 8]. 
It must be remembered that the use of IT as a defensive or 
offensive weapon against a strategic target can equally well be 
applied in the same or the opposite mode against the company. 
Moreover, using IT in this way can require high levels of capital 
investment and running costs, entail high risk of failure through 
planning errors or effective retaliation by the target, and 
create severe short-term to medium-term rigidities in the 
company's technical infrastructure and organizational processes. 
According to Porter [1980: 35; 1985: 11-16], there are three 
generic competitive strategies a company can adopt in dealing 
with the competitive forces: differentiation of the company, its 
product or its service; low cost leadership in making, delivering 
and supporting the product; and competitive scope or focus, in 
terms of which a broad arena or a narrow arena (a "niche") may be 
chosen. Broad competitive scope can be achieved through organic 
growth beyond the current segment, through the acquisition of 
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other businesses, or through alliances with other organizations, 
while a niche would be maintained by restricting the terms of 
company mission and protecting its operating "turf". 
The key dimensions to competitive scope are: the horizontal 
spread of product and market segments covered; the vertical 
integration of functions, backward into supplier industries or 
forward into distributor and buyer industries; and geographical 
coverage. 
The three generic strategies taken together with the generic 
targets allow questions such as those described above to be 
sharpened to yield deeper insight into the purposes of IT in 
competitive strategy. Figure 10, based on Cash and Konsynski's 
[1985] discussion of inter-organizational systems, shows examples 
of how this can be done. 
Wiseman [1985, 42] separates "scope" into "growth" and 
"alliance", and adds a fifth strategy "innovation". The latter 
is not a logically independent concept, but it is a strong enough 
stimulus to creative thinking to deserve a category of its own. 
The net result is a set of five- "strategic thrusts": -
differentiation, cost, innovation, growth, and alliance. 
According to Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes [1976: 42], a company can 
relate to its environment in two distinctive modes: 
Competitive Mode: The company seeks to make its 
goods/rewards transactions with the environment profitable 
by producing as efficiently as possible, and by securing 
the highest possible price and market share. 
Entrepreneurial Mode: The company seeks to replace 
obsolete products andjor markets with new ones which offer 
higher potential for future profits. It does this by 
identifying areas of new demand, developing responsive 
products and appropriate manufacturing and marketing 
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capabilities, market testing, and introducing the (new) 
products to the (new) markets. 
Alignment IT strategy is characteristic of the competitive mode, 
and impact IT strategy of the entrepreneurial mode. 
In this Framework, the concepts of strategic targets, generic 
strategies and the mode of deployment provide the operational 
dimensions of the purposes of IT in competitive strategy. They 
are shown as the first three steps of the "Strategic Option 
Generator" in Figure 11, which has been adapted from Wiseman 
[1985: 57]. (See also Appendix E.) 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
This quadrant of Figure 8 represents the second major step in 
defining the role of IT in the business strategy. It requires 
detailed analysis of the environmental impacts on organizational 
effectiveness identified in the Corpora~e IT Scenario (Section 
4.2.IV.C.). Following the argument of Figure 4 (Section 4.2.I.), 
organizational effectiveness can be examined in terms of the 
congruency between the organizational design and the competitive 
strategy. Either intuitively or with the aid of a syste~s 
requirements analysis technique, innovative options can be 
generated for the "use" of IT in supporting organizational 
effectiveness (alignment IT strategy) or in shaping it (impact IT 
strategy). 
If certain IT uses turn out in practice to be better suited to 
some purposes than to others, this will be because some 
corresponding organizational design is better suited to some 
competitive strategy [Galbraith & Nathanson, 1978: Miller, 1986: 
1987]. It would be part of the decision makers• strategy 
formulation task to investigate these possibilities, in respect 
of their own company and their competitors. 
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A. Organizational Impacts of IT 
Accounts of the use of IT to improve organizational effectiveness 
have been appearing since the earliest days of the technology's 
use in business. Because of the abundance and variety of the 
stories, it is best in practice (although not necessarily in 
research) to approach them with some a priori concept that will 
help isolate key points of IT impact on the organizational 
design. The concept of "bounded rationality" (Bakopoulos & 
Treacy, 1985: 5], derived from Simon's (1976: 240-244] 
explanation of the "limits to rationality", is proposed in this 
Framework because it emphasizes the close association between 
company development and individual decision maker development 
(see Section 4.2.I. and Figure 4). 
In this Framework, individual decision making (which can be taken 
to include task performance) is said to be rational if it is 
consistent with the decision maker's assumptions regarding 
company ends, norms and alternative means, and with the proper 
utilization of available information. Group decision making 
(including process performance) is said to be rational if it is 
consistent with ·the collective assumptions of the group and the 
collectively available information. 
"''he need for an administrative theocy :resides in the 
fact that there are practical limits to h1.lll\Clll rationality, 
and that these limits are not static, but deperrl upon the 
organizational enviromnent in which the irrli.vidual 's 
decision takes place. 'Ihe task of administration is so to 
design this envirornnent that the irrli.vidual will approach 
as close as practicable to rationality (judged in tenns of 
the organization's [ems]) in his decisions." [Sinon, 
1976: 24Q-241] 
From this point of view, there are two general classes of use to 
which IT can be applied: 
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Enabling the gap to be narrowed between the individual 
decision maker's assumptions and the realities of 
organizational ends, norms and means. 
Enabling the assumptions of different decision makers to be 
synthesized into useful, consistent sets of collective 
assumptions. 
Four levels of application can be identified at which IT, by thus 
extending the bounds of individual and group rationality, can 
improve the fit between organizational design and competitive 
strategy, and hence between its own uses and purposes. These 
constitute the framework within which the organizational impacts 
of IT are identified, and they are described in the following 
Sections. 
1. Personal Effectiveness 
Because developing the company's distinctive competence depends 
crucially on developing individual decision makers' competence, 
uses of IT that widen the bounds of individual rationality can 
significantly further the purposes of IT in the competitive 
strategy. Such uses occur in the context of different generic 
tasks - e.g. managers, professionals, specialists, clerical 
workers, factory foremen - and through the medium of personal 
productivity tools - e.g. information access services, word 
processing, computer-aided design, personal databases, and 
spreadsheet systems. 
The impact of IT on personal effectiveness can be measured in 
terms of the "value added" to labor or management resources 
[Strassman, 1985: Ch. 8]. But, 
"'!here is a limit to the annmt of information one may 
extract fran any productivity ratio • • • 'Blat is lttlhy I have 
fourrl productivity in:iexes, used alone, so unsatisfactory. 
'Ihe strategic aspects of information tedmology are best 
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explained in tenns of t.heir influences m blsiness results, 
such as ~ in market share, il1proved product quality, 
iD=reased market penetration, higher profit margins, an:i 
enhanced custaner service." [strassman, 1985: 140] 
The challenge to IT decision making at this level, therefore, is 
to devise a means of observing and measuring the relationship, if 
any, between increasing personal competence and improving company 
performance. At the very least, such measures will have the 
merit of calling into question investments in personal IT support 
that have no identifiable effect on overall company performance. 
Certain technologies - e.g. local area networks, shared, 
departmental systems, integrated workstations - link individual 
tasks in the passage from personal to work-group effectiveness. 
2. Work-group Effectiveness 
By enabling better interaction among individuals, and hence 
better pooling of data and assumptions (regarding organizational 
ends, norms and alternatives), IT can extend the bounds of 
work-group rationality. It can ~reate collective rationality 
where very little more than a collection of organizational 
isolates would otherwise exist. It is at this level of 
application that the behavioural sciences concerned with group 
processes should be brought into systems analysis (see, for 
example, Davis & Olson, [1985: 169-177]). 
Applications of IT at this level further those purposes of 
competitive strategy that rely on the effective linking of tasks 
and processes, within and between organizations. They occur in 
the context of different generic roles - e.g. managers and their 
secretaries, members of permanent decision making groups and, in 
general, members of any set of interdependent tasks: 
"''he sinplest type of inter-deperrlence is pooled. It 
sinply means that two units share the same pool of 
Page 150 
rescuroes such as 1IDJ1eY, managerial talent, or space. 'lbe 
secxni type is sequential i.nt:.er-depeni, where ~ is 
DDVemeiit of "WOrk between lmits, as in a fabrica.ti.n;J am 
assed>ly cperaticm. • • • 'lhe thini am JOOSt critical type 
of i.nt:.er-depeni is reciprocal. An exanple of this is 
an assembly lmit that feeds an inspecticm cperaticm that in 
tum feeds back the pieces to the assembly mrl.t." 
[Galbraith & Nathanson, 1978: 21-22] 
Each level of group inter-dependence represents increasing costs 
of IT support, ranging from pooled (which could need nothing more 
complex than common access to a database), through sequential 
(which could be satisfied by an elementary data input and 
retrieval system, batch or online depending on the timeframe of 
the inter-dependence, but could also require electronic mail and 
other quasi-interactive services), to reciprocal (which could 
demand a real-time, interactive information and control system, 
with costly fail-safe features). 
The impact of IT on work-group effectiveness can be measured in 
terms of "departmental value added" [Strassman, 1985: 143-145], 
but problems similar to those mentioned in the individual context 
will arise. 
Zuboff (1982] raises fundamental issues of the "new worlds of 
computer-mediated work", induced by networks, workstations and 
shared databases at the work-group level. New organizational 
policies are needed to shape new employment relationships; new 
techniques of managerial control have to be developed; and shifts 
in basic beliefs about the nature of an organization and the role 
of management are changing corporate cultures. 
"What is an organization if people do not have to cc.me 
face to face in order to aoc:xEplish their 'WOrk? D:>es the 
organization itself becx:me an abstracticm? What hawens; to 
the shared pn:pose am cxmnitment of nenbers if their 
face-to-face interaction is reduced?" [Zuboff, 1982: 152] 
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Certain technologies - e.g. wide-area data communication 
networks, transaction processing systems, integrated database 
management systems - will link workgroups and their processes in 
the passage from work-group to business unit effectiveness. 
3. The Business unit 
At this level, the purposes of competitive strategy are served by 
uses of IT that effectively configure tasks and processes into 
systematic wholes. These wholes may not be the same as the 
official organizational structures, but they are clearly related 
to the strategy in that they help individuals and groups make and 
carry out decisions that approach as close as feasible to 
rationality as defined in this Framework (Section 4.3.III.A.). 
Technologies that support effectiveness at this level are those 
that link major structures and processes within and between 
organizations - e.g. integrated order entry systems linking 
customers and suppliers, office administration systems that link 
into company databases, integrated factory management systems, 
just-in-time delivery systems, computer-aided design and 
manufacturing systems linked to suppliers' inventory systems, 
shared airline reservation systems. These technologies can be 
used to support strategic business units as they already exist 
(alignment strategy) or to shape them (impact IT strategy). 
It is generally agreed (Benson & Parker, 1986{2); Porter & 
Millar, 1985; Strassman, 1978: 140] that the business unit is the 
lowest organizational level at which the IT contribution to 
organizational effectiveness can satisfactorily be measured. 
This point is relevant in the definition and measurement of the 
competitive advantage gained through the use of IT {Section 
4.3.IV.C.), and in the evaluation of the strategic costs, 
benefits and risks of particular IT implementations {Section 
4.5.III.A.). 





and learning, the use of IT at business unit level can extend the 
bounds of rationality by generating good dialectic. 
Firstly, because of the considerable range and flexibility of 
technological options at this level of aggregation, significant 
contradictions can arise between business unit needs as perceived 
by owners and developers within a business unit, and corporate 
needs as seen by owners and developers with a company-wide 
perspective. For example, business unit purposes may be best 
served by a self-contained, highly integrated software package 
with specialized data and program structures - such as the 
Millenium software for financial accounting and administration, 
the Hogan software for commercial banking, the PRISM software for 
financial asset management, or any of a variety of materials 
requirements and planning packages. Corporate requirements, on 
the other hand, might best be served by common management 
information formats and data recording standards. 
Secondly, optimally satisfying a business unit's IT demands can 
result in significant additional cost to the corporation as a 
whole and to the other business units, who may have to bear 
higher cost allocations for software, equipment, network 
services, machine capacity and technical support that might 
otherwise have been shared. 
Thirdly, applications of IT at this level have the capacity to 
reconfigure the underlying generic work processes and jobs, to 
the extent of challenging the effectiveness of the official 
delegation and reporting structures. 
It must be expected, therefore, that conflicts between corporate 
management and business unit management and between one business 
unit management and the others, and contradictions between 
generic and official organization structures, will arise in 
formulating a company-wide IT strategy. In good organizational 
dialectic, these should be recognized as natural and important 
developmental opportunities for the company. In practice, unless 
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organizational change is the explicit objective of the project, 
it is unlikely that a major re-structuring of the company or its 
policies will follow on an IT application. Chandler [1962: 
314-323] theorizes that corporations rarely reform themselves 
until mounting inefficiency forces them to do so, and describes 
how organizational innovators are likely to be persons quite 
different in temperament and approach from business strategists. 
In the terminology of the present Framework, the situation would 
be that of attempting to impose an impact IT strategy onto a 
competitive mode business strategy. Introducing the concept of 
bounded rationality into organizational IT learning addresses 
this situation by attempting to transform the mode of thinking in 
the business domain from competitive to entrepreneurial, thus 
permitting the IT architects to design a target environment in 
which the time lag between implementation of IT strategy and 
restructuring of the organization can be reduced considerably. 
Inter-divisional systems mark the passage from business unit 
effectiveness to company-wide effectiveness, and point more 
clearly than any other single factor to the need for a 
consistent, company-wide IT infrastructure. 
4 • The Company 
Sullivan [1982] suggests six dimensions along which systems 
architecture can contribute to the internal capability of a 
company. The concept of bounded rationality can be expanded in 
terms of these six dimensions in order to identify impacts on the 
generic structures and processes of the company, which transcend 
current business unit and other organizational definitions. 
Horizontal Dimension: Integrating business functions - e.g. 
accounting, marketing, manufacturing - to achieve more 
comprehensive functions that are more cost effective or 
provide better vehicles for strategic moves. 
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Longitudinal Dimension: Integrating systems in one business 
unit with those in another, to exploit synergies. 
Vertical Dimension: Integrating internal levels of control, 
e.g. strategic, tactical, operational. 
Physical Dimension: Integrating systems across geographical 
locations; integrating different kinds of IT. 
Temporal Dimension: Ensuring that IT purposes as originally 
formulated remain congruent with IT uses as eventually 
implemented, over many business cycles. 
Gateway Dimension: Providing·the inter-organizational 
systems needed by the business strategy. 
In single-loop learning, the bounds of individual and group 
rationality can be widened by integrating systems along any of 
these dimensions, but only to the extent that existing business 
unit definitions are not upset. It may require double-loop or 
even second-order learning at the highest management levels in 
the company, if business units are to be redefined. 
There is another, more fundamental, way in which the use of IT 
can extend the bounds of rationality at company level. Extending 
the strategic scope of a company (by innovation, growth or 
alliance) can be viewed as the substitution of internal decision 
making processes for external market operations (Williamson, 
1975: Ch. 2]. In effect, the uncertainties of the market place 
are replaced by relatively more predictable organizational 
relationships and processes. 
The circumstances under which this substitution will be made 
depend on the nature of the company's transactions, and the costs 
of completing them, rather than on technology per se (Williamson 
(1975: 1-2]. IT, however, is different from other technologies 
precisely in that it is a transaction processing technology. It 
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will, therefore, be a major factor in any transaction-oriented 
analysis of the company's scope and of its relationships with 
other organizations Williamson's [1975] theory of "markets and 
hierarchies" can provide the theoretical foundations of a 
business case for inter-organizationa~ systems, complementing the 
use of Porter's [1980; 1985] theories of strategic forces, 
generic strategies and the value chain. 
The principal technologies that support corporate effectiveness 
at the company level are those related to transaction flow - data 
communication networks, and company-wide and inter-company 
transaction processing systems and databases. Where the rate of 
transaction flow is high, the performance levels of the 
technologies, e.g. computer processing power, data storage access 
speeds, telecommunication bandwidth, become crucial factors. 
B. Organizational Uses of IT 
1. Strategic Business Systems 
Simon [1976: 39-41] identifies three bounds to decision makers' 
ability to make correct decisions and to-carry out tasks. In 
order to characterize strategic uses of IT, these three bounds 
can be summarized in traditional terms as follows: 
Knowledge: The knowledge and information available to 
decision makers in performing tasks and making decisions. 
Skills: The unconscious skills, habits and reflexes, that 
limit decision makers' ability to perform a task. 
Attitudes: The values and conceptions Of purpose that 
influence the way in which tasks are performed and 
judgements are made, which may diverge from the ideals, 
objectives and goals of the organization. 
According to Simon, it is only within these three bounds that 
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decision making can be regarded as rational. It is also clear 
from the levels of organizational impact discussed in Section 
4.3.III.A. that good, i.e. rational, organizational dialectic 
(Figure 4) will depend on the knowledge, skills and attitudes 
brought to strategic decision making at each organizational level 
- individual, workgroup, business unit and company - and in all 
four domains - owners, developers, users and operators. 
Hence, in terms of the present Framework, the organizational 
design task must be to build structures, processes and IT 
applications that extend the bounds of individual and group 
rationality at all organizational levels, in all domains, judged 
in terms of the strategic purposes established for IT. A 
strategic use of IT is defined in this Framework as one that 
supports this organizational design task. 
In their discussion of a company's "internal strategy" (i.e. 
organizational design), Bakopoulos & Treacy [1985: 4] highlight 
the duality of the organizational design problem: 
structures: The alternative organizational forms, at 
corporate, business unit and work-group levels, into which 
tasks, authorities and responsibilities are structured as 
best fits strategic objectives. 
Processes: The alternative organizational processes - the 
work, resource and information flows - for getting the 
tasks done. 
The distinction must be made between, on the one hand, generic 
organizational processes and the de facto organizational 
structures (configurations of work) they induce, and, on the 
other hand, the formal management structures shown in the 
official organization charts. Generic structures and processes 
correspond to the concept of "primary function" in EwiM, and are 
generic in the sense that they define company likeness by 
industry class and function [Benson & Parker, 1985: 16]. They 
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rest on a systems theoretic view of organizations and reflect the 
actual inter-dependencies among individuals and work-groups 
through which the company is able to produce and deliver its 
products and services. 
The lag between competitive strategy implementation and 
organizational restructuring observed by Chandler {Section 
4.3.III.A.3.) can be investigated dialectically as a 
contradiction between persistent older organizational forms and 
emerging new generic structures and processes, which awaits 
synthesis by organization innovators. To ensure that this issue 
does enter the organizational dialectic explicitly and timeously, 
and is not left to chance, the Framework defines a "unit of 
discourse" for the use of IT in organizational design. This is 
the "strategic business system": 
A set of closely interrelated generic organizational 
structures and processes, i.e. a human system, 
Supported by one or more generic IT applications, i.e. an 
information system, 
That extends the bounds of rationality of its owners, 
developers, users and operators, 
In order to achieve, directly or indirectly, well-defined 
and measurable purposes in the competitive strategy. 
An information system may be freestanding, e.g. a payroll 
system. It may be an element of some larger application~ e.g. an 
inventory control system within a factory management system. It 
may be a service imbedded in the IT infrastructure itself, e.g. 
the data access security system. Similarly, a human system may 
be self-contained within an official branch or department of the 
company, e.g. stock control. It may be co-extensive with such a 
department or branch, e.g. factory management. It may span 
several departments and branches, either as a recognized element 
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of the corporate infrastructure, e.g. personnel administration, 
or as a web of sub-processes permeating many areas of functional 
and divisional responsibility, e.g. the cash management process. 
Organizational designers require a rationale or logical framework 
through which the abstract concept of a strategic business system 
can be made concrete and relevant in terms of the generic 
structures and processes of their particular company. Many such 
frameworks are available in the literature. The two proposed in 
the Structure Component of this Framework (Section 4.4) are: 
Porter's [1985] theory of the business unit as a chain of 
value-creating activities and linkages, because it permits 
the concept of a strategic business system to be linked 
directly and measurably to the purposes of IT, through a 
precise definition of "competitive advantage". 
Ives & Learmonth's [1984] model of the customer resource 
life cycle, which can be used to generate many 
implementable opportunities for strategic business-systems 
in the relationships between a company and its customers. 
2. Classes of Use 
Since strategic business systems involve uses of IT that extend 
the bounds of rationality, three major classes of such systems 
can be identified: 
Automation of Activities: These are systems that expand or 
substitute for human capability, usually at the level of 
task performance, i.e. the operational and operational 
control levels of the company [Anthony, 1965: 19; 
Blumenthal, 1969: 29]. 
Organizational Process Control: These are systems that 
support or enforce congruency between the ends (ideals, 
objectives, goals) of individuals and work-groups and those 
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of their own or some other organization. Until the late 
1970s, these were management control systems aimed at 
co-ordinating the budgets, resource allocations, standards, 
quality control and so forth of consenting participants 
within the organization. In the "competitive weapon" 
systems, the effect if not the stated intention is to 
control persons, processes and organizations outside the 
company (Section 4.2.II.B.), and consent is not always 
respected. 
Information Services: These are decision support systems, 
management information systems, data retrieval systems and 
so forth, which expand or substitute for human decision 
making competence at any organizational level, by 
gathering, processing, correlating and presenting 
appropriate knowledge and information. 
In each of the above classes,/ the applications represent 
conventional uses of IT in every sense. They combine appropriate 
technologies according to generally accepted systems engineering 
principles, and provide the basic data processing functions of 
capture, ·conversion, transmission, transformation, generation, · 
association, retrieval and presentation. The information system 
part of a strategic business system is not materially different 
in design or use from any other application. The difference lies 
in its purpose and hence the management attitude towards it, a 
fact confirmed in a Butler Cox Foundation Survey: 
"'f the :respc:>nients, 68 per cent irrli.cated that they do 
regard ccmpetitive-edge applications as different. Several 
respondents p:rovided reasons for their view, and these can 
be S\.ntU'IIarized as just two basic differences: 
• • • the basis on whim the decision to proceed is 
made. ~ entilasis is on c:x:rrparirg opporbmities and 
risks rather than on c:x:rrpari.rg costs and benefits. . .• 
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Different attib.¥:les ani awroaches to systems 
develq:ment • • • Speed of i.nplementation, ml.iability, 
am the quality of the user interface rank m:>re highly 
than efficien=y ani tedmi.cal elegal'X)e." [Butler Cox 
Fc:Jurdation, 1987: 4] 
These respondents emphasized that, from a technical point of 
view, the competitive-edge applications are similar or identical 
to traditional applications. The other 32 per cent indicated 
that, in their view, competitive-edge applications do not 
constitute a separate class of system because, in their 
organizations, all factors - competitiveness, efficiency and 
effectiveness - were taken into account in systems planning. 
Elements of each of the three classes - automation, control, 
information - will be apparent in virtually any strategic 
business system, but one of them will tend to be the dominant 
theme. 
For example, systems in which automation is the dominant theme 
would be designed and used to process defined transacti_ons, to 
produce fixed-format management reports on schedule, or to 
establish intra- and inter-organizational links. Machine 
processes are substituted for human processes. 
In alignment IT strategy the purpose would be organizational 
effectiveness though product or service improvements or cost 
reductions, possibly in ways that would not be feasible without 
IT - e.g. rapid order processing and customer billing. In impact 
IT strategy, the purpose and acceptable scale of the investment 
would be different, e.g. a turnaround on order processing and 
customer billing that is so rapid that it raises the level of 
competitor rivalry or creates a barrier against new entrants. 
Systems in which organizational process control is the dominant 
theme would be designed to ensure that organizational processes 
continue to operate within the desired bounds. Machine processes 
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control human activities. 
In alignment IT strategy the applications are aimed at optimizing 
and co-ordinating the linkages between processes within the 
company, e.g. integrated manufacturing systems, integrated 
corporate planning systems. In impact IT strategy the system 
might be inter-organizational, aimed at manipulating the linkages 
between the company and its strategic_targets, e.g. just-in-time 
systems imposed on suppliers, airline reservations systems 
outflanking competitors, order-entry systems infiltrated into 
customer organizations. On the surface, these systems appear to 
be aimed at automation or information services but, as the 
Frontier Airline case shows (Section 4.2.II.B.), the true purpose 
is undeniably control of the strategic targets. 
Systems in which information service is the dominant theme would 
be designed to satisfy the information needs of managers and 
employees, e.g. by providing data gathering, collation and 
retrieval facilities, end-user programming, graphics, "what-if" 
modelling programs, and so forth. Machine processes are applied 
in support of human effectiveness. 
In alignment IT strategy, the aim is managerial effectiveness 
though better planning, management controls, decision making and 
so forth, almost always in ways that would not be feasible 
without IT, e.g. to reduce budget preparation time from months to 
weeks or even days. In impact IT strategy, the application might 
focus on obtaining and using privileged information about the 
strategic targets, or on changing the production economics andjor 
user acceptability of the product by increasing its "information 
intensity" [Porter & Millar, 1985: 153]. 
In this Framework, the concepts of level and class of use define 
the operational dimensions of the use of IT in organizational 
design. They are shown as the fourth and fifth steps in Figure 
11. The five steps taken together force decision makers to link 
purpose and use in their strategic thinking, and the unifying 
Page 162 
concept for design and implementation is that of a strategic 
business system. 
IV. IT POSITIONING 
"IT positioning" is the quadrant of IT Strategy shown in Box B of 
Figure 8: 
"Before the top team can create a strategy usinJ IT 
effectively, it has to have a clear mrle.rst:arxti. both of 
the tectmologies available J'lC7N an::l in the foreseeable 
future an:i of the likely inpact of each of those 
t.eduiologies on the organization's oatpetitive position. 
• • • '!he process of gai.nirg this urrlerstardi.rg has 
attracted the name IT positioning." [Jarvis, 1985: 21] 
/ 
The analyses carried out in terms of Boxes A and c of Figure 8 
(Sections 4.3.II. and III.) allow IT decision makers to formulate 
the purposes and uses of IT as a number of possibilities or 
potentialities. In accordance with the contingency principle 
(Section 4.1.III.D.3.), Box B is intended to help in formulating 
constraints on appropriate purposes and uses, i.e. which of the 
possibilities are feasible and desirable. The outcome of this 
third major step in determining the role of IT in the business 
strategy is an "IT Positioning Statement", which will serve as 
the fundamental guideline in developing and implementing the 
architecture of the target environment. 
A. IT Strategy Evaluation 
It is clear from the discussion of Figure 9 in Section 4.3.I. 
that IT strategy is not of equal importance in all companies. 
"For sane organizations, IS activities represent an area 
of great strategic importance while for other organizations 
they play' an:i awropriately will continue to play' a 
CXIS't-effective an:i useful role but one which is distinctly 
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suwortive in nature. Organizations of this latter type 
shall.d expect that a lesser anomt of senior management 
strategic t.hinki.rg wall.d be devoted to their IS 
mganizatioo." [cash, H:::Farlan & M::Kenney , 1983: 26] 
The adaptation of McFarlan's "information systems strategic grid" 
(Cash, McFarlan & McKenney, 1983: 216-218], shown as the "IT 
strategy evaluation grid" in Figure 12, provides a means of 
determining what a business unit's IT positioning ought to be. 
If the company consists of several business units, a separate 
analysis is necessary for each. In broad terms, the grid helps 
decision makers address the following questions: 
What changes in IT strategy and organizational design are 
necessary if the current IT positioning is not consistent 
with the current competitive strategy? 
What changes in IT strategy and organizational design are 
necessary to move the company from its current competitive 
strategy to another? 
Either case can be interpreted as a move from one of the Boxes of 
Figure 12 to another, and a strategic IT decision making problem 
is to identify and provide for the implications of such a move. 
If the company consists of several business units, they may not 
all be moving in the same way, and this too has to be taken into 
consideration in company-wide IT strategy. 
By analogy with the product/business life cycle and the Boston 
Consulting Group growth/share matrix [Robinson, 1986: Cbs. 5-8; 
11-13], and with a view to tuning the IT strategy evaluation grid 
as a diagnostic and prescriptive tool geared to the company's own 
stage of development (Section 4.6.III.A.), various "sequences" of 
IT positioning moves can be considered. For example: 
First Stage: The business unit is in the Turnaround Box -
it may already enjoy effective IT support for its 
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organizational processes, but its competitive strategy has 
not hitherto been critically dependent on it. The data 
analysis and dialectical enquiry of the Context Component 
indicate that the situation is now changing, and there is 
much emphasis on new systems development. By def~nition, 
this entails new purposes and uses for IT, so IT strategy 
will almost certainly be impact. Much strategic planning 
is needed, and this will be difficult if managers lack 
experience in strategic IT decision making. 
Business Life Cycle·Phase: "Introduction". 
Boston Consulting Group Matrix: "Question Mark". 
Second Stage: By the time the business unit reaches the 
Strategic Box, the strategic business systems identified in 
the previous stage have become existing systems, but the 
need for further new applications in the competitive 
strategy is still growing. Hence the business unit is now 
critically dependent both on the smooth running of existing 
systems and on rapid and reliable development of new 
applications. Much strategic IT planning effort is needed, 
aimed at being both "right" and "first" - e.g. to preempt 
competitors, or to gain lasting unit cost advantage by 
being first down the experience curve [Robinson, 1986: 
Ch.9]). If the emphasis on new systems development implies 
new purposes and uses for IT, and hence new competitive 
strategies and (eventually} new organizational designs, the 
IT strategy will be impact. 
Business Life Cycle Phase: "Growth". 
Boston Consulting Group Matrix: "Star". 
Third Stage: When the business unit is in the Factory Box, 
it will have exhausted the range of feasible purposes for 
IT in the current product/market segments, at the current 
stage of the technological life cycle, and the demand for 
new systems tapers off. While the business unit remains 
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heavily dependent on the existinq systems, there is little 
indication of basic chanqes in its competitive strateqy and 
orqanizational desiqn, and hence of new purposes and uses 
for IT. An alignment IT strateqy is indicated, focusinq on 
better support for existinq processes, good systems 
maintenance, and operational efficiency. 
Business Life cycle Phase: "Maturity". 
Boston Consultinq Group Matrix: "Cash Cow". 
Fourth Stage: Finally, as the product andjor its market 
decline, so too does the competitive impact of IT in this 
context. The business unit enters the Support Box, where 
IT issues are not critical to the business strategies. The 
IT budqets, however, can grow quite rapidly if users and 
operators start buyinq into new technoloqies - e.g. 
personal computers, laser printers, graph plotters - on a 
scale that is not justified by any strategic purpose of the 
owners or the developers. Unless the desired impact of IT 
is to inject new life into old products, thereby startinq a 
new cycle, IT strateqy is appropriately alignment and a 
strategic task is to ensure that it remains so. 
Business Life Cycle Phase: "Decline". 
Boston Consulting Group Matrix: "Dog". 
This sequence of IT positioninqs is only one of several 
possibilities. A sequence that is appropriate for a given 
company has to be determined, for example through dialectical 
debate, and tested empirically, for example through market 
research. Such an exercise has diagnostic and prescriptive value 
for the planninq of transition stages in IT strategy 
implementation (Sections 4.5.II. and 4.6.III.A.). It could also 
reveal new purposes for IT, e.g. to change the shapes of the 
product and business life cycle curves (Robinson, 1986: 74-83]. 
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B. Investment Focus 
If evaluation shows that an upward movement in the scale and 
importance of the IT strategy is .needed, two further questions 
immediately arise: 
What will the overall cost be in terms of time, money and 
other resources, and can the company afford it? 
Where should the investment focus be - i.e. what are the 
development priorities? 
In traditional systems requirements analysis, such questions have 
been asked only after one or more development projects have been 
identified. When, however, an IT strategy is based on the 
principles of interactive planning and idealized design (Section 
4.2.III.A.), the questions have to be asked in advance, and the 
approximate bounds of acceptable answers must be stated as policy 
guidelines for strategic IT planning. For example, what are the 
upper limits to available capital? What is the acceptable ratio 
of IT running costs to sales revenue andjor total operating 
expenses? What broad priority areas for development are implied 
by the identified purposes and uses of IT? 
A wide range of issues will arise in attempting to answer such 
questions. Once again both facts and assumptions will be 
relevant, and Tichy's (1983] 11T,P,C (Technical, Political, 
CUltural) Theory" for change management provides a useful 
framework- for organizing the issues: 
The Technical Design Problem: The investment focus agreed 
on should reflect a proper allocation of scarce IT 
resources to those strategic business systems that will, in 
the aggregate, contribute to maximizing the competitive 
advantage gained through IT, over the payback period agreed 
on. It is largely to this strand of the problem that the 
Structure and Process components of this Framework are 
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addressed. There are, however, two other strands that must 
also be managed. 
The Political Allocation Problem: If there is more than 
one business unit in the company, corporate management have 
to agree on a basis for distributing IT resources at this 
1evel. The problem is political because, at least in South 
Africa, IT human, financial and technological resources are 
scarce and problematical. If their availability to the 
company as a whole is well below what the business units in 
sum total believe they can afford to employ, mechanistic 
allocation criteria will not convince one business unit 
that its claims are inferior to those of another. 
As discussed in Section 4.3.III.B., the structures and 
processes of strategic business systems often lie beneath 
the official organization forms. It is in terms of the 
1atter, however, that management competence and 
accountability, and "functional area policy options" (Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978: 23-24], are commonly understood. Hence a 
further political problem arises out of the potential for 
mismatch between an IT investment focus that is best for 
the success of the business strategy, and one that is best 
for the success of the decision makers. 
The Cultural/Ideological Mix Problem: Deciding on the 
company's competitive strategy and whether and to what 
extent the organizational design should be adapted are 
greatly influenced by the decision makers' personal 
values. Consequently, the decision on how much resource to 
invest in which projects can be influenced as much by 
"soft" cultural and ideological factors as by "hard" 
technical and financial analysis. 
Many managers find it difficult, for example, to justify IT 
expenditures in any terms other than cost savings. They 
may hold espoused theories about the other kinds of generic 
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strategy, i.e. differentiation and scope, but when it comes 
to making a decision their theories in use revolve around 
cost displacement. ~or example, IBM Canada's [1983, 1986] 
•Executive Planning for Data Processing" translates the 
evaluation of IT costs and benefits into the terminology of 
•effective headcount". 
More general political and cultural problems are discussed in 
Section 4.3.V.B., while another application of Tichy's framework 
is described in Section 4.4.V.A. 
c. Competitive Advantage 
In this Framework, human systems design and information systems 
design are tightly coupled in the concept of a strategic busin~ss 
system. The Porter value chain is the proposed basis for systems 
analysis (Section 4.3.III.B.1) because it permits the success of 
an IT strategy - viewed as the creation and deployment of 
strategic business systems - to be measured in terms of the 
competitive advantage aimed at and achieved. Thus the third 
important "constraint" to be taken into account in IT positioning 
is the measurable competitive advantage the company hopes -to gain 
from its strategic business systems. Estimating this competitive 
advantage constitutes the final step of the Strategic Option 
Generator (Figure 11). 
Hofer & Schendel [1978: 25] define "competitive advantage" as the 
unique positions a company develops vis-a-vis its competitors 
through its pattern of resource and skill deployments andjor its 
present and planned interactions with its environment. They 
define "synergy" as the joint effects the company seeks between 
its resource deployments on the one hand and its environmental 
interactions on the other. These definitions suggest an approach 
to measuring competitive advantage that will be consistent with 
the dialectical activities and organizational congruencies of the 
present Framework, as depicted in Figure 4 (Section 4.2.I.). 
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The approach is outlined in Figure 13: 
Interactions with the Environment: The net effect of the 
company's past, present and intended interactions with its 
environment, which includes product and market scope as 
well as interactions with the strategic targets, is its 
ncompetitive position". 
An evaluation of a company's competitive position would 
refer to its overall performance goals (e.g. total 
turnover, profit margin, return on investment, earnings per 
share) and to key success factors relative to the 
competition (e.g. market share, breadth of product line, 
sales distribution effectiveness, capacity and 
productivity). 
Resource and Skill Deployment: The net effect of the 
company's past, present and planned deployments of its 
skills to achieve its competitive position is its 
"organizational effectiveness". 
An evaluation of a company's organizational effectiveness 
would refer to the quality of operating and technical 
performance it achieves through its pattern of skill and 
resource deployments. Measures such as turnaround time on 
orders, reduction in clerical error rates and transactions 
handled per workgroup per day quite common. More general-
ly, Ansoff (1968: 84-93] describes how the relatively 
informal "strengths and weaknesses" analysis of the Context 
Component can be made more rigorous as a "grid of 
competences", according to major functional areas and 
generic classes of capability. 
Synergy: The joint effects of the company's competitive 
position and organizational effectiveness, and of colla-
borative efforts among different workgroups and business 
units of the organization, may be called "synergy". 
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An evaluation of synergy would refer to the aqgregate sales 
revenue, operating expense and return on capital employed 
obtained from all the company's products, and how these 
results would change when the several production processes 
are inter-related in different ways [Ackoff, 1968: 72-74]. 
Many other factors than IT come into play in determining the 
overall company results pertaining to competitive position, 
orqanizational effectiveness and synergy, and it would be 
extremely difficult in practice to sift out the measurable IT 
contribution to each. By descending each of the columns depicted 
in Figure 13, however, it should be possible to trace a sequence 
of cause-effect relationships in such a way that IT-specific 
measures can be arrived at, which refer to strategic IT purposes, 
organizational IT uses, and the congruency between them. 
Competitive Strategy - IT Purposes: For example, it may be 
decided that a certain IT application will improve the 
company's competitive position: 
If it allowed the sales team to increase market share 
by a given percentage, 
Or if it allowed the engineering function to lower the 
capital intensity of a production process enough to 
raise the return on capital employed by a given amount 
over the industry average, 
Or if it allowed production management to change 
short-run cost curves in a way that enabled the 
company to increase net profit over a given period by 
a better percentage than the competition. 
The measure of IT contribution to competitive position is 
not taken in terms of the actual increase in market share, 
return on capital or profit margin realized. It is taken 









preconditions for attaininq these results were created, 
i.e. the observable chanqes in the quality of the sales 
support, or of the production process, or of cost 
manaqement, that can be attributed to the IT application. 
Hofer & Schendel (1978: 75-79: 106-107] describe a 
five-step process for identifyinq and scoring the 
measurable key success factors for competitive position. 
If IT-based preconditions are attached to each key success 
factor, the process can be adapted to the evaluation of 
competitive position through IT, intended vs. attained. 
Organizational Effectiveness - IT Uses: Hofer & Schendel 
(1978: 152] make the point that not all organizations have 
resource and skill deployments so unique that they could be 
called distinctive competences. For most companies, 
organizational competences need to be carefully identified 
in functional terms, so that they may be measured as 
precisely as possible. Using Porter's value chain to 
analyze strategic business systems in terms of generic 
functions or "value activities" (Section 4.3.III.B.1.) 
allows this to be done. By definition, a business unit 
achieves measurable competitive advantage - i.e. becomes 
organizationally effective - when it performs the chain of 
value-creating functions that go into producing its product 
or service, either at a lower cost than competitors can or 
in a way that justifies a premium price. 
Once again, the measure of the IT contribution to organiza-
tional effectiveness is not taken directly in terms of the 
improvements obtained in functional and inter-functional 
performance. It is taken rather·in terms of whether and to 
what extent the preconditions for functional effectiveness 
have been achieved by the application of IT. For example, 
the observable improvements in task performance, in 
inter-departmental workflow and in managerial decision 
making that can be attributed to the IT application. 
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Part of the analysis will involve determining precisely how 
the preconditions for organizational effectiveness differ, 
if at all, from those for competitive position, what the 
logical relationships between them are, and what the 
implications may be for selecting and managing IT 
application projects. 
Synergy- Congruency: Following Ansoff [1968: 75-84], four 
different kinds of synergy can be identified. With 
reference to the purposes and uses of IT, these can be 
described as follows: 
Sales Synergy: This can occur when different products 
or services use the same IT infrastructure andjor 
business systems in distribution channels, sales 
administration, warehousing and so forth. The 
synergistic effects arise out of the putting together 
of organizational processes that would otherwise have 
remained separate, and are reflected in decreased 
development or operating costs, decreased IT and other 
capital investment, or increased turnover made 
possible by the additional customer bases opened up to 
each product. A company with just one product can 
also achieve these effects through participation in 
inter-organizational systems. 
Operating Synergy: Lower operating costs can be 
achieved through fuller utilization of IT skills and 
other resources, spreading of overheads, common 
learning curve effects, and volume purchase discounts. 
Investment Synergy: Sharing common IT infrastructure 
and business systems can lead to fuller utilization of 
capital employed; it can also bring IT facilities 
within the reach of business units who might not be 
able to afford them on their own. 
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Management and Expertise Synergy: Management 
experience and technical skills gained in applying IT 
in one business area can give the company a head start 
in another business area. 
The above are all positive synergistic effects, which make 
congruency between IT purposes and IT uses much more than 
merely the neutral issue of good fit. There are, however, 
also negative synergistic effects. For example, two 
business units may agree to a joint development of an 
information system because their two products appear to be 
so similar. In the course of detailed analysis, it may 
become clear that their administrative and operating 
requirements (the human systems parts) are so different 
that the effort and expense involved in building a joint 
system to satisfy both far exceed the cost of separate 
development. 
Even when there is no sharing of infrastructure and 
business systems, synergistic effects are still possible. 
For example, there are usually several ways in which IT 
infrastructure and information systems can be designed to 
support a given product. Some of these ways may provide a 
better fit than others with the human systems part, in the 
sense that they could stimulate higher sales revenue, or 
lead to lower operating costs, or require lower capital 
investment. Such effects could arise out of insightful 
design of the infrastructure and the information systems to 
meet the requirements of the human systems. In such cases, 
congruence is achieved through an alignment IT strategy. 
Better insight into what is needed to serve the purposes of 
the competitive strategy could, however, lead to bolder and 
more skillful (re)design of the entire business system -
the information systems part as well as the human systems 
part. In this case, a higher order of congruence is 
achieved through an impact IT strategy. 
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The above characterization of competitive advantage has a number 
of important implications for the IT Positioning Statement: 
Firstly, by definition it is best to define competitive 
advantage through IT in the aggregate for a given product 
or product line, or even perhaps for the whole company, 
depending on the synergy between business units. It can 
never be satisfactory to consider the ROI of one project or 
business system among many (cf. McFarlan, 1984: 101-103]. 
Secondly, the payoff expected from the aggregate strategic 
investment in IT should refer to the improved attainability 
of the "ultimate" measures (business goals and key success 
factors) relative to the competition, rather than to their 
actual attainment. 
Thirdly, specific advantages - in competitive position, in 
organizational effectiveness and in synergy - will differ 
from one business unit to another. The implications of 
these differences for the IT strategy evaluation (Section 
4.3.IV.A.) and the IT investment focus (Section 4.3.IV.B.) 
should be made clear in the positioning statement. 
This characterization of measurable competitive advantage thus 
provides the definition of "benefits" for the calculation of the 
aggregate strategic costs, benefits and risks of IT strategy, as 
discussed in Section 4.5.III.A. Measures relating to competence 
in IT decision making constitute a special subset of the factors 
that will emerge as analysis proceeds down the right-hand column 
of Figure 13. These are the "decision making success criteria" 
dealt with in Section 4.4.V.D.2. 
D. Appropriate Technology 
A reasonably accurate picture of the informatio~ technologies 
that will be strategically important to the company will have 
been developed in the Corporate IT Scenario. These include not 
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only emerging new technologies but also the emerging capability 
of existing technologies - for example, computer processing 
power; processor memory design, capacity and throughput rates; 
data communications capacity and functionality; and data storage 
design, capacity and channel speeds. 
Particular technologies and capabilities that are deemed relevant 
to the present and possible future competitive strategies of the 
company need to be identified in the Positioning Statement. It 
is useful to consider three levels of strategic relevance: 
General Relevance: Technologies that are critical to any 
company in the Turnaround or Strategic Box of the Strategy 
Evaluation Grid. 
Particular Relevance: Technologies that are critical to 
this industry or to this company. 
Special Relevance: Technologies that assume special 
significance in the South African setting. 
It is not only new or advanced technologies that are strategic. 
The innovative use of existing technologies in new applications, 
or of existing applications in new strategic situations, can be 
as impactive as state-of-the-art technologies, and will often 
involve less risk. 
"'Ihere is ex>nsiderable evidence, both fran our researc:h 
arrl that of others, that in nost cases competitive-edge 
applications evolve though the .increirental extension of 
in-house systems; arrl that they are identified arrl pm;ued 
by line managenent without (in many cases) much help fran 
the systems department." [Butler Cox FOU1'¥3ation, 1987: 1] 
It must also be remembered that a technology is counterproductive 
when it reinforces an undesirable status 9YQ in organizational 
processes - for example, when an online bar-coding system is used 
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to keep track of the flow of vast quantities of paper documents. 
Whether IT remains "a" or becomes "a crucial" or even "the" 
technology of the business will depend on the changes it brings 
about in company mission, competitive strategy and organizational 
design. The permissible scope and limits of these changes will 
determine whether alignment IT strategies or impact IT strategies 
are to be followed, and the consistency of these judgements will 
be cross-checked in the IT strategy evaluation. 
Timing is another critical factor in IT positioning. At what 
points in the life cycle of a technology will the company 
generally wish to enter - e.g. "cutting edge", "state of the 
art", "advanced", "mainstream", "mature" or "decline"? [Buskirk, 
1986: 8]. In what sequence should the technologies be introduced 
into the organization, bearing in mind that development resources 
are limited? How far in advance can the IT needs of specific 
competitive strategies (e.g. responses to the market; launches of 
new products and services; new market entries; specific 
campaigns) be reliably foreseen, and how far ahead can the 
appropriate technology entry points be predicted? What will the 
acceptable trade-off be between development lead-time and 
technical efficiency? 
The Arthur Andersen Delphi study conducted for LOMA [Life Office 
Management Association, 1984: 16] identified three stances 
companies could take with regard to IT innovation. 
Pioneers: These were the companies who made greater 
initial investments, thereby gaining a decided competitive 
edge, but at some business risk. 
Move With the Pack: These companies followed the leaders; 
they increased productivity and perhaps improved their 
competitive position. This was seen as the least-risk 
strategy and was favoured by "emerging leaders and 
technology executives". 
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Trailers: By delaying the implementation of new techno-
logies, these companies compromised their competitive 
position in all regards except business risk avoidance. 
Pioneers exhibit the entrepreneurial mode (Section 4.3.II.B.2.) 
and are thus candidates for impact IT strategy. The other two 
stances exhibit the competitive mode, and their IT strategies, if 
any, are typically alignment. 
V. IT STRATEGY 
If the match a company makes between the opportunities and risks 
of its external environment and its internal skills and resources 
can be called a strategy, then all companies can be said to have 
a business strategy [cf. Hofer & Schendel, 1978: 4]. 
In the same way, if the match a company makes between the issues 
of Boxes A, B and c of Figure 8 can be called a strategy, then 
all companies can be said to have an IT strategy. This match may 
or may not have been planned, and it may or may not be good, but 
it can always be investigated and described. If IT is important 
in the business strategy, which it certainly is if the company is 
positioned in the TURNAROUND or STRATEGIC Box of Figure 12, then 
the IT strategy should be formally planne~ and explicitly 
communicated to all concerned. 
Following Hofer & Schendel [1978: 5-7], the reasons for making 
the IT strategy formal may be summarized as follows: 
To assist in drawing up and communicating corporate and 
business unit objectives and goals for IT. 
To assist in identifying and managing the major strategic 
issues associated with IT. 
To assist in determining and evaluating appropriate IT 
investment projects (bearing in mind the limitations of 
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traditional capital budgeting and riskjreturn evaluation 
techniques in IT planning). 
To assist in making the correct allocations of the 
necessary human, financial and technological resources. 
To assist in co-ordinating and expediting the many 
administrative, operating and technical activities involved 
in implementing IT strategy. 
To assist in developing the competence of strategic IT 
decision makers. 
IT strategy is always corporate or company-wide. This is 
trivially true when the company has just one business unit, but 
it is true also when there are several. In the first place, 
since IT strategy involves the allocation of scarce human, 
financial and technological resources to business units, it 
follows from generally accepted principles of business portfolio 
planning [Hofer & Schendel, 1978: 70; Porter, 1987: 53-57; Sloan, 
1972: Ch. 7] that at least in this respect it is a matter for 
decision making at corporate management level. 
Secondly, all business units share the responsibility for finding 
out what synergistic effects are available to the company as a 
whole. Whether these exist, and what to do about them, will 
involve joint decision making by corporate management and the 
several business unit managements. If there are indeed 
synergistic effects to be pursued (possibly no more than a saving 
in aggregate capital investment andjor running costs), all 
business units will become involved in defining and implementing 
a common IT infrastructure. 
The very essence of business strategy is, as Bower [1982(1): 32] 
points out, effective problem solving, and many tools and 
techniques are available for specific problems in IT strategy 
(Section 4.1.IV.). Following Bower's [1982(1): 43] schema of the 
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strategic planning process, strategic IT problem solving and 
decision making activities and the tools they require can be 
separated into two broad classes. The first concerns strategy 
formulation and the second, strategy implementation: 
~ Technology Strategy: This is the formulation of 
appropriate purposes and uses for IT subject to the 
constraints of_the company's IT positioning- i.e. the 
business vision for the role of IT, and the development of 
the infrastructure, systems and decision making competence 
needed to realize the vision. 
It follows from the principles of interactive planning and 
idealized design (Section 4.1.III.A.) that the strategy 
will be expressed in the form of an architecture for an 
ideal "target environment"; and from the principles of 
continuity and contingency (Section 4.1.III.C. and 0.3.) 
that the target environment will be designed for 
incremental implementation over time. 
IT Management Strategy: This is the overall administration 
and logistics plan for implementing the IT technology 
strategy. Essentially, it is a process for managing the 
transition from the present IT environment to the future 
target environment. It consists of a series of strategic 
thrusts and action plans aimed at building, incrementally, 
selected segments of the target environment, and it also 
covers the issues of acquiring and allocating the needed 
human, financial and technological resources, development 
priorities and project definition, co-ordination and 
control. The process can extend over several years, and 
could involve building decision making structures and 
processes that do not already exist in the company. 
The IT technology strategy is dealt with in systems architectural 
terms in the structure Component (Section 4.4), and the IT 
management strategy in organizational development (00) terms in 
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the Process Component (Section 4.5). The IT Positioning 
Statement produced by the Content Component should, however, 
indicate the scale, scope and significance of the IT strategy 
corporate and business unit management expect. 
oooOooo 
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4.4 DECISION STRUCTURE 
I. THE TARGET ENVIRONMENT 
The target environment is the shared management vision of a 
company-wide internal environment in which IT is optimally 
applied in the business strategy, expressed in consistent, 
constructive terms that lead to implementation. 
The Structure Component provides a framework - shown in Figure 14 
- to help IT decision makers formulate an IT technology strategy 
in the form of a Target Environment Architecture that gives 
effect to the purposes and uses of IT determined in the Content 
Component. 
Figure 14 is based on Figures 1, 2 and 3 of this Framework, 
Benjamin's "Three Steps in Strategic Planning" [Benjamin, Seminar 
E-01: Plate 4], and Nolan, Norton & Company's "Levels of Computer 
Architecture" [Advanced Systems Inc., Course 5055: 6]. 
As shown in Figure 14, the Target Environment Architecture can be 
presented from three perspectives: 
Dimensions: The four dimensions of the target environment 
introduced in Section 4.1.II.3. - IT infrastructure, human 
systems, information systems and human resources. 
Views: In each dimension, there is an external view that is 
communicable to all strategic IT decision makers, and an 
internal view for the developers of that dimension. 
Levels of Discourse: The four levels described ,in Section 
4.l.III.D.3. - conceptual, meta-architectural, macro-
architectural and micro-architectural. 
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Except for brief indications of the nature of the internal view 
in each dimension, this study is limited to the external views. 
since the study is also limited to the conceptual level of 
discourse (Section 4.l.III.D.4.), the following general 
description of what would be involved in the other three levels 
is provided: 
Meta-Architecture: This is the architecture of the ideal 
target environment, specific to the company in question, 
set well beyond the medium-term planning timeframe. Each 
of the four dimensions of the target environment is 
described in terms of generic constructs. The principal 
types of generic construct are: 
Activities: Tasks that will be performed by 
individuals, groups, and machines. 
Structures: Organizational and technological forms 
into which tasks, workgroups and resources will be 
structured. 
Processes: Organizational and technological methods 
and sequences of actions, through which work, 
resources and information will flow as tasks are 
carried out. 
Policies: General rules that indicate which structures 
should be used and which methods and courses of action 
followed in different circumstances. 
Criteria: Standards according to which the quality of 
structures and processes and the success of activities 
and policies can be assessed. 
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Macro-Architecture: This is the more detailed architecture 
of one or more decision packets (Section 4.l.II.C.), which 
will be implemented in the medium term planning timeframe 
(3 to 5 years). The macro-architecture is expressed in 
terms of specific constructs. It is at this level that 
resources are committed to definite, realistic objectives, 
and the shared business vision for IT is communicated 
company-wide. Hence the decision packets are also_the 
units for communicating the IT strategy to those who will 
be affected by it. It must, however, always remain 
possible to refer back to the meta-architectural level in 
order to explain the assumptions underlying the specific 
constructs chosen. 
Micro-Architecture: This is the collection of detailed 
designs for implementation projects and for the ongoing 
management of operational systems. The timeframe is the 
company's ordinary short-term planning period, usually the 
financial year. It is at this level that short-term goals 
are set, resources are allocated, and implementation 
projects are started, continued, completed or abandoned. 
Policies are set out in detail, conformance is monitored, 
and variances are analyzed and interpreted. This is the 
main context in which errors and the conditions for error 
will be detected and fed back into the learning loops 
(Section 4.1.II.B.3.). Activity at this level, however, 
typically has a narrow focus, and relationships between the 
business vision and the detailed implementations may not be 
at all clear to those working here. Consequently, 
appropriate education and training must be provided to 
' 
ensure that organizational IT learning can in fact take 
place (Section 4.4.V.A.3.). 
An unavoidable consequence of directed incrementalism (Section 
4.1.III.D.3.) is that conceptual and meta-architectural 
statements will tend to be somewhat abstract. Since it is 
crucially important that the generic constructs be practicable, 
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i.e. capable of eventual realization, tests such as the following 
[cf. Lacey, 1976: 165] are recommended for all generic constructs 
proposed: 
Realistic: Can the generic construct lead to one or more 
specific constructs that can be implemented within a 
foreseeable timeframe using technology that can be expected 
·to be available, and within the resource constraints of the 
company? 
Useful: Does the generic construct help to identify new 
strategic business systems, or enhancements to existing 
ones, with measurable competitive advantage? 
Certain: Will the construct be understood in the same way 
by all decision makers concerned, and will they be able to 
use it confidently and appropriately? 
Precise: Does it designate one particular entity in the 
overall context of strategic IT decision making, and no 
other, which can be justified, specified and implemented 
according,to sound principles? 
Organic: Does it fit naturally into the Target Environment 
Architecture? Does it help clarify: 
Physical boundaries - for example, of jobs, 
workgroups, business units, the company, strategic 
business systems? 
Logical boundaries - e.g. of rationality, of 
acceptable impact on mission and strategy? 
Relationships ~cross these boundaries? 
Relative: When instantiated, will the specific construct 
have a clear, consistent and compelling meaning in relation 
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to all dimensions of this company's Target Environment 
Architecture? 
The B+OL+D methodology (Benjamin, Seminar E-01: 3-1] suggests 
three further tests that can be applied to the meta-architecture 
as a whole: 
Completeness: Is every possible requirement of the IT 
technology strategy covered by the complete set of generic 
constructs? 
Uniqueness: Can every possible requirement ·of the IT 
technology be mapped to one and only one subset of generic 
constructs? 
Permanence: Will the complete set of generic constructs be 
capable of adaptation (through organizational IT learning) 
to all foreseeable IT technology strategy requirements? 
II. THE IT INFRASTRUCTURE 
The IT infrastructure is the totality of all hardware, software, 
telecommunications, services, methodologies, skills and other 
tangible resources the company will require to create strategic 
business systems (Section 4.3.III.B.1.) that will fulfil the 
purposes and uses of IT (Sections 4.3.II.B. and 4.3.III.B.). 
The architecture of this infrastructure is a set of blueprints, 
interface standards, policies and other logical constructs that 
provide direction for "technological base-building" (Bakopoulos 
and Treacy, 1985: 17], i.e. for developing the company's 
distinctive competence in the deployment of its IT resources 
(Section 4.2.I. and Figure 4). The aim is to provide the company 
with a base or capability on which it will be able to build new 
systems and assimilate new technologies, with minimum cost and 
lead time, as and when the needs emerge in the future. 
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The architecture defines inter-relationships among technologies, 
business systems and IT decision making processes, both 
internally and externally to the company. It focuses, not on 
specific technologies which are highly volatile, but on how 
technologies are to be managed to provide the features, functions 
and options needed; on how these can be classified to facilitate 
rational planning; and on how users inside and outside the 
company will have access to the business systems. 
The external architecture gives the owners, users and operators 
an appropriate view of the features, functions and options of the 
infrastructure. There are many ways of defining generic 
constructs to present this view. Some architectures are data 
orientated (e.g. "Business Systems Planning" [International 
Business Machines, 1984]); some are resource (hardware, software 
and communications) orientated (e.g. "Systems Application 
Architecture" [International Business Machines, 1987]), and some 
are management-orientated (e.g. the Nolan, Norton & Company 
framework [Advanced Systems Inc., 1985: Course 5052]). 
The present Framework, because of its close association with 
Benjamin's B+OL+D Methodology [Benjamin, Seminar E-01], is based 
on the "workstation paradigm". This is illustrated in Figure 15 
and explained in the following Sections. 
A. Generic Activities 
The columns of Figure 15 refer to the four principal forms of 
business data: computational (e.g. date of birth, payroll number, 
prices, quantities); text (e.g. letters, reports, memos); image 
(e.g. charts, diagrams, pictures, E.C.G.s); and voice (e.g. 
telephone conversations, meetings) [cf. Campbell, 1982: 189]. 
From the point of view of IT infrastructure, the first set of 
generic activities that can be identified are the things that can 
be done to data, the operations shown in the rows of Figure 15: 
input and output, communication, processing and storage. In the 
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present (and foreseeable) state of technology, there is no single 
device available to business that can perform all functions on a 
given form of data, or a given function on all forms of data. 
One of the challenges in external architecture is to contribute 
to expanding the bounds of user rationality (Section 
4.3.III.B.l.) by presenting the appearance of a single device 
that performs all the functions on all the forms of data, i.e. a 
"single system image". However, "··· IT has"to develop ways of 
handling information in its most natural form whatever that may 
be, e.g. if it is text then it should be kept as text, if voice 
then it is voice that should be stored, communicated and out~ut. 
The medium should not distort." (Campbell, 1982: 192] ~ 
The second set of generic activities that can be identified is 
the things that can be done with data. 
"'!here is a danger • • • that info:r::mation technology will 
aim at the wroDJ target or at least a llDVlDJ target. If 
office practices have been shaped by previous technologies 
then is it sensible to sperrl t.ine analyziDJ tasks we 
perfo:r:m in the office at the nanent am tJ:y to apply 
technology to them? Should we not be sperrling t.ine in 
taking a :ft.lrDanental look at what we do in offices arrl why 
we do it?" [<::anpJel.l, 1982: 193] 
By turning to what he calls "the office of yesterday" and 
considering how work was done before the picture was distorted by 
the introduction of IT, Benjamin describes four fundamental 
"automatable activities" [Benjamin, Seminar E-01, 3-2.1.1]: 
Data Processing: Creating and maintaining the operational 
records and files of the company and handling the 
transactions that constitute its business. 
Information Processing: Retrieving and manipulating data 
for management information and decision making purposes. 
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Office Functions: Keeping diaries, sharing and maintaining 
files, communicating by mail and by telephone, and so 
forth. 
Productivity Tools: Forms design, statistical analysis, 
simulation techniques, and other aids to managerial and 
professional performance. 
Another challenge in external architecture is to contribute to 
expanding the bounds of user rationality by providing the 
requisite kind and level of automation in each of these four 
categories, through the single system image, while at the same 
time providing internal safeguards over the integrity of business· 
data and transactions. 
For example, the operational data of a company is normally 
subject to institutional controls, while the control of data used 
in information processing is ordinarily regarded as a personal 
responsibility. A simple way of protecting operational data from 
unauthorized access and uncontrolled update is to keep the two 
kinds of processing physically apart, e.g. on separate machines. 
Modern software, however, such as the Millenium accounting 
package, often creates environments in which both data processing 
and information processing can be carried out simultaneously. 
Data protection then becomes an infrastructure design and 
management issue. 
The significant architectural differences between data processing 
and information processing refer to such factors as: Scope -
whether one or a few persons depend on the data; as opposed to an 
entire work-group or business unit; Duration - How long the data 
will remain relevant to the management of the company; 
Reproducibility - whether and how the data can be reconstructed 
in the event of damage or loss; Interfaces - how data is 
' 
extracted from and fed back into operational data files; Control 
- the kinds of control required, e.g. operational data files may 
be updated in data processing but not in information processing. 
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"Importance" is not a distinguishing factor, since both data 
processing and information processing must be presumed to be 
important. 
B. Generic Structures 
Figure 15 shows five "virtual" structures through which a single 
system image of infrastructure features, functions and options 
can be developed and implemented incrementally over time. They 
are called "virtual" because their.design is independent of the 
eventual choice of specific hardware and software. 
The structures are based on Benjamin's (Seminar E-01: 2-3.3] 
"external meta-architecture" and Nolan, Norton & Company's 
"segmentation model" [Advanced Systems Inc., Course 5053]. They 
are consistent with IBM's "Systems Application Architecture 
Model" (International Business Machines, 1987: 11]. 
1. Virtual Workstation 
This is a conceptual organization of infrastructure features, 
functions and options, and of all data forms and generic 
activities, as seen by a given individual. It is not tied to a 
particular location~ and is implemented as much by software 
(which may be distributed across the network) as by the physical 
equipment. Tanenbaum (1981: 421-429] describes the hardware and 
software interfaces of a "virtual terminal", while Benjamin 
(Benjamin, Seminar E-01: 4-3.1] describes more general functions 
and features of the workstation from a utilization point of view. 
The virtual workstation "represents" the individual user in the 
infrastructure architecture. It is the physical medium through 
which the bounds of rationality can be expanded at the individual 
level. 
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2. Virtual Network 
The virtual network is a conceptual organization of the totality 
of all IT resources anywhere in the organization: the data 
communications networks (wide area and local area), computers and 
other hardware, software, databases and application program 
libraries that lie behind the appearances of the virtual 
workstation. The term "network" is used to emphasize that these 
resources are all to be regarded as inter-connected, if not 
through the data communications infrastructure, then at least to 
the extent that they share the same human support skills and 
conform to the same standards. 
Subsets of the virtual network "represent" work groups, business 
units and the company as a whole in the infrastructure 
architecture. They are the physical media through which the 
bounds of rationality can be expanded at work group and other 
organizational levels. 
Correct deployment of structures such as local area networks, 
departmental computers and inter-organizational systems is the 
necessary physical foundation for an effective binding of human 
systems and information systems into strategic business systems. 
3. Virtual Applications Portfolio 
This is a conceptual collection of all those features, functions 
and options of the IT infrastructure (e.g. software, interfaces, 
standards, protocols and so forth) that are required to support 
the present and potential generic application functions (Section 
4 • 4 • IV. A • ) • 
Considered as a blueprint, the virtual applications portfolio 
should reflect the rationale or logical framework according to 
which the information systems developers agree to segment the 
strategic applications portfolio as this emerges in incremental 
planning (Section 4.4.IV.B.l.). This segmentation will be based 
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largely on generic technological criteria, for the simple reason 
that both the business criteria and the technical specifics will 
only emerge over time. 
Considered as a construct of the IT infrastructure, the virtual 
applications portfolio gives the minimal design standards which, 
if observed by developers, will allow specification of particular 
information systems to be deferred until the appropriate stage of 
macro- and micro-architectural planning arrives. It also allows 
these systems to be developed and implemented with minimum lead 
time and maximum flexibility of options. 
4. Virtual Data Model 
This is a conceptual collection of all those features, functions 
and options of the IT infrastructure (e.g. software, interfaces, 
standards, protocols and so forth) that are required to support 
the present and potential application data aggregates (Section 
4.4.IV.A.). 
Considered as a blueprint, the virtual data model corresponds to 
what Bascom & Kent call a "conceptual information model" (Section 
4.4.III.B.), and like the latter it need not be defined very 
rigorously. As a construct of the IT infrastructure, it gives 
the minimum design standards for both the "conceptual" and the 
"external" views of present and potential data aggregates, in the 
sense defined by Date [1981: 21-23]: 
Conceptual View of Data: This is a meta-architectural 
concept, and refers to a representation of data "as it 
really is", rather than as users are forced to see·it by 
the constraints of the hardware and software they are 
using. It is shown as the "Business Information" Box in 
Figure 16. 
External View of Data: This is a macro- and micro-
architectural concept, and refers to the view given to the 
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user, by an application program, of a relevant portion of 
the database. It is to be distinguished from the 
"internal" view, which is a very low-level representation 
of how the data is actually stored in computer records. 
The external view is shown as the "Application Data" Box in 
Figure 16. 
The virtual applications portfolio and the virtual data model are 
not meant to indicate particular kinds of software, or even one 
software approach as opposed to another (e.g. "object 
orientation" vs. "function orientation"). They are simply 
descriptions of the kinds of infrastructure elements that will be 
required to support agreed kinds of application functions and 
data. The architectural levels provide a rule of thumb to help 
infrastructure developers avoid falling into the trap of being 
too specific about virtual models: Meta-architecture - generic 
functions and data; Macro-architecture - specific kinds of 
software; Micro-architecture - branded software products. 
Another pitfall decision makers have to avoid is to confuse the 
virtual applications portfolio and data model with the strategic 
applications portfolio (Section 4.4.IV.B.). The former are 
infrastructure elements, which will ultimately be realized as 
supporting software, interfaces, and standards, while the latter 
refers to the application programs and data that will developed 
in this context. 
5. IT Support Organization 
It was suggested in Section 4.3.III.B.1. that generic organiza-
tional processes and IT applications are likely to cut across the 
official forms shown in the organization charts. In the same 
way, the generic human skills and functions needed to formulate 
and implement IT strategy are independent of the official IT 
organization charts. In fact, 
"'lhe ·Data Processirg deparbnent was the child of the 
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~~-~~~tioo~M~~a~ 
central S\lR)Ort agency, bit the Info~tioo 'l'ec::i'uDlogy 
suwe>rt Organizatioo ·(ITSO) of the 90s bears little or m 
zesemblance at Ml to the DP Depart:nent of the 70s. A 
SDDOth migratioo fran DP Depart:nent to ITSO is l'XJt ooly a 
necessity for the careers of OCIIp.1ter spechlists am 
managers, bit an absolute requisite for suooess in 
achlevin;J the full benefit of info~tioo tedmology within 
the ocmpany. ~ ITSO, thel:efore, needs its own strategy 
for managin;J that transition, am for positiooin;J itself to 
inpleoont am SllfP)rt the (IT tedmology strategy]." 
[Benjamin, Seminar E-01, Sectioo 6] 
Developing the IT support organization is a crucial element of 
target environment development in the B+OL+D Methodology 
(Benjamin, Seminar E-01, Section 6] as well as in the Nolan, 
Norton & Company approach, where it is referred to as "leadership 
models for managing in the advanced stages" [Advanced Systems 
Inc., Course 5060]. The problem is one of striking a balance 
between differentiation and integration of company-wide strategic 
IT decision making responsibilities (Sections 4.1.III.D.l.) that 
is appropriate for the company, rather than the simplistic issue 
of centralization vs. decentralization. Strategic decision 
making tasks of the IT support organization are discussed in 
Section 4.4.V.C.2. 
c. The Internal Architecture 
The internal view of the IT infrastructure is needed by its own 
developers and, to some extent, by the developers of the human 
and information systems. As in the case of the external 
architecture, many different approaches are possible. Generally, 
the internal view is likely to ~e more complex than the external 
view, partly because of the scope and depth of technical detail 
involved and partly because the constructs have to be defined 
from multiple points of view. 
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For example, the B+OL+D architecture (Benjamin, Seminar E-01: 
Plate 16] defines a "cube" whose 3 x 3 x 3 = 27 sub-cubes present 
different facets of the same internal architectural constructs: 
Three Meta-Systems: Business Systems Management System; 
Workstation Management System; Network management system. 
Three Meta-Managers: Distribution Manager; Content Manager; 
Session Manager. 
Three Processor Packets: Central; Departmental; Personal. 
An arbitrary number of "technical frameworks" can then be defined 
in terms of these facets, e.g. user/developer classification, 
processor transaction handling mode, data security domain 
framework, and so forth. A technical framework is, therefore, a 
particular kind of decision packet (Section 4.1.II.C.). 
D. Generic Policies 
The infrastructure architecture is the basis on which to build 
policies (directives, procedures, standards and protocols) for: 
The instantiation and realization of the five virtual 
constructs - workstation, network, applications, databases 
and support organization. 
Resource allocation and control. 
The acquisition of specific technologies. 
Directives indicate, for example, which levels and classes of IT 
use (Section 4.3.III.B.) are appropriate for which kinds of 
application and data structures and which support arrangements. 
Much of the B+OL+D external architecture (Benjamin, seminar E-01, 
Section 3-2.2] consists of tables of directives. 
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Procedures indicate, for example, how resources are to be 
acquired and controlled, how implementation projects are to be 
mounted, and how IT developers are to cooperate in carriing out 
their responsibilities. Application development and pro)ect 
management methodologies are familiar examples of procedures. 
Standards specify, for example, the desired performance 
characteristics of mainframes, terminals, programs, programmers. 
Operators and users often formalize the standards governing their 
relationship as "service level agreements". 
Protocols range from the familiar ones of data communications to 
more general organizational agreements on shared databases and 
systems, and agreements with vendors on conformity between their 
future technology developments and the company's emerging 
business requirements (Blauman, 1987]. 
Directives, procedures, standards and protocols based on the 
infrastructure architecture facilitate good organizational 
dialectic precisely because they are'predicated on defined and 
discussable assumptions. Architecture restores to the term 
"policy" some of its earlier meaning as a synonym for "strategy", 
and makes the building of IT infrastructure in advance of future 
business systems a feasible technology strategy. 
Three classes of policy can be described, which facilitate the 
identification of specific policies. They provide the 
foundations for the strategic, architectural and operational 
controls described in the Process Component (Section 4.5.III.; 
Figure 23). 
Business Management Policies: These map constructs of the 
Content Component to the external architecture, and thus 
constrain the design of infrastructure, systems and data, 
and the deployment of human resources. They are the basis 
for strategic controls. 
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For example, strategic business systems with interfaces 
external to the compan¥ may be subject to rigorous 
standards for reliability and security. 
Architectural Policies: These map constructs of the 
external architecture among themselves and to the internal 
architecture. In general, they are the parameters of "good 
design". They provide the basis for architectural 
controls. 
For example, automated office facilities and automated 
personal tools will be available for both data and 
information processing, and there will be policies to 
indicate which facilities and tools are acceptable in which 
kinds of processing. A LOTUS spreadsheet is a 
well-accepted tool for information processing, but not for 
data processing except possibly in very small 
organizations. 
Operational Policies: These map constructs of the external 
and internal architectures to the IT management strategy. 
They provide the basis for operational and user control 
over implementation. 
For example, there may be policies governing when generic 
constructs will be developed in-house and when they will be 
bought in. Contingency plans for supplier failure, 
disaster and so forth also fall into this category. 
III. HUMAN SYSTEMS 
It is a basic tenet of this Framework that effective decisions 
about information systems cannot be made separately from the 
human systems they are intended to support, and this principle is 
embodied in the concept of a strategic business system (Section 
4.3.III.B.l.). The approach to formulating these two dimensions 
of the target environment uses Bascom & Kent's (1984] framework 
Page 197 
of "Business Information Architecture". 
The top half of Figure 16 refers to the human systems part of 
strategic business systems, i.e. business processes (generic 
organizational processes), organization structures (generic 
configurations of tasks, roles and responsibilities), and 
business information (data "as it really is"). 
Business Information Architecture as described by Bascom & Kent 
focuses on alignment IT strategy, but it can be made to apply to 
impact IT strategy through the extensions shown in Figure 16. In 
the top half, the broad lines connecting the Business Processes 
and Business Information Boxes to the Organization structures Box 
represent the dialectical activities of organizational develop-
ment and organizational learning (Section 4.2.I.; Figure 4), 
through which persistent older organizational forms are 
systematically replaced by new structures and processes that 
arise in response to competitive strategy implementation (Section 
4.3.III.B.l.). 
A. Business Processes 
Porter's [1985: Ch. 2] characterization of the business unit as a 
chain of value-creating activities effectively links the concept 
of a strategic business system to that of competitive advantage. 
According to Porter, the strategic aims of a business unit are 
reflected in the technologically and economically distinct 
activities it performs to do business. These are called value 
activities. Value created is measured by the amount customers 
are willing to pay for the end product or service of the chain of 
value activities. 
Theoretically, total value can be broken down into the values 
contributed by each generic value activity. A business unit is 
profitable when the total value created exceeds the total cost of 
the value activities. It will achieve competitive advantage when 
it can perform these activities either at lower aggregate cost 
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than the competition, or in a way that leads to a product which, 
in the eyes of buyers, is so significantly different from the 
competition that they are willing to pay a premium price for it. 
As shown in the upper half of Figure 17, nine generic activities 
make up a value chain. There are five primary activities 
concerned with the physical creation, marketing, delivery and 
support of the product - 11 inbound logistics11 , 11operations11 , 
11 outbound logistics", 11marketing & sales11 and 11service11 • There 
are three kinds of support activity, which may or may not be 
shared by several of the primary activities - 11human resource 
management11 , 11 technology development 11 , and 11 procurement11 • 
Finally, there is "firm infrastructure", e.g. general management, 
legal, accounting and data processing, which is shared by all 
value activities. Internal linkages exist where the performance 
of one of the nine value activities affects the cost of or value 
created by another. 
A diversified company or business unit can be considered to have 
several value chains, one for each product line, sharing some or 
all of the support activities. Each value chain may be 
considered to represent a generic "line of business", and this 
may correspond to some ideal "strategic sector", "strategic 
business unit" or "strategic planning unit" (Ohmae, 1982: 
142-145] of the company. It would, however, be a mistake to 
commence analysis on the assumption that an existing business 
unit of the official organization chart ipso facto constituted a 
value chain. 
The value chains of the company and its strategic targets, 
considered together, make up the "value system" shown in the 
lower half of Figure 17 - supplier, company, channel and buyer 
value chains. External linkages arise out of dependencies 
between the company's value chain(s) and those of its strategic 
targets. For example, the company can differentiate its product 
or service by establishing linkages with its customers' or 
distributors' value chains. 
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Many of the generic competitive·strategies referred to in Section 
4.3.II.B. rely on inter-organizational systems, i.e. strategic 
business systems that span organizational processes in both the 
company and its strategic target. Hence, in studying an 
opportunity for competitive advantage through IT, the company 
would ideally want to analyze not only its own value chains but 
also those of the target. It is unlikely, however, that all the 
necessary information (in effect, the target firm's production 
functions) will be available for inspection, and alternative 
analysis techniques will be necessary. 
For example, the company's products are its customers' resources, 
and sufficient information would normally be available for a 
company to study how it can assist its customers in managing 
their resource life cycles. Ives and Learmonth (1984] have 
formalized the concept of a "customer resource life cycle" to 
provide a suitable technique for this purpose. It is an 
expansion of BSP's well-known 4-stage life cycle (International 
Business Machines, 1984: 29] into thirteen more detailed stages, 
and it shifts attention from the company's own cycle to that of 
the customer. 
"''he products that an organization provides to its 
c::ust:.cmars are, fran· the custaner' s perspective, supporti.n:J 
resources. T6 acquire them, the c::ust:cmar goes through a 
resource life cycle. '!his frequently requires a 
considerable irwestment of time arrl effort to manage. If 
the suwlier can assist the custaner in managirg this life 
cycle, the suwlier may be able to differentiate itself 
fran its cust:cmers, usually on the basis of enhanced 
custaner service or, in sate cases, by introducirg direct 
cost savirgs." [Ives & I.eanronth, 1984: 1194] 
The Porter value chain and the Ives & Learmonth customer resource 
life cycle are powerful concepts because of their two-fold use in 
analysis: they help in identifying strategic opportunities for 
the use of IT, and in developing the human and information 
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systems to exploit them. With regard to opportunity 
identification, the concepts help in finding opportunities for 
new strategic business systems, or new strategic purposes for 
existing business systems. At the intuitive level, both 
techniques can be used to spark ideas for creative uses of IT in 
competitive strategy (e.g. Ives, Sakamoto & Gongla, 1986]. At 
the analytical level, competitive advantage (Section 4.3.IV.C. 
and Figure 13) can be seen as a function of the value chain and 
value system: 
Competitive Position: The company's ability to 
differentiate itself from its competitors reflects the 
contribution of each value activity towards fulfilling 
buyer needs, as well as an effective linkage of its value 
chain with those of its suppliers ("upstream value") and of 
its buyers ("downstream value"). 
The company's cost position reflects the aggregate cost of . 
performing and co-ordinating all its value activities, 
relative to the competition. 
Strategies of broad scope can exploit linkages between 
business unit value chains serving different industry or 
market segments and different geographic areas. Strategies 
of narrow scope can tailor the company's value chain to a 
particular target segment. Strategic alliances interlock 
parts of the company's value chain with those of its 
allies. 
Organizational Effectiveness: Every value activity has a 
physical and an information processing component. By 
creating strategic business systems that reconfigure the 
value chain,· the balance between these components can be 
altered to bring about significant improvements in the 
company's production functions (Section 4.3.II.A.3.). For 
example, in many industries (e.g. steel mills) scale is no 
longer a prerequisite for automation, and automation no 
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longer necessarily entails inflexibility. Similarly, most 
products have a physical and information component, the 
latter being everything the buyer needs to know to obtain 
and use the product. IT makes it feasible to provide far 
more information along with the product or service. 
Synergy: Synergistic effects are possible whenever IT is 
applied to the internal linkages of a value chain, or to 
linkages between the several value chains of the company, 
or to the value system itself (through inter-organizational 
systems). 
Porter and Millar [1985] define the concept of "information 
intensity", a two-dimensional measure combining the relative 
degree of IT use in the value chain with its relative degree of 
use in the product. This concept generalizes the familiar idea 
that in some companies "the system is the product" (e.g. banks, 
insurance companies), while in others the systems support the 
product or service (e.g. manufacturing, travel, hotels). 
Bascom & Kent [1984: 25-26] propose three dimensions in human 
systems architecture: 
Management Functions: Plan, Control, Execute. 
Planning Levels: Strategic, Tactical, Operational. 
Functional Decomposition: The hierarchical structuring of 
processes into sub-processes, according to well-defined 
rules [Bascom & Kent, 1984: 7-8: Gane & Sarson, 1977; Ross 
& Brackett, 1976]. 
The value chain and customer resource life cycle concepts add a 
fourth and even more fundamental perspective: 
Generic Value Activities: Value chain activities and 
linkages, or customer resource life cycle "stages". 
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This dimension also permits the analysis of business processes to 
be linked directly to application functions and data, and to 
applications portfolio planning. It is thus the principle means 
of ensuring good fit between human systems and information 
systems, and ultimately congruency between IT purposes and uses. 
B. Business Information 
At the meta-architectural level, business information is 
represented by a "conceptual information model", i.e. the 
conceptual view of the data referred to in Section 4.4.II.B.4. 
This is not meant to be a particular kind of diagram or a 
particular level of abstraction, but simply a description of the 
information, which can be displayed in various forms (lists, 
tables., diagrams, text) and at various levels of abstraction or 
detail [Bascom & Kent, 1984: 36]. The model would be completed 
increJnentally as the "external view of the data", as it evolves 
through the macro- and micro-architectural levels, not always in 
a top-down sequence. 
Bascom & Kent [1984: 27-40] describe a simple but effective way 
to analyze the structures and flows of the "real world" 
information on which business processes act. The smallest unit 
of information is the "fact", which represents a business 
"entity" or a "relationship" between entities. "Information 
classes" are aggregates of business information. Because the 
concepts are developed in sound set-theoretic terms, Bascom & 
Kent's technique is general enough to be useful in a variety of 
business problem analysis methods - for example, IBM's BSP, Gane 
& Sarson's [1977] "structured systems analysis" and de Marco's 
[1978] "structured analysis". 
C. Inter-Organizational Systems 
Because inter-organizational systems can expose the company's · 
internal processes to its strategic targets, and its 
organizational planning to the latter's IT decision makers, they 
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constitute a special class of strategic business systems with 
risks that demand senior management attention. 
If the inter-organizational system permits the sharing of 
application functions and data by several companies, then 
inevitably the corresponding business processes and business 
information of the participating companies will interlock. 
According to Cash & Konsynski [1985], the impacts this will have 
on the company's own organization tend to appear first as changes 
in business processes and communication patterns. These can lead 
to changes in skill requirements and job definitions and 
eventually, if key functions are affected, to changes in the 
organizational design and even the mission and competitive 
strategy. The sequence of internal changes seems to depend on 
whether the company is reacting to someone else's 
inter-organizational system or is itself initiating or 
implementing the system, and on whether or not top management 
participates in the decision making. 
Cash & Konsynski [1985] provide a framework to help management 
decide whether and on what terms to participate in proposed 
inter-organizational systems. 
D. The Internal Architecture 
The internal architecture of human systems, which may be taken to 
include the external ergonomic features of the "man-machine 
interface" [Carey, 1982; Galitz, 1980], is the traditional 
terrain of organization and methods (O&M) specialists. With the 
spread of online systems usage in offices and factories, this is 
becoming an increasingly important field of specialization, but 
the details lie well beyond the scope of the present Study. 
An important point must, however, be made. IT suppliers, such as 
IBM and Xerox, do a considerable amount of "office systems 
research" [e.g. International Business Machines, 1982; Ellis, 
1979, 1983; Ellis & Nutt, 1979], with a view to automating some 
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office functions and providing real-time information systems 
support for others. If this work were to be taken up in business 
systems design, the bounds of rationality could be extended by 
virtue of a better fit between business processes and application 
functions. The "information control net models" described by 
Ellis, for example, can help in analyzing and redesigning 
business processes to reap this benefit. 
"Information cxmtrol nets have been cq:plied to ~ 
offices am to hypothetical autanated offices •••• '!he 
typical lazqe office of today is a carplex, highly 
parallel, interactive information pnx:essirx.J system. 
tJrrlerstarrlir of current offices am the design of future 
offices can be greatly aided by the leverage available fran 
a mathematical nmel. Whereas the office of the past has 
been able to slCMly evolve am correct mistakes as it does, 
this may not be adequate for the future: technological 
dlange may be rapid am radical. . '!his level of 
mathematical rigor is the main separation between our \tt'Ork 
am other documented Office studies. II (Ellis, 1979) 
IV. INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
The lower part of Figure 16 refers to the information systems 
part of strategic business systems, i.e. application functions 
and the application. data they act on. At the meta-architectural 
level, both the functions and the data are generic and 
independent of the specific programs and databases in which they 
will eventually be realized. 
A. Information Systems Architecture 
The information systems architecture consists of an applications 
architecture and a data architecture. 
"In contrast to blsiness processes am information whi.dl 
are in:ieperrlent of method or technique, cq:plication 
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:fuootions ani data are inplemented. an a oatpiter system. 
AJ:plicatioo. m:dritecture is oc:n:::mned with awlications 
mrrently installed ani qlel:atiooal, those urrler 
develcpoont, ani those planned for ·the future." [Basoan & 
Kent, 1984: 41] 
The external architectures systematically define the collection 
of functions provided by all the applications in the inventory of 
all strategic business systems, and the data flows among them. 
As instruments of idealized design (Section 4.1.III.A.), the 
architectures can only be implemented incrementally. At any 
point in time, however, it must be possible to map the existing 
business processes and information to the existing applications 
and data (macro- and micro-architectures), and the ideal business 
processes and information to the ideal applications and data of 
the target environment (meta-architecture). 
Bascom & Kent (1984: 47-53] describe an application data model, 
consisting of data "aggregates", "clusters" and "elements" 
corresponding to the information "classes", "facts" and 
"relationships" of their business information model. 
"A data aqm:eoate is any useful grouping of data. '!he 
smallest data aggi~te is a cluster of data elenents that 
represent a single fact ( enployee nuim:ler plus department 
nnnber means enployee is assigned to department). '!he 
largest data aggzeqate would probably contain all the data 
:relevant to a large application area. Typical data 
~tes are databases arxi other master files, records or 
segnents of databases arxi files, awlication-to-awlication 
interfaces, user-to-application interfaces, arrl interface 
records." (Bascom & Kent, 1984: 47-48] 
Because this data model is quite general, and is translatable 
into relational data structures (Date, 1981: Ch. 4], it can be 
applied to any of the three major database approaches -
relational (e.g. IBM's DB2), hierarchical (e.g. IBM's IMS) or 
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network (e.g. CUllinet•s IDMS, which is based on the CODASYL 
Database Task Group recommendations). 
In the external architecture, data aggregates are not disjoint, 
since they are merely views of.arbitrary subsets of all data 
elements and clusters. It is indeed a generally accepted 
principle of database design to minimize "data redundancy" (the 
physical replication of data clusters) by giving several 
application programs their own "external" views of what is 
essentially the same internally stored data. 
In this Framework, the units of incremental information systems 
implementation are as follows: 
Application Function Packet: A practical subset of 
application functions that can be programmed and run in 
support of a corresponding subset of business processes. 
Application Data Aggregate: A practical, not necessarily 
disjoint, subset of data clusters and elements, which will 
become the external view of the data offered by an 
application function packet. 
In the lower half of Figure 16, the broad lines connecting the 
Applications Functions and Application Data Boxes to the IT 
Infrastructure Box represent the creation, in advance, of 
strategic IT capability on the basis of assumptions agreed and 
made explicit in the five virtual structures described in Section 
4.4.II.B. 
The crucial design step is the identification and agreement of 
"interfaces" in both application functions and data. 
•FUnctions cammmicate through interfaces, i.e. , they 
sen::i data to each other. • • • We can detect or recognize an 
interface when one party writes data an:i another party 
zeads the same data. We are interested in awJ.ication 
• 
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prog:r:am am user interfaces because they are the 1glue' 
that bin:ls together the awlicatians am users into a 
system." [Basccm & Kent, 1984: 44] 
Three kinds of interface must be identified if incremental 
implementation of application functions and data is to be 
feasible: 
User Interfaces: The mapping of business processes and 
information to application functions and data, as indicated 
by the "support" lines in Figure 16. This is partly a 
matter of internal business systems architecture - e.g. the 
use of information control net models (Section 4.4.III.D.) 
to map generic organizational processes to generic 
application functions - and partly an issue of infra-
structure design, i.e. agreement on the design of the 
virtual structures (Section 4.4.II.B.). 
Systems Interfaces: The agreed interfaces between 
different application function packets and application data 
aggregates. Standard interfaces permit program modules to 
be designed and implemented incrementally, as and when the 
business needs emerge. Similarly, standard interfaces in 
data designs permit new segments of the overall database to 
be designed and latched into segments that have already 
been implemented. For example, Heimbigner & McCleod [1985] 
describe a "federated architecture" for the sharing and 
interchange of data among autonomous database management 
systems. 
Infrastructure Interfaces: The architectural policies and 
supporting software arising out of the virtual structures 
described in Section 4.4.II.B. which, if they are adhered 
to, guarantee that future business systems and the 
particular information technologies they will require can 
be assimilated into the infrastructure cost-effectively and 
with minimum delay. 
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The SQL database management systems [Finkelstein & Pascal, 
1988] make it possible to define a generalized "logical 
data interface" that will provide for any future data 
access requirement, in terms of algebraic functions (join, 
projection and selection) defined on an arbitrary and 
dynamic collection of data "tables". 
In the same way, the "online engine" software developed at 
Old Mutual makes it possible to define a generalized 
"logical procedure interface" that will provide for any 
future online transaction or session requirement, in terms 
of control transfer functions (e.g. call, nest, get) 
defined on an arbitrary and dynamic collection of program 
•modules". 
B. The Applications Portfolio 
The "strategic applications portfolio" is a way of looking at the 
totality of all the strategic information systems (i.e. the 
information systems parts of strategic business systems) of a 
company or business unit. The concept is important from both the 
business and the IT points of view. 
1. · The Business Perspective 
In many companies, rising levels of IT expenditure are reaching 
the limits of affordability when accounted for as administrative 
and even sales/manufacturing expenses. If such a company is 
positioned in the strategic or Turnaround Boxes of Figure 12 
(Section 4.3.IV.A.), then it should seek another way of 
justifying the level of expenditure required. One way is to 
regard the IT infrastructure and strategic information systems as 
a portfolio of dura~le assets and to manage them accordingly. 
Nolan, Norton & Company have long promoted the idea of a 
"normative applications portfolio" [Nolan, 1982: Ch. 5; Advanced 
Systems Inc., Course 5054] as a productjservice mix approach to 
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managing IT. Questions such as the following are to be asked and 
answered: 
What levels of investment in particular IT functionality 
and service are required, and how are they justified? 
When do particular technologies and systems reach 
obsolescence, and what provision is made for this? 
Which business processes are supported by which 
technologies and systems, at what cost and for what 
purpose? 
These are project-orientated questions, and they must always be 
asked in the overall context of the "aggregate" que·stions of IT 
positioning (Sections 4.3.IV.C. and 4.5.III.A.). 
Following Nolan, Norton and Company, three basic concepts driving 
applications portfolio management can be identified: 
Segmentation: The total collection of present and potential 
application functions and data can be segmented in some 
meaningful way. The Porter value chain and Ives & 
Learmonth customer resource life cycle (Section 4.4.III.) 
provide the natural schematic for this Framework, but there 
are other options - for example: 
Nolan, Norton & Company's original "normative 
applications portfolio" [Nolan, 1982: Ch.5], which is 
based on Anthony's [1965] 3-tier planning framework. 
Blumenthal's [1969: 76, 81] taxonomy of operational 
control systems, based on Anthony's framework and 
Forrester's [1961] analysis of the six networks that 
describe the flow of resources in the organization 
(materials, orders, money, personnel, capital 
equipment and information). 
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BSP's [International Business Machines, 1984: Ch. 8] 
information architecture matrices. 
BIAIT Systems Inc.'s [1986] enterprise analysis model, 
which classifies business activities according to 
management level (strategic, tactical, operational, 
control) and functional area (markets, resources, 
deliverables and results). 
Evaluation: If the collection of applications is to be 
regarded as a portfolio, then it must be evaluated. The 
natural measure of value in this Framework is competitive 
advantage, as described in Section 4.3.IV.C. 
In addition, McFarlan (1982] provides a comprehensive 
approach to evaluating project risks and the overall 
portfolio risk profile. The critical dimensions of this 
analysis are: 
Company experience with the technology, i.e. the state 
of organizational development and learning relative to 
the particular technology or system being evaluated. 
Project structure, i.e. factors in the organizational 
dialectic such as management understanding, decision 
maker consensus, and stability of management aims. 
Project size, e.g. expense, staffing, elapsed time, 
number of decision making constituencies involved. 
Portfolio Management: Managing the portfolio requires 
asset-orientated management philosophies and techniques. 
The following are some of the criteria for portfolio 
management, which can be used to compare the actual 
portfolio with the ideal and with the competition: 
Coverage, i.e. the relative information intensity 
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(Section 4.4.III.A.) of the processes and products 
covered by different segments of the portfolio. 
Balance, i.e. the distribution of coverage, relative 
to the criticality of the processes and products 
covered. 
Maturity, i.e. the age of the systems in different 
segments of the portfolio, relative to the criticality 
of the processes and products covered. 
Company experience, i.e. the risk of failure due to 
inexperience in particular segments of the portfolio. 
2. The Technical Perspective 
From the IT point of view, the strategic applications portfolio 
is the totality of all application function packets and 
application data aggregates, considered in the light of the 
infrastructure features, functions and options they depend on. 
The proper level at which to plan a portfolio is the line of 
business or business unit, not the company as a whole. Business 
unit management would generally accept this as a fact consistent 
with their management autonomy, but the following considerations 
are also important: 
A strategic business system has been defined (Section 
4.3.III.B.l.) as a set of generic organizational processes 
supported by generic IT applications, and this is reflected 
in the human and information systems architectures by the 
close mapping of business processes and information to 
application function packets and application data 
aggregates. Since the line of business with its value 
chain is the level at which the purposes and uses of IT can 
be matched to achieve measurable competitive advantage, it 
follows that it is also the natural unit for applications 
portfolio planning. 
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This means that the value chain framework can be used for 
applications portfolio segmentation as confidently as it 
can for the analysis of business processes. It also means 
that subsets of IT purposes and uses can be rigorously 
mapped to portfolio segments (subsets of application 
function packets and application data aggregates). 
A third advantage is that IT policies can be specified as 
appropriate to a business unit, and they need not be the 
same for all business units. Company-wide policies then 
become a matter of compatibility, not uniformity. For 
example, different systems development and project 
management methodologies may suit different business units; 
purchased software may be suitable for some business units, 
in-house development for others; real-time data entry 
systems may be standard data processing practice in one 
business unit, batch in another. 
On the other hand, there is the danger that by focusing too 
exclusively on the business unit planners may overlook such 
requirements as do exist for company-wide data models and 
application interfaces. This could cause problems if and when 
systems and databases have to be restructured as a result of 
company reorganization at the business unit level (business 
portfolio strategy- Section 4.3.II.). 
Figure 18 is an outline of a strategic applications portfolio 
segmentation scheme based on Porter value chain concepts: 
The IT Infrastructure: These are the features, functions 
and options that existing and future strategic information 
systems, as currently envisaged, will require. In 
particular, the virtual applications portfolio and data 
model provide the major technological guidelines for the 
incremental implementation of application function packets 
and application data aggregates. 
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Strategic Information Systems: These are the application 
function packets and application data aggregates, existing 
and foreseen, grouped according to the value chain 
activities and linkages they cover - firm infrastructure 
activities, business unit support and primary activities, 
and shared activities. 
c. The Internal Architecture 
The internal applications and data architectures are matters of 
software design representation (Freeman, 1978(1) and (2)] and lie 
in the field of software engineering. There is an abundant 
literature - see, for example, the I.E.E.E. Transactions on 
Software Engineering. 
Many proprietary methodologies are on offer - e.g. Softech's 
"Structured Analysis and Design Technique" (SADT) (Lucas, 1985: 
140; Ross, 1977; Ross & Bracket, 1976; Ross & Schoman, 1977], 
Teichroew•s "Problem Statement Language/Analyzer" (PSL/PSA) 
(Teichroew & Hershey, 1977], and Yourdan and Constantine's (1979] 
"Structured Design". For useful overviews see Advanced Systems 
Inc. [1978] and Freeman (1979] • 
V. HUMAN RESOURCES 
A human resources "architecture" is the blueprint for an ideal 
structuring of decision making tasks and processes. This 
architecture will be implemented incrementally in the same way as 
any of the other three dimensions of the target environment. 
Hence it would be part of the IT management strategy (Section 
4.5.II.) to ensure that human resources development keeps pace 
with the evolving requirements of the other three dimensions. 
A. The Aims of the Architecture 
The fundamental aim of a strategic business system has been 
stated to be the extending of the bounds of rationality in 
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decision making and task performance in all four domains, and at 
all levels of IT impact on the organizational design (Section 
4.3.III.B.1.). It follows that the roles involved in defining 
and implementing the purposes and uses of a strategic business 
system must reflect "the collective wisdom of some relatively 
homogeneous group of experienced managers rather than the needs 
as perceived by any individual or by any group of experienced 
managers" [Ghymn & King, 1976: 598]. It is, however, an explicit 
assumption of this Framework (Section 4.2.II.) that in a large 
enough company these decision makers will in fact constitute a 
heterogeneous group, with multiple backgrounds, orientations and 
motives. 
The general aim of a human resources architecture can, therefore, 
be defined as the provision of a framework of generic decision 
making roles, tasks, responsibilities and success criteria, 
within which many persons with many and varied attributes can 
interact in an orderly and productive manner, resulting in good 
organizational dialectic. 
In the process of customizing the Framework for a specific 
company, this general aim can be made specific with the aid of 
the following tests for good dialectic, adapted from Argyris & 
Schon [1978: 145-146]: 
Strategic IT decision makers should be ready to challenge 
organizational assumptions and to search for 
"dis-confirming data". 
They should be able to synthesize their various 
theories-in-use (Section 4.2.I.) into a single set of 
shared images and maps- the Corporate IT Scenario(s), the 
IT Positioning Statement, the Target Environment 
Architecture, the staged Master Transition Plan and the 
Organizational IT Learning Systems - which clarify the 
inter-connections of all relevant data, assumptions and 
conclusions. 
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They.should remember the successes and failures of the 
past, which gives them a context for interpreting present 
error and enables them to proceed through the appropriate 
learning loops {Section 4.l.II.B.3.). 
They should be able to respond to uncertainty - for 
example, when expectations to achieve specified goals are 
continually disappointed - with efforts to restructure 
their perc.eptions of the problem. 
They should always test: 
Theory-In-Use vs. Espoused Theory - "Do we really 
believe our stated reasons for adopting/rejecting this 
proposal?" 
Data vs. Assumptions - "Is what we really believe 
really so?" 
Competitive Strategy vs. Organizational Design - "Will 
these processes do the job required by this strategy?" 
Distinctive Competence of the Company vs. Decision 
Makers' Competence - "Are we capable of managing this 
strategy, or this strategic business system?". 
IT Purposes vs. Uses - "Is the system we are asking 
for, and the cost of developing it, what we truly 
require to achieve our stated objectives?" 
They should be aware that inter-personal conflicts often 
arise out of contradictions in organizational ends, norms 
and means. While they should advocate their own positions 
as ably as they can, they should also enquire into the 
positions of others and be willing to consider a 
restatement of the problem that might allow both sets of 
values to be met. They should always take pains to 
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evaluate the "costs of victory". 
A human resources architecture will, therefore, set out guiding 
principles for structuring and staffing strategic IT decision 
making in a way that will lead to good organizational dialectic. 
An external and an internal architecture can be defined: the 
former would refer to the external, objective aspects of decision 
making, i.e. roles, tasks, responsibilities and success 
criteria; the latter would refer to the personal, subjective 
aspects of the decision makers, i.e. their careers, attributes 
and developmental requirements. 
Figures 19 to 21 are frameworks to help in such a structuring of 
strategic IT decision making. 
B. Strategic IT Decision Making Roles 
Figure 19 is based on Figure 5 and the organizational development 
technique, "environmental mapping" (Beckhard & Harris, 1977: 62]. 
1. Decision Making Domains 
If the aim were simply to reduce heterogeneity in a description 
of existing strategic IT decision making roles, then domains 
could be derived empirically through the use of data analysis 
techniques. For example, Ghymn & King (1976] used discriminant 
analysis to isolate homogeneous classes of management information 
system users. Their approach could be adapted to investigate 
whether there exist in the company relatively homogeneous classes 
of managers and other employees, according to the importance they 
attach to various aspects of strategic IT decision making. 
In this Framework, however, the four defined domains - Owners, 
Developers, Users and Operators (Section 4.2.II.C.) - refer to 
roles in the organizational dialectic of an ideal target environ-
ment, and as such may not be very closely related to any current 
responsibilities as set out in official organization charts. 
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Two further qualifications of the four domains are shown in 
Figure 19 - levels of participation of the decision making roles 
in the tasks, and communication factors that will limit the 
effectiveness of role incumbents. 
2. Levels of Participation 
The three levels of participation in each decision making domain 
are: facilitative, directive and active. It is a well accepted 
management principle that, when decision making is participative, 
the decision making roles should be defined to be as near as 
poss~le to the source of the relevant information or the locus 
of the action. From this point of view, the three levels can be 
regarded as ranges of "organizational distance" from the 
hypothetical core of a strategic IT decision, within which it is 
convenient to classify the decision making roles. (Implications 
regarding leadership style that are often associated with the 
terms facilitative, directive and active are not intended here.) 
Facilitative: These are roles outside the company, which 
influence the external IT planning environment. Examples 
in the business domain are government and regulatory 
bodies, trade associations, trade unions, and management 
and users at the other end of inter-organizational 
systems. Examples in the IT domain are telecommunications 
authorities, computer professional and management 
associations, and technology suppliers. 
It is implicit in the principle of interactive planning 
(Section 4.1.III.A.) that the facilitative level should be 
taken into account in the company's IT decision making 
processes. Since these persons do not normally participate 
directly in the internal processes of an organization, it 
should be part of the IT management strategy to ensure that 
the company is adequately represented in the appropriate 
external bodies. 
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Directive: These are roles inside the company that create 
the favourable conditions necessary for effective decision 
making. They give direction to those nearer the core of 
the decision through, for example, the allocation of 
fin~nce, manpower and other resources, the authorization of 
IT policies, the overall management of the business systems 
portfolios and the IT infrastructure, and the resolution of 
conflicts. It is their task to authorize or veto strategic 
IT decisions. 
These roles are characteristic of the authorization step in 
Mintzberg's [1979: 188] "continuum of control over the 
decision process". 
Active: These are roles directly involved in some aspect 
of carrying' out a strategic IT decision making task. They 
. '· 
are characteristic of the other steps in Mintzberg's 
continuum of control: Information - persons who provide 
requisite information or who need to be kept informed; 
Support - persons who provide advice or other kinds of 
support to those who have to make the choice; Choice -
persons directly responsible for making the choice; 
Execution - persons responsible for giving effect to the 
decision, i.e. producing the intended outcome. 
A given person could be fulfilling a role at the directive level 
in some decision situations and at the active level in others. 
It is also believed that some persons perform better at some of 
these levels than at others. 
3. Communication Factors 
In constructing a practical system of strategic IT decision 
making responsibilities, it is not sufficient to consider only 
the organizational issues of role, task and level of 
participation. Behavioural issues pertaining to the role 
incumbent must also be taken into account. For the purposes of 
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this Framework, the issues are condensed into two communication 
factors, "semantic gap" and "power asymmetry" [De Brabander & 
Thiers, 1984], which create the potential for contradiction and 
conflict in the decision making process. 
De Brabander & Thiers investigated how the ways in which users 
become involved in application development projects affect the 
success of systems produced, on the assumption that effective 
communication is the crucial intervening factor. Their argument 
can be generalized for· this Framework by considering how IT 
decision making success is affected by the ways in which role 
incumbents from all domains and levels become involved, on the 
assumption that good organizational dialectic is the crucial 
intervening factor. 
In any decision making process, good dialectic will have occurred 
when the parties' mutual agreement to implement a proposal, or to 
abort it, is free and based on the sharing of all relevant 
assumptions and data. Dialectic will have been poor when the 
decision is made on the basis either of forced consensus (as a 
result of power asymmetry), or of mismatched assumptions or 
incomplete data (as a result of semantic gap). 
Such agreement is unlikely to be maintained when the party 
forcing consensus is no longer on the scene or fails to 
follow-up, or when the mistaken assumptions or data are 
confronted by reality. The outcome is invariably loss of time 
and effort, and disappointed expectations in one or more of the 
domains - for example, owners who resent the waste of time, 
effort and opportunity in bad projects; developers whose designs 
have been distorted; users whose work has been hindered rather 
than helped; and operators hassled by endless requests for 
program changes and reruns. The outcome of decisions reached 
through bad dialectic could, indeed, be a counter-strategic 
business system. 
If the findings of De Brabander & Thiers• study are generalized 
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to the broader context of strategic IT decision making in this 
way, then two strong requirements for good dialectic and hence 
for the structuring of decision making responsibilities become, 
in Nolan, Norton & Company's terminology [Advanced systems Inc., 
Course 5060]: 
Paradigm: A shared business vision for IT, based on shared 
assumptions and beliefs regarding the purposes and uses of 
IT in company strategy. It is an objective of the system 
of decision making responsibilities to ensure that all 
strategic IT decision makers have the opportunity to 
participate in the dialectical enquiry of the Context 
Component and the strategic option generator of the Content 
Component in a way that eliminates semantic gap. 
Balance of Power: The relative power of the decision 
making domains and levels of participation ,is a crucial 
factor in the continuum of decision making control 
[Mintzberg, 1979: 187-188; see also Solomon, 1983]. It is, 
therefore, also an objective of the system of decision 
making responsibilities to ensure a balance of power such 
that no person or coalition has the ability to force 
consensus on the other participants, e.g. through the real 
or perceived power to administer "side-payments" or 
punishments [De Brabander & Thiers, 1984: 140] 
The particular effects of these communication factors will depend 
on company culture (Section 4.3.V.B.) and on the stage of company 
development (Section 4.6.III.). Persons responsible for 
structuring the system of decision making responsibilities will, 
therefore, require some kind of diagnostic tool to help determine 
what is appropriate for their companies. Until such time as 
empirical research provides guidelines for this purpose, there is 
value to be obtained in transposing available behavioural 
theories to this context. Two such are: 
McGregor's (1960] "Theory X" and "Theory Y". , 
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Churchman & Schainblatt's [1965] four "communication 
positions" between parties with different backgrounds and 
fields of competence. 
The situation in companies where there is a general reluctance to 
become involved in the decision making activities in domains 
other than one's own is remarkably like McGregor's [1960: Ch. 3] 
Theory X: 
Business managers display an inherent dislike of systems 
thinking (too vague) and the systems development process 
(paralysis by analysis), and avoid these if they can. 
Because of this, they must be cajoled, sold and threatened 
into serious participation in IT decision making. They 
prefer to have their IT opportunities and strengths managed 
for them, and wish to avoid any responsibility for threats 
and weaknesses. 
The IT managers and specialists, on the other hand, show an 
inherent dislike of business thinking (too mundane) and 
administrative tasks (too bureaucratic), and avoid these if 
they can. Because of:this, they must be cajoled, sold and 
threatened into serious participation in strategic planning 
and participative decision making. They prefer to have the 
business objectives and IT purposes and uses spelled out 
for them, and they wish to avoid responsibility for any 
failure of the applications to meet requirements. 
In such circumstances, a system of decision making responsibility 
could be built around any of the first three of Churchman & 
Schainblatt•s communication positions: 
Separate-function: The tasks of the business and IT 
domains are treated as essentially separable. The business 
domain formulates the purposes and uses of IT, taking into 
account whatever IT professional advice it asks for and 
finds. The IT domain produces the IT infrastructure and 
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information systems as completely and efficiently as 
possible. 
Persuasion: This position calls for more understanding of 
IT on the part of business people - what the technologies 
are and how they can be applied to competitive purposes and 
organizational design. The business people draw cioser to 
IT decision.making, typically by participating in systems 
design, or in the choice of personal computers, local area 
networks and other technologies. 
Communication: This position calls for more understanding 
of business on the part of the IT people. They draw closer 
to business decisions regarding organizational design and, 
if their credibility is high enough, competitive strategy. 
They remain almost totally responsible for system design, 
but they act as communicators, educators and marketers in 
the business domain, typically through such roles as 
business analysts and information centre personnel. 
There are, however, companies where the IT planning environment 
resembles McGregor's [1960: Ch. 4] Theory Y: 
The effort involved in systems thinking and formulating IT 
strategy is natural and congenial to businessmen, and 
management decision making is equally stimulating to IT 
specialists. Side-payments and penalties are not effective 
means of bringing about participative decision making. 
Both business people and IT people exercise self-motivation 
and self-direction in creating IT solutions in the service 
of the business ideals to which they are jointly 
committed. Commitment to business ideals and IT solutions 
is a function of the personal satisfaction of being a 




Under appropriate conditions and with appropriate guidance, 
business managers and IT specialists learn not only to 
accept but to seek responsibilities in the other decision 
making domain. 
The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of 
imagination, ingenuity and creativity in devising IT 
solutions for business ideals is widely, not narrowly, 
distributed in both the business and the IT domains. 
The opportunities and threats of the modern competitive 
environment, and the rapid growth in the functionality and 
capacity of modern IT, have as yet barely bequn to tap the 
intellectual potentialities of ordinary people in both the 
business and the IT domains. 
In such conditions, a system of decision making responsibilities 
can be built around the fourth of Churchman & Schainblatt•s 
communication positions: 
Mutual Understanding: Owners and users in the business 
domain learn what drives IT, by actively acquiring and 
exercising some IT design and management skills. The 
spread of personal computers is characteristic of this 
trend. At the same time, developers and operators in the 
IT domain set about emulating owners and users by acquiring 
some skills in financial management, factory management, 
marketing and so forth, in an effort to manage the IT 
function as a "business within a business" [Nolan, 1982: 
237]. Distribution of systems development and other IT 
functions is typical of this position. 
c. Structuring the Strategic IT Decision Making Tasks 
Strategic IT decision making tasks can be aggregated in terms of 
the various committees and support functions that help in 
co-ordinating them. It is convenient to consider the tasks at 
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this level .of aggregation because it allows discussion to be 
considerably shortened and maps the tasks directly to the focal 
points of activity. The structuring described in this Section 
is, however, only one possibility - there are many others. 
1. Co-ordinating Bodies 
In participative decision making, co-ordinating bodies are needed 
to ensure that roles and tasks are correctly identified and that 
the agreed responsibilities are carried out in an orderly way. 
Some of these bodies would be concerned with formulating decision 
packages, while others would co-ordinate implementation activity 
within a particular decision packet. 
There is an extensive literature on IS steering committees, which 
can used as starting points in developing guidelines for the 
co-ordinating bodies- see, for example, Doll (1985]; Doll & 
Ahmed (1984]; Nolan (1982: 370-383]; McKeen & Guimaraes (1984]; 
Umbaugh (1984]. It must be remembered, however, that this is a 
dialectical Framework, focusing on generic, not necessarily 
official, organization structures and processes. Hence the 
co-ordinating bodies should be more concerned with contradiction 
than with conflict, with synthesis than with consensus, and their 
roles will be active as well as directive. For example, 
" general managers must be involved to ensure that 
cross-flmctional linkages, mre possible to adrleve with 
infonnation technology, are exploited ••• Rather than 
control infonnation technology • • • an IT manager should 
oo-onlinate the architecture am starrlards of the many 
awlications throughait the organization, as well as 
provide assistance am ooadlin;J in systems develcpnent." 
(Porter & Millar, 1985: 159] 
The examples of co-ordinating listed below are based on 
experience at Old Mutual. 
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Corporate Steering Committee: These are senior executives 
in the business and IT domains. They are the main 
participants in the dialectical enquiry of the Context 
Component and as such have an active role in developing the 
Corporate IT Scenario(s) and the IT Positioning Statement. 
They have a directive role in developing the Target 
Environment Architecture and the IT management strategy and 
its Master Transition Plan. 
Where systems development responsibility is decentralized 
to business units, this committee would retain a directive 
\ role for the architectures of the IT infrastructure, human 
resources and shared business systems only. 
Typical of this committee's detailed tasks are: 
Authorizing the business management, architectural and 
operational policies (Section 4.4.II.D.) proposed by 
the Joint Technical Planning Team. 
Approving general levels of funding, arbitrating the 
overall priorities, and laying down general principles 
for cost allocation (Section 4.5.III.). 
Reviewing the formulat~on, financial justification and 
progress of decision packets at the meta-architectural 
and the macro-architectural levels - i.e. the broad 
strategic thrusts of the management strategy (Section 
4.5.II.). 
Ensuring that appropriate strategic, architectural and 
operational controls are implemented and observed 
(Section 4.5.III.) • 
• 
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Managing second-order learning in the company (Section 
4.l.II.D.J.), e.g. through the reformulation of the 
business vision for IT and its Target Environment 
Architecture. 
Business Unit Steering Committees: These are senior 
managers and specialists in the owner and developer domains 
of a particular business unit. They have an active role in 
developing the Corporate IT Scenario(s) and IT Positioning 
Statement, insofar as their business units are concerned, 
and in defining the transition stages of their business 
units. They have a directive role in developing the 
architectures of their own business systems. 
Detailed tasks of this committee include: 
Assisting appropriately in all the tasks of the 
• 
Corporate Steering Committee - in particular, ensuring 
that the IT Infrastructure and human resource plans 
stay in step with their own systems plans. 
Reviewing the service and support provided by the 
centralized elements of the IT infrastructure and IT 
support organization. 
Joint Technical Review Committee: These are technical 
managers and specialists drawn from all domains and 
business units. Their task is to support the Corporate and 
Business Unit Steering Committees in architectural, 
technical and organizational matters relating the 
formulation and implementation of IT strategy. They have 
an active role in defining architectures in response to IT 
Positioning Statement, and in formulating and carrying out 
the management strategy. 
The concept of this committee is similar to that of the 
•General Technical Committee" described by Sloan: 
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"Its JOOSt inportant role was that of a stniy groop. 
It got to be known as ·a seminar. Its~ US~mlly 
~ cpened with the readin;J of ale or two papers en a 
specific ergineerinj prd>lem or device, ard these 
'WOUld then be the center of a general dj srussiCil. 
Saietines the cxmnittee' s di srnssion 'WOUld oarx:l.u:le 
with the awroval of a new device or method, or a 
xeoc:mnemation on ergineerinj policy ard procedure, 
hit liDre often the results ~ silrply that 
info~tiCil was transmitted fran ale to all." [Sloan, 
1963: 125] 
User Committees: These are persons with key roles in the 
user, developer and operator domains. Their task is to 
provide insight into the requirements of the people who are 
expected to work within the systems. Careful and sensitive 
handling of this task will help reduce much of the 
frustration and alienation, of which owners and developers 
are all too often unaware. 
Along with the Joint Technical Planning team, this body 
makes recommendations to the steering Committee, accepts 
assignments from it, and takes decisions on matters that 
can appropriately be handled without senior management 
intervention. It should also be capable of assisting in 
the technology evaluation processes (Sections 4.6.IV.B. and 
c.), particularly in respect of the man-machine interface 
[Galitz, 1980] and of individual and workgroup tasks. 
There should be at least one User Committee per business 
unit. 
2. The IT Support Organization 
The idea of an "IT support organization" as the successor to the 
traditional DP department in the new perspective of syst~ms 
thinking (Section 2.II.B.) comes from Benjamin [Course E-01: 6.], 
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and its role as the organizational construct of the IT 
infrastructure was introduced in Section 4.4.II.B.5. The aim in 
this Section is to identify generic tasks of the strategic IT 
decision makers in the IT support organization. 
The ITSO is, by definition, part of the IT domain of the company 
and its members will be employed in various IT functions 
throughout the organization - some as a central element, a part 
of the shared firm infrastructure, and some as integral elements 
of the business unit value chains [cf. Nolan, 1982: Chs. 3 & 4]. 
In this Study, however, only those tasks are considered ~hat lie 
close to the interface between business and IT. As in the case 
of co-ordinating bodies (Section 4.4.V.C.l.), it is convenient to 
consider these tasks at an aggregate level. 
Corporate Planning Staff and IT B&D Staff: Although not 
strictly speaking part of the IT support organization, the 
corporate planning staff have the crucial task of doing the 
environmental data analysis and documenting the Corporate 
IT Scenario(s) developed in the dialectical enquiry of the 
Context Component (Section 4.2.IV.). 
They need to be supported by specialists from the IT 
domain, who, in a large enough organization, would ideally 
form a dedicated IT R&D function. Such an R&D function 
would also have tasks to carry out in managing the 
organizational learning systems for innovation and 
assimilation of technologies (Section 4.6.IV.B. and C.). 
Architecture Staff: There are many ways in which one or 
more architecture staff departments in the IT domain can be 
aligned to the organization structure of the company. In 
companies where the IT functions are highly centralized, 
there may be just one such department covering all four 
dimensions of the target environment. In other companies, 
Old Mutual for example, one may find staff departments for 
infrastructure and for human resources in the central 
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element of the IT support organization, and departments for 
the business systems architectures in the business units. 
The major generic tasks of the architecture staff are to 
formulate the Target Environment Architecture, under the 
supervision of the Joint Technical Planning Team, and to 
assist in its incremental implementation. 
Specific tasks that architecture staff departments can 
undertake include: 
Assisting the corporate planning and IT R&D staff in 
documenting the Corporate IT Scenario(s), especially 
with regard to impacts on strategic business system 
design (e.g. the implications of new operating systems 
for application systems design, or of object-oriented 
programming on workstation design). 
Assisting the application and database development 
personnel, partly by providing the user, systems and 
infrastructure interfaces that support incremental 
development (Section 4.4.IV.A.), and partly by lending 
their own expertise to difficult design tasks. 
Benjamin, Rockart, Scott Morton & Wyman (1984: 7-9], Nolan, 
Norton & Company [Advanced Systems Inc., Course 3935: 29] 
and other writers advocate the appointment of a "Senior 
Technology Officer" or "Computing Functional Executive" to 
work alongside the traditional DP manager. Adopting a 
"hands-off style", the aim of this executive would be to 
create an internal planning environment in which managers 
in the owner domain can see IT as an important strategic 
weapon, and managers and specialists in the IT domain 
routinely address computing tasks as achievable through 
various technologies and approaches. In this Framework, the 
three major generic tasks of such an executive would be: 
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To supervise the customization of the Framework and 
the establishment of the strategic IT decision making 
process in the company. An important part of this 
activity would be to focus senior management attention 
on IT, since significant structural change will 
require senior management vision and direction. 
To co-ordinate the IT strategy, i.e. the formulation 
of an IT technology.strategy in terms of a Target 
Environment Architecture, and its incremental 
implementation in an IT management strategy (Section 
4.3.V.). An important part of this activity would be 
to generate awareness throughout the organization of 
the potential advantages of IT at all levels of 
impact, since nothing significant will be achievable 
without the commitment of the individuals involved. 
To control the organizational IT learning systems -
for example, by ensuring that proposed adaptations of 
the IT strategy are mapped to the correct learning 
level (Figure 3) and hence are escalated to the 
appropriate co-ordinating body. 
Corporate steering committee - second order and 
double loop learning. 
Business unit steering committee - double loop 
learning. 
Joint technical planning team - double loop and 
single loop learning. 
User committee - single loop learning. 
The core of the technology officer's mission is to ensure 
the free and informed discussion among competent decision 
makers, on which good organizational dialectic depends. 
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IT Planning Staff: Whereas the architectural staff focus 
on the infrastructure and systems dimensions of the 
technology strategy, planning staff focus on the human 
resources dimension and on the management strategy. The 
alignment of IT planning staff in the organization would 
normally parallel that of the architecture staff, and the 
two would cooperate closely. 
Depending on the organizational environment and the skills 
of the available people, it may be convenient to separate 
planning staff into three groups, as follows: 
Strategic Planning: Establishing the decision making 
processes, co-ordinating the work of the various 
architectural teams, and administering the transition 
plans. 
Human Resources: Formulating and implementing the 
human resources architecture, and obtaining and 
developing the requisite personnel. 
Financial Planning and Control: Developing evaluation 
criteria and managing the financial justification and 
control processes. Computer capacity and performance 
management staff would provide important input to this 
activity. 
There are many other roles at the technical levels of the 
IT support organization whose incumbents can perform useful 
supportive tasks in strategic IT decision making, e.g. 
hardware and software evaluation and acquisition, system 
programming, network planning, database management, and 
system quality assurance. 
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D. Strategic IT Decision Making Responsibilities 
1. Charting the Responsibilities 
Once the generic decision making roles and tasks have been mapped 
out, it is possible to identify, in general terms, what needs to 
be done, by whom, why, and subject to what constraints and 
difficulties. 
". • • llle need to urx:lerst.arrl how opera~, administrative, 
ard strategic decisions link together arrl Wiit roles the 
different participants - operators, tq> arrl middle-line 
managers, technocratic arrl support staffers - play in the 
}ilases of the different decision processes." [Mintzberg, 
1979: 61] 
Figure 20, which is based on Figure 5 and the organizational 
development technique, "responsibility charting" [Beckhard & 
Harris, 1977: 77], is a simple device for mapping roles and tasks 
into generic decision making responsibilities. The earlier this 
charting is done the less chance there will be that the manage-
ment strategy bogs down in role confusion and inter-personal 
conflicts about who is responsible for what - "mandate", 
"authority", "accountability" and so forth. 
The rows of the chart are grouped according to generic decision 
making roles (Section 4.4.V.B.), and the columns according to 
generic tasks (Section 4. 4 • V. c. ) . wi'th due regard for the level 
of participation and the communication factors (Sections 
4.4.V.B.2. and 3.), a cell entry should provide: 
A narrative description of the responsibility of the role 
for the task, if any. 
An indication of the kind of responsibility: 
Initiation: Initiate action and ensure completion. 
Page 233 
Authorization: Approve/veto a course of action and 
allocate/deny the requisite resources. 
Choice: Identify and recommend alternative courses of 
action. 
Task: Carry out the work involved in implementing a 
decision. 
Support: Provide technical, administrative or 
logistical advice and resource. 
Inform: Inform or be informed about the implications 
of a decision. 
The relevant decision making success criteria (Section 
4.4.V.E.). 
2. Strategic IT Decision Making Success Criteria 
Figure 21 is is based on Figure 5 and Fosdick's [1985: 33] 
discussion of the need for quantification and measurement in 
information resource management. It shows examples of strategic 
IT decision making success criteria in each of the four domains. 
In practice, specific criteria will need to be mapped to each of 
the charted decision making responsibilities (Figure 20), and to 
the major inter-relationships between these respons,ibilities. 
Decision making success criteria arise in the course of analyzing 
competitive advantage (the third box in the right-hand column of 
Figure 13). They are included in the human resources dimension 
because it is only with the competence and commitment of the 
people participating in it that strategic IT decision making can 
be successful. These success criteria are, therefore, personal 
measures that decision makers can use to evaluate themselves, 
individually and collectively, for the following reasons: 
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Selection: To choose among alternative proposals, or 
courses of action, for implementing the target environ-
ment. These criteria relate to the selection of thrusts 
for the transition plans, and they can thus be formulated 
in terms of decision packets (Section 4.5.II.) and the 
costs, benefits and risks they entail (Section 4.5.III.A.). 
Control: To ensure that the current strategic thrusts and 
their action plans stay on track. These criteria would be 
used in co-ordinating and controlling the transition stages 
and in monitoring the realization of costs and benefits. 
Evaluation and Learning: To determine whether and to what 
extent the strategic thrusts and plans have in fact been 
successful, and to provide feedback to the planning of 
future transition stages. 
To be relevant in the context of this Framework, each indicator 
should measure one or more of the following properties of a 
proposed strategic thrust or action plan [cf. Bower, 1982(2): 
632]: 
Effectiveness: Contribution to competitive advantage -
competitive position, organizational effectiveness and 
synergy (Section 4.3.IV.C.). 
Profitability: (Eventual) impact on the costs, marketing, 
financial and other operating goals of the company. 
Acceptability: Conformity with the social responsibility 
standards according to which the company operates [cf. 
Rowe, Mason & Dickel, 1986: Ch. 6]. 
Each box of Figure 21 shows two levels of criteria: 
Externally Valid Criteria: These are of interest and use 
to the other three domains, or to the other two levels 
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within a domain. They refer to areas of common concern, 
such as competitive position, organizational effectiveness, 
executive performance appraisal, and service level 
agreements. 
Internally Valid Criteria: These are of interest and use 
to decision making roles within a given level and domain. 
They refer to areas of domain concern, such as professional 
standards, quality improvement measurements, and internal 
installation management standards. 
All of these criteria relate to the observable outcomes of 
decision making activity. Criteria relating to "input factors" -
the knowledge, skills and attitudes of decision makers - would be 
found in the internal architecture. Nevertheless, specifying 
properties and indicators to measure them will depend to some 
extent on the roles and attitudes of the responsible decision 
makers. An online system, for example, may be deemed effective 
by a developers and users if it supports the right people, in the 
right way, and on the right scale, according to the system 
specifications. It will not, however, be deemed effective by 
operators and owners if these requirements are met at 
unacceptable levels of resource utilization and cost. 
Hence, decision making success criteria are best defined in terms 
of inter-domain relationships. Six broad classes arise: 
OWner-Developer: These refer to major projects for the 
development of IT infrastructure and strategic business 
systems. Specific indicators can be taken from the 
strategic and financial control processes of the IT 
management strategy (Sections 4.3.IV.C. and 4.5.III.A.). 
OWner-Operator: These belong to the world of "service 
level agreements". They refer to the price-performance of 
the ongoing services offered by the IT infrastructure and 
business systems, in support of the "four automatable 
/ 
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activities" - data processing, information processing, 
automated office functions and productivity tools (Section 
4.4.II.A.). 
Qwner-User: These belong to the familiar world of personal 
performance appraisal. In the present context, the 
indicators refer to the successful use of the IT 
infrastructure and strategic business systems in meeting 
their strategic purposes. 
Developer-Operator: These are similar to the owner-operator 
criteria, but refer specifically to information system 
design and development activities - computer aided software 
engineering (CASE) support, for example. 
Developer-User: These refer to the requirements of people 
who will be expected to perform within the boundaries of 
the system - examples include productivity standards and 
man-machine interface standards. 
User-operator: These also belong to the world of service 
level agreements, and refer to the ongoing support given to 
organizational effectiveness at each of the four levels of 
organizational impact (Section 4. 3,. III .A.). 
A practical guideline in specifying indicators in each of the six 
categories is to consider the three Types of Link: 
~ I: These suggest indicators of success in the 
organizational dialectic, as between the business and IT 
domains - for example, the level and cost of technical 
functionality needed to deliver service significantly 
better than the competition; the ranges of project lead 
times that are acceptable in meeting different kinds of 
market windows. 
Type XX: These suggest indicators referring to the 
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controllable interactions among different Components of the 
Framework - for example, legal and ethical norms 
constraining owners in the choice of competitive weapons; 
social, economic and technical constraints on developers' 
choice of appropriate technology in systems design. 
~ III: These suggest indicators referring to 
organizational IT learning - for example, the rates of 
technology innovation and assimilation necessary to sustain 
competitive leadership in distribution channels or 
product/service performance leadership. These are 
essentially experience curve issues. 
Useful tools and techniques for the development of decision 
making success criteria include the Critical Success Factors 
Technique (Bullen & Rockart, 1981; Rockart, 1979], and function 
points analysis [Albrecht, 1979, 1983(1), 1983(2); Albrecht & 
Gaffney, 1983; Behrens, 1983]. 
Useful guidelines can also be gleaned from an abundant literature 
on IT selection and evaluation criteria - for example, King, J.L. 
(1980], King & Schrems [1978], King W.R. [1978, 1983(1), 
1983(2)], Klein & Beck [1981], Knight [1983]. Probably the most 
comprehensive treatment available to management is Boehm's [1981] 
11 COCOM011 model. 
E. The Internal Architecture 
The tests for good organizational dialectic given in Section 
4.4.V.A. make it clear that, for this Framework to be a useful 
aid in strategic IT decision making, the decision makers must 
indeed hold a reasonable number of contradictory assumptions to 
be challenged and synthesized. Assumptions, however, differ only 
because people see things differently, and this in turn is the 
result of differences in personal attributes - background, 
education, knowledge, skills, attitudes, styles and so forth. 
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Consequently, the aim of the internal architecture is to provide 
operational guidelines for acquiring, developing and retaining 
the requisite variety of people, and deploying them effectively 
as strategic IT decision makers in the roles and responsibilities 
mapped out by the external architecture. This aim includes the 
devising of incentive systems that simultaneously encourage the 
acceptance and attainment of decision making success criteria, 
and innovative, risk-taking attitudes. Such incentives will by 
no means be solely financial, as the research and recommendations 
of Cougar and Zawacki [1983] indicate. 
Seen in this light, the human resource ideal for the target 
environment is to achieve congruency between IT purposes and 
usesi not by breeding a new species of DP manager, but rather by 
placing as many people as may be needed, with as great a variety 
of human attributes as can be obtained, into structured, 
participative decision making situations. Some of these people 
will be domain specialists, in either business or IT. Others 
will be multi-disciplinary generalists, responding not so much to 
the demands of a particular project as to generic needs - for 
example, organization and methods analysts with training in 
computer systems analysis and some fluency in mathematics and 
management accounting. 
The problem, however, is that the available skill pool in South 
Africa is small enough to rule out the feasibility of many 
otherwise attractive IT strategies. 
oooOooo 
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4.5 DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
I. IMPLEMENTING IT STRATEGY 
This is the Component in which the decision making focus shifts 
from IT technology strategy (the formulation of the IT strategy 
as a target environment architecture) to IT management s~rategy 
(the incremental implementation of the architecture). Two broad 
classes of problem have to be addressed in the management 
strategy: 
Planning the implementation projects to take place, over 
time, in the context of the ongoing activities and 
relationships of organizational life. 
Ensuring that the various projects initiated to implement 
different aspects of the target environment architecture 
are well co-ordinated, and that they remain true to the 
overall architectural aims - for example, to the agreed 
purposes and uses of IT in the business strategy. 
Just as the technology strategy may emphasize generic structures 
and processes that do not already exist in official organization 
charts, so too the management strategy may require decision 
making processes that are not already in place in the company. 
These are the kinds of change that introduce uncertainty into 
roles, tasks and responsibilities at all organizational levels -
individuals, workgroups and business units - and people tend to 
resist them. Much confusion, demotivation and obstructiveness 
can be avoided if the changes are carefully planned, communicated 
and executed, with maximum participation of those most affected 
by them. 
One way to do this is to treat IT strategy implementation as an 
exercise in company-wid,e organizational development [cf. Beckhard 
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& Harris, 1977]. Seen in this light, incremental implementation 
of the strategy can be structured as a series of organizational 
transition stages towards the shared vision of the target 
environment, and a considerable armoury of accepted "OD" insights 
and techniques becomes available to manage the transitions. 
Similarly, the co-ordination and control of the implementation 
projects may require accounting concepts and practices that are 
not yet current in the company. In particular, it follows from 
the Framework's definitions of strategic business systems 
(Section 4.3.III.B.1.) and measurable competitive advantage 
(Section 4.3.IV.C.) that much emphasis will be placed on the 
aggregate costs and benefits of the whole IT strategy. 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
The definition of company-wide organizational development given 
by Beckhard & Harris [1977: 2-3] can be adapted to become the 
definition of IT management strategy, as follows: 
IT management strategy is a planned'· organization-wide 
effort, managed from the top, to increase organizational 
effectiveness and health through planned interventions in 
organizational structures and processes, using both 
information technology and behavioural science knowledge. 
For a successful IT management strategy, the crucial element of 
this definition is "organizational health", and Beckhard & Harris 
[1977: 3-4] define it in a way that can be adapted to capture the 
central themes of this Framework (Section 1.I.): 
Organizational Adaptation: The organization as a whole as 
well as its significant sub-parts - individuals, workgroups 
and business units - manage the implementation of the IT 
strategy as a concerted effort towards agreed goals, 
objectives and ideals. 
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Form follows function, i.e. the tasks to be performed 
determine how a strategic business system (a human system 
with its supporting information system) is designed to 
support the people who will use it. 
Both in the implementation of the IT strategy, and in the 
new organization structures it produces, decisions are made 
and tasks are performed by or near the internal sources of 
the relevant information, regardless of where these may be 
located in the current organization charts. 
Organizational Dialectic: Every effort is made to ensure 
that communication, both lateral and vertical, remains 
undistorted. The tests for good dialectic suggested in 
Section 4.4.V.A. are based on the premise that people are 
generally open and confronting, and share all the relevant 
facts, including assumptions and feelings. 
Good organizational dialectic helps reduce inappropriate 
win/lose activities among individuals and groups, through 
constant effort at all organizational levels to make 
problems subject to problem solving methods. 
A high level of healthy contradiction (clash of ideas) 
relating to the ends of IT strategy and the architecture of 
the target environment is encouraged. At the same time, 
effort is made to keep the level of unproductive conflict 
(role confusion and personal clashes) as low as possible. 
Organizational Learning: Individuals, work groups and 
business units see themselves as interacting with each 
other through organizational processes that can be 
improved, and with a larger environment through 
inter-organization~! processes that can be controlled. In 
this way, the company is perceived and managed as an "open 
system". 
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There is a shared value of trying to help all individuals, 
work groups and individuals in the organization maintain 
their own integrity and uniqueness in a highly 
inter-dependent environment. Conversely, the "not invented 
here" syndrome is actively discouraged by the fostering of 
an attitude of wanting to achieve, more than simply wanting 
to do - and with the help of others wherever possible. 
The reward system is such that decision makers are rewarded 
appropriately, in terms of their level of participation, 
for the achievement of short term goals and medium term 
objectives, for the development of their subordinates, and 
for creating viable work groups. 
Decision makers at all levels in all domains operate in an 
"action...:.research" way, i.e. it becomes part of the general 
practice to build feedback and learning loops into control 
processes, so that individuals, work groups and business 
units can learn from their own and others' experience 
These aims of organizational development are necessary conditions 
for an effective implementation of IT strategy, as envisaged in 
this Framework. If they do not already exist in the company, the 
effort to create them will have to be included as part of the 
management strategy. Useful conceptual frameworks for this 
purpose have been suggested in Section 4.3.V.B. 
Beckhard & Harris [1977] describe how large-system change 
strategies can be carried out as a series of state changes. 
Their approach can be adapted to the needs of IT management 
strategy if incremental implementation is envisaged as a series 
of organizational transitions towards the target environment. 
The process can be summarized as follows : 
Aggregate the activities that need to take place into 
meaningful "strategic thrusts", which can be scheduled as 
organizational transitions from one environmental state to 
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the next on the road towards the ideal target environment. 
Identify, link and sequence the short term action plans 
needed to give effect to each thrust. 
Allocate the resources and expertise needed in each thrust, 
and acquire or develop them timeously for the action plans 
in which they will be used. 
Identify the stakeholders in each thrust and action plan, 
i.e. the decision makers involved at each level in each 
domain (Section 4.4.V.B.), and obtain their commit~ent. 
Map the roles, tasks and responsibilities (Section 4.4.V.), 
broadly per thrust and in greater detail per action plan. 
Agree the timetables for the thrusts and action plans. 
Identify, plan, and market to those concerned the changes 
that each thrust will require or produce in organizational 
processes and structures, as well as in all the managerial 
practices, procedures, rewards and policies that are 
affected. The Tichy [1983] and Miesing [1984] frameworks 
recommended in the Content and Organizational Learning 
Components are also useful for this set of activities. 
Agree the bases for evaluating progress and achievement in 
each thrust and action plan. 
Develop the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed in each 
domain, and at each level of participation, to enable stake-
holde~s to manage the current transition stage, and to work 
in the new environmental state that will be its outcome. 
III. TRANSITION STAGES 
The basic concept in planning a transition stage is the "decision 
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packet" (Section 4.1.II.C.). A transition stage represents the 
implementation of one or more decision packets, each with its own 
clearly defined contents, boundaries and interfaces. 
A. Defining Strategic Thrusts 
Figure 22 shows a fragment of a "Master Transition Plan", which 
sets out in broad terms how strategic thrusts are structured as 
decision packets spanning the dimensions of the Target 
Environment Architecture, and how they are are mapped into 
organizational transition stages. It will be noticed that there 
is an added fifth dimension in each strategic thrust, which 
represents the new or adapted strategic IT decision making 
responsibilities and processes that will be required. 
Each cell of the Figure represents: 
Those elements of the Target Environment Architecture 
chosen for implementation in that thrust. 
The relevant Type I, II and III Links that will have to be 
managed (Section 4.1.II.B.). 
It follows from the discussion of the three levels of architec-
ture (Sections 4.1.III.D.3. and 4.4.I.) that the content, 
boundary and interfaces of a transition stage can be defined at 
each of these levels. It is indeed at this point that the levels 
of planning, architecture and implementation can be explicitly 
associated with planning timeframes (Section 4.1.III.A.): 
Level of Planning Level of Level of 
Planning Time frame Architecture Implementation 
Strategic Long term Meta- Customization 
Tactical Medium term Macro- Instantiation 
Operational Short term Micro- Realization 
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Once the Framework has been customized for use in a given 
company, the entire Master Transition Plan should be complete 
{but adaptable) to at least the meta-architectural level. 
Transition stages scheduled to commence within the medium term 
should reach at least the macro-architectural level of detail 
within that timeframe. Finally, the current transition stage or 
a transition stage scheduled to commence in the short term should 
reach the micro-architectural level in that timeframe. 
It will, of course, be necessary for decision makers to define 
precisely what they mean by the "commencement" and indeed the 
"end" of a transition stage. A rough rule of thumb is that a 
transition stage begins with the work involved in formulating the 
micro-architecture, proceeds through human and information 
systems development and implementation, and ends when the new 
environmental state is realized. 
The B+OL+D methodology [Benjamin, Seminar E-01] recommends two 
parallel sets of strategies: 
"Management" strategies expressed in terms of the external 
architecture. 
"Technical" strategies expressed in terms of the internal 
architecture. 
Experience at Old Mutual indicates, however, that many people 
will have difficulty, firstly in understanding the logical 
difference between the two sets, and secondly in mapping the one 
set to the other when validating implementation plans • 
• 
The present Framework proposes just one IT management strategy, 
to implement just one IT technology strategy. Referring to 
Figure 23 {and ignoring the controls for the moment), it will be 
seen that at the meta- and macro-architectural levels the thrusts 
and plans of the IT management strategy are couched in the 
terminology of the external architecture. They can thus be 
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understood by decision makers at all levels of participation in 
all domains. Details relevant to the internal architecture can 
be provided in separate documentation for those who require them. 
At the micro-architectural level, however, action plans are set 
out in the implementation-orientated terminology of the internal 
architecture. It should not be necessary to document details of 
the external micro-architecture, if the features, functions and 
options of the IT infrastructure and business systems are 
well-designed and prototyped. 
Returning to Figure 22, it will be seen that the thrusts of a 
company's IT management strategy can be developed by following 
first the columns of the Chart, then the rows. A "sub-strategy" 
can be identified with each column: 
A company-wide IT infrastructure strategy. 
A human systems strategy and an information systems 
strategy for each business unit. 
A company-wide human resources strategy. 
A strategy for creating the decision making processes the 
IT management strategy itself requires. 
Each of these sub-strategies can be further subdivided into any 
number of more specific sub-strategies, for example, a 
telecommunications strategy, a mainframe strategy, a data 
management strategy, an office automation strategy, and so on. 
Each of these can broken down into a number of development 
stages. The "technical strategies" referred to in Figure 9 
emerge in this way. 
The activities and development stages thus identified may then be 
re-grouped into thrusts (rows), taking into account technical and 
business priorities, and inter-dependencies among the strategies 
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- for example, ensuring that infrastructure and human resource 
development stages keep at least abreast of application 
development requirements. 
The thrusts can then be mapped into transition stages. 
B. The Medium Term: Tactical Plans 
The objective of a medium-term.(e.g. 3-year) tactical plan is to 
accomplish an organizational transition stage. It consists of 
one or more strategic thrusts aimed at bringing some portion of 
the Target Environment Architecture into reality. Special 
decision making roles may be necessary if the transition state is 
unique or different from either the pre-change or post-change 
scenario, e.g. a stage manager, or a product/process "champion" 
with sufficient power skills (Section 4.6.IV.B.) to see that 
difficult changes go through successfully [cf. Beckhard & Harris, 
1977: 45]. 
A tactical plan is set out in two parts - a process plan and a 
commitment plan. Although these relate to the level of the 
macro-architecture, and their details are thus beyond the scope 
of this Study, the following two Sections offer some explanation 
of what they comprise._ 
1. Process Plans 
The word "process" is used intentionally. Firstly, it highlights 
the fact that every strategic thrust and transition stage is to 
be managed as a total process of change [Beckhard & Harris, 1977: 
51], and not as a number of more or less autonomous projects that 
require synchronizing. Secondly, it suggests that the boundaries 
of a tactical plan should follow those of the generic 
organizational processes involved, to ensure a feasible scale of 
change and careful interfacing with the parts of the organization 
that are not included in the transition. Moreover, a transition 
stage that is restricted to a well-defined subset of the value 
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chain facilitates calculation of the benefit (i.e. competitive 
advantage) expected. 
In essence, the process plan is a road map for the change effort, 
which contains the following elements: 
Stakeholders: The strategic IT decision makers involved in 
this transition stage, at all levels of participation in 
all domains. 
~ransition Scenarios: Delineations of those parts of the 
internal environment and inter-organizational relationships 
that will be affected by the transition stage - their 
present state, their intended state at the end of the 
stage, and the changes needed to get from the former to the 
latter. 
Projects and Resources: An outline of the technical and 
organizational projects that will be mounted over the 
period concerned to bring about the needed. changes, their 
timeframes and priorities, and the resources that will be 
allocated to them. 
Education and Marketing: The requisite technical and 
organizational knowledge that must be imparted to all the 
stakeholders, including demos and other marketing 
materials. 
A good process plan will have the following characteristics 
[Beckhard & Harris, 1977: 51-52]: 
Purposeful: All activities are clearly linked to the 
transition stage objectives and priorities. 
Feasible: The transition is not too big to be managed 
effectively with the resources available to the company. 
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Task-specific: The types of activity are precisely 
identified rather than broadly generalized and are clearly 
mapped to the stakeholders, in a responsibility chart, 
together with agreed decision making success criteria 
(Section 4.4.V.D.). 
. 
Integrated: All activities arise out of the Master 
Transition Plan (Figure 22), and are explicitly 
inter-linked in suitable statements of assumptions and 
dependencies in the project documentation 
Temporal: The plan is time-sequenced, and can be 
controlled by critical path scheduling methods. 
Adaptive: The plan is capable of adaptation through the 
organizational IT learning loops (Section 4.1.III.D.3.; 
Figure 3), and there are also contingency plans for major 
disruptions (Section 4.5.II.D.). 
Agreed: The plan is agreed by all its stakeholders, 
starting with the chief executive officer of the company. 
Cost-effective: The plan is properly evaluated (Section 
4.5.III.A.), and justified in terms of its contribution to 
competitive advantage (Section 4.3.II.C.). 
2. Commitment Plans 
Experience shows, according to Beckhard & Harris [1977: 52-53], 
that in addition to developing the plan for carrying out changes, 
it is also necessary to determine key persons among the 
stakeholders who must be committed to these changes if they are 
actually to take place. 
This is in part a political problem, the "P" strand in Tichy 1 s i 
[1983] T,P,C Theory. Moreov~r, experience strongly indicates 
that in any complex change process there is, for every subsystem 
Page 250 
affected, a critical mass of people whose commitment is necessary 
to generate the energy for the change to occur. There is also, 
of course, also a threshold beyond which too many commitments 
would be required to enable the transition to be managed 
effectively. Hence a commitment plan sets what may be termed the 
lower and upper political bounds to the scale of the transition. 
A commitment plan, therefore, is that part of a strategic thrust 
aimed at securing the support of key persons involved in the 
generic processes covered by the transition stage, as well as key 
supportive persons in other parts of the organization~ Such 
persons will be identified for much the same personal attributes 
as those found in "corporate innovators" - power skills, an 
ability to resolve the dilemmas of participative decision making, 
and insight into the architecture and implementation of culture 
and strategy change (Section 4.6.IV.B.). 
Beckhard & Harris [1977: 54 - 57] provide guidelines for setting 
up a commitment plan. 
C. The Short Term: Action Plans 
To accomplish a strategic thrust, the process and commitment 
plans must be translated into a number of action plans, which 
will be included in the ordinary business and IT planning 
processes of the company. Action plans to change th~ human 
systems should be included in the business plans of the relevant 
business units, and be explicitly linked to the competitive 
strategy purposes they are meant to serve. 
The corresponding IT infrastructure, information systems and 
human resource action plans should similarly be included in the 
relevant business plans, capacity plans, technical plans and so 
forth of the IT support organization • 
. This the only level at which resources are actually acquired, and 
elements of the target environment are actually created. It is, 
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therefore, the principal level at which errors and the conditions 
for error in the IT strategy will be detected, ·and consequently 
the action plans should be drawn up, executed and controlled 
within the context of effective organizational IT learning 
systems (Section 4.6.IV.). 
D. Contingency Plans 
These are company-wide_plans that do not directly contribute to 
progress towards the target environment, but are essential to 
ensure the survival of an IT-dependent company and the viability 
of its IT strategy. Examples are: 
Supplier Policies: These are rules for selecting all types 
of technology supplier - hardware; software; technical 
support and consultancy; programming and other contractors 
- and for conducting ongoing relationships with them. 
Broadly, they indicate the extent to which the company 
wishes to be committed to any one supplier, and what it 
will do if for any reason a supplier fails to meet its 
commitments to the company. 
Security Plans: These are rules, procedures and structures 
to protect the company's data, systems and equipment from 
unauthorized access, physical as well as logical; damage, 
whether malicious or accidental; and loss of competitive 
advantage, e.g. through unauthorized access to design 
details. 
An important aspect of these plans is the protection of the 
confidentiality/secrecy of the IT strategy itself. This 
will include security-related criteria for the selection of 
participants in the strategic IT decision making processes, 
constraints on which parts of the strategy may be document-
ed in writing and on who may have access to the documents, 
and measures to protect the confidentiality of development 
projects and the company's ownership of the systems and 
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programs produced. 
Disaster Recovery Plans: · These are rules, procedures and 
structures to protect the company's data, systems and 
equipment from partial or complete disaster, and for 
recovery from such disasters should they occur. 
IV. CO-ORDINATION AND CONTROL 
Co-ordination and control of the IT management strategy in the 
aggregate, as it unfolds incrementally and adaptively, will be 
required along three axes: 
Logical: To maintain the integrity of the plans down 
through the levels of implementation - customization, 
instantiation and realization - and up through the levels 
of organizational IT learning - single-loop, double-loop 
and second-order (Figures 3 and 14). 
Temporal: To maintain the integrity of the plans as a 
transition stage is implemented, and from stage to stage 
(Figure 22). 
Organizational: To maintain the integrity of the plans 
across all the decision making levels and domains (Figures 
19, 20 and 21), and to ensure that new generic structures 
and processes are realized with minimal distortion by the 
pressures of vested interests in current organizational 
forms (Figures 15 to 18). 
The specific elements that need to be controlled will become 
apparent as the decision packets constituting the strategic 
thrusts are built up from the Components, Parts and Links of the 
Framework. They fall into the three classes shown in Figure 23: 
Strategic Controls: These monitor the IT strategy as a 
whole, through a stage and from stage to stage, to ensure 
Page 253 
that all the Parts are co-ordinated, and that all action 
plans remain true to the agreed purposes and uses of IT. 
If adaptation is required in the IT technology strategy per 
se (the IT Positioning Statement and the Target Environment 
Architecture), either double-loop or second-order learning 
would be taking place. 
Architectural Controls: These ensure that action plans 
remain true to the medium-term objectives of the current 
transition stage, and are consistent with those elements of 
the Target Environment Architecture that ~ave already been 
instantiated. If adaptation can be contained at this 
level, single-loop learning would be taking place. 
Operational Controls: These ensure that the action plans 
and resource allocations are correctly inter-related, that 
they remain true to the requirements of the process and 
commitment plans, and that operators and users get the 
service they can legitimately expect from the systems 
delivered. If adaptation is confined to the macro- and 
micro-architecture levels, then single-loop learning would 
be taking place. 
The two major kinds of benefit measurement that support the 
co-ordination and control of IT strategy in the aggregate have 
already been introduced, in the Content and Structure Components 
of the Framework: 
Competitive Advantage: (Section 4.3.IV.C.) These measures 
support strategic control of the Master Transition Plan and 
the tactical and action plans. 
Decision Making Success Criteria: (Section 4.4.V.D.2.) 
These measures are related to the strategic control 
measures, but because they are domain-specific they are 
particularly useful in architectural and operational 
control. 
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There is an extensive literature covering various kinds of cost 
and risk measurement that support the co-ordination and control 
of IT strategy. Useful ideas can be obtained, for example, from 
Boehm (1981], Goldberg & Lorin (1982], Inmon (1983], 
International Business Machines [1983: Vol. IV], Nolan (1977], 
Nolan (1982: Part 4], and Norton & Rau (1977]. 
The following Sections describe some of the ways in which costs 
and risks can be calculated and aggregated, with particular 
reference to the different kinds of benefit (i.e. competitive 
advantage - Section 4.3.IV.C.) and the different kinds of 
decision making responsibilities. 
A. Costs, Benefits and Risk 
Two useful frames of reference are provided by: 
The "Four-Category Resource Budgeting" model of the B+OL+D 
methodology [Benjamin, Seminar E-01, Section 5-2). 
"Enterprise-wide Information Economics" (EwiE), a subset of 
Enterprise-wide Information Management (EwiM) [Benson & 
Parker, 1986(2)]. 
In the following Sections, these are synthesized and adapted to 
the concepts of IT infrastructure, strategic business systems, 
competitive advantage and decision making success criteria, as 
defined in the present Framework. 
1. Aggregate Classes of Strategic IT Costs 
There are two broad classes of strategic IT costs: 
IT Infrastructure: The cost of all resources - the basic 
hardware, software, services and human skills - required to 
provide or extend the IT infrastructure in readiness for 
the strategic business systems that will depend on it. 
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Strategic Business Systems: The cost of all resources -
the system-specific hardware, software, services and human 
skills - required to provide both the human systems part 
and the information systems part of a strategic business 
system (Section 4.3.III.B.l.). 
In each class, total costs can be analyzed as follows: 
Development Costs: The "up-front" costs of developing and 
implementing new IT infrastructure and strategic business 
systems, or of adapting existing infrastructure and systems 
in response to double-loop or second-order organizational 
IT learning. 
Operational Costs: The ongoing running and maintenance 
costs of the IT infrastructure and strategic business 
systems after they have been implemented. Such costs will 
increase over time, as a result of growth in the volume of 
transactions supported by the business systems, maintenance 
and adaptation arising out of single-loop organizational IT 
learning, equipment obsolescence, inflation, and so on. 
Operational costs must be separated into the "existing" 
costs of those parts of the Target Environment Architecture 
that have already been realized, and the "prospective" 
costs of the systems and IT infrastructure yet to be 
realized. 
Incremental Costs: The development costs plus the 
discounted present value of the prospective operational 
costs, in respect of a proposed strategic business system 
or extension to the IT infrastructure. 
Transition Costs: The aggregate of all incremental costs 
pertaining to the strategic thrust(s) of a transition 
stage. In this Framework, "strategic IT costs" are defined 
to be the transition costs. The activity involved in 
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customizing the Framework and preparing the first release 
of the Master Transition Plan should be included in the 
first transition stage. 
Since each transition stage is a total process of change 
with a self-consistent and workable environmental state at 
the end of it, management always has the option to suspend 
the IT management strategy at the end of any stage. Hence 
total strategic IT costs are always determinate and 
manageable - they are the current transition costs. 
By analogy with Benjamin's [Seminar E-01, Section 5-2] model, 
transition costs can be further analyzed as follows: 
"WED" (Workstation Environment Development): The costs of 
implementing or adapting the four physical constructs of 
the infrastructure - virtual workstation, virtual network, 
virtual applications portfolio, and virtual data model 
(Section 4.4.II.B.1. to 4. and Figure 15). 
' "USE" (User Services Environment): The costs of 
implementing adapting the information technology support 
organization (Section 4.4.II.B.5. and Figure 15). The 
costs of developing human resources and strategic 
management processes would be included here. 
"STRAD" (Strategic Application Development): The costs of 
implementing or adapting strategic business systems, or of 
converting existing business systems to become part of the 
strategic portfolio (Section 4.4.IV.B. and Figure 18). 
In this Framework, Benjamin's "WAR" (Work as Required) can be 
interpreted as a balancing item representing the difference 
between transition costs and the total IT budget. 
Another perspective on transition costs, which links them more 
clearly to kinds of benefit, is obtained in terms of Benson & 
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Parker's [1986(2): 3-4] framework: 
Substitutive Applications: These applications (i.e. IT 
infrastructure as well as strategic business systems) are 
intended to reconfigure the value chain by substituting new 
generic processes for existing processes that are less 
information-intensive and less efficient. Either existing 
costs are replaced, or potential new costs are avoided. 
These applications often, but do not always, entail the 
replacement of human labour by relatively less expensive 
machine power. 
Complementary Applications: These applications aim at 
increasing the effectiveness of generic processes, either 
by enhancing the productivity of individuals and 
workgroups, or by increasing the efficiency of support 
activities and linkages (external as well as internal) in 
the value chain. 
Innovative Applications: These applications aim at gaining 
or maintaining some unique competitive advantage, and are 
typical of impact IT strategy. They achieve their 
uniqueness through radical changes in processes andjor 
products, and frequently involve inter-organizational · 
links. Much detailed risk analysis may be required. 
"Potential benefits are high, bit. the measurement 
awroaches are speculative, due to the nature of 
crea:tirg entJ:y barriers am the risk of [not] beirg 
both first am right." [Benson & Parker, 1986(2): 4] 
Figure 24 shows nine aggregate classes of strategic IT costs, 
which result from the Benjamin and EwiM categories. If ~esired, 
each box could be further subdivided in any of a variety of ways 
as suggested by the constructs of each dimension of the Target 
Environment Architecture. The purpose of such a grid is to help 
not only in keeping track of where the money is going but also in 
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identifying the kinds of benefit to be expected, and hence the 
kinds of evaluation technique that are appropriate in different 
circumstances. 
2. Evaluation Techniques 
It is consistent with the principle of directed incrementalism 
(Section 4.2.IV.B.3.), and with the definition of total ~trategic 
IT costs as the current transition costs (Section 4.5.III.A.1.), 
that evaluation of strategic benefits and risks should only be 
attempted per transition stage. 
Benson & Parker [1986(2): 4-8] identify five kinds of evaluation 
technique which can be used to calculate the benefit ( measurable 
competitive advantage - Section 4.3.IV.C. and Figure 13) and risk 
corresponding to different aggregate classes of transition costs: 
Traditional Cost-Benefit Analysis: These techniques arise 
out of financial management theory and deal with direct and 
tangible benefits, such as cost avoidance. They are most 
useful in the "Substitutive" column of Figure 24, but they 
can be adapted to "Complementary" systems - for example, 
IBM Canada's [1983, 1986] "EP/DP (Executive Planning for 
Data Processing" technique, which attempts to quantify the 
"value of data processing" in terms of the "equivalent 
headcount" replaced or avoided. 
Since, in general, these techniques are best suited to 
small, piecemeal costs charged directly to a specific 
project, value activity or product, they are best applied 
independently, as required, in each of the three boxes of 
the "Substitutive" column. The results of all the analyses 
can then be added to get the aggregate costs and benefits. 
/ 
Architecture-Based Cost-Benefit Analysis: These techniques 
[Parker, 1982(1); 1982(2)] are suited to comprehensive 
proposals with large up-front commitments, such as total 
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transition costs. They can be applied to the aggregate 
evaluation of all three boxes in the "Substitutive" column 
of Figure 24. 
Indirect Cost-Benefit Analysis: The basic assumption of 
these techniques is that; because a job or a process 
continues to exist in an organization, it must contribute 
in some measurable way to a value chain, and that this 
"imputed value" can be calculated. Such techniques are 
needed when the benefit lies, not in the capacity to 
substitute computer power for routine labour, but rather in 
shortening the time needed to accomplish a given task, or 
in allowing more of a given task to be done in the same 
' 
amount of time, or in allowing the restructuring of work 
(Sassone & Schwarz, 1986: 83]. 
Drawing on the microeconomic theory of the firm and the 
theory of linear programming, Sassone & Schwarz have 
developed a "hedonic model" that can be used to investigate 
the value of the components of a good or service, or the 
contribution of a value activity. 
". • • we reoognize that jciJs are not liDllOlithic, but 
have identifiable CCIIlpOlleJ1ts with different i.nplicit 
values. For exanple, a manager's job may involve 
managerial, professional, technical, administrative 
am clerical c:orrponents. We express these c:x:atpOI"leel 
in a 'WOrk profile • • • By usinJ the hedonic JOOdel to 
explain the value of the job (salcu:y plus frinJe 
benefits plus direct ovemead) in tents of the annmts 
of each c:x:::mponent the jci:> entails, we can draw 
inferences about the inplicit value of each 
canponent." (Sassone & Schwarz, 1986: 86] 
Since IT permits changes in the composition of a work 
profile - the configuration of a job, a generic process or 
a value chain - the implicit, or hedonic, values can be 
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used to place a monetary value on that change, and hence on 
the IT application itself. 
Benefit Acceleration Model Analysis: such techniques, as 
described by Benson & Parker (1986(2): 6-7], assess the 
costs of a proposal against the speeding up it will achieve 
in the rate of accrual of relevant benefits. Although it 
does not appear to be as general as the hedonic model, a 
benefit acceleration model could be used to justify the IT 
applications in certain cases, e.g. where the impact of the 
change, say new programming support facilities, is to 
reduce the "applications backlog". 
Innovation Risk Analysis: This kind of analysis is 
appropriate for the "Innovation" column of Figure 24. It 
would be used 
''when the financial issues m::JVe from those of 
neasurement to those of evaluati.rg am choosi.rg 
alternatives. It is useful for new, unpreoe:!d.ente1 
CiR)lications Of infonnation teclmology 1 am takes into 
consideration the valuejbenefit of qai.n:irqlmaintai 
c:x:mpetitive advantage; the risk/cost of bei.rg first; 
am the risk/cost of failure. It can be applied to 
any flmction of the enterprise value dlain." [Benson 
& Parker, 1986(2): 7-8]. 
There is a growing literature on new-venture risk analysis, 
and Benson & Parker cite several sources. 
B. Domain Accountability 
The management accounting processes of the company have to be 
brought into play in the IT management strategy in order to 
generate the data needed for the cost, benefit and risk 
evaluations described in the previous Section. A second and 
equally important function for these accounting processes is to 
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facilitate management of the accountability that accompanies 
responsibility in participative strategic IT decision making. 
Each decision making domain is accountable in some way to every 
other domain. These relationships will be in respect of budgeted 
as well as actual costs and benefits. The following list is not 
intended to be exhaustive, and shows only the main relationships. 
Stage and Project Justification: Using the cost, benefit 
and risk evaluations described in the preceding Section, 
transition costs can be analyzed and managed in terms of 
the strategic purposes and uses envisaged in the 
medium-term transition plans. The output of this analysis 
would constitute an "IT business plan" for the transition 
stage, prepared for the owners by the developers of the 
transition plans. 
Capacity and Service Commitment: The IT business plan must 
be accompanied by an appropriate and specific commitment of 
resources to the users who, working within the envisaged 
system, are expected to make the plan happen. Acting on 
the owners• behalf, the developers are in a position to set 
out these commitments in terms of requisite capacity, 
functionality and service levels. 
Capacity and Service Delivered: As implementation unfolds, 
it is necessary for the operators to monitor the capacity 
and service levels actually delivered to users. This is an 
important part of the user, architectural and strategic 
controls arising out of the action plans (Figure 23). 
Strategic IT Cost Allocation: Transition costs will have 
been presented in terms of strategic purposes and uses and 
generic processes, in the IT business plan for the stage. 
It is also necessary for them to be translated into 
whatever conventional Business/IT expense categories have 
been agreed, for allocation against the profit centres 
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responsible for them. Both the budgets and the actual 
costs and variances should, of course, be reconciled to the 
IT business plan. 
Expenditure Accounting: Similarly, it is necessary for 
transition costs to be analyzed in terms of conventional IT 
management categories. This permits developers to monitor, 
on behalf of the owners, usage, price and efficiency 
variances according to different human and technical 
resource categories. This process should also include the 
monitoring of technology and resource acquisition plans and 
the contingency plans. 
Responsibility Accounting: This is the analysis of 
transition costs according to the responsible departments 
in the official organization chart rather than generic 
processes in the value chain. Managers and supervisors 
receive budgets for those elements of transition costs that 
pertain to their departments, and over which they have 
direct (or shared) control. Transition costs, of course, 
include the up-front development costs as well as the 
prospective operating costs, so that users become 
accountable for the ongoing operation of the infrastructure 
and business systems as well as their proper development. 
In this way they become the agents of the owners, not 





4.6 ORGANIZATIONAL IT LEARNING 
I. DEVELOPING THE IT CAPABILITY 
Achieving congruency in the development of a company's strategic 
IT capability, as envisaged in this Framework (Section 4.2.I.: 
Figure 4), requires two complementary learning processes. 
On the one hand, there must be some practical way in which the 
organization, as an entity with an existence that continues 
beyond the incumbency of its current decision makers, can be made 
to accumulate experience and skills in formulating, implementing 
and adapting IT strategy [cf. Shrivastava, 1983: 14]. From this 
point of view, organizational IT learning can be seen as the 
process through which a company develops distinctive competences 
in deploying IT resources - in specific competitive strategies, 
by exploiting the effects of IT on generic strategies (Section 
4.3.II.B.), and in specific organizational designs, by exploiting 
the effects of IT on generic structures and processes (Section 
4.3.III.B.). 
On the other hand, incumbent IT decision makers acting as the 
learning agents of the organization must: (a) recognize and 
respond to situations where learning can and should take place 
[cf. Argyris & Schon, 1978: 29]; (b) themselves become adept, 
individually and collectively, in making strategic IT decisions; 
and (c) give effect to the corporate accumulation of skills and 
experience. IT learning is triggered when decision makers 
respond to "errors" in their evolving tactical and action plans, 
which arise not only because of mistakes in the IT strategy, or 
in its implementation to date, but also because technological and 
other changes in the external and internal environment invalidate 
the original assumptions. 
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From both points of view, learning becomes organizational when 
"learning systems" are in place to record what individuals have 
learned in "shared images and maps" [Argyris & Schon, 1978: 
16-17]. The aim of this Component of the Framework is to assist 
in the conscious design and building of formal learning systems, 
through which individual and organizational IT learning will be 
perpetuated and institutionalized in the company [Shrivastava, 
1983: 7]. The learning systems are intended to produce, maintain 
and adapt, on an ongoing basis, the five explicit sets of shared 
images and maps shown in Figure 2: 
The Corporate IT Scenario, 
The IT Positioning Statement, 
The Target Environment Architecture, 
The Master Transition Plan, and 
The Learning Systems themselves. 
It may be noted in passing that the very process of applying IT 
is itself a powerful means of developing decision making 
competence in all four domains (owner, user, developer and 
operator), through the systematic thinking it demands of decision 
makers and through the ability of the technology itself to widen 
the bounds of decision makers• abilities (Section 4.3.III.B.: 
Bakopoulos & Treacy [1985: 4-7]). This "accelerator" effect is a 
major reason why modern information engineering tools for 
software development are so powerful [Martin, 1986]. 
II. PERSPECTIVES OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
Five principal "organizational disciplines" emerge as the subject 
areas of organizational learning. They permeate all Parts of the 
Framework, but are focused in the Components indicated below: 
Organizational Dialectic: This is both a discipline and a 
process in this Framework, and its focus is on the 
dialectical enquiry of the Context Component. 
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Organizational Policy: This is the overall theory and 
practice of business strategy, which covers corporate 
strategy, competitive strategy and organizational design. 
Its focus is on the strategic option generator of the 
Content Component. 
Organizational Design: This is that part of organizational 
policy which can be expanded as a set of architectures for 
IT infrastructure, human systems, information systems and 
human resource development. Its focus is on the Target 
Environment Architecture of the Structure Component. 
Organizational Development: This is a body of behavioural 
science theory and techniques, supporting the orderly 
transformation of the organization through the planned 
transition stages. It is itself a dialectical process, in 
that new kinds of IT and applications expose underlying 
generic organizational structures and bring them into 
contradiction with the existing official forms. Its focus 
is on the transition plans of the Process Component. 
Organizational Learning: This too is both a discipline and 
a process in the present Framework, and its focus is on the 
learning systems of this Component. Organizational IT 
Learning is itself an area for (second-order) learning 
because IT strategy challenges management to rethink, and 
to learn how to rethink, the nature of the business, the 
mission of the company, and the role of the technology. 
Part of the effort will be to dispel the illusion that 
innovation is always something imported from outside the 
company. Every adaptation of strategy, organization or 
plans, however wide or limited the scope of the change, 
represents both innovation and organizational learning. 
Although there are as yet no rigorous theories of organizational 
learning, four distinct and contrasting perspectives have been 
identified by Shrivastava [1983: 9-16], which help in identifying 
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the organizational IT learning systems a company will require. 
Shrivastava•s descriptions of the four perspectives are 
summarized in the following Sections. 
A. Adaptive Behaviour 
In this perspective, organizational learning is seen as the 
adaptive behaviour organizations exhibit over time, in three 
different aspects of strategic decision making: 
Adaptation Qf Ends: Organizations change their planning 
ends (ideals, objectives and goals) on the basis of their 
own and others' experienqe. 
Adaptation in Attention Rules: Organizations change the 
rules by which they selectively attend to some parts of 
their environment and ignore others. 
Adaptation in Search Rules: Organizations change their 
criteria for selecting strategies and evaluating success, 
in the light of their previous successes and failures. 
Individual learning becomes organizational through interactions 
that occur among individuals and organizational subgroups -
workgroups, business units, and the company as a whole. These 
interactions result in two kinds of stress, which stimulate 
learning: 
Performance Stress: This occurs when there is a gap 
between the goals people strive for and the results they 
achieve. For example, Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes [1976: 42] 
note that the competitive mode of strategic behaviour 
(Section 4.3.II.B.2.) is "profit producing" while the 
entrepreneurial mode is "profit absorbing", and that a firm 
is likely to gravitate towards the former so long as it 
thinks the potential of its existing markets is adequate 
for its growth and profit objectives. In such a company, 
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impact IT strategy, with its focus on improved potential 
for future success rather than on immediate success, is 
likely to generate performance stresses. 
Disjunctive Stress: This arises out of contradictions 
among means, ways and ends (Section 4.2.IV.B.l.), and 
conflict among individuals and subgroups. For example, a 
given transition plan may represent an alignment IT 
strategy for some parts of the organization but an impact 
strategy for other parts, thus calling for different 
managerial and technical responses. "Different parts of 
the firm should have different ••• capabilities, depending 
on whether their mission is to support competitive or 
entrepreneurial activities" [Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes, 
1976: 65]. 
Organizational learning occurs through individual, subgroup and 
company-wide adaptation to the contradictions and conflicts 
caused by these stresses. 
In general, the rows and boxes of the strategic option generator 
(Figure 11) are highly interdependent: the choice of strategic . 
target strongly influences, and is strongly influenced by, the 
choice of generic strategy, and so on through the choices of 
mode, level of use, class of use and competitive advantage aimed 
at. While a poorly balanced set of choices will produce an 
infeasible or extremely difficult strategy, a reasonably but not 
ideally balanced set of choices should be expected to generate 
the performance and disjunctive stresses that prompt adaptive 
learning. Everything, however, depends on the decision makers, 
who may 
"l.ack the notivation, the skills am the risk 
propensities not only to plan but to follCM planning with 
aw:ropriate actions. 'Ihe system am the structure [may be] 
geared for carpetitive activities am not capable of rapid 
entrepreneurial response. 'Ihe available infonnation [may 
• 
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be] totally inadequate for generatin;J the needed strategic 
alternatives. 'lhe reward ani value system [may] actually 
pmish, rather than reward, entrepreneurial risk tactics." 
[Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes, 1976: 48] 
The differences between the kinds of strategic challenge, 
organizational response and management attitude associated with 
the two strategic modes, which exemplify the kinds of issue that 
have to be addressed in adaptive learning systems, are summarized 
by Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes [1976: Tables 1, 2 and 3]. 
It should be noted that the term "entrepreneurial" is used in 
three quite different senses in this Framework: 
The entrepreneurial mode as contrasted with the competitive 
mode, in the sense of strategic posture discussed in the 
Content Component (Section 4.3.II.B.2.). 
The entrepreneurial competence of decision makers as 
contrasted with administrative competence, in the sense of 
organizational capability discussed in the Context 
Component (Section 4.2.I.). 
The corporate "entrepreneurial spirit", a synonym for 
intra-organizational innovation in the sense used by Kanter 
(Section 4.6.IV.B.). 
These differences of usage need not problematical. They 
underline the organizational (i.e. participative/collaborative) 
character of successful strategic IT decision making. Kept 
clearly in mind, they can lead to fruitful debate of congruities 
and contradictions as amongst strategic posture, distinctive 
competence and organizational climate. Kanter found in the 
companies she studied that 
"there are marked differences in how much the 
entrepreneurial spirit flourishes in different 
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envil:ornoonts. • • • '!here are alloost twice as many 
well-regarded nanage:rs am professionals in any :fur¥::ticmal. 
area carryin;J out innovative projects in finns dlaracter-
ized by integrative practices as in those emibitirg too 
l1l.1d1 segnent:alism • • • 'Ihe envil::amelt DDre than the 
persa1 makes the biggest differeooe in the level of 
inoovative managerial activity. Imividual differenoes 
play a role only when the oatpany' s environment d..iscx:m:ages 
initiative am innavatiat. 11 [Kanter, 1983: 211] 
B. Developing a Knowledge Base 
In this perspective, the organization is seen as a system of 
purposeful activities engaged in co-ordinated transformation 
processes (i.e. production functions or value chains) that turn 
sets of inputs into outputs. The success of the organization -
competitive position, organizational effectiveness and congruency 
(Section 4.3.IV.C.) - is a function of its long-term directional 
choices, its choices of transformation processes, and its 
supporting administrative structures. Rational choices are based 
on prior knowledge about the relationships between organiza~ional 
actions and outcomes, and hence success is qualified by the 
knowledge available to the organization for making crucial 
choices. 
Learning becomes organizational when knowledge about the 
action-outcome relationships and the factors that affect them -
indeed, the context, content, structure, process and learning 
components of strategic decisions - induces relatively permanent 
changes in individual and sub-group behaviours, across the entire 
organization. The required organizational IT learning systems 
must, therefore, contribute to the company-wide knowledge base 
that makes these changes feasible. 
The five explicit sets of shared images and maps constitute 
precisely such a knowledge base. Through them, knowledge is 
distributed across the organization, is communicable among 
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decision makers, has consensual validity, is incremental, and is 
integrated into the generic processes and administrative 
structures of the organization. 
c. Institutionalized Experience 
This view of organizational learning is based on the theory of 
learning curve effects, and its generalization by the Boston 
Consulting Group into the theory of experience curves (Robinson, 
1986: Ch. 9]. The importance of learning curve and experience 
curve effects in other parts of the Framework has already been 
noted - in creating sustainable competitive advantage (Section 
4.3.II.B.2.), in IT positioning (Section 4-.J.IV.A.), and in the 
:creation of operating synergy (Section 4.3.IV.C.). 
The strategic IT decision makers gain vital knowledge and 
experience through their participation in successive cycles of 
dialectical debate, through their work in formulating IT 
scenarios, positioning statements and architectures, and through 
formulating and implementing strategic thrusts and transition 
plans. The competence they gain in any given transition stage 
positions them, as a group, to plan and carry out future stages 
better. The crucial point is that the gain be collective - that 
it represent better organizational knowledge and anticipation of 
the environment, both internal and external, better understanding 
and utilization of the generic processes of the organization, and 
a growing ability to overcome resistance to change in official 
organizational structures. 
It follows that important requirements of the learning systems, 
if individual learning is to become organizational, are: 
That the competence gained be relevant and transferable 
across different groups of decision makers in the company, 
and over time. 
That there be a means of evaluating the cumulative gain at 
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any point in time, so that transition stages will not be 
attempted that require competences the organization does 
not yet possess. 
That there be a means of minimizing the attrition of 
competences through inappropriate career development of 
critical decision makers or their avoidable departure from 
the company. 
D. Assumption Sharing 
Since this is the main perspective of organizational learning 
underpinning this Framework, and it is referred to many times in 
the other Components, its general definition is given in the 
organizational learning entry in the Glossary (Appendix C). 
Three levels of learning are shown in Figure 3 and discussed in 
Section 4.1.III.D.3. - single-loop, double-loop, and second-order 
learning. The latter two are the levels at which IT learning 
becomes effectively organizational. 
Most organizations contain what Argyris & Schon [1978: Ch. 5] 
call "Model 0-I limited learning systems", and these inhibit 
double-loop and second-order learning through the kinds of 
"action strategies" induced by their governing variables. The 
three governing variables of Model 0-I learning systems are: 
"Define goals and try to achieve them"; "Maximize winning and 
minimize losing; "Minimize generating or expressing negative 
feelings". Typical of the inhibitory action strategies they 
engender are: 
Design and manage the environment unilaterally - instead of 
arguing your case logically, appeal persuasively to higher 
order goals. 
Own and control the task - be the guardian of its 
definition and execution. 
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Unilaterally protect yourself - speak in inferred 
categories accompanied by little or no data: reduce 
incongruity by defensive actions such as blaming, 
stereotyping, suppressing feelings, intellectualizing. 
Unilaterally protect others from being hurt - withhold or 
censor information, hold private meetings. 
Double-loop and second-order learning require what Arqyris & 
Schon [1978: Part III] call "Model O-Il learning systems". 
"If we cn:e interested in overcani.rg the forces that 
inhibit double-loop leam:inj, we ImJSt seek another leam:inj 
system. But if our assertion that JOOSt organizations 
a:mtai.n Q-I leam:inj systems is valid, arrl if Model Q-I 
leaznfnJ systems deter the creation of new leami.rg systems 
that :nm counter to their basic strucblre, then the new 
1eaznfnJ system is not likely to be fOUI'rl by lookiig at the 
lll10rld as it presently exists. '!he creation of Model-II 
will therefore have to be a rare event. Rare events cannot 
be created without a map that describes the new territory." 
[Argyris & Schon, 1978: 130] 
The three governing variables of Model-II learning systems are 
[Arqyris & Schon, 1978: 137]: "Valid information"; "Free and 
informed choice"; "Internal commitment to the choice and constant 
monitoring of the implementations". Typical action strategies 
that flow from such governing variables are: 
Design situations or encounters where the participants 
themselves originate the information and have a strong 
sense of ca~sing the actions. 
Let each task be controlled jointly by the relevant 
participants. 
Arrange matters sd that protection of self is a joint 
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enterprise and oriented towards development and growth. 
Let protection of others be a bilateral or multilateral 
responsibility. 
Like the other constructs of the target environment, effective 
organizational systems for double-loop and second-order learning 
systems cannot be accomplished in just one transition stage. 
Time, patience and expert intervention are all necessary. 
Argyris & Schon (1977: Parts III and IV] provide extensive 
descriptions of interventions aimed at building Model o-II 
learning systems, which can readily be adapted to become part of 
an IT management strategy. A concise description of the two 
Models is given by Argyris (1977]. 
Salaway (1987] reports the results of a study of user/developer 
interaction in a system development project, where a new "Model 2 
interaction methodology" successfully generated more valid 
information with increased detection of errors. 
III. STAGES OF COMPANY DEVELOPMENT 
It would be a corollary of any dialectical approach to strategic 
decision making that the organization will pass through succeed-
ing stages of development,-contradiction and conflict, and 
further development, in its progress towards the target environ-
ment. This is made explicit in the present Framework through the 
concepts.of strategic thrusts and transition stages, against the 
background of incremental implementation and learning loops. 
At the same time, researchers and theorists in the fields of both 
business strategy and IT management have claimed that companies 
pass through historical stages of development, which are the 
inevitable consequences rather than planned elements of the 
strategies they actually carry out. When customizing and 
instantiating this Framework for use in a specific company, 
decision makers will have to enquire whether and how the 
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postulated historical stages of development affect the 
formulation and implementation of their company's IT strategy -
in particular, the selection and timing of transition stages and 
the development of learning systems. 
A. Stages in the Business Domain 
Historical stages of development, if they are significant for a 
given company or its industry, will affect the determination of 
the strategic purposes and uses of IT, and the corresponding 
competences needed in the four decision making domains. They 
should, therefore, be taken into account in the dialectical 
debate of the Context Component and in the strategic option 
generator of the Content Component. The results of the analysis 
should be reflected in the Corporate IT Scenario and the IT 
Positioning Statement. 
The following Sections describe three different views of 
historical development. 
1. Phases in the Utilization of Resources 
In his study of the history of American industrial enterprises, 
Chandler [1962] came to the conclusion that: 
; . 
"If the need to use resources provided the dynamic force 
that dlanJed st:n.Icture am strategy, the nature of the 
invesblert: in these :resources helped to detennine the 
c:nn:se am di.recti.on of grcMth am of subsequent structural 
dlarqe. '!he type of i.rwestment, in tmn, deperrled on the 
tedmology of production am the techniques of marketing of 
the :intividual cx::xnpani.es' original product line or lines. 
Finally, the rate of grcMth am the effectiveness in the 
use of the ente.tprise • s resources rested on the injemrlty 
anj ability Of its administrators II [Olarrll.er, 1962: 
384] 
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This Framework is specifically concerned with the use of IT as a 
dynamic force changing the structure and strategy of a company. 
It .is on the type of IT investment in the value chain, on the 
particular way in which the relations of production are changed, 
and on the ingenuity and ability of the available strategic IT 
decision makers, that the success of a company's IT strategy will 
depend. Chandler went on to describe four historical phases in 
the acquisition and use of resources by a growing company: 
n ... the initial expansion an:l aOCUl'llllation of resources; 
the rationalization of the use of resoorces; the expansion 
into new markets an:1 lines to help assure the cxmtinuirg 
full use of resources; an:l finally the develq:m:mt of a new 
structure to make possible continuing effective 
nmilization of resources to meet both c.hanJin:J short-tenn 
market demarrls an:l long-tenn market trems. Al:thoogh eadl 
oarpany had a distinct an:l unique histocy, nearly all 
followed alon;J this general pattern." [Clla.rrll.er, 1962: 
385] 
Wiseman [1985: 44-47] describes how the use of the strategic 
option generator will vary in these phases of resource 
utilization. During the first phase (accumulation of resources), 
for example, the likely strategic thrusts are growth and 
alliance, while during the second phase (rationalization of 
resources) they are likely to be cost leadership and innovation. 
It would be part of the meta- and macro-architectural analysis of 
the human resource dimension (Section 4.4.V.) to determine the 
kinds of decision making competence that will be required in each 
of the four decision making domains, in each of the four phases, 
and hence the kinds of learning system required. 
It will probably also be found that the responsibilities of 
certain domains are more prominent in some phases than in 
others. For example, it may be found that the responsibilities 
of owners are most prominent in the first and third phases 
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(initial business needs for IT, and expansion into new purposes 
and uses): developer responsibilities in the first, third and 
fourth phases (initial applications and infrastructure, 
development into new application areas and infrastructure 
requirements, and (re)development of mature strategic business 
systems and integrated company-wide IT infrastructure); and user 
and operator responsibilities in the second and fourth stages 
(rationalization of resource usage and controls, and the ongoing 
delivery and mature usage of integrated human and information 
systems). 
If the transition stages of the IT strategy are'consciously 
mapped onto a company's expected future phases of resource 
acquisition and utilization, it may well be found that the 
expected shifts in domain responsibilities are significant enough 
to justify the use of concepts like "driving force" and "driving 
function". For example, the driving force in a certain stage may 
be the development of new markets, with marketing and distribu-
tion as the driving functions. In another stage it may be volume 
production, with manufacturing or delivery as driving functions. 
Value chain analysis will provide specific keys to the IT 
infrastructure and systems (Section 4.4.III.), and hence to the 
learning systems, demanded by different driving forces and 
functions. More general guidelines to the shifts in emphasis and 
approach that will be required when driving forces and functions 
change can be obtained from sources such as Ansoff [1987], Robert 
[1983] and Tregoe & Zimmermann [1980]. Indeed, part of the 
learning problem would be to generate understanding and 
acceptance of the fact that the focal points of the IT strategy 
can and probably will change as the transition stages unfold. 
"A key feature of strategic orientation - am a difficult 
one to introduce into a finn- is the dispassionate view of 
the finn • s historical successes: a preparedness to abarrlon 
'sticld.n:J to the knitti.n)'' in favor of 'bein:J were the 
action is • . " Ansoff [ 1987] 
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2. From Competitive to Entrepreneurial Mode 
A shift from the competitive mode to the entrepreneurial mode 
(Section 4.3.II.B.2.), and hence from alignment to impact IT 
strategy, is not always a clear-cut choice between one strategic 
posture and another. It has already been suggested (Section 
4.6.II.A.) that what is seen as competitive behavior in one part 
of the organization may seem entrepreneurial in another. 
Moreover, 
"in practice one firrls variation of behavioor within each 
JOOde: canpetitive behavioor varies fran no-holds-barred, 
all-out aggressive OClll'petition to bureaucratic 
unresponsiveness to custaners of established tronc:polies; 
entrepreneurial behavioor ran:Jes fran reluctant ilnitatian 
of canpetitors • new products to a ex>nti..nuin;J stream of 
innovations." [Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes, 1976: 48] 
Recognizing that a transformation of the strategic posture of a 
company is "not only a cognitive-logical problem, but also a 
psychological-social process", Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes [1976: 
68, 72] offer a comprehensive framework for planning the 
"dynamics of posture transformation" that rests on the same 
commitment to "directed incrementalism", which they call the 
"planning-learning process", as the present Framework. 
Their diagnostic and prescriptive tables assume four different 
sets of environmental and planning conditions, Stable, Reaction, 
Anticipation, and Interaction, which correspond to Ackoff's 
planning orientations, Inactive, Reactive, Preactive and 
Interactive (Section 4.1.III.A.). They explicitly map these 
conditions to industry and product life cycle stages, which 
allows the issues of posture transformation to be taken into 
account in the IT Positioning Statement (Section 4.3.IV.A.) 
Separate tables are presented for each of the two strategic 
postures - competitive mode and entrepreneurial mode - and taken 
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together they can be used to identify contradictions, errors and 
the conditions for error in current development plans. The 
purpose of the analysis would be to help in specifying learning 
system requirements according to the two modes, and to the need 
to transform the organization (or a sub-group) from one mode to 
the other if this is necessary to make a particular IT strategy 
feasible. 
3. Evolution of the Planning System 
A third view of historical development in the business domain is 
provided by Gluck, Kaufman & Walleck's (1980] description of the 
evolution of corporate planning systems. The particular emphasis 
is on companies whose managers are willing to restructure the 
organization to create successful plans. They identify four 
phases of evolution, and the value system on which each is based: 
Phase Value System 
Basic Financial Planning Meeting the budget. 
Forecast-Based Planning Predicting the future. 
Externally-Orientated Planning Thinking strategically. 
Strategic Management Creating the future. 
The value of this view lies in the insights it provides into the 
different kinds of planning process that are likely to be 
encountered andjor required in the different stages of historical 
development. Raphael (1986], for example, describes the 
evolution of strategic decision making at Bank of America in 
terms of this model. 
such a view, together with careful analysis of the organizational 
linkages between different components of the planning process 
along lines such as those suggested by Miesing [1984], can help 
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in planning the transformations of internal planning processes 
that will be required as the IT management strategy unfolds. 
In particular, it can provide guidelines for the development over 
time of the Information Technology Support Organization (ITSO) 
itself (Sections 4.4.II.B.5. and 4.4.V.C.2.), which from the 
point of view of this Framework is the single most important 
element of the corporate planning process. Both the planned 
transition stages, and changing environmental pressures in 
different stages of company history, must be expected to induce 
changes in the strategic role of the ITSO, and this is a major 
issue for many researchers and theorists (e.g. Advanced Systems 
Inc. [Course 5060]: Johnston & Carrico [1988]: McFarlan and 
McKenney (1983]: Metz [1986]: Nolan (1985]: Reynolds (1985]). 
Once again, these historical stages of development can be taken 
' 
into account in the IT Positioning Statement, in this case 
through the medium of the "IT strategy evaluation grid" (Section 
4.3.IV.A.: Figure 12). The idea would be to determine whether or 
not the Box in which the company is, or wishes to be, is 
congruent with the evolutionary phase of planning the ITSO has, 
or will have, reached. Mismatches would indicate the learning 
and adaptation still required. The following examples are 
intended to suggest the kind of thinking involved, and make no 
claim to empirical or theoretical validity. They are set against 
the background of Gluck, Kaufman & Walleck's (1980: 157] chart of 
the four evolutionary stages of corporate planning. 
Support Box: This Box may be deemed to correspond to the 
Basic Financial Planning phase. The planning focus would 
appropriately fall on cost-cutting, in both the management 
and the application of IT. The ITSO would help establish 
criteria for minimum costs, projects on time and within 
budget, and so forth. 
Factory Box: Because the major requirement is good support 
of current business systems, the ITSO focus remains on 
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cost-cutting and efficiency, but with additional emphasis 
on capacity management and the prediction of future 
business volumes. The corresponding evolutionary phase may 
be deemed to be Forecast-Based Planning. 
Turnaround Box: As the company and its ITSO are required 
to become increasingly sensitive to market needs and the 
activities of the competition, the emphasis shifts to 
Externally-orientated Planning. The ITSO role evolves from 
passive "computer support" to active participation in the 
evaluation of strategic alternatives. New technological 
roles also emerge, e.g. the provision of end-user computing 
facilities and technical support for non-technical users of 
microcomputers 
Strategic Box: The orchestration of IT resources to create 
significant and sustained competitive advantage for the 
company suggests that the corresponding planning phase is 
Strategic Management. The ITSO assists in equipping the 
company with a formal strategic IT planning framework, 
establishing creative, flexible planning processes, and 
generating a business vision for IT and a supportive value 
system and climate. 
This view of the evolution of internal planning processes can be 
used dialectically, to expose contradictions between stated 
planning aims and actual planning processes, and to help in 
achieving congruency between company development and decision 
maker development. For example, the temporal sequence of 
strategic boxes implied by conventional product/business life 
cycle analysis (Section 4.3.IV.A.) is not the same as that 
implied by Gluck, Kaufman and Walleck's evolutionary phases of 
corporate planning, and the implications of this disparity must 
be investigated. King's [1983(1)] framework for evaluating a 
company's strategic planning system provides a practical and 
comprehensive means of doing this. 
-
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B. Stages in the IT Domain 
The above three views of historical stages of development reveal 
a sequence in the analysis of learning system requirements, from 
the evolution of the overall business strategy, through the 
evolution of the internal planning environment, to the evolution 
of the planning processes. Following this theme, the next step 
would be to enquire into the existence of historical stages of 
development within the Information Technology Support 
Organization itself. 
1. The Nolan Stages Theory 
Nolan, Norton & Company have built a very successful world-wide 
consultancy and education practice on the proposition that there 
are indeed overall stages of maturity in the IT management 
functions of a company. Their model has itself evolved,-from an 
original "hypothesis" of four stages [Gibson & Nolan, 1974; 
Nolan, 1973] to the six-stage learning curve and "recharting 
framework" underlying the modern practice [Advanced Systems, 
Inc., Courses 5051 and 5053]. 
Version of the Stages Theory 
Stage 1974 1975 1979 1983 
1 Initiation Initiation Initiation Initiation 
2 Expansion Contagion Contagion Contagion 
3 Formalization Control Control Control 
4 Maturity Integration Integration Integration 
5 Data Admin. Architecture 
6 Maturity Demassing 
The meaning of the various stages is well-documented in readily 
accessible sources [e.g. Advanced Systems, Inc., Course 5051; 
Gibson & Nolan, 1974; Nolan, 1973; Nolan, 1982]. The 1983 
version of the model consists of two s-shaped learning curves 
corresponding to the first three and the latter three stages, 
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separated by a "technological discontinuity". These are intended 
to represent two eras in the evolution of a company, "The Data 
Processing Era" and "The Era of the Advanced Stages". 
'"'he nature of the disoonti.nu.ity between the two eras has 
been the subject of orqoin;J research. Recent ev:iden:Je 
in:li.cates that failure to oarplete stage III of growth 
results in a lllldl 100re proi'DJIX:led discantinuity between the 
two curves. If stage III maturity is l'XJt reached, the 
seoorrl growth cw:ve will begin lower than the first one. 
In this case, there is a short period of decline before 
growth can continue into stage IV. 11 [Mvanoed Systems IIX::. , 
Course 5051: 7] 
The six stages arise out of four underlying "growth processes" 
[Advanced Systems Inc., Course 5051: 8-9; Nolan, 1979: Exhibit 
1], which can be mapped to the present Framework as follows: 
Applications Portfolio: This corresponds to the human and 
information systems dimensions of the Target Environment 
Architecture. The portfolio progresses from the automation 
of simple tasks - typically functional cos·t reduction - in 
stage 1 to integrated applications that "mirror" the 
information flows of the organization in the advanced 
stages. 
The Users: This corresponds to the human resources 
dimension of the architecture. User participation evolves 
from the "hands off" climate of Stage 1 to the acceptance 
of joint business and IT responsibility for IT strategy in 
the advanced stages. 
The Resources: This corresponds to the IT infrastructure 
dimension of the architecture. Planning and control of IT 
resources evolves from "lax" in the first two stages, 
through a period of management reaction with tight 
controls, to strategic IT and data resource planning in the 
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advanced stages. 
The Management: IT management evolves from a highly 
specialized approach geared to technological learning in 
Stage 1, to the company-wide participative IT decision 
making envisaged in this Framework, in the advanced stages. 
The Holan stages theory has two broad areas of application in the 
present Framework: 
' 
Evaluation: It can be used to evaluate the readiness of a 
company and its strategic IT decision makers for a 
contemplated IT strategy, or for one of the transition 
stages. The evaluation would be carried out in terms of 
.. benchmarks" formulated according to the underlying growth 
processes [Nolan, 1979: Exhibit V; Nolan, 1982: Ch. 10]. 
Criteria such as those used by Benbasat, Dexter, Drury & 
Goldstein [1984: Table 1] and Drury [1983: Tables 2 & 3] in 
their empirical critiques of the Nolan stage theory can 
equally well be used by strategic IT decision makers to 
instantiate the benchmarks for their own companies. 
King's (1988] framework for evaluating a company's 
information systems planning effort provides a practical 
and comprehensive means of putting an evaluation into 
practice. 
Prescription: As a prescriptive tool, the stages theory 
assists in determining the gap between the capability 
required for a given transition stage and the capability 
the company currently possesses, and hence where the 
current focus of the organizational IT learning systems 
should be placed. In particular, it would be used to 
determine the work that has yet to be done to complete 
Stage 3 maturity, and to "re-chart" for the advanced stages 
[Advanced Systems Inc., Courses 5051 and 5053]. 
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Other ITSO growth models have been proposed, which are more 
specific than the Nolan stages theory. These are useful in their 
own right, in respect of the specialized areas they address. 
Taken together, they can be used dialectically to investigate 
mismatches and contradictions among the different internal growth 
processes they describe. Examples of these other growth models 
are described in the following Sections. 
2. The Maturity of Capacity Planning 
Artis [1985] contends that, typically, the capacity planning 
process of a company evolves through five stages: 
Stage 1 - Vendor Capacity Planning: The successful 
supplier, after carrying out the company's first step in 
capacity planning, i.e. sizing its first computer ~ystem, 
usually goes on to provide further system sizing as part of 
its ongoing marketing effort. 
Stage z - Special Studies: Individuals in the data 
processing department are periodically assigned to conduct 
capacity studies for special purposes. 
Stage ~ - Technician: This stage is dominated by capacity 
planning technicians and their tools, and is usually the 
most expensive stage. Because the technicians often do not 
communicate very well with end users, they tend to have few 
political ties and poor understanding of the organization. 
"At its height, the third stage is characterized by 
serious contradictions. On the one han:l, oorporate 
managers worry that they aren •t reoeivin;J appropriate 
infonnation, despite significant expentitures for 
staff an:l tools. On the other han:l, the capacity 
planners are confused as to \tiDy oorporate decision 
makers are ignorin;J the SOl.1lXl technical arguments they 
have provided." [Artis, 1985: 55]. 
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Stage 4 - Organizational Development: Capacity planners 
transfer their focus from tools to end-user requirements, 
reporting and communications. Their efforts are now 
synchronized with the budget cycle so that their 
recommendations can be integrated with the company's 
financial plans. 
'"'he fourth stage ems lil41en the oozporate decisioo 
makers c:x:.me to vierw the capacity plarmirq as a 
reliable am essential i.np.It to their decision JDakinj 
process. Today, only a small fractioo of 
installations can be said to be in the fourth stage." 
[Artis, 1985: 56] 
Stage 2 - Mature: Senior corporate management have 
confidence in the capacity planners and perceive their 
results as essential to their decision making process. 
3. The Maturity of Applications Development 
Albrecht [1983(1)] has developed an "AD/M Maturity Grid" for 
measuring the maturity of the applications maintenance and 
development functions in a company. This tool would be useful at 
the macro- and micro-architectural levels, when design and 
development intentions become specific. It is based on Crosby's 
[1979: 38-39] "Quality Management Grid", and produces a profile 
of four categories: management; resources; processes, standards 
and guidelines; tools and techniques. Each category is evaluated 
on an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, with checkpoints characterized by 
the Crosby stages of quality management maturity: "Uncertainty", 
"Awakening", "Enlightenment", "Wisdom" and "Maturity". 
"If you would like to use the Grid to canpare 
different operations, keep in :min:i that the puxpose of 
cx:xrparisons is to get those m:win3' Who aren't m:win3'. 
It is not sinply to report the results." [Crosby, 
1979: 37] 
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4. Stages of Growth in Office Information Systems 
Building on the Nolan stages theory and work by Zisman [1978], 
Hirscbheim (1983] proposes a 5-stage theory of growth to help 
organizations develop strategies for electronic office 
• information systems. Hirschheim•s model includes the same three 
early stages as the Nolan model, but only two advanced stages, 
i.e. integration ~nd maturity. There is no discussion of a 
discontinuity between the early stages and the advanced stages. 
The model can be modified to take into account the strategic 
posture of a company since, according to Hirschheim, the shape of 
the 5-stage learning curve will depend on management's decision 
making approach: Procrastination, Learning or Innovation. These 
postures can in turn be related to the classes of environmental 
and planning conditions postulated by Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes: 
Stable/Reaction, Anticipation and Interaction as underlying the 
competitive and entrepreneurial modes of strategic behaviour 
(Section 4.6.III.A.2.). 
IV. LEARNING AND INNOVATION 
A. Learning Systems 
Two broad classes of learning system can be identified: 
EXPlicit Learning Systems: These provide the requisite 
education and training, according to formal capability 
development plans. Ansoff, DeClerck & Hayes (1976: 55-65] 
provide a conceptual framework that can be adapted to the 
purpose of diagnosing the "capability transformation" a 
company will require to carry out its IT strategy, and of 
phasing formal capability development plans into the 
transition stages. Bearing in mind that, in the present 
Framework, a fundamental objective of the learning systems 
must be to develop an interactive planning orientation 
within the company (Section 4.1.III.A.), a list of "desired 
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managerial capabilities" can be determined, according to: 
Strategic posture - competitive, or entrepreneurial, 
or transition from competitive to entrepreneurial. 
Planning orientation - reactive, inactive, preactive 
or already interactive, and the transition from the 
current orientation to interactive. 
Timing of the learning - technical precedences arising 
out of the nature of the education and training to be 
provided, as well as strategic priorities arising out 
of the requirements of the Master Transition Plan. 
Implicit Learning Systems: These are the organizational 
relationships, control systems, corporate cultural values 
and campaigns, and other features of general organizational 
life that provide situational and experiential learning -
for example, through participation in decision making 
processes. 
"A major e;rtp"lasis in the transfonnation plan must be 
on the interrelation of the strategy arrl capability 
processes. Certain elements of the transfonnation can 
be the natural outcome of strategy~ing activities 
(personal skill, team work, infonnation) • 'Ihus an 
approadl of cllan;Jing capabilities by doing strategic 
work is attractive, particularly since it ~ines arrl 
interrelates the cognitive process of planning with 
the SCX:::io-dynami.CS Of I llrplementation I • II (Ansoff I 
DeClerck & Hayes, 1976: 64] 
Good organizational dialectic is the main vehicle of 
implicit learning systems. It contributes to the 
management of disjunctive stress - for example, as between 
users or operators and the business systems within which 
they are expected to work (reduction of alienation), and as 
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among the decision making domains, the levels of 
participation, the workgroups, and the business units 
(reduction of conflict) - and of performance stress -
through clear definition of ends and expectations, and 
through analysis and resolution of contradictions. 
The principal factors in the design of learning systems that 
emerge from the review of perspectives and stages of learning 
(Sections 4.6.II. and III.) may be summarized as a set of "design 
parameters" as follows: 
Organizational Disciplines: dialectic, strategy, design, 
development, and learning. 
Organizational Levels: individual, work-group, business 
unit and company. 
Aspects of Adaptation: ends, attention rules, search 
rules. 
Stimuli for Adaptive Learning: performance stress and 
disjunctive stress. 
Historical Stages of Company Development: the maturity of 
resource utilization, the intensity of interaction with the 
environment, the evolution of company planning. 
Stages of Maturity in IT Decision Making: Nolan and others. 
The Formal Knowledge Base.: five sets of shared images and 
maps - the Corporate IT Scenario, the IT Positioning 
Statement, the Target Environment Architecture, the Master 
Transition Plan, the Learning Systems. 
Requirements for Collective Comoetence: relevant and 
transferable experience: evaluation of the cumulative gain 
in competence: controlling the attrition of competences. 
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LeVels of Incremental Strategy Implementation: meta-. 
architectural, macro-architectural, micro-architectural. 
LeVels of Learning: second-order, double-loop and 
single-loop. 
Classes of Organizational Learning System: Model 0-I and 
Model 0-II, each with characteristic governing variables 
and action strategies. 
Two fundamental objectives that should be kept in mind when 
designing organizational IT learning systems are: 
To ensure that individual learning does in fact take 
place. This will involve the development of initiative and 
innovativeness in general, for example, through lateral 
thinking skills (De Bono, 1970], as well in particular 
innovation skills, for example "system builders", "loss 
cutters", "socially conscious pioneers", "sensitive readers 
of early warning signals" (Kanter, 1983: 210]. 
To ensure that individual learning does in fact become 
organizational. This will require that individuals, acting 
as the learning agents of the organization, recognize and 
respond to learning situations, and record the relevant and 
transferable parts of what they have learned in the shared 
images and maps. 
From this point of view, the problem of ensuring individual and 
organizational IT learning can be seen as part of the two more 
general problems: that of managing innovation and innovators 
within the context of a given, ongoing organization; and that of 
assimilating innovations into the fabric of that organization 
(Figure 4). These are discussed in the following Sections. 
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B. Innovation 
Kanter's [1983: Part Four] process and architecture for 
"corporate innovation", i.e. intra-organizational innovation, 
exemplifies the approach needed in the present Framework: 
"'lhese •new entrepreneurs' do mt start blsinesses; they 
:i:nprove them. 'lhey p.1Sh the creation of new products, lead 
the develcpnent of new production tedmology, or experiment 
with new, m:>re humanly responsive lto10rk practices." [Kanter, 
1983: 210] 
Focusing on the political and cultural aspects of change 
management, Kanter describes three major sets of skill 
requirements: the power skills needed to form coalitions and to 
get ideas accepted and resources committed; the skills needed to 
resolve the dilemmas of participative decision making; and the 
skills needed to re-architect the culture of the organization. 
Power Skills: Since innovative accomplishments change 
existing organizational structures and jobs to bring new 
capability to the organization, they entail disruption of 
existing activities and redirection of human energies. 
"Arrl change, no matter heM desired or desirable, 
requires that new agreements be negotiated am tools 
for action be fOl.D'Xl beyom what it takes to do the 
rootine jab, to maintain already established 
strategies am processes .••• However differently they 
start, oo:rporate entrepreneurs soon fini that they 
have sanethi.rg in c:x:mtDn: the need to exercise skills 
in cbtai.ni.rg am usin} power in order to ac::xx:mplish 
innovation." [Kanter, 1983: 212-213] 
Particular power skills include: 
Gathering the information and agreeing the problem 
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definition, to arrive at "saleable" innovations. 
Coalition building - gaining senior management 
approval "in principle"; pre-selling; creating 
--
"cheerleaders";·horse trading; and, once resources and 
support are in hand, formalizing the arrangements for 
continuing participation of the key supporters. 
Mobilization of the action phase - team building; 
handling opposition and blocking interference; 
maintaining momentum; rule changing, bending and 
breaking as needed; "managing the press"; and 
delivering on promises. 
Corporate entrepreneurs cannot be "solo artists". They 
produce their innovative achievements through working in 
collaborative/participative fashion with other highly 
talented artists - persuading much more than ordering, team 
building, seeking input from others, showing sensitivity to 
the interests of others, and, last but not least, sharing 
the rewards and recognition [Kanter, 1983: 237]. 
Dilemmas of Participation: 
'"'he integrative, participative vehicles surrotll'Xiin;J 
innovators - open ccmnunication, interdeperrlent 
responsibilities, frequent team efforts -keep theJ:n 
close to the JXJWer sources they need to operate, 
ensuring aCXJesS to infonnation, resources, am the 
support needed for inplemantation. 11 [Kanter, 1983: 
241] 
Participation can be overdone, and the innovative spirit 
can be smothered in steering committees, task forces, 
quality circles, and an endless variety of other meetings. 
Even when it is not overdone, participation creates 
problems of its own which have to be managed along with the 
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problems of innovation itself. Kanter describes in detail 
six broad classes of dilemma in managing participation: 
dilemmas of beginning; dilemmas of structure and 
management; dilemmas of choice of issue; dilemmas of 
teamwork; dilemmas of linking teams to their environment; 
and dilemmas of evaluation. 
Architecture of CUlture and Strategy Change: Precisely the 
same problem that arises in IT strategy research (Section 
J.II.A.) and in the analysis of the strategic planning 
environment (Section 4.2.III.A.) arises as a fundamental 
issue in the management of intra-organizational innovation 
- that of unravelling and re-synthesizing "fact, fiction 
and the fact of fiction". 
"All the pieces can be right - new product 
prototypes already test-marketed, new work methods 
neasured arrl fourrl effective, new systens arrl 
structures piloted in local areas - arrl still an 
organization can fail to inco:rporate them into new 
responses to charxJing demarrls. • • • '!he ultimate skill 
for change mastery works on [the] larger context 
surrounii.n;J the innovation p~. It ex>nsists of 
the ability to conceive, construct arrl ex>nvert into 
behavior a new view of organizational reality." 
[Kanter, 1983: 278-279] 
In other words, the over-arching skill is the ability to 
identify and synthesize decision makers' assumptions, and 
to develop from them an effective, shared vision of the 
business, as described in the Context and Content 
Components. Kanter [1983: 281] goes so far as to say that 
organizational change is stimulated not so much by the 
pressures of the environment resulting per se in a buildup 
of problems that triggers an automatic response, as by the 
perceptions of environmental pressures held by key decision 
makers. Furthermore, a company with a diverse group in the 
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"dominant coalition" of decision makers is likely to pick 
up on more external cues than a company with a smaller, 
more homogeneous set of top decision makers, or with a 
single sub-group having disproportionate power to dictate 
the focuses of attention. 
"Innavatioo ard c::har¥}e [therefore] are ba.m:i up with 
the meanin;Js attadled to events ard the action 
possibilities that flow fran those me.anin]s. But that 
very reoognition- of the syntx>lic, oonceptual, 
cultural side of charge -makes it IID:re difficult to 
see charge as a mechanical process ard extract the 
"formula" for prcxluci.rg it." [Kanter, 1983: 281] 
The architecture of culture and strategy change requires an 
awareness of foundations and beginnings [Kanter, 1983: 283] 
- the prehistory of events, both positive and negative, in 
which "changes really start". It also requires an 
acceptance of the fact that part of the innovation process 
is the "rewriting of corporate history": individual 
initiatives will disappear into collective achievements: 
early events and people will disappear into the background 
as later events and people come forward; conflicts will 
disappear into consensuses - the organizational memory 
cannot afford grudges: equally plausible alternatives will 
disappear into obvious choices: accidents, uncertainties 
and muddle-headed confusions will disappear into 
clear-sighted strategies: multiple events will coalesce 
into single thematic events: and the fragility of changes, 
which start as contradictions with the residues of older 
organizational forms, disappears into solidarity and full 
realization. 
"Organizational charge cxmsists in part of a series 
of emergi.rg constn.tctions of reality, includ.i.rg 
revision of the past, to corresponi to the requisites 
of new players ard new demarrls." [Kanter, 1983: 287] 
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Kanter [1983: 287-303] goes on to describe in detail five 
highly inter-dependent building blocks present in all 
productive corporate changes: departures from tradition; 
crises or galvanizing events; strategic decisions and the 
integrative systems they depend on; individual "prime 
movers"; and action vehicles. Binding all of these, are 
the "visions and blueprints of change masters". 
In addition to Kanter's three sets of skill requirements, insight 
is needed into the dynamics through which individual learning and 
innovativeness can become institutionalized as organizational 
learning and corporate innovation. One approach to gaining this 
insight is through Lessem•s [1984] "spectral theory", which can 
be adapted as shown in Figure 25. Seven levels of individual 
learning are identified in the .first column of the Figure. 
Working from bottom to top, these can be described in terms of 
increasing levels of IT decision maker development as follows: 
Action: The ability to develop, use or operate parts of the 
IT infrastructure and strategic business systems, with 
little or no need for insight into the overall rationale of 
the target environment. 
Skill: A higher level of ability in developing, using or 
operating infrastructure and business systems, requiring 
certain personal knowledge, skills and attitudes, and 
insight into the rationale of some part or aspect of the 
target environment. 
Knowledge: The ability to analyze the strategic uses of IT 
and to develop, use or operate infrastructure and business 
systems accordingly. 
Will: The ability to analyze the strategic purposes of IT 
and to commission, develop, use or operate infrastructure 
and business systems to meet those purposes. 
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Concept: The ability to conceptualize the generic 
strategies, structures and processes of an organization, 
and to (re)direct the appropriate purposes and uses of IT. 
Meaning: The ability to understand political, social and 
economic context and role of the enterprise, and how these 
can be translated into a successful, growing company. 
Creativity: The ability to articulate a business vis'ion 
and mission for the enterprise, to communicate it to 
others, and to ensure that it is translated into effective 
strategies, structures, processes, IT infrastructure and 
strategic business systems. 
According to Lessem (1984: 2~], the organizational process of 
innovation can be considered as "learning in reverse" - it starts 
with the creative idea and ends with a physical product. Thus a 
level of innovation can be identified corresponding to each level 
of learning, as shown in the second column of Figure 25. Reading 
from top to bottom: 
Creative Person: One who originates an idea as a unique 
solution to a significant business problem. 
Gatekeeper: One who identifies the underlying market need 
and concept that the idea will serve. 
Executive Champion: The decision maker who causes the idea 
to be developed into a product or service, and ensures the 
organizational (re)design needed to bring it to market. 
Product Champion: One who ensures sustained commitment of 
the required organizational resources. 
Project Controller: The task of setting out the detailed 
steps for effective implementation of the product, service 
or organizational (re)design. 
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Project Manager: Managing the people and other resources 
involved in the implementation project, and ensuring 
ongoing communication among all participants. 
Producer: One who is involved in making delivering the 
final product or service through the (re)designed 
organization. 
It should be noticed that the levels of learning refer to 
individual competence, while the levels of innovation refer to 
organizational activity. To give effect to the linkage between 
the two, learning systems should be based on three sets of 
considerations:: 
Vertical Dependencies: It can be argued that, as far as 
the competence of an individual is concerned, each level of 
learning is fairly independent of the other levels. For 
example, a creative systems architect may or may not be a 
competent computer programmer. Collectively, however, the 
usefulness and success of any competences a company may 
possess at a given level are wholly dependent on 
complementary competences at all the other levels. The 
implication of this for the present Framework, is that the 
learning systems have to be planned holistically, and the 
principles of integration, differentiation, co-ordination 
and contingency (Section 4.1.III.D.) will apply. 
As far as the organizational processes of innovation are 
concerned, it is clear from Kanter's account that, at least 
politically and culturally, every level of innovation is 
intimately dependent on all the other levels. It is not, 
in fact, meaningful to speak of successful innovation 
except in terms of all seven levels. 
Horizontal Relationships: The third column of Figure 25 
summarizes Lessem•s (1984: 22 - 34] "key questions" linking 
innovation and learning at each level: 
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Mission and Vision: What is my personal mission? 
Where does my imagination lead me? How is my idea 
going to change the fortunes of the company? --What, 
precisely, is this idea, and what makes it a unique 
solution to a significant organizational problem. 
Needs: Which ideas have potential? What is their 
importance to me? What underlying company purposes 
are they likely to serve? How is IT developing and 
where does this particular idea fit in? With which 
suppliers, customers or collaborators should we ally 
ourselves? 
Structure: How does this idea affect my present 
roles, tasks and responsibilities? What product and 
organizational (re)design is needed to bring this idea 
to market? How will the development be structured, 
from start to finish? How will different functional 
areas in the company interact in this development? 
How will project teams be integrated into the 
functional organization? 
Goal and Influence: Why should I personally commit, 
and why should my organizational sub-group? How can 
it be ensured that the organization will commit the 
necessary resources, and that other organizational 
subgroups will cooperate? What is the risk, for me, 
for my sub-group, and for the company, and what is the 
likely return? 
Progress and Monitoring: How do we formally evaluate 
ideas? How can the detailed steps be taken, in the 
right order and at the right pace, to ensure effective 
implementation? How are projects and departments 
monitored and controlled financially? What time scale 
do we work to? 
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Participation and Communication: What are my 
particular skills and motivations and how do they 
relate to this idea? How will we involve different 
people and their skills, from different parts of the 
organization, and how will we ensure effective 
communication? 
Requirements and Production: How do we physically 
produce the new product or service, in conformance 
with the requirements, on time, and within budget? 
Particular Innovation Skills: As the learning requirements 
and innovation activities are identified at each level, the 
particular focus and scope of each decision making domain 
and level of participation (Sections 4.4.V.B.1. and 2.) can 
be made specific. In the remaining columns of Figure 25, 
roles, tasks, responsibilities and requisite personal 
characteristics can be set out, using a staffing framework 
such as that proposed by Roberts & Fusfeld (1981]. 
Maidique [1980] shows how the staffing requirements will 
vary according to the company's stage of development. 
c. Assimilation 
From an innovation point of view, organizational IT learning is 
essentially a long-term problem, since the conditions for 
learning and an innovative spirit must be expected to develop 
over many transition stages. The cognate problem, ensuring that 
the action plans for appropriate innovations do not stagnate and 
that the new technologies are assimilated into the organization 
without disruption, is essentially short-term. 
A certain time-lag is required before an innovation reaches wide 
acceptance in .a company, e.g. from the external origination of a 
new technology, through its recognition and introduction into the 
company on a trial basis, until its eventual diffusion to the 
intended areas within the organization. The cost of this process 
'· ;-
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is an unrealized investment until the very end of the time-lag, 
when the intended benefits begin (or fail) to flow. 
Thus learning systems for assimilation would be concerned with 
managing the costs and progress of the innovation time-lag. 
"One of ·the JOOSt difficult issues in managi.rg the 
Cciiplter Archltecture Product Spectrum is balarx:irg slack 
am oontrol. By slac:k, I mean creati.rg an environment that 
encourages experimentation with the product to disoover :how 
the the product may be used in a particular organizational 
setti.rg. 'lhe high slac:k environment generally leads to a 
product beirg used effectively in suwort of a business 
function, but in a highly inefficient manner. Once it is 
discovered how the product can be used effectively, control 
can be introduced to pronate efficient use. '!he slack 
environment should precede the oontrol enviromnent. But 
the main issue is one of timing to appropriately balance 
slack arxi oontrol . so that a particular product is used in 
the JOOSt effective arrl efficient marmer over tilne." 
[Mvanoed Systems Inc. 1 Course 394 7: 18] 
Learning systems for assimilation are needed, for significant 
system changes in general and new technologies in particular, in 
order to expedite the following decision making stages: 
Determining which are undesired changes and technologies 
and excluding them from further consideration, which 
includes preventing their surreptitious introduction. 
Introducing the desired technologies or modelling the 
proposed changes, on a trial basis, at the right points in 
time. 
Reaching the decision point (accept/reject) as quickly as 
possible. 
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Determining and employing methods to hasten the desired 
diffusions. 
Doing all of the above without stifling the spirit of 
innovation, which entails balancing slack and control, as 
appropriate to successive stages of assimilation. 
Figure 26 shows the framework for managing technology 
assimilation into an organization, developed by McKenney & 
McFarlan [1982: McFarlan, McKenney & Pyburn, 1983]. Their 
discussion is in terms of a new technology, but the framework 
applies to any significant system change. 
The underlying assumption is that different management approaches 
are needed at different stages in the assimilation process. Thus 
Phases 1 and 2 would be the responsibility of an entrepreneurial 
systems group, which may be permanent, or drawn ad-hoc from a 
number of departments: 
Phase 1: This phase begins with the decision to try out a 
technology that is new to the organization. It may consist 
of several complementary projects and user training, 
revolving around: learning about the technology and how to 
apply it, organizing the test site, determining the staff 
skills needed, and setting up the first applications. 
Stagnation Block A could occur for a variety of reasons, 
e.g. supplier failure, poor user participation, incompetent 
project management, unanticipated technical problems, or 
lack of senior management attention. All projects studied 
by McFarlan & McKenney that were stalled in Stagnation 
Block A had significant cost overruns. 
Phase 2: This phase involves trying out the technology in 
tasks beyond those mentioned in the initial proposal. 
Planning focuses on user consciousness of the new 
technology and potential applications. User pilot projects 
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are a major key to success. 
Stagnation Block B could occur if there is too much focus 
on implementation at the expense of experimentation and 
dissemination of learning. 
The decision to reject the technology could be made at any 
stage, but normally one would expect this to come at the 
end of Phase 2. McKenney & McFarlan [1982: 115] recommend 
that, where possible, Phase 1 and 2 technologies should be 
kept organizationally separate from Phase 2 and 3 
technologies, so that the efficiency goals of the latter do 
not blunt the effectiveness goals of the former. Thus 
Phases 3 commences with the transfer of responsibility from 
the entrepreneurial system group to the control-orientated 
group. 
Phase d: Management controls and cost/benefit models are 
drawn up, and there is frequently a need for adaptation of 
organizational structures and functions. The planning 
objective is to decide on permanent application areas and 
to implement them cost-effectively. The Phase tends to be 
dominated by short-term, organizational considerations, 
sorting out troublesome applications, upgrading staff 
knowledge levels and using the technology efficiently. 
The Phase will end in Stagnation Block c if there is too 
much standardization and control - these inhibit legitimate 
dissemination and encourage surreptitious, unproductive 
experimentation. 
Phase ~= The final Phase commences with the decision to 
transfer the technology to all the intended organizational 
areas. Organizational learning and management control are 
completed, and the planning focus returns to an intensive 
look at future business and technology trends. 
·Page 302 
Cash & McCleod [1985] offer further insights into managing the 
introduction of information technologies in companies that are 
strategically dependent on them. The dilemma such companies face 
is that, on the one hand, it is crucial that they rapidly 
identify and exploit appropriate IT opportunities while, on the 
other hand, the rate of new announcements is much faster than 
most organizations can assimilate. They propose a simplified 
two-phase assimilation framework - the first phase (innovation) 
corresponds to Phases 1 and 2 of the McKenney & McFarlan 
framework, and the second phase (control) to Phases 3 and 4. 
In discussing the need for and responsibilities of an "Emerging 
Technology Group", which will vary according to the two phases, 
Cash & McCleod effectively provide a charter for the role of the 
Information Technology Support organization (ITSO) in fostering 
innovation and guiding assimilation. Leonard-Barton & Kraus 
[1985) provide further insights into the dual role of technology 
change management - to serve as both technical developers and 





IT strategy has been characterized in this Framework as the 
formulation of a Target Environment ~rchitecture and its 
incremental implementation in a company-wide organizational 
development programme. This is consistent with the general view 
of development and competence that underlies the Framework. 
Following Ackoff [1981: 34-38], development is seen as a process 
in which the company as a whole and the individuals within it 
increase their ability and desire to satisfy their own needs and 
. those of others. Development is seen to be more a matter of 
increasing competence, capacity and potential, than of particular 
outcomes. Against this background, strategic IT decision making 
is more a matter of motivation, responsibility, knowledge and 
understanding, than of particular attainments. It has less to do 
with how much resource the company needs to carry out IT strategy 
than with what it can do with the resource it has. 
The Framework also has less to do with technology per se than 
might have been expected. There is more than a little truth in 
the EwiM project's claim that 
"Information Systems Technology is solved: any currently 
available technology will work well. Decisions about 
Information Systems Technology will turn on non-technology 
matters." [Benson & Parker, 1985: 84] 
Similarly, Strassman [1985: xv] finds that the "supply side" 
examination and assessment of i~formation technology itself will 
not be of much practical value in decisions about which 
technologies a company should invest in. "Understanding must 
begin with meticulous observation of people and organizations 
under conditions when information technology is or is not 
applied." 
Thus the technology itself is usually not the limiting factor in 
the application of IT to business strategy - indeed, in many 
cases it is ahead of the company's ability to grasp its -· 
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implications and to apply it. The inhibitors are rather the 
political, sociological, economic and managerial factors in 
strategic IT decision making, and it is with these that the 
Framework is primarily concerned 
The main reasons why a company needs to make its business vision 
for the use of IT explicit in a Target Environment Architecture 
can be summarized as follows: 
Consensus: To achieve agreement and ongoing co-operation 
among all parties involved in strategic IT decision making, 
by giving them a common language in which to discuss the 
crucial issues, such as po~itioning, purposes, uses, costs 
and benefits, innovation and control, without being forced 
into premature commitment to specific policies and 
projects. 
Blueprints: To serve as a set of blueprints giving 
company-wide direction and consistency to all corporate, 
business unit, work group and individual plans for the 
development of IT capability - the selection and 
assimilation of appropriate technologies, the creation of 
strategic business systems, and the development of IT 
decision makers (Section 4.6.IV.). 
Integrity: To permit the target environment to be 
implemented incrementally over time, in strategic thrusts 
and action plans, by providing the means though which 
congruency between the purposes of IT as originally 
envisaged and its eventual uses as implemented can be 
maintained. 
Evaluation: To provide a conceptual foundation for 
analyzing the full strategic and organizational impact of 
proposed IT applications, and a means of evaluating the 
aggregate costs, benefits and risks of the overall 
investment in IT strategy. 
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Learning: To help practitioners avoid certain dangerous 
but all-too-common errors of judgment: 
Errors of Context: Inadequately providing for the 
impact of social, political and economic environmental 
forces on competitive strategy and organizational 
design. 
Errors of Content: Producing an information systems 
department technical strategy instead of an IT 
strategy that is recognizably a part of or complement 
to the company's business strategy. 
Errors of Structure: Producing an IT strategy that 
does not cover all the dimensions of the target 
environment - typically, an application systems plan 
with inadequate attention given to the design of 
organizational tasks and processes, or which is not 
related to any plan for a feasible technology 
infrastructure, or which does not take the realities 
of the environment into account. 
Errors of Process: Formulating a technology strategy 
which the company does not have the resources to 
implement - typically, believing that a non-trivial IT 
strategy can be built in 3 to 6 months. 
Errors of Learning: Relying on external consultants 
as the primary intellectual resource, or hoping that 
strategic thought will somehow come from business and 
IT decision makers who are manifestly incapable of it 
- typically, attempting to develop a business vision 
for IT and commitment to it, without careful selection 
and briefing of key decision makers and the explicit 





THE FRAMEWORK IN SOUTH AFRICAN PRACTICE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter is aimed at the fourth objective of the Study: 
D. To propose a way of implementing the Framework in South 
African practice, which will address the key issues and 
lead to an improvement in the quality of strategic IT 
decision making. 
As stated in the Overview of the Framework, the Components and 
Parts and the constructs defined in them are interdependent 
elements of one "systemic process, each feeding and fed by the 
others" (Section 4.l.II.A.). This accounts for much of the 
separation and repetiti~n of material in Chapter 4 and, more 
importantly, it implies that the Framework cannot be implemented 
strictly in the order of its documentation in that Chapter. It 
must also be expected that for a given company there will be many 
optional sequences of implementation to choose from. 
In Section II., therefore, the principal constructs of the 
Framework are reviewed, and the initial activities required to 
set strategic IT decision making in motion in terms of them are 
identified. Only the broad sequence of activities is discussed, . 
at the conceptual level. Initial activities required to 
customize and instantiate relevant parts of the Framework are 
indicated but not discussed in detail in this Study. 
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Section III. is concerned with how the Framework can be evaluated 
for acceptance by specific South African companies. The issues 
are considered in the light of the findings of the field survey 
described in Chapter 3, using an adaptation of King•s [1983; 
1988] model for evaluating existing planning systems. This model 
has already been proposed for development stage assessment 
(Sections 4.6.III.A.3. and 4.6.III.B.1.), 
In Section IV., it is concluded that the Framework can indeed be 
implemented in a South African company in a way that addresses 
the key issues and improves the quality of strategic IT decision 
making. 
II. IMPLEMENTING THE DECISION MAKING CONSTRUCTS 
Implementing the Framework will itself be part of the IT 
management strategy it produces, and thus action plans for its 
realization must be included in the strategic thrusts of the 
~aster Transition Plan (right-most column of Figure 22). A basic 
rule-of-thumb is to ensure that relevant portions of each of the 
Framework's constructs are implemented either ahead of or at 
least as part of the decision packets that will require them. 
The major constructs arising out of the five Components of the 
Framework, the initial activities they will entail, and how they 
would fit into an overall planning framework are reviewed in the 
following Sections. 
A. Initial Activities 
At the outset it is only necessary to review initial activities, 
since ongoing activities will be generated by the DMF itself as 
implementation unfolds in the strategic thrusts (Section 4.5.). 
1. The Context Component 
The First Fundamental Agreement: It must be agreed by 
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corporate and business unit management that the company 
needs a formal IT strategy, and that a formal strategic IT 
decision making process is also needed. 
The scope of the strategy - group of companies, single 
company, or a business unit - must be agreed. 
The shortcomings of the available methodologies, tools and 
techniques should be understood. It must be agreed that 
participative IT decision making (e.g. in terms of the 
Vroom-Yetton Model) and incremental implementation of a 
target environment architecture (as an approach to IT 
strategy) are acceptable to the management of the company. 
The Participants: The participants in the various facets 
of formulating company-wide strategic IT decision making 
must be identified. A domain grid (e.g. Figures 5 and 19) 
can be used to ensure good organizational coverage. 
Dialectical Debate: Those of the participants who--will 
• take part in the debate must be selected and briefed. A 
qualified facilitator must be retained, and the debate 
carried out. 
Environmental Data Scan: Staff must be selected from both 
corporate planning and the IT domain and briefed. Generic 
environmental categories must be agreed and instantiated. 
The means-ways-ends paradigm and the detailed analytical 
processes, e.g. force field analysis, must be agreed and 
implemented. 
Coroorate IT ScenarioCsl: Format and content must be 
decided, with a view to facilitating the analyses of 
competitive strategy and organizational design. The 
scenario(s) must be prepared, authorized and distributed to 
the other participants in strategic IT decision making. 
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2. The Content Component 
The constructs and initial activities of the Content Component 
arise out of the Strategic Option Generator. 
The Participants: Analytical responsibilities flowing from 
the content of the Corporate IT Scenario(s) must be defined 
and organized. Different participants will be required 
corresponding to different rows of the Generator. 
Analysis of the Competitive Strategy: The target(s) and 
generic competitive strategy or strategies must be decided. 
Focus and detail will differ by industry, company and 
relevance of S.A. factors, as will the depth of the 
analysis in terms. of value chains and production 
economics. Analytical approaches range from the informal 
and intuitive to such formal approaches as King's (1978] 
"strategy set transformation". 
A limited analysis can stop here (Figure 10; Rows 1 to 3 of 
Figure 11), and implementation can proceed intuitively, 
using conventional requirements analysis techniques, e.g. 
those of BSP or Tetrarch. 
Analysis of the Organizational Design: The organizational 
level(s) and application class(es) of use that will satisfy 
the competitive strategy must be described and candidate 
strategic business systems identified in broad terms. 
The Strategy Evaluation Grid: Which Box the company is 
currently positioned in and which it wishes to be in must 
be determined, and the implications of a move made clear. 
Business life cycles and their implications for transition 
stage planning should be taken into account. 
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The Investment Focus: The acceptable overall levels of 
funding and where they will be directed must be indicated. 
The technical, political and cultural implications should 
be taken into account, and mechanistic and simplistic 
development prioritization processes avoided. 
The Competitive Advantage Model: The concepts and measures 
of competitive advantage to guide all the quantifiable 
elements of the IT strategy must pe worked out and agreed. 
The IT Positioning Statement: This statement must be drawn 
up and marketed to all concerned in the company, subject to 
confidentiality requirements. 
3. The Structure Component 
All the constructs and initial activities of the Structure 
Component arise out of the Target Environment Architecture. In 
the following, the term "first release" refers to the work that 
must be done in the first strategic thrust, in order to permit 
the drawing up of an initial Master Transition Plan. While the 
first release of the meta-architecture must certainly be 
consistent, correct and reliable, it cannot be expected to go 
into very much detail and its life expectancy is short. 
The Participants: Flowing from the analysis of the 
organizational design and the IT Positioning Statement, 
systems analysis and design tasks must be defined and 
organized in respect of each of the four dimensions. 
The IT Infrastructure Architecture: The first release of 
the blueprints, interface standards, policies and other 
logical constructs pertaining to the five virtual 
constructs must be developed and agreed: workstation; 
network; applications portfolio; data model; IT support 
organization. No other work on target environment 
development can proceed without these guidelines. 
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The Human Systems Architecture: The first release of the 
overall strategic business systems analysis, in terms of 
the value chain(s) and value system and/or the customer 
resource life cycle, must be completed and agreed.- It must 
be clearly linked to the competitive advantage model 
developed in the IT positioning analysis. 
All four dimensions of the human systems architecture -
management functions, planning levels, functional 
decomposition, and generic value activities, should be 
covered in broad terms. Intentions with regard to 
inter-organizational systems should be clearly stated. 
The Information systems Architecture: The,first broad 
outline of the strategic applications portfolio must be 
completed and agreed, to accompany the human systems 
architecture. Both the business and the IT perspectives of 
the portfolio should be covered, and dependencies on the 
virtual applications portfolio stated. 
The Human Resources Architecture: The aims of such an 
architecture, based on tests for good organizational 
dialectic, must be agreed. The first release of the 
Responsibilities Chart, setting out preliminary roles, . 
levels of participation, tasks and decision making success 
criteria, must be completed and agreed. 
The corporate steering committee, business unit steering 
committees, joint technical review committee, and requisite 
parts of the IT support organization need to be established 
early. User committees and most of the IT planning staff 
can follow at a later stage. 
The Target Environment Architecture: All of the above must 
be put together as the first release of the external 
meta-architecture, and marketed (in different ways) to all 
decision making domains, subject to confidentiality. 
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4. The Process Component 
The constructs and initial activities of the Process Component 
are those required to set all the other activities in motion. 
The Second fundamental Agreement: It must be agreed by the 
management of the·company that the IT strategy should be 
implemented in a company-wide organizational development 
programme. They must agree to acquire and implement the 
needed OD techniques and interventions. 
The Participants: The participants in the various facets 
of implementing the IT strategy must be nominated and 
briefed. 
The Master Transition Plan: A broad outline of the 
strategic thrusts, technical strategies, timeframes and 
transition stages must be put together, on the basis of the 
first release of the Target Environment Architecture. 
The first medium-term tactical plan, including the first 
process and commitment plans, must flow from this 
activity. The first strategic thrust should cover the 
customization of the Framework, the first dialectical 
debate and environmental data scan, and the first releases 
of the IT Positioning Statement and Target Environment 
Architecture. 
Stakeholders in the first transition stage should be 
identified as soon as possible, and briefed. It will 
probably take more time for the transition scenarios, 
project and resource schedules, and stage-related education 
and marketing to be described. 
The first action plans should cover only the initial 
activities being described in this Section. 
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Contingency Plans: Work must commence on the contingency 
plans, which are likely to extend over several transition 
stages. supplie~ policies, security plans, and disaster 
recovery planning cannot be delayed, and will therefore 
require resource allocation in parallel with the mainstream 
activities. 
Control Systems: Similarly, work must commence on devising 
and installing strategic, architectural and operational 
controls. Aggregate cost categories must be defined and 
evaluation techniques and management accounting processes 
agreed. 
5. The Organizational IT Learning Component 
The constructs and activities of the Organizational IT Learning 
Component accompany all the other activities. 
Introductory Education: All participants in strategic IT 
decision making will require (different kinds of) education 
and training in the design principles of the Framework. 
They will need to understand its dialectical nature, and 
will require training in the dialectical approach to 
problem solving. 
Available Education and Consultancy: The education, 
learning tools and techniques, and consultancies available 
in South Africa should be surveyed and mapped to tne 
principal organizational disciplines - organizational 
dialectic, organizational policy (business strategy), 
organizational design, organizational development, and 
organizational learning. What is already available, and 
what will be done about what is not yet available? 
stage Assessment: The present stage of development in both 
the business and the IT domains must be assessed, in order 
to validate the feasibility of the IT strategy and to 
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determine what else must be done to make it feasible. 
The stage of company development - in terms of utilization 
of resources, competitive/entrepreneurial mode, evolution 
of the planning system - will influence the way in which 
competitive strategy, organizational design and IT 
positioning are analyzed, and the business vision expressed 
in the IT positioning statement. 
The stage of IT - in terms of Nolan stages theory, maturity 
of capacity planning, maturity of applications development 
- determines the kind of target environment architecture 
the company can reasonably expect to implement. 
Formal Learning Systems: The first release of the learning 
systems the IT strategy will require must be developed and 
agreed, covering formal education and training as well as 
systems implicit in the control mechanisms. 
Management of Innovation and Assimilation: Work must 
commence on establishing formal management processes and 
standards for innovation and innovators, and for the 
acquisition and assimilation of new technologies 
B. Fit with the Overall Planning Process 
To assist in understanding how the Framework would fit into a 
company's overall strategic planning processes, Figure 27 maps 
its major constructs to IBM's "EwiM Action Plan" [Benson & 
Parker, 1986(2) & (3)]. Many of the basic concepts of the 
present Framework derive from EwiM, and using the Action Plan 
should make it easier to bring future IBM offerings in this area 
to bear - for example, education for business executives; and 
facilitative expert systems. 
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1. Part I: Basic Concepts in Strategic Planning 
Without exception, the first steps in any implementation of the 
Framework must be the Fundamental Agreements, the Introductory 
Education, and a survey of available methodologies, tools and 
techniques. Some initial education will be needed in order to 
discuss the fundamental agreements, and these will also depend to 
some extent on the outcome of the survey. 
At the end of these steps, there should be a reasonably clear 
understanding of management•s predisposition towards competitive 
behaviour and alignment IT strategy or entrepreneurial behaviour 
and impact IT strategy. Their attitudes may change, but what 
they are initially will influence the way in which the Framework 
is implemented. 
2. Part II: The Strategic Business Questions 
If the predisposition is towards entrepreneurial behaviour and 
impact IT strategy, then the mandatory next steps are Dialectical 
Debate and the Environmental Data Scan, culminating in the 
Corporate IT Scenario(s). Senior managers from the business and 
IT domains must be involved. 
When management is disposed towards competitive behaviour and 
alignment IT strategy, they may still decide to carry out these 
steps. Alternatively, more limited discussion and environmental 
analysis may be delegated to the corporate planning and IT R&D 
staff, in which case the Corporate IT Scenario will have to be 
submitted to senior management for approval. 
The next step is to evaluate the current stage of company 
development, from the perspective of the business domain. When 
alignment IT strategy is contemplated, this task may be delegated 
to corporate planning staff and selected middle managers. 
The next three steps are crucial - Competitive Strategy Analysis, 
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Organizational Design Analysis, IT Positioning (IT strategy 
evaluation, IT investment focus, definition of competitive 
advantage). Unless they are done well, there would be no point 
in using the present Framework. 
If senior management are not directly involved in the analyses, 
they must be briefed on what is being done. The resulting IT 
Positioning Statement must be explained in detail and agreed to 
by them. Indeed, the predisposition towards alignment or impact 
IT strategy could begin to change at this point, as opportunities 
and impacts begin to be understood. 
Corporate planning and IT R&D staff, some IT planning staff, and 
some of the co-ordinating bodies, should be put in place during 
the course of the activities described in this Section. Learning 
systems cannot be developed this early, but it is both possible 
and necessary to begin identifying their design factors {Section 
4.6.IV.A.). 
3. Part III: IT - Strategic Planning Questions 
The next step is to evaluate the current stage of company 
development, from the perspective of the IT domain. The task is 
essential whether alignment or impact IT strategy is being 
contemplated, but the risks are greater in the latter case. The 
task should be carried out jointly by business and.IT domain 
professionals. The objectivity of the evaluation may be enhanced 
by employing an outside consultancy. 
The initial activities relating to the four dimensions of the 
Target Environment Architecture {Section 5.II.A.3.) will be 
carried out concurrently, so that by this time virtually all the 
co-ordinating bodies and architectural staff should be in place. 
4. Part IV: Implementation 
Part IV runs in parallel with Parts II and III. This means that 
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an analysis of the "organizational health" should be carried out 
at a fairly early stage - possibly even as part of obtaining the 
Fundamental Agreements. Its main practical benefit should be to 
determine the kinds of Co-ordinating Bodies and staff functions 
required. 
The first Process, Commitment and Action Plans cover the initial 
activities required to get strategic IT decision making going in 
accordance with this Framework (Section S.II.A.4.). Later plans 
will cover the substantive content of the IT strategy, and these 
will come into being as the Master Transition Plan unfolds and 
adapts according to the logic of the Framework. 
Figure 27 adds an eighth question to the original EwiM seven -
"How do we ensure ongoing success and development?". In this 
Framework, the answers lie in quantification and evaluation, 
control systems, accountability, and organizational lear~ing 
systems. 
III. EVALUATING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE FRAMEWORK 
However much internal validity, intuitive appeal and operational 
acceptability an IT decision making framework may possess, the 
fact remains that there is as yet no known way of proving its 
efficacy, either in advance of acceptance, or after use: 
"No conclusive evidence exists to denonstrate that JOOSt 
[ infonnation systems strategic plai'liliDJ] processes might 
smvive a critical cost-benefit evaluation. Enpirical 
studies that examine the overall inpact of such plai'liliDJ 
proceSses on business perfonnanoe are just beginniig to be 
perfonned. Procedures wh.idl are diagnostic in nature, arrl 
Vrldl therefore go beyorrl the issue of generally validatin;J 
the merits of ( infonnation systems strategic plai'liliDJ] 
processes, have not yet been developed to any significant 
extent." [Kirg, 1988: 103] 
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Moreover, Chakravarthy's [1987] research into the strategic 
planning systems of a number of diversified companies in the 
u.s.A. suggests that the criteria for assessing the goodness of 
fit between a planning system and the company using it are by no 
means obvious. He found, in the sample he surveyed, that: 
Managers' ratings of their strategic planning systems 
showed no significant correlation with the financial 
performance of their firms. 
The planning systems of the firms surveyed were for the 
most part lacking in both external fit (i.e. with the 
firm's business strategy and financial context) and 
internal fit (i.e. with the firm's organizational and 
cultural context). 
There was a poor relationship between planning system 
rating and the external and internal fits it enjoyed. 
There was a strong preference for having a control 
orientation in the planning system. 
The most important determinant of the rating of a planning 
system was its novelty (which could be attributed either to 
fad value or to the high hopes held for the new system). 
A. Direct vs. Indirect Evaluation 
It is proposed in this Study that, for the time being, persons 
responsible for establishing the strategic IT decision making 
processes of their companies should focus on what King [1983] 
calls "the direct approach to planning evaluation" - or, in the 
present context, to the evaluation of a decision making 
framework. 
Indirect approaches attempt to evaluate the efficacy of planning 
systems by comparing various firms in terms of their performance 
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as measured by profitability, growth, etc. 
"In effect, (they treat] the products of plann:inj- the 
plan, the strategy which it entails, etc. - as a 'black 
box' that should be assessed solely in tenns of the 
ultimate perfo:rJDal'X:le of the business". [Kin;J, 1983: 265] 
King describes the limitations and deficiencies of such 
approaches, which are similar to the problems that arise in IT 
strategy field research (Section 2.II.A.). By contrast, direct 
approaches seek to evaluate the system on its own terms, in a 
detailed and comprehensive way: 
"A wide variety of benefits are claimed for plann:inj by 
virtually all of its p::oponents (e.g. steiner, 1969]. 'Ib 
fairly assess plann:inj, the evaluator must assess the 
degree to which these diverse benefits are, in fact, 
adrleved. " (~<in], 1983: 266] C4 
'Ihe followin:;J Sections descr.ibe an adaptation of Kin;J' s two 
similar franeworks - the 1983 version for general strategic 
plai'lllinj am the 1988 version for strategic IT plann:inj - which 
can be used to evaluate, in advance, the likely acxeptability of 
the present F'ranework to a specific cxmpany. 
'Ihe evaluation framework shown in Figure 28 cxmsists of the seven 
elE!I1ellts (boxes) described in this section, ani ten "evaluation 
points" described in the next section. 'Ib avoid confusion, the 
evaluation framework will be referred to as the EF, am the 
decisicn maki.rg Framework to be evaluated as the Dn". 
B. Evaluation Precepts 
Kin;J [1983: 268-269; 1988: 105-106] describes five evaluation 
''precepts" 1 whiCh are awlied in the present context as fOllOWS: 
Multi-Dimensional Assessment: It is neither necessacy nor 
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desirable to reduce the varirus assessments of the Parts, 
Links, oanstructs am attr.ibrt:es of the IJtiF to a sirgle 
overall maasure. 'lhe overall evaluaticm can, hov.lever, be 
expressed ii1 terms of a profile whose shape as 'Well its 
evaluative dimensions will be :infonnative. 
Use of Both Internal am Extel:nal st.amards: 'lhe IJtiF 
shrul.d be evaluated in terms of the specific aims to whidl 
it will be applied in the C'XI'I'lp3n;y, in terms of generally 
aCXleptecl nonns of good decision maki.r¥j practice, am in 
c:x.mparison with other oarpeti!Yj frameworks. 
Analvsis of Multiple System stakeholders: 'lhe IJtiF should 
be assessed in terms of the interests of strategic IT 
decision makers at all levels of participation in all 
decision~ domains. Differences in the evaluations 
will in themselves constitute inportant :infonnation. 
Use of Judgemental am Objective Assessnents: As in the 
mF , htnnan judgement is the vital in:Jredient in the EF. 
''H~er, that judgement should not be merely 
iinpressionistic. Rather, it should be guided by a 
series of prescribed neasurement points an:i prescribed 
assessments, whidl, although the details may vary fran 
finn to finn, are rather generic in nature." [King, 
1988: 106] 
King & Rodriguez (1978] have described a variety of such 
assessments. 
c. Elements of the Evaluation Framework 
The elements of the EF are represented by the seven boxes and ten 
evaluation points shown in Figure 28. The boxes are as follows: 
Information Input: This element of the EF represents the 
Page 321. 
information required to be processed by the DMF in 
producing its decision outputs. Major categories of 
information are: 
Internal and external environmental information. 
Business information - company mission; planning ends; 
strategy; organizational structures and processes; 
' business (action) plans. 
IT information - the technology; suppliers and other 
external forces; available human resources; structure 
and management of the IT support organization. 
Other important information about the company -
critical success factors; SWOT analyses. 
Resources Input: This box represents the human, financial, 
technological and other resources consumed in creating, 
using and maintaining the DMF. 
Decision Making Aims: This element represents the specific 
aims to which the DMF will be addressed. These 
''might be as IOOdest as att:enpt.in:J to develop a 
rational scheme for prioritizinJ the many OCI1pll1:.er 
awlications developoont projects that are 'urrlerway or 
proposed. Alternatively, they may be as broad as· 
attempting to OCilprehensively plan for the future 
awlications of c:x:mp.rter, infonnation an::l 
communications tedmology in various areas of the 
entezprise ••• " [King, 1988: 104) 
A basic thesis of Chapter 4 is that the successful 
application of IT may bring about changes in the 
competitive strategy of the company, and hence in the 




alignment IT strategy to impact IT strategy. In the same 
way, successful implementation of the DMF may bring about 
changes in the behavioural mode of the decision makers -
e.g. from competitive mode to entrepreneurial mode - and 
hence in the basic rationale for the existence of the DMF. 
The Decision Making Framework: This element represents the 
DMF, the entity to be evaluated. Since it encompasses the 
people making the decisions as well as the mechanisms they 
use, the DMF can in effect be viewed as the entity 
performing the decision making [cf. King, 1983: 267]. 
Evaluation should focus on the major constructs and initial 
activities reviewed in Section S.II. 
Decision Making Outputs: The output block does not merely 
represent the four major documents of the IT strategy, the 
Corporate IT Scenario(s), the IT Positioning Statement, the 
Target Environment Architecture and the Master Transition 
Plan, but rather their content and effect: 
The business vision for the role of IT. 
The IT positioning. 
The emerging IT infrastructure, strategic business 
systems and human resources. 
The way in which the transition plans are carried out 
and controlled. 
As King [1988: 105] remarks, alternatives that were 
considered but not incorporated into the final plans should 
also be considered as an output of the DMF. 
The Quadrants of IT Strategy: The final block denotes the 
ultimate effect of the strategic IT decisions made in 
accordance with the DMF. These are the measurable impacts 
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of the outputs on the quadrants of IT strategy that 
prompted their creation in the first place. 
The two quadrants of the business domain refer to 
competitive advantage, i.e. the gains in competitive 
position and organizational effectiveness achieved. The 
two IT quadrants refer to the development of the IT domain 
itself. These are the measurable ways in which the IT 
support organization has improved its support of the 
competitive strategy and organizational design, and made 
the company a more effective exploited of IT resources. 
External Norms and Practices: External norms complement 
the internal standards of the company in evaluating the 
DMF. They refer generally to good decision making theory 
and practice in respect of any of the constructs of the 
DMF. The design principles set out in Section 4.1. are 
special instances of such norms. Also included here are 
good practices observed on the part of allies and strategic 
targets. 
D. The Evaluation Method 
The "evaluation points" shown in Figure 28 represent two sets of 
assessments, which collectively result in an evaluation profile 
of the DMF. six assessments (A to F) are based on the internal 
characteristics of strategic IT decision making in the company, 
and four (G to J) on comparisons with norms and practices 
external to the company, e.g. comparisons with case histories and 
with whatever can be found out about what competitors are doing. 
In addition to whatever hard data may be to hand, opinions can be 
obtained through questionnaires or interviews conducted in all 
four domains, with questions framed along much the same lines as 
those given used in the field survey of this study (Appendix B). 
Systematic comparison of the opinions obtained from the different 
domains will be useful in making the assessments. 
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In each assessment the objective is to decide whether the DMF can 
bring about significant improvements in the company's strategic 
IT decision making practices, more cost-effectively than other 
available DMFs. In the following Sections, the assessments are 
characterized by questions that explicitly address at least one 
of the constructs reviewed in section S.II. 
Section numbers 1. to 8. given in parentheses refer to the field 
survey findings discussed in Section 3.III.C., and suggest areas 
of particular importance in a south African company's evaluation. 
1. Internal Evaluations 
Point A: Appropriateness of Decision Making Aims: Will 
this DMF help in analyzing the many environmental issues 
facing the company and singling out the critical issues 
that require priority attention (Sections 3. and 4.)? 
Will it help in arr1v1ng at decision making aims that are 
appropriate for this company (Section 5.)? 
In particular, will it managers appreciate the importance 
of an external orientation in strategic IT decision making 
and better understand the aims of interactive planning and 
idealized design? 
Does the company have, and will it provide, the resources 
needed - human, financial and technological - to pursue 
these aims in the comprehensive manner envisaged in this 
DMF? In particular, does it have sufficient numbers of 
development staff of the requisite calibre for the kinds 
and varieties of IT applications that are likely to emerge 
from the strategic plans (Section 1.)? 
Point B: Effectiveness of Decision Making: Will the DMF 
fit in with and enhance whatever strategic decision making 
processes the company already has - for example, corporate 
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planning, information systems steering committee, systems 
strategy documents (Section 2.)? 
Will it help managers agree and implement processes the 
company does not already have - in particular, good 
business/IT dialogue, IT R&D, IT-related O&M, focusing the 
IT investment, and quantifying the aggregate benefits 
{Sections 1., 2. and 5.)? 
Will it lead to better understanding of the need t9 take 
perceptions and assumptions as well as data into account? 
Will it help in achieving the identified decision making 
aims? Will it help in identifying opportunities that might 
otherwise have been overlooked, and in rejecting 
"opportunities" that should be avoided (Section 8.)? 
Will it improve the quality and success of IT strategy 
proposals (Sections 5. and 7.), and the way these proposals 
are evaluated? 
What improvement in the quality of IT support for the 
company's business plans can be expected from the use of 
this DMF, and how will this be measured? 
Is the DMF's functional coverage adequate - in terms of 
areas participating as well as scope of the plans produced? 
How effective will it be in generating company-wide 
strategic IT decision making in an organization where 
business functions are decentralized but IT decision making 
is still largely centralized (Sections 1. and 5.)? 
Will the move towards decentralization of 
application-related tasks seen in many companies (Section 
5.) provide a good starting point for introducing the 
concepts of the DMF? 
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Point c: Role and Impact of the DMF: Assessing the 
potential role and impact of the DMF needs to be especially 
careful in companies whose managers believe th~y are 
managing the issues well enough already (Section 3.). 
The central question must be: will the outputs really be 
used to drive the actual decision making activity, or will 
they "gather dust on the shelf"? The·answer lies as much 
in the prevailing culture of the company as in any 
attributes of the DMF and its outputs. 
Will the DMF help managers strike a suitable balance in 
nurturing both creativity and control in the internal 
environment of the company? Chakravarthy [1987] and 
McGinnis [1984] identify a number of key elements that are 
instrumental in achieving this balance. 
Will it help participants in strategic IT decision making 
accept commensurate accountability for the control of IT 
costs (Section 5.). 
Will it encourage developers to move into the microeconomic 
aspects of requirements analysis, which seem to be missing 
in current methodologies and practice - for example, value 
chains and production functions (Sections 2. and 6.)? 
In general, will it encourage them to make morejbetter use 
of available tools and techniques (Section 6.)? 
Will this DMF (or any other, for that matter) encounter 
significant resistance in the company, especially if, as is 
likely, participative IT decision making is not already an 
accepted practice (Section 5.)? 
Will the concepts of value chain analysis, competitive 
advantage calculations, and strategic business systems be 
understood and accepted (Section 2.)? 
Page 327 
Will the DMF help improve the general understanding and 
organization of IT roles, tasks and responsibilities in the 
company? Will it overcome the effects of 11organizational 
distance 11 from the business/IT decision making interface 
(Section 3.). 
Point ~: Impact of the Decisions Made: This is the key 
assessment - what impact are the outputs of the DMF likely 
to have on the four quadrants of IT strategy - competitive 
strategy, organizational design, technology positioning and 
the IT strategy itself? 
It is also the most difficult assessment, since in many 
companies there are likely to be many differences of 
opinions and perceptions (Section 7.). 
Following King's [1988: 108] line of reasoning, it would 
seem that when the decision making aim is alignment IT 
strategy (the company being in the support or Factory Box 
of the Strategy Grid), the assessment will be most 
difficult to make. It will be easier when the aim is 
impact IT strategy (with the company in or moving into the 
Turnaround or Strategic Box), since in this case the role 
and expected benefits of IT are more sharply defined. 
The overall evaluation of the DMF must include assessments 
of how well it is likely to help the company achieve these 
benefits. The same benefit calculation techniques proposed 
in the DMF should be used to assess the likely impact of 
the DMF on these benefits. King [1988: 109] suggests a 
useful sensitivity test - if the business strategy were to 
be changed in each of a number of specified ways, would the 
DMF generate significant changes in the IT strategy? 
Point E: Adaptive Value of the DMF: The concepts of 
architectural levels and corresponding adaptive learning 
loops are fundamental to the DMF. Without it, directed 
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incrementalism would be infeasible, and target environment 
architecture would be yet another total planning approach, 
in the rationalist-comprehensive mold. 
Hence the central question here is: will the company be 
able to develop practical and effective organizational IT 
learning systems as envisaged in this DMF, and will people 
really use them? 
Will the DMF and its four outputs adapt in response to the 
impacts on IT strategy actually experienced? Will feedback 
extend, if necessary, to the aims of strategic IT decision 
making? For example, the DMF may have produced high-risk 
technical strategies for infrastructure and business system 
development. It may turn out that the strategies are 
difficult to implement and do not bring the expected gain 
in competitive advantage. Will the DMF then adjust its 
evaluation criteria, and will its aims change to, say, the 
generation of less risky alignment strategies? 
Point F: Strategic Congruence: A primary aim in using 
this DMF is to achieve the three kinds of congruencies 
inherent in its definition of organizational dialectic 
between competitive strategy and organizational des.ign, 
between the distinctive competence of the company and the 
collective competence of the strategic IT makers, and 
between IT purposes and IT uses (Figure 4). 
Will the DMF help in identifying the best strategic 
purposes for IT in relation to the company's industry and 
market, and organizational uses that will give effect to 
those purposes (Sections 3. and 8.). Will it provoke 
deeper thought into these issues on the part of strategic 
IT decision makers, and encourage them to undertake impact 
IT strategies when these are appropriate and feasible 
(Section 5.)? 
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2. External Evaluations 
Point~= Relative Efficiency 2f the DMF: Will~the 
resources - human, financial and technological ~ likely to 
be consumed in implementing this DMF be justified by the 
results assessed at Point D? 
What is it "normal" to spend in this industry and this 
market? What are the company's allies and strategic 
targets spending? Will expenditure on theDMF-be treated 
as organizational slack, to be cut substantially during 
periods of business down-turn? 
How will the DMF itself contribute to its own efficiency -
for example, through better structuring of decision making 
roles, tasks and responsibilities? 
.:- ·. ~. i 
Point H: Relative Credibility of Decision Making Aims: 
Are the kinds of strategic IT decision making aims 
addressed by the DMF commonly regarded as suitable for this 
kind of company? The answer.to this question will depend 
to some extent on the scale of the company, on its industry 
and market, and on the Boxes of the strategy Evaluation 
Grid in which it currently is andjor intends to be. 
Will the DMF help makers better discriminate among the 
different reasons why having an IT strategy should be 
important, and thus identify the company•s·Box(es) crisply 
and accurately (Section 5.). 
Will it help them to understand the implications of 
long-term IT strategy, when this is what is needed, and to 
develop consistent approaches to the opportunity costs of 
building an IT infrastructure (Sections 3. and 5.)? 
Point ~: Relative Worth of the DMF: How does the DMF rate 




.:- ~gw ~.does ltr1~11te in terms of standards found in fhe; :=-.n:..s of 
-~a~~gement literature (e.g. Huber, 1980; Steine~/~96~~~ 
_~~~-:-relation--~~ other: information systems planni~-i. ·;;_~...,or: 
frameworks? 
. p~es it incorporate other well-known aids to dec-~ip~t;r 
~~king - e.g. Critioal Success Factors techniqqe#-~~axsu:­
·-analysis, cost, Benefit and Risk analysis? Does:·_w"""retllfi .. ont 
suitable on analytical techniques. -- -~· tE' ::~ 
_ -J?o~s it give -Bppropriate attention to auditing of ttie::-e " 
resources and competences available for carrying ott~~ 
pl~ns it will ge.tl~rate - human, financial and otheZ04t.-t>.- i 
-P9W does it rat-i!"-itl terms of its own design princip:tes:'rs 
Will it help in creating and managing good orqaniza~n~l 
.dialectic, or wi.l1 it be regarded as too compleltn-all!ili~s 
_ ct~e,pretical for{ practical decision making, as the bllWl~ ·lfo 
respo~se rates to -the questionnaire survey seem to inliicat;e _;}, 
-{~ec::t_!on 1.)? r ---- _;_;.:; !.5-
How does it compare with the systems used by allies and. 
. 0 
strategic targets? 
.Point J: Rela-tive Worth of the IT strategy: How will:ithe 
optp~ts of the DMF rate in terms of whatever external 1 
standards for I~ strategy are deemed important? For i 
example, will ~bey be appropriate to the stage of company 
development, in both the business and the IT domain? 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The maj9r constructs Qf the Framework described in Chapters 4 and 
5 do not differ in any radical way from those found in many ' 
conventional strategic planning frameworks. Their mapping to the 
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four Parts of EwiM Action Plan further suggests that their mode 
of implementation should not pose severe problems in companies 
who have, or are willing to develop, adaptive planning systems. 
The major features of this Framework that are likely to cause 
problems in accepting and implementing it are its emphasis on a 
holistic organizational dialectic, and its insistence on the 
incremental implementation of an essentially unreachable target 
environment. This will be partly a problem of understanding, and 
partly a problem of gaining commitment to the levels of_ effort 
and resource that are undoubtedly called for. Nevertheless, the 
conclusions drawn from the field survey discussed in Chapter 3 
indicate that there is indeed a need for just such a Framework in 





I. THE FUTURE FOR IT STRATEGY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Although the subject matter of the proposed decision mak~ng 
Framework is specifically information technology, this Study has 
been at pains to emphasize that it would be a major error of 
judgment to concentrate only on the artifacts - the machines, 
tools, telecommunications, and even the application systems. At 
least equally as important as these for successful IT strategy 
are the political, social and economic factors in a company's 
external operating environment, and the organizational and 
cultural factors of its internal environment. 
Hence the scope of strategic IT decision making as characterized 
in this Study is far wider than the issues of hardware, software 
and methodologies - it extends,· indeed, to the underlying forces 
operating beneath the appearances of environmental change and 
turbulence, and the underlying beliefs and as~umptions that 
determine the way these are taken into account in decisions. The 
first requirement in strategic IT decision making is to know what 
these forces and these assumptions are. 
On the other hand, not everyone accepts the frequently made claim 
that IT will lead to fundamental changes in the entire social and 
economic fabric of the country. Even in the context of a single 
company, few respondents in the survey pool seemed ready to 
accept the validity of impact IT strategy - and perhaps not 
unwisely so. 
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Major world-wide trends in IT today include: 
Dramatically reducing cost relative to other technologies 
and to human labour, and dramatically increasing 
functionality and power. 
The merging of hitherto separate information technologies -
data processing, telecommunications, office automation, 
robotics, and so forth. 
The ever-improving ease of operation of the systems, 
through increased sophistication of the software and the 
human interface - for example, through the use of 
artificial intelligence. 
These trends taken together mean that IT has become a daily fact 
of life across a wide spectrum of technical and non-technical 
people, in the First World and to an increasing extent even in 
the Third World. People now expect a sophisticated IT component 
in almost any product or service, from arcade games and motor 
cars to medical care and financial services. 
The present political and economic uncertainties make it 
unlikely, however, that these developments will influence South 
African business strategies to anything like the extent that they 
have done and will yet do overseas. There are a several reasons 
why South African managers' expectations should be cautious: 
The notorious scarcity of specialist IT skills throughout 
the world is a particularly daunting problem in South 
Africa, given the inadequate education of the vast--majority 
of the youth of this country and the considerable legal, 
regulatory and attitudinal obstacles in the way of doing 
anything about it. 
The country's geographic isolation from the top thinkers 
and planners in the fields of business and IT strategy 
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becomes more of a problem as these people become less 
willing or able to visit (or to receive) South Africans. 
There is the very real danger of mandatory sanctions on 
hardware and software exports to this country, and large 
corporations are already "buying forward". It is one thing 
for a company to be denied access to technologies when the 
competition is similarly denied, but quite another when the 
competition gets in early enough and only the company is 
denied. Worst is for a company to find its supplies and 
maintenance cut off once it has committed to a technology. 
In South Africa, it will probably be those companies who best 
evaluate the opportunities and risks, build an environment in 
which to assimilate and exploit judiciously chosen technologies, 
and carefully husband their scarce resources, that will achieve 
significant and sustainable competitive advantage from IT. The 
question remains, however, whether even the cautious and the 
doubting Thomas's can afford to ignore the message of the 
competitive weapon stories, and risk the possibility of being 
reduced, as Warren McFarlan would put it, to "playing catchup". 
In this country, management would be wise to satisfy itself on 
four fundamental issues before it embarked on IT-based business 
strategies: 
Firstly, the company generally and its IT function in 
particular should already have reached an appreciable level 
of competence and cooperation in applying IT in the 
traditional support-orientated ways. 
Secondly, achieving a favourable political, social and 
economic environment will entail a far more interactive 
involvement by businessmen in the political and social 
fields than most seem willing to undertake. 
Thirdly, management will have to bring itself to an 
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explicit acceptance of the entrepreneurial mode of 
strategic behaviour, and encourage corresponding attitudes 
at all levels of decision making in the company. Wiseman 
[1985: 179-180] sums up this issue in three principles of 
"strategic IT vision": 
The general purpose of the firm is to organize the use 
of the resources at its disposal so that it can 
achieve its long-term profitability and growth goals. 
The range of possible uses of the resources at the 
firm's disposal is limited only by the experience, 
knowledge, and imagination of its employees. 
Entrepreneurs are responsible for identifying new, 
productive uses of the resources at the firm's 
disposal. 
Finally, the entrepreneurial attitude to IT is frankly 
opportunistic, and the traditional paradigm of nuser needs" 
is absorbed into a more general schema of domain 
responsibilities in which owner purposes are predominant. 
The question must then be asked as to how it will be 
ensured that a company uses its new "competitive weapons" -
whose full power it has not even begun to understand - in 
the best interests of the society which sanctions its 
existence. What is good IT strategy in Europe or the 
United States is not necessarily good in Asia or Africa. 
For these if for no other reasons, a new perspective on strategic 
IT decision making as advocated in this Study is urgently needed 
in South Africa. The ways in which this study and the decision 
making Framework that it proposes aims to contribute to the new 
perspective are summarized in the following Section. 
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II. THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
Figure 29 indicates eight themes through which the Framework 
encourages a shift in IT management thinking from the traditional 
modes to new, more interactive modes: 
IT Positionina: Most traditional IT planning efforts 
result in alignment IT strategy. At least insofar as IT 
decision making is concerned, the mode of business strategy 
tends to be competitive rather than entrepreneurial, and 
the business planning approaches are at best preactive. 
Virtually all the IT planning tools and techniques in 
current use aim at fulfilling identified "user needs" in 
existing organizational structures and processes, in 
support of predetermined business strategies. 
The Framework, however, emphasizes the choice management 
has between alignment and impact IT strategy, depending on 
its circumstances as expressed in terms of the strategy 
evaluation grid. It shows how, in applying IT to change 
the strategy and design of the company, management can 
define and calculate the competitive advantage it hopes to 
gain by this, where it should focus its investment in 
human, financial and technological resources, and how to 
identify technologies appropriate to these aims. The 
messages of the competitive weapon stories thereby become 
feasible propositions for many companies. 
Master strateay: The traditional emphasis on alignment IT 
strategy and on the quantification of benefits in terms of 
cost displacement leads to a focus on cost leadership 
strategy, whether or not this happens in reality to be the 
company's master strategy. 
The Framework, however, emphasizes the fact that a company 
has many choices of master strategy. Any of these can be 
considered in strategic IT decision making, and there are 
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many choices of targets towards which the strategy can be 
directed. 
pyrposes and Uses of ~: The presumption of cost displace-
ment and task and process efficiency as the strategic role 
of IT resulted, until fairly recently, in an almost 
exclusive focus on management information, decision 
support, data processing, and job or process automation as 
appropriate terms of reference in requirements planning. 
In the Framework, however, these concepts become secondary, 
the primary considerations being the specific purposes of 
the applications in competitive strategy and their levels 
and classes of use in organizational design. Three 
different kinds of app~ication can be identified -
substitutive, complementary and innovative - and their 
costs justified in terms of quite different kinds of 
strategic benefit. 
It is no longer possible, in this perspective, to -
perpetuate the traditional separation of information 
systems design from the design of the organizational 
processes they are meant to support. 
Orientation of Applications: The traditional contribution 
of IT to organizational design has an internal orientation, 
and applications are selected on the basis of the known 
past and present needs of existing tasks and processes. 
Neither the effectiveness of these tasks and processes in 
achieving the organizational ends nor their alternative 
configurations are usually discussed. 
The value chain approach proposed in the Framework 
emphasizes both the internal structure of the organization 
and its external linkages with other organizations~ By 
exposing underlying generic organizational structures and 
processes as the true entities supported by information 
Page 338 
systems, it leads to a better understanding of potential 
future needs. 
Issues Q! ~ Organization: Traditionally, the issues of 
information systems organization revolve round whether or 
not to "decentralize" some or all of the functions to the 
business units and functional departments of the company. 
In the Framework, these are deemed to be implementation 
issues, if they are strategic at all, and they are· 
appropriate to the macro- and micro-architectural levels of 
discourse. Generic IT support functions that arise out of 
the Target Environment Architecture are, however, matters 
of IT strategy. They enter the organizational dialectic in 
much the same way as the generic organizational processes 
that are uncovered in strategic business systems analysis. 
Contradictions between them and the existing information 
systems organization must be discussed at the conceptual 
and meta-architectural levels, and resolved in terms of the 
fundamental concepts of differentiation and integration. 
Approaches to Problem Solving: Conventionally, problem 
solving in IT practice has been rooted in the passionless 
logic of the flowchart. Contradictions in ends, ways and 
means are errors to be avoided or eliminated, and conflicts 
of attitude and approach must be resolved through consensus 
and compromise. 
The dialectical logic advocated in the Framework has as 
much to do with imagination as rationality. Contradictions 
are regarded as a step in the analytical process, and are 
actively sought as the source of new perceptions, novel 
approaches, and innovative opportunities. Participative 
decision making and dialectical debate emphasize synthesis 
rather than compromise, and seek to direct conflict into 
healthy, productive channels by carefully clarifying roles 
and depersonalizing sensitive issues. 
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Methodoloaies: The old internal orientation of IT 
applications has been well served by the closed~system and 
"rational-comprehensive" character of traditional IT 
planning methodologies. Requirements have been correctly 
and precisely determined, at least in principle, and 
implementation has followed as efficiently as the 
competence of available personnel permitted. The 
understanding of "requirements", however, has.been limited, 
relying as it has usually done on past and present needs as 
perceived by actors within the system. 
The Framework has an open-system orientation in several 
respects: 
Its levels of incremental implementation and adaptive 
learning, which imply continual response to changes in 
the environment. 
Its reliance on value chain and value system analysis, 
which implies that the company and its IT strategy are 
planned in the context of a larger whole. 
Its nature as an open tool-box rather than a set of 
prescribed tools and techniques, which means that 
users are encouraged to seek out and use whatever 
decision making aids are suitable and available, or 
may in future become available. 
The five "principle disciplines" underlying the Framework 
are all well-recognized fields of expertise, in which 
trained educators, consultants and facilitators are readily 
available in South Africa. While the Framework does not 
claim to be a methodology, it is a means of integrating 
these disciplines into a credible and practical support 
system for strategic IT decision making in a specific 
company. 
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Paradigm: Finally, all of the above differences are summed 
up by the shift in the over-arching criterion for strategic 
requirements - from the sovereignty of "user requirements" 
to the "mutual responsibility" shared by four dist~nct but 
cooperating domains of strategic IT decision makers. 
There are, however, pitfalls to be avoided in embracing the 
new paradigm. Although maximum appropriate involvement of 
users and operators in transforming the systems within 
which they are expected to work is certainly an ideal of 
the Framework, nevertheless a fundamental·error owners and 
developers must avoid is "bowing·to spontaneity" - to fads, 
to the unproven "insights" of enthusiastic users, to new, 
exciting, but untested technologies, and to a demand for 
systems and system changes whose relationship to the agreed 
purposes and uses of IT has not been demonstrated. 
The greater and more widespread the upsurge of user and 
operator involvement, the incomparably greater and more 
complex the need for competence and control in managing the 
theoretical, technical, political, and cultural strands of 
IT strategy. But clinging to the outworn structures of 
earlier stages of development - e.g. rigid centralization 
of information systems functions, and inflexible budgetary 
control - is not an appropriate dialectical response. 
It could be argued [cf. Churchman & Schainblatt, 1965] that one 
of the major causes of the rift between business and IT thinking 
in traditional strategic decision making has been a certain 
arrogance on both sides. There is a tendency for many IT people 
to believe that, because they think rationally and clearly in 
their own field, they can think rationally and clearly in any 
decision making situation. Many business people, on the other 
hand, seem to believe that IT people do not have the "gut feel" 
for business problems, or enough experience of the ••real world" 
to contribute more to strategic thinking than commentary on 
technical feasibility. 
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At the same time, the typical IT planning methodology seems to 
have been based on the premise that a certain kind of reasoning 
must prevail, and that once this way of thinking has been made 
clear the problem analysis and the proposal that results from it 
will be understood and accepted by all who are neither negligent 
nor stupid. Business people, for their part, seem to believe 
that their goals and problems are so complicated, so elusive, so 
creative, that they must forever remain beyond the reach of 
anything so simplistic as a methodology. 
It is hoped that the shift in management thinking exemplified in 
the above eight themes will result in the owners and users of the 
business domain coming to a better understanding of what drives 
IT people, and a better appreciation of the role they can play in 
strategic decision making. It is hoped that the developers and 
operators of the IT domain will learn more about the objectives 
and priorities of business people, possibly by emulating them in 
learning how to manage DP as a "business within a business" 
[Nolan, 1982: 237]. 
In these circumstances, it is not unreasona~le to expect that 
many tasks in the business and IT domains will eventually draw 
closer together, and that Churchman & Schainblatt•s [1965] 
"mutual understanding" position will eventually become the 
organizational and cultural norm. This would rank among the most 
significant contributions the Framework can make to strategic IT 






Business Member Responses 
Sector Company Name Class Received 
1 Allied Building Society A ABC 
1 Bankorpdata A c 
3 BP Southern Africa A c 
3 Caltex Oil A A B c 
1 Commercial Union Assuran!=!e B c 
4 Edgars Stores A A B c 
2 Esc om A A B c 
1 First National Bank A B c 
4 Foschini· A A B c 
1 Johannesburg Stock Exchange A A B c 
2 Kanhym B A B c 
1 Metropolitan Homes Trust A A B c 
3 Mobil Oil A A B c 
1 Mutual & Federal B A B c 
2 Nissan SA A A B c 
4 OK Bazaars A A c 
1 Old Mutual A A B c 
2 S.A. Nylon Spinners B c 
1 S.A. Reserve Bank A A B c 
5 S.A. Transport Services A A B c 
1 Santam Versekering A A B c 
3 Shell South Africa A A B c 
2 Smithdata B c 






Toyota Marketing Company B A B c 
United Building Society A A B c 
Volkskas A A B c 
wooltru A A B c 
Business Sector: 1 = Finance 5 = Transport 
2 = Industry 6 = Mining 
3 = Oil 7 = Bureau 
4 = Retail 
Membershin Class: A = 1 to 9 DP employees 
B = 10 to 49 DP employees 
c = 50 or more DP employees 
Resnonse ~= A = Business person, no IT involvement 
B = Business person involved in IT 





Declined to participate 
No responses received 
Members not ROlled: 
Government departments, suppliers, 
education, training, personnel 
agencies 








THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
This Appendix shows the Survey Questionnaire and the covering 
letter under which it was sent out. It will be seen from the 
latter that three versions of the questionnaire were sent to each 
company, although only version "C" is shown here. 




Question 1: "I am not an IT professional, and have 
little or no involvement in IT decisions" 
Other questions included: 28 - 91; 108 - 173; 181 - 188. 
Question 1: "I am not an IT professional, but I am 
involved in strategic IT decisions" 
Other questions included: 12 - 188. 
Question 1: "I am an IT professional, and I am 
involved in strategic IT decisions" 
Other questions included: all, i.e. 2 - 188. 
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Stationery of COMPUTER USERS COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA 
November 1987 
Dear 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROGRAMME 
Attached to this letter you will find three copies of a survey 
questionnaire, dealing with: 
"STRATEGIC IT DECISION MAKING 1H SOUTH AFRICA". 
This is the first project in our new Information Exchange 
Programme, which was announced at our Annual General Meeting on 
Friday, 20th November. 
I am convinced that you will find both the results and the 
questionnaire itself interesting and useful, and that your time 
and effort will be well justified. If you would like a copy of 
my list of references to the strategic IT planning literature, I 
will happily send it to you - just indicate accordingly at the 
end of the questionnaire. 
Please, may I very earnestly ask you to support this exercise? 
The more responses we receive, the more useful and reliable the 
results will be. The returns will be treated with the strictest 
confidence, and will not be shown to anyone outside of the small 
research team without your express permission. In this 
connection, I must also add that the survey forms part of my 
research work towards the Master of Commerce Degree in Business 
Data Processing at the University of Cape Town. 
The three copies of the questionnaire are marked "A", "B" and 
"C". Would you please have each filled in, separately aJl.d 
without discussion, by an appropriate person as indicated on the 
front page. These should be people who have some insight into 
the company's business, but who do not have strong hobby-horses 
or biases that are not typical of management in your company. · 
Could the completed forms please be returned to me, at my home 
address, before you break for the Seasonal holidays, or before 
the end of December at the latest? My home address is: 14 
Juliana Veld South, PINELANDS, 7405. If you would like to ask me 
anything, I can be contacted at (021) 509-2037 (Office) or (021) 
53-1713 (Home). 
May I thank you in advance for your valued participation in this 
exercise, and offer you my sincere good wishes for Christmas and 





strategic IT DeciSion Maki.rg in south Africa 
Introduction 
'!his is a survey of strategic decision maki.rxj :roles ani 
practices in south African c:x:mpanies, with regard to IT 
(infonnation tedmology am systems). It covers both the 
use of IT in business strategies, am the lOI"XJ-tenn 
tedmical ·strategies for managirg IT. 
'Ihe survey is a project in the Infonnation Exdlange 
Progranune of the carprt:er Users <nmcil of south Africa, 
ani the finti.rgs will be presented to lnE'Jli:lers as one of 
the benefits of membership. 
Instructions 
Please answer the ''box'' questions by tickin;J the box you 
believe gives the best answer, or by enterirg a rati..rg as 
requested. You are welCCI'le to add further detail or to 
mention any difficulty in interpreti.nj the questions. 
1here are many :roles in strategic IT decision making, at 
all levels of the c:x:mpany. It is assumed that the 
follCMirg is a reasonable description of yours: 
I am an IT professional, arrl I am 
involved in strategic IT decisions 1 
'!his is an opinion survey - there are NO right or wrong 
answers. Whatever your opinions may be, they are inportant 
inp.It to the research. 
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'nle followirg are key organizational characteristics. For eacb 
enter your best guess at the informatim requested, or tick the 
box that JOOSt nearly fits the facts. 
Q:mpany' s name 
Your imustzy 
size of your oarpmy relative 
to the zest of your imustzy 
Total n.Jmber of enployees: 
'!he entire c:xmpany 
Ccmp.Iter ~tions, e.g. 
operators, tedmical st.gX>rt 
Systems developnent, e.g. 
analysts' progranm:ers' data 
base administrators 
ccmpany organization structure 
IT organization structure 






Multiple rosiness units/ 
profit centres 
other ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Sirgle unit 
Central catp.rt:er operations 
plus decentralized systems 
developnent departments 
Central systems devel<:lp!Elt 
depa.rt:rtent plus deoentral-
ized CCIIplter operations 
other ..................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Approxinate total IT/DP budc;jet (current financial year) : 
capital experrliture R 
10 
Operatirg expenses, includin::J R 







Please tick YES or m in answer to the followini questions, 
whi.cbever seems closest to the facts abcut yrur cx:mpmy. 
Is there a fonnal. oozporate pl.am'ri.n3 am;or 
~ envircnDent scamrl.rg prooess in yrur <X"''P"H"JY? 
Is there a oc:arpany-wide IT decisicm maki.n:J pzooess 
~ of any Jdni? 
Is there fonnal. interacticm between these two 
~ . int m9etin:Js :ts? ~es, e.g. JO , zepo~ . 
Is the cycle aver which senior management try to 
~ oantrol the grc:Mth of IT costs 2 years or lCDJer? 
Is the overall strategic benefit of IT, in oc:arpany-
~ wide tenns, measured arrl evaluated in any way? 
Taken over the last, current am next (projected) 
~ finarx::ial years, is the overall level of IT expenses ~ at a greater rate than gross sales revenue? 
Are IT develcpnent costs dlal:qed back to users, 
IYINI either Wholly or in part? 
Are rurm:ii¥J costs of operational IT systems charged 
~ back to users, either wholly or in part? 
Are the benefits am;or risks of particular IT 
~ cq:.plications am projects evaluated in any way? 
Ikles yair cx:xrpany have a documented IT strategy 
IYINI an:ljor an infonnation systems architecture? 
Ikles yair cx:xrpany have a senior executive steeri.rr:J 
~ oc:mnittee for IT? 
Ikles the CC1'l'pal'JY have special posts to co-ordinate 
~ all the varioos facets of CXI'lUI.micaticm between IT am the users, e.g. "aOCCA.Jnt executives"? 
Has a "senior technology officer" or "IT R&D'' post 
~ been created separate fran the day-to-day data process~ responsibilities 
.[k)es yair cx:mpany have ''business analysts" or O&M 
~ peq>le lillho look at office t«>rkflows arrl joo designs as they relate to the cx::atprt:er systems? 
J:k> ycu have "user-progranurers" on your rnainfrane 
~ am;or an "infonnation centre" awroac:h to bards-on mainframe OC!1p.lt.i.rr:J services for users? 
Are personal carprt:ers used extensively, or are they 


















lblt is your cpinion regardinJ each of the followirx] strategic 
issnes? Please qive your answer in two parts, as follows: 
Rate the inportanoe of each issue to your c:x:mpany, on a scale 
of 1 (least .i.nport:ant) to 10 (IOOSt .i.nport:ant). 
For those soor.i.n:.J aver 5, rate how well the CX'IIpa11y manaqes it, 
using this scale: -2 = ver.y poorly, -1 = less than adequately, 0 = adequately 1 + 1 = better than average, +2 = ver.y well 
Ratirg HorN Managed 
Cclr1tiJgency plans against env.i.rornnental. 
threats, e.g. political action, 
security 1 disaster 
Co-operclt.i.n:.J with SAro in develq>.i.n:.J the 
national telecarmmications services 
Participat.i.n:.J in bodies such as the 
Cctip..lter Society, Cclrpiter users council 
Vemor relations an:i reliability of 
tedmology suwly sources 
Makirg better use of IT to gain or 
maintain canpetitive advantage 
DefininJ an:i measuring the IT 
OOIIlr:ib.ztion to business oojectives 
In::reasi.rg the scx::pe/pace of office or 
factory autanation 
Develcpi.rg better management infonnation 
am;or decision Sllf.P)rt systems 
Develcpi.rg better systems links with 
other organizations 
Exploiti.rg new tedmologies, e.g. image, 
expert systems, voice/data integration 
Develcpi.rg a CCBTpany-wide IT infra-
stnlcture to integrate diverse t.ec.hno-
logies (data, voice,- image, etc.) 
Shorteni.rg the time it takes to develop 
new awlication systems 
Inprovin:J the quality of cperational 
systems ani services 
Utilis.i.ng better software developnent 
tools anj techniques 
Adapting office systems an:i jci:ls to make 
the JOOSt effective use of IT 
Very Very 
Poorly • • • • Well 
D j-21-11 ol+11+21 28 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 29 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 30 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 
D 1-21-11 oj+11+21 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+2l 34 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 35 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 36 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 37 





D 1-21-11 oj+11+21 39 
D 1-21-11 oj+11+21 40 
D 1-21-11 oj+1,+21 41 
D l-2j-1l oj+11+21 42 
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Drasti.cally reduci.rg the annmt of ·o (-21-11 ol+ll+21 paper hamli.rg in the c:x:mpany 43 
Managhg data as a oc:arpmy-wide (or 
D 1-21-ll ol+lj+21 hlsiness unit) :resooroe 44 
Develcpi.rg a oarpany-wide (or hlsiness D (-21-ll ol+ll+21 unit) ~lications portfolio 45 
Pl:'a1Dt.:in3 JOOre em-user c::x:l1pitirg' an D 1-21-11 ol+ll+21 mainframes am;or micros 46 
Increasin;J the use of packaged software D (-21-ll ol+ll+21 instead of inhouse prograit'GllinJ 47 
DevelcpinJ am retainirx.J skilled IT D 1-21-ll ol+ll+2j human resources 48 
Measurin:J am cxmtrolli.n:J cnsts, D 1-21-ll ol+ll+2j benefits am risks of IT projects 49 
Measurin:J the effectiveness of IT 
D 1-21-ll of+ll+2j managenent am technical staff 50 
Takirg better account of strategic IT 
D 1-21-11 ol+il+21 issues in business planning processes 51 
Develcpinj IT organizational structures D 1-21-ll ol+ll+21 am clarifyi.rg decision lllak:mj roles 52 
controllirg the overall level am rate 
D 1-21-ll ol+ll+21 of increase of IT rosts 53 
I..eanrirg ftan experience to make better 
D 1-21-ll ol+ll+21 strategic decisions ooncernin:J IT 54 
I..eanrirg how to identify am assimilate 
D 1-21-11 ol+ll+2j relevant technologies into the c::arpany 55 
Improvi.rg the quality of the dialogue 
D 1-21-11 oj+1j+21 between hlsiness am IT managarent 56 
Buildin.J IT managenent disciplines D 1-21-11 ol+11+2j am technological leadership skills 57 
other: D (-21-11 ol+11+2j 58 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 59 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+2j 60 
D 1-21-11 ol+ll+21 61 
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How far wall.d yw agree with the follO'iiin;J statements abait the 
jnport:aooe of ~ good IT decisioos in yoor oc::.npmy? 
-2 =strongly disagree -1 =disagree 0 = mt really sure 
+1 = agree +2 = strorgly agree 
'lhe survival am grc1trlth of mr cnrpany depem 
critically a1 mr exi.stin;J ~ticmal. systems 
'lhe survival am grc1trlth of mr CX'J'f'{)3l'1Y depen:i 
critically oo mr de!vel.q>in:J new awlicatioos 
Effective IT support in our CXJ'TP3l1Y requires 
neticuloos capacity am q>eraticmal. plannin;J 
Providirg strategic IT capability in a oc:upany 
sudl as ours demarrls a lon;J tenn plannin;J 
effort, at least tlu:ee years into the :fub.n:e 
strargly strargly 
Disagree • • Agree 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 62 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 63 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 64 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 65 
.Adrlevi.n:J cxmpany goals demarrls a high starrlard 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 of two-way dialogue between mr b.lsiness 
planners am our IT planners 66 
Good IT decisions need sc:me inp.rt: fran our 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 blsiness planners, but c::x::Hipany goals are not 
critically deperrlent on IT oonstraints 67 
We can develop IT capabilities that will 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 alter aJr cx::atpany IS mission am objectives 
68 
In a CXJ'I'{lal1Y sudl as ours, strategic IT 
1-21-11 ol+11+21· decisia1 JDakinJ should be fonnalized, with 
clear-cut goals, proc:esses am criteria 69 
Develq>in:J an IT infrastnlcture is a matter of 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 strategic capability, which can am shall.d be addressed in advance of specific awlications 70 
A carefully thought out picture of saxe ideal 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 :fub.n:e cx::tlplting infrastnlcture is the only basis a1 whidl to build an IT strategy 71 
'Dle ally practical way to inplement an IT 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 strategy is piec:le-by-piece as needs energe, 
buil~ on '\tiDat the oc:upany already has 72 
'Dle best way to get gcx:xl IT decisions is to 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 involve as many people as possible, whatever 
the extra tine am effort this requires 73 
A good rr strategy must start with cxmpany 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 objectives am the pllllX>Se5 served by IT in 
that OCXltext 74 
A good rr strategy exploits any feasible IT 
.1-21-11 ol+11+21 owortunity 1 trmatever the oc:upany mission 
maybe 75 
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Hc:M far would ycu agree with each of the followi.rg statements 
abo.It the quality of IT decision ma.kin;J in yoor CX'JT'P"U1Y? 
-2 = st:J:'cn;Jly disagree -1 = disagree 0 =rot really sw:e 
+ 1 = agree +2 = st:J:'cn;Jly agree 
8t.r<n3ly Sb:agly 
Disagree • • 1qree 
We are doirg little to a:Ner rurselves against I I I I I I 
significant enviramnental. threats -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
76 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 77 
~ ,;:;:=::: a':,~~of the natme I-2H oluH 78 
OUr b.Jsiness managers give little or 
no sense of direction to rur IT plannirg 
OUr an:rent c:pmltional systaiS meet their 
blsiness objectives very well 1-21-11 ol+11+21 79 
~ al~ ~ "!'Plicatim systeos"" need""' I-2H oluH 80 
~ ~=~ :~: ~ ~tai I-2H oluH 81 
OUr IT team is reasonably stable - levels of 
'b.lnxwer ani vacancy are tolerable 
M:::lst of rur IT managers are ccxrpetent am 
experienced . 
M:::lst of rur IT technical staff are ccxrpetent 
arxi experienced 
We have had few if any major systaiS failures 
CNer the last two years 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 82 
1-21-11 oj+ll+21 83 
1-21-11 oj+ll+21 84 
1-21-11 ol+11+21 85 
:7~J:..~~mal~~ I-2H oluH 
86 
We lag behini the rest of the irx:lusb:y in rur 
exploitation of strategic IT opporbmities l-21-11 ol+ll+21 87 
~":~!"'~"::I~ H-11 oluH as 
We invest a satisfacto:ry level of human ani 
financial resources in :research.:inJ new 
tedmologies arrl ORX>rbmities 
We already have effective ways of Il&lSUrirg the 
CNerall IT contribution to rur strategic goals 
We already have effective ways of Il&lSUri.rg 
IT m:magem;mt effectiveness 






How centralized/decentralized is participation in strategic IT 
decision makiir:j in ycur carpany? 
VC = very centralized c = saner.mat centralized B = balan:Jed 
D = sanewhat decentralized VD = very decentralized 
SelectinJ mainframe ocmp1ters am related 
lvc I I I 0 I vol hardware c B 92 
SelectinJ tenninals, personal oarp.tters, 
lvc I I I 0 I vol ather "personal" equipnent c B 93 
Detenni.nin;J the scale ani geograpric 
lvc I I I I voj ~ of the data ocmmm.ications network c B D 94_ 
Select:in:J mainframe software, e.g. the 
lvc I I I I voj operatin:J system, database, larguaqes c B D 95 
SelectinJ application packages, e.g. 
lvc I I I I vol payroll, general ledger c B D 96 
Analysirg data am desiqnin;J the 
lvc I I I I voj files ani databases c B D 97 
.AWlication systems - selecting, jvc I cl sl I vol justifying ani prioritizing D 
98 
.AWlication systems- analysis, design, 
lvc I I I I voj progranuning' testing c B D 99 
Decidi.n;J on the operational catpiter 
lvc I I I I voj services - schedules, response t~ c B D 100 
Establishing acx::ess controls ani other 
lvc I cl I I voj security measures (all kil'rls) B D 101 
Adaptirg am;or stamardizing office lvc I I I I voj systems ani jabs to ma:tdl the carp.rt:er c B D systems 102 
Decidi.n;J on the overall level of 
lvc I I vol main:frane ani disk capacity c B D 
103 
Decidi.n;J on the appropriate overall 
lvc I I voj level of IT costs c B D 
104 
Forecasting future business volumes ani 
lvc I I voj needs for capacity planning purposes c B D 
105 
'l'ec::fm:>logy research ani developnent 
lvc I I vol projects; liaison with verrlors c B D 
106 
Fo:rnulati.rg the c:x:mpany' s overall IT jvc I I vol strategy c B D 
107 
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'!he follOIIin;J are cxmnon tools ani tedmiques available to help 
in strategic IT decision maki.nJ. What do ya1 know of them? 
? =Never heard of it 
H = Heard of it, hit never used it 
T = Tried it, hit did mt fin:l it useful 
u = Fam:i it JOOderately useful 
W = Fam:i it very useful 
BrainstoJ:mi:rq ? I HIT I 0 I wl 
D.Jsiness strategy JOOdel (any) ? I HIT I 0 I wl 
Business Systems Plannirg (BSP) (IJI.f] ? I H I T I u lwl 
Costjbenefit evaluation JOOdel (any) ? I HI T I u lwl 
Critical success Factors [Rockart] ? I HI T I u lwl 
Envirornrental scann:in:J (any) ? I HIT I 0 I wl 
Feasibility studies (any) ? I HI T I u I wl 
Financial JOOdelli.ng (any) ? I HI T I u I wl 
Nolan stages 'lheory ? I HIT I 0 I wl 
Nan:inal group technique ? I H IT I u lwl 
PERI', Critical Path Scheduling ? I HI T I u I wl or silnil.ar 
Porter ••strategic forces" ? I HI T I u jwl 
Porter "value dlain" analysis ? I HIT I u I wl 
Project managem:mt system (any) I ? I H I T I u I wl 
Service level agt"eements between I 1 ·1 H I T I 0 I wj operations ani users 


















I HIT I 0 I wl Tetrardl [O'm:XI'l] ? 
124 
User Needs Survey [Al.loway;art:ler OJx] ? I HIT I 0 I wl 
125 
other:- ? I HIT I 0 I wl 
126 
'!he foll~ are sane lesser known tools am tedmiques. 
lilat do yoo kr¥:Jw abrut them? 
Ig>lication portfolio [Nolan] ? I HI T I u I wl 
127 
BIAIT Enterprise Analysis ? I H I T I u lwl 128 
B+<>Irl-D Methodology [Online People] ? I HI Tl u lwl 
129 
D.lsiness Infonnation Control study ? I HI Tl u lwl 
(BICS) [IIM] 130 
Olange managenent process (any) ? I HI T I u I wj 
132 
CUstamer Resource Life cycle [Ives] ? I HI Tl u jwl 
133 
Enterprise survey [Hansen] ? I HI T I u lwl 134 
EnteJ::prise-wide Infonnation Management ? I H I Tl u lwl (EwlM) [liM] 135 
Executive Plannirg for ll3.ta Processing ? I HI T I u I wl 
(EP/DP) [liM, Canada] 136 
:rnnova.tion managenent technique (any) ? I HI T I u lwl 137 
IS strategic Grid (McFarlan] ? I HI T I u I wl 
138 
IS 1-blel am Ardritecture Generator ? I HI T I u lwl (ISIDD) 139 
Org. Infonnation Reql.lirenents Analysis ? I HI T I u I wl 
(Wethe.rl:>e/ll3.Vis] 140 
lbrtfolio risk analysis [McFarlan] ? I HI T I u lwl 141 
Priority settirg method (any) ? I HI T I u lwl 142 
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OVerall, how suooessfully do yru think yoor oarpany's IT 
decision maJd.rg meets the folle~Winj criteria? 
-2 = very poorly -1 = less than adequately 
+1 =better than average +2 =very well 
Results in a significant reduction or 
oont:airJient of operatirg costs or headcx:Junt 
Results in a significant increase in 
tunxwer or profit margin 
Results in a great .inprovement in the 
quality of our products or senrires 
Results in a good image of our c::x:xrpany as 
an effective user of ''high t:ec:h" 
A major factor in our gai.nirg or ret:.ainin;J 
market share 
A major reason for our readti.nJ our goals 
for cxmpany growth 
A major factor in our reaching our targets 
for the overall return on capital enployed 
in the c:x:mpany 
SUccessfully oo-ordinates many participants, 
fran nany backgrclums, am gets them to 
readl consensus 
Creates a high quality of dialogue between the 
business planners am the IT specialists 
Sorts cut am clarifies the diverse issues of 
IT strategy am heM they inter-relate 
Expedites decision maJd.rg so well that we can 
develcp or c::harge our Systems quickly in 
response to market needs 
Results in excellent tmierst:arxli.nJ between 
the users am the people wo manage our 
CO]Oirg operational services 
0 = adequately 
Very Very 


























What is yair q>inicm regardi.n;J each of the folladn:j pnposes 
for 'Which yair C'XJ'l'{WlY cxW.d use IT strategically? Please 
give yair answer in two parts as follONS: 
Rate the likelihood of each p.npose as an area of qporbmity, 
em a scale of 1 (least likely) to 10 (IOOSt likely). 
For those soorin;J aver 5, rate how well the oarpany exploits it 
usinj this scale: -2 =not at all, -1 = peJ:haps a little, 
o = adequately, +1 = reasonably well, +2 =very well 
Create value-added features in oor 
products or service, the ''marketi..n;J mix" 
Ratiig HCM Exploited 
Not Very 
at all ••••• Well 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 
Make it m:>re difficult for our custane:rs 
D 1-21-11 oj+1j+21 or clistril:::JUto:rs to switch fran us 
Enable us to becane the low-cost narket 
D 1-21-11 oj+11+21 leader 
Enable us to forward-integrate into 
D 1-21-11 oj+1j+2j oor clistr:i.b.ltion dlain 
Encourage oor suwlie:rs to c:xxrpete 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 aggressively for our b.ls:iness 
Encourage suwlie:rs to confonn with 
D 1-21-11 oj+1j+2j oor production schedules, e.g. "kan-ban" 
Make it easier for us to switch oor 
D 1-21-11 oi+11+2J b.lsiness anw::>rg suwlie:rs 
Enable us to backward-integrate into 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+2j oor SUf.PlY dlain 
Significantly distinguish our product, 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 service, image, fran our oarpetito:rs 
Enable us to organize an:i administer 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 oor CCI'l'paily much 11Dre effectively than oor cx:::np::=tito:rs 
Make it difficult for our existing 
D oarpetito:rs to gain access to our 1-21-11 ol+11+21 custane:rs 
D:i.scxJurage new entrants to our narket, 
by raisinj the m:in:inn.nn level of D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 i.nvestnent in systens an:i services 
Discourage new entrants to our narket, 















Di.soourage new entrants to oor market, 
thrc:u;Jh exclusive networks am joint 
sezvices with exi.stirq players 
Di.soourage substitutes for oor products, 
by creat.:in;J a OCillprehensive rarge of 
integrated products am services 
Di.soourage substitutes for oor products, 
by mai.nt:ain:i.rg highly ~titive 
prioetperfo~ 
Di.soourage substitutes for oor products, 
thrc:u;Jh networks am joint sezvioes with 
CCillpanies producin:J related products 
~= --------------------------- D 1-21-11 ol+1 1+2l 
D 1-21-11 ol+11+21 
'!he followin:J are sane of the uses of IT that can be . applied 
to the above strategic purposes. Usirg the oorrespo~ 
question numbers (155 to 173}, i.rxlicate w.hich use would be 
best applied to the strategic purposes you rated nore than 5. 
Exanple: Inter-organizational systems 158, 171 
Autc.mation of office processes 
Autc.mation of factory processes 
Autc.mation of controls 
Inter-organizational systems 
Professional support, e.g. CAD 
Autana:tirg the client interface, 
e.g. autanatic teller machines 
Management infonnation arrljor 














Yo.n- name: 181 
Yo.n- job title: 182 
Yo.n- area of responsibility: Q>rporate 0 Business lmit 0 183 
If a rosiness unit, tt.hl.c:h? 184 
II Finally, sane questions abrut the questiamaire itself. II 
Very Very 
tedious • • • interestirg 
How do feel about the task of fillirg 
it in? 
What new :insights into the issues of 
strategic IT decision mak:in:J came to you 
while fillin} it in? 
How useful would it be to you as an aide-
neiiDire in your own strategic thi.nkirg am 
d . . .... ,.lr; ........ ? ec1S1.0I1 £·~~· 
Would you like a copy of the select 
bibliQCJraiXly of useful strategic 
IT plarinin.J literature? 
j-21-11 oj+11+21 18~ 
Very Very 
fer« . • . • . • • lDal'1.}' 
Very Very 
lill1Cil • • • • • • • • • • little 
187 
.. 
'!hank you very nuch for participatirg. We hope you will f.in:i 
the research results useful, am that they will justify the 




This Glossary contains words and phrases which belong to other 
authors, or which are in general use, but are used in a special 
way in the Framework described in Chapter 4. Concepts and 
constructs defined in the Framework itself are not repeated here. 
Alignment IT Strategy: A functional area strategy for the 
application of IT as a resource of the company, in support of 
a business strategy that has been laid down relatively . 
independently of IT considerations. 
Alignment IT strategy provides support for improving the 
organization as it now exists. It differs from impact IT 
strategy in regard to the amount of change the application of 
IT is allowed to introduce into the organizational design 
andjor organizational strategy set. The presumption is that 
the "organizational strategy set", i.e. company mission and 
objectives and the competitive strategy [King, 1978], and the 
fundamental organizational design will not change 
significantly. 
In impact IT strategy, it is precisely understood that at 
least some elements of these will change significantly if the 
IT strategy is successful [cf. Benson & Parker, 1986: 71]. 
The point where an IT strategy ceases to be alignment and 
becomes impact is a matter of opinion. The term is borrowed 
from Benson and Parker [1985: 17] but is defined differently 
in this Study. See also "impact IT strategy". 
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Architecture: Organizational and technical blueprints to guide 
implementors of IT systems and infrastructure in progressing 
towards the target environment. Architecture provides the 
fundamental designs for structures (e.g. workstation, 
network, applications portfolio, business systems) and 
policies (directives, standards, protocols, criteria). 
Business Units: Strategic sectors, strategic business units, 
divisions, etc., which focus on specific products and markets 
and are run as profit centres with management autonomy. 
Business Unit Management: The head and other senior managers of a 
business unit, including managers of decentralized functions 
(e.g. decentralized research, engineering, systems 
departments). 
Business Strategy: See "strategy". 
Central Services: Corporate functions that are essentially 
central (e.g. secretary, comptroller, legal), and other 
functions the company decides to retain centrally (e.g. all 
or some of research, engineering, IT}. 
Competitive Strategy: According to Porter [1985: 1], competitive 
strategy aims to establish for the company a profi~able and 
sustainable position against the forces that determine 
industry competition. Two central questions underlie the 
choice of competitive strategy: the attractiveness of 
industries for long-term profitability and the factors that 
determine it; the determinants of relative competitive 
position within an industry. 
Conditions for Error: Properties of the internal planning 
environment that make errors uncorrectable [Argyris & Schon, 
1978: 57-59]. These may be summarized as inadequacy 
(mistaken assumptions; incongruities; incompatibilities); 
obscurity/uncertainty (vagueness; ambiguity; excess/sparse 
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detail; untestability); inaccessibility (scatter; wi~hheld 
information; information important for action kept out of 
currency). 
Corporate: Referring to the company as a whole; common to all 
business units in a company; company-wide. 
Corporate Management: The chief executive officer (e.g. executive 
chairman, president, managing director), heads of business 
units (e.g. executive directors, general managers), heads of 
central services. 
customization: The "front end" of incremental IT strategy 
formulation; the selection of Components, Parts and Links of 
the Framework, their adaptation to the culture and 
requirements of a specific company, and their imbedding in 
the ordinary decision making processes of the company. 
CUstomizing the Framework results in the meta-architecture of 
the company's target environment. See also "instantiation". 
Dialectic: A method of seeking knowledge by question and answer. 
Matters where the debate is logical rather than factual are 
suitable for treatment by the method. The method is not 
suitable where the object is to discover new facts - in 
empirical research, for example (Russell, 1961: 109-111]. In 
the Framework, the term is used instead of simply "enquiry" 
or "debate" to reflect "the dialectical nature of the larg_er 
process of organizational change within which we find 
episodes of learning or of failure to learn". (Argyris & 
Schon, 1978: 41] See also "organizational dialectic". 
Ends: See "goals, objectives, ideals". 
Espoused Theory: See "theory of action". 
Goals, Objectives, Ideals: These terms follow Ackoff's (1981:63] 
usage. Goals are ends that can be attained within the 
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current operational planning period, which is usually one 
year and sometimes two years. 
Objectives are ends that can be attained only after the 
current operational planning period, but towards which 
progress is possible within the tactical planning period, 
which is at least one year longer than the operational 
planning period. 
Ideals are ends that are believed to be unattainable, or 
attainable only at some distant time, but towards which 
progress can be made during and after current operational and 
tactical planning periods. 
Impact IT Strategy: A business strategy in which IT is applied to 
bring about certain desired changes in the organizational 
strategy set andjor organizational design. The term is 
borrowed from Benson & Parker (1985: 18] but is defined 
differently in this Framework. See also "alignment IT 
strategy". 
Information Technology (IT): All the hardware, software, 
services, methods, tools, management processes and technical 
human skills involved in the use of information systems in 
business. 
Information Technology Support Organization (ITSO): The generic 
organizational structures and functions and management 
responsibilities involved in planning, organizing, 
implementing and controlling information systems and 
services. All of these may be centralized in one department 
of the company, or they may be distributed in any of a number 
of ways - see, for example, the Buchanan & Linowes 
"distribution spectra" (Nolan, 1982: Chs. 3& 4]. The term 
comes from the B+OL+D Methodology (Online People, Seminar 
E-01], and is used in preference to traditional terms like 
"DP", "MIS" and "IS" to avoid preconceptions. 
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Instantiation: The 11ongoing11 stages of incremental IT strategy 
formulation. The substitution of specific environmental 
information, organization structures, IT structures and 
policies, information systems, etc., for the corresponding 
generic constructs of the meta-architecture. OVer time, 
instantiation converts the meta-architecture into the 
macro-architecture of those elements of the target 
environment scheduled for implementation in the current 
medium term tactical plans. 
The term is borrowed from the Prolog programming language and 
its underlying problem solving logic [Yin & Solomon, 1987: 
40; Kowalski, 1979: 50], and indicates the process of 
11 logical closure11 in which generic concepts are bound to 
specific data [Mason, 1969: Footnote 18]. See also 
11 customization11 • 
Obiectives: See 11goals, objectives, ideals 11 • 
Organizational Development: The planned, organization-wide 
effort, managed from the top, to increase organizational 
effectiveness and health through planned interventions in the 
organization's processes, using behavioural science knowledge 
[Beckhard & Harris, 1977: 2-3]. 
This Framework proposes the 11 system-wide11 version of OD as an 
appropriate framework within which, and a set of tools to 
apply to, managing the staged transition from the company's 
current IT planning environment to the target environment. 
Organizational Dialectic: Formal decision making processes that 
address situations of organizational conflict and contra-
diction, including IT strategy problems that lie beyond the 
current limits of management experience in a company. It is 
accepted that whatever problem setting and problem solving 
techniques may be chosen, the solutions will lead inevitably 
to new situations of conflict and contradiction, and hence to 
new rounds of dialectic. [Argyris & Schon, 1978: 42] 
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Organizational ~ Learning: In the Framework, organizational 
learning is understood as both an accumulation of experience 
and an active process. The experience refers to applying 
resources and managing environmental interactions to achieve 
the company's objectives. The process is that through which 
the-conditions for development created by innovation are 
effectively managed to become "distinctive competences" of 
the organization (Hofer & Schendel, 1978: 25], and in which 
strategic decision makers themselves become more competent. 
Organizational IT learning is a particular aspect of 
organizational learning. The experience refers to an 
understanding of the impacts of IT on the organizational 
strategy set and organizational design. The process involves 
detecting and correcting errors in formulating and 
implementing IT strategy, and removing the conditions for 
error. 
''When the error detected arrl ex>rrected pennits the 
organization to canyon its present policies or 
achieve its present objectives, then that 
error-de~ionarrl-correction process is sin;Jl~ loop 
learning." [Argyris & SdlOn, 1978: 2-3] 
"Double-loop learning cx:nJrS when error is detected 
arrl ex>rrected in ways that involve the m:x.lification of 
an organization's tmierly.irg nonns, policies, am 
objectives." [Argyris & Sch6n, 1978: 3] 
Second order learning occurs when the organization learns 
through the organizational dialectic to synthesize and manage 
larger classes of IT problem, and how to adapt the learning 
apparatus itself. [cf. Argyris & Schon, 1978: 26-27] 
Planning Levels: Strategic, tactical and operational. Derives 
from Anthony's [1965] 3-level framework for planning and 
management control systems. 
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Strategy: In the Framework, this term refers to a hierarchy of 
related concepts, the principle sources of which are 
Bakopoulos & Treacy [1985], Hofer & Schendel (1978] , King 
(1978] and Porter (1980; 1985]. The business strategy of a 
company may be defined as the "fundamental pattern ot present 
and planned resource deployments and environmental 
interactions that indicates how the organization will achieve 
its objectives" (Hofer & Schendel, 1978:25]. Its external 
elements are company mission, objectives and competitive 
strategy, which may be referred to as the organizational 
strategy set [King, 1978]. Its internal elements are 
organizational design and functional area management 
strategies, e.g. marketing management strategy, manufacturing 
strategy, personnel development strategy. 
In addition to its business strategy, a company has an IT 
strategy, consisting of two parts - an IT technology strategy 
and an IT management strategy. The former refers to the 
application of IT to business purposes and uses, and the 
latter to the administrative, logistic and technical-issues 
of implementing IT. 
It is important to distinguish two kinds of IT strategy -
alignment and impact. In alignment IT strategy, both the IT 
technology strategy and the IT management strategy are 
functional area strategies in support of pre~defined business 
ends. In impact IT strategy, the IT technology strategy is 
discussed as part of the business strategy. Both technology 
strategy and management strategy induce significant changes 
in the organizational strategy set and/or the organizational 
design. 
Theory of Action: The core concept in Argyris & Schon's 
perspective of organizational learning, which is the 
perspective applied in this Framework. 
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II • • • theories createj to urxierst.anj am predict may 
be quite different fran theories createj to help 
people make events cane about. 'lhe latter, which llle 
have called theories of action, mst lead to 
urrlerstanlirg am prediction, bit they mst qo beyon:i 
these two inportant functions. 11 [Argyris & SchOn, 
1977: 5]. 
The qap between "espoused theories" - which people claim to 
be the guidelines of their actions - and "theories in use" -
which actually quide their actions, and of which they may not 





GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
The following lists are not, and probably never could be~_ 
complete. They are intended only as a starting point for the 
analysis of environmental data described in the Decision Making 
Context Component (see Section 4.2 and Figure 7). 
I. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
A. The Business Domain 
Generic factors that in the aggregate characterize the external 
operating environment of the pompany. For each factor, the 
questions that must be asked are: 
What are the specific opportunities and threats represented 
by this factor for this company, and how do they affect: 
Goals: The current operational planning period? 
Objectives: The medium-term tactical planning period? 
Ideals: The long-term? 
In each time-frame, how can IT help the company exploit the 
opportunities and cope with the threats? 
1. Global Factors 
World-wide and national opportunities and inhibitors to the 
exploitation of IT in business strategy. 
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Political, social, economic and technological infra- structure of 
the country. 
Political: The ideological, ethical and other norms of the 
country; stability, law and order; attitudes of foreign 
governments, suppliers and organizations; international 
co-operation organizations - economic, business and 
technological; international sanctions on the supply of 
technology. 
Legal: General laws and regulations - national, regional, 
fiscal; specific regulations relating to machinery, 
I 
personnel, intellectual property rights, acquisition and 
transmission of data; technology imports and exports; 
trans-border data flows. 
Social: Education and training of IT professionals from all 
population groups; housing and other social constraints in 
IT recruitment; social impacts of IT applications. 
Economic: International economic and business trends; 
national economic indicators, e.g. real growth, inflation, 
interest rates, per capita income,· income distribution; 
macro factors, e.g. natural resources, availability of 
capital, foreign exchange, level of development, 
productivity, salaries and wages; organization and mobility 
of labour; information "economics", e.g. relative costs of 
hardware, software, human resources. 
2. Industry Factors 
The company's physical, human and financial resources relative to 
the rest of the industry. 
The supplier and resource end of the company's operating 
environment. 
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The boundaries of the industry and of the company: the blurring 
of boundaries. 
Potential sources of "upstream value" in applying IT to the 
company's competitive strategy _[Porter, 1985: 34]. 
Physical Resources and Technologies: Kinds of resource and 
technology relevant to company, and trends in availability 
and development; micro-economics of company resources and 
technologies, e.g. production function, capital intensity, 
capacity; information intensity of products and processes: 
role - raw materials, sub-assemblies, services: rate of 
innovation in specific technologies. 
Human Resources: The national skills pool - size, quality, 
growth and costs: cultural and attitudinal factors: social 
and political factors: bargaining power: organized labour. 
Supply of Materials and Services: Geographical location: 
supply lines. supplier's industry - concentration, rate of 
growth, profit levels, relative level of supplier's profit 
margin, level of fixed or storage costs: supplier's product 
- standardization, differentiation, substitutes, 
price-performance trends, switching costs, relative 
importance to company (cost and use); company-supplier 
relationship - role of supplier e·.g. producer, assembler, 
re-seller, distributor; role of the company, e.g. 
assembler, re-seller, distributor; relative importance of 
company's business to supplier (revenue, market share); 
scope for vertical integration - forward by the supplier, 
backward by the company: competitive information -
available to the company about the supplier (markets, 
policies, costs, prices, turnover), and available to the 
supplier about the company. 
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3. Market Factors 
The markets in which the company's products are distributed and 
purchased. 
The buyer and comp~titor end of the company's operating 
environment. 
The boundaries of the market and of the company; the blurring of 
the boundaries. 
The potential source of "downstream value" in applying IT to the 
company's competitive strategy [Porter, 1985: 34]. 
Market Structure: Size, growth, share, concentration; 
geographic boundaries; inter-organizational and 
inter-market boundaries; basis and intensity of 
competition. 
Products and Services: Characteristics of products; 
profitability, prices, quality, services offered; 
differentiability of product and service in consumer 
perception and use; rate of obsolescence, frequency of new 
products; potential substitutes; life cycle and 
"renewability" of the product. 
Buyers: Geographical locations, dispersion, and isolation 
from other suppliers; cultural and attitudinal factors; 
social and political factors; role and bargaining power of 
the buyer - distributor, assembler, re-seller, end-user; 
buyer's industry - concentration, rate of growth, profit 
levels, relative level of buyer's profit margin, level of 
fixed or storage costs; company's product -
standardization, differentiation, substitutes, 
price-performance trends, switching costs, relative 
importance to buyer (cost and use); company-buyer 
relationship - role of the company (producer, assembler, 
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re-seller, distributor); role of the buyer (assembler, 
re-seller, distributor); relative importance of buyer's 
business to company (revenue, market share); scope for 
vertical integration - forward by company, backward by 
buyer; competitive information - available to the company 
about the buyer (markets, policies, costs, prices, 
turnover), and available to the buyer about the company. 
Competitors: Names, numbers, capacity, recent and expected 
changes; apparent market strategies; quality of service; 
competitor's IT positioning relative to the company's; 
competitor's rate of growth, relative level of profit 
margin, level of fixed or storage costs; structural 
barriers against new entrants - economies of scale, 
economies of scope, organizational slack, capital 
requirements; product barriers against new entrants - need 
to achieve low cost and, need to achieve high cost and 
complex differentiation, price-performance trends, 
switching costs; access to suppliers; access to 
distribution channels and buyers; relationships with 
existing competitors - number, diversity and balance of 
competitors; sources of rivalry; scope for co-operation or 
collusion; intelligence about competitors; exit barriers; 
gaining and protecting market share; competitive balance. 
B. The IT Domain 
Generic technologies and factors affecting the strategic--
exploitation of IT by the company. 
For each technology and factor, the questions that must be asked 
are: 
What are the specifics of this technology or factor as far 
as this company is concerned? 
In what way, directly or indirectly, does this technology 
' 
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or factor impact specific opportunities and threats in this 
company's business domain? 
It is possible to work in either or both of two directions when 
mapping business domain factors to IT domain factors: "outward" 
from business needs in search of IT solutions, or "inwards" from 
IT opportunities and threats to business objectives and ideals. 
1. Generic Information Technologies 
IT considered as a fundamental technology of the company. 
The units of observation and analysis in IT environmental 
scanning. 
Basic Technologies: Artificial intelligence, expert 
systems, robotics; computer-assisted design, manufacturing, 
education, training; databases - centralized and 
decentralized; data dictionaries; hardware - laser, fibre 
optics, printers, micro electronics, display screens, 
mainframe, mini computers, micro computers, intelligent 
work stations, dumb terminals, telecommunications, modems, 
multiplexors; media - cables, satellite, microwave, fiber 
optics; memory and storage - cache, solid-state, extended 
memory, content-addressable filestore, disks, tapes, 
cartridges, optical media, channels; micro-chip technology; 
office automation; software - operating systems, 
application software, integrated application software, 
compilers, languages, database management systems, data 
dictionary systems, data communication monitors, graphics; 
telecommunication networks - networking software and 
hardware, electronic mail, data access networks, satellite 
direct broadcasting, mobile cellular radio telephones, dial 
up, leased lines, Diginet, packet switching; viewdata, 
videotex, Beltel. 
LeVels of Integration [Otten, 1984]: First level-
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technological systems, converging technologies, 
combinations of the basic technologies as integrated 
products, e.g. reprographics, robotics, voice/data/image 
processing systems; Second level - business systems -
integration of first level systems into business systems 
and services and "turnkey" solutions; may be internal to 
the company (e.g. image storage and retrieval system for 
office support), or an inter-organizational system·· (e.g. 
SASWITCH). 
Technological Alternatives: Performance, reliability and 
cost factors; range of applicability; relative merits of 
alternative solutions, e.g. viewdata vs. leased line vs. 
dial-up vs. value-added networks for distributor support; 
mainframes vs. minis vs. micros; competing architectures 
and "standards", e.g. IBM's SNA model vs. International 
Standards Organization's OSI model: centralized vs. 
decentralized vs. distributed control of data: competing 
proprietary approaches to office automation. 
2. Potential Impacts of Specific Technologies 
Organizational Design: on skills and abilities of workers: 
on the nature of factory and office processes: on job 
design and individual responsibilities: on organization 
structures; obtaining supplier commitment to the company's 
development path [Blauman, 1987); contradictions in the 
company's IT architectures (e.g. secure operational data 
and systems vs. flexible user programming); limits to the 
feasibility of integration and open-ended architecture -
cost, skills, lead time, risk; the risk of architectural 
"dis-integration" resulting from buy vs. make decisions; 
slow emergence of standards; multiple standards 
organizations; rate of development of specific technologies 
- need for realistic assumptions in corporate IT scenarios: 
changing microeconomics - e.g. IT can make small production 
runs become feasible and lead time to get market reduces. 
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Corporate and Inter-Organizational Networks: Changing the 
way information flows in and between organizations; linking 
geographic locations; linking sales and distribution 
functions directly with manufacturing and supply, under the 
control of central market planning, finance and accounting 
functions; effects on geographic and functional 
organizational structure of the corporation - the company 
can run as efficiently on a globally dispersed basis as on 
a locally concentrated basis; top management could be given 
real-time access to relevant, filtered information (cf. 
Ackoff,1967; Dearden, 1966; 1983]; world-wide information 
databases and product information; information affecting 
personal and political behaviour may be beyond the control 
of governments. 
3. Information Technology Suppliers 
Geographic location and political factors; vested interests of 
corporations that own the suppliers; risks of viability of the 
supplying company, or of its products; product pric~s, quality, 
state-of-the-art, obsolescence; delivery lead-times; maintenance 
and problem-resolution - "service levels"; quality of after-sales 
support; bargaining power - of supplier or of the buyer. 
II. INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
A. The Business Domain 
Generic factors that in the aggregate characterize the internal 
IT planning environment of the company. 
For each factor, the questions that must be asked are: 
What are the specific strengths and weaknesses represented 
by this factor in this company, and how do they affect 
goals, objectives and ideals? 
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In each time-frame, how can IT help the company _capitalize 
on its strengths and eliminate or work around its 
weaknesses? 
1. Company CUlture 
Philosophies and Values: Philosophies, values and norms of 
management that determine the kind and quality of the 
decisions they will make, and ultimately the organizational 
IT learning of which the company is capable; "theories of 
action" [Argyris & Schon, 1978], both "espoused" and "in 
use", that constitute behavioural constraints on IT 
decisions. 
Planning View-points: Planning viewpoints that determine 
the kinds of IT strategy and decision making management is 
willing to contemplate, e.g. alignment vs. impact 
strategies, target environment vs. incremental planning, 
directive vs. participative decision making. 
Attitudes, Beliefs and styles: Management styles 
influencing the quality of the dialectic process; 
management and employee attitudes to alternative avenues of 
corporate and personal achievement; personal preferences 
of senior management and the attitudes and expectations of 
personnel that influence acceptance of the framework and of 
particular strategies, structures and changes in human work 
processes; focus of management attention and behaviour, 
e.g. operations, efficiency, effectiveness, opportunity, 
planning period, cost-consciousness, innovation; management 
attitudes to risk, e.g. entrepreneur, risk-averse; employee 
attitudes to the company and to IT. 
Organizational Time-frame: The strategic planning horizon; 
the opportunity "windows" and IT lead times; how far ahead 
managers are willing to think, and thus what kind of IT 






2. Organization Strategy Set [King, 1978] 
The key business and organizational factors of the company 
determining what management will come to see as the purposes and 
uses of IT in the company. 
In conventional IT planning, these are the starting points of 
analysis. In the present Framework, they are factors that may or 
may not be confirmed in the dialectic. 
Mission, Ideals, Objectives, Goals: The existing mission of 
the company - products, markets, technology, goals, 
objectives and ideals; the purpose of IT in the current 
concept of the business. 
Strategies and Business Plans: Existing business strategies 
and business plans; current views of the uses of IT in 
support of the business; current action plans and the 
boundaries to what is achievable in the short term; 
business plans setting out the operating and financial 
objectives of the company; current criteria for determining 
the acceptability and priority of IT policies and projects, 
and how success of these will be measured. 
3. Intrinsic Characteristics of the Company 
Size: Size of the company in terms of assets, turnover, 
profit margins, personnel. 
Resources: Availability of physical, human, technological 
and financial resources; knowledge and capability 
accumulated through experience; strengths for growth and 
diversification. 
External control: The company's stakeholders and the extent 
to which they must be considered in strategic decisions; 
the extent to which the company or business unit can make 
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its own decisions or is controlled by another organization; 
subsidiary and associated companies that must be taken into 
account in strategic decisions. 
4. Organization and Management Structures 
Formal Organization: Business units, processes and primary 
functions, and their relevance to human and information 
systems design; location of the firm infrastructure 
(including the information systems functions) as central 
services andjor business unit functions; pressures towards 
redistribution of these; roles in strategic IT decision 
making, and control of strategic IT human resources; 
management and professional reward and control systems; 
information and measurement systems. 
Development and Learning: The company's understanding of 
business purpose as reflected in its "strategic business 
units" [Ohmae, 1983: 143-148] and "business unit 
inter-relationships" [Porter, 1985: 258-263]; organization 
needs for and limits to participative IT decision making; 
organizational and individual learning - inhibitors and 
synergies inherent in the organization structures and 
processes. 
B. The IT Domain 
Generic organizational and technological factors affecting the 
quality of strategic IT decisions and the assimilation of IT into 
the fabric of the company. For each factor, the questions that 
must be asked are: 
What are the specifics of this factor in the internal 
environment of this company? 
Bow does this factor affect specific strengths and 
weaknesses in this company's business domain? 
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As in the case of the External Environment (Section I.B. above), 
it is possible to work in either or both of two directions when 
mapping business factors to IT factors: "outward" from business 
strengths and weaknesses in search of IT support,- or "inwards" 
( 
from internal IT capabilities and limitations to feasible 
business plans. 
1. Quality of the Information Systems Function 
Objective Factors: The observed ability of the IT function 
to meet the strategic demands; the observed effectiveness 
of the internal structures of the information systems 
function(s), e.g. planning, design, development, 
operations; IT decision making processes and their 
effectiveness, e.g. steering committees, project 
management; the quality of operational systems and 
services, both real and perceived; the completeness of the 
current applications systems portfolio as currently 
perceived. 
Personal Factors: Experience, skills, business orientation 
of IT managers and professionals; the general readiness of 
management for IT-supported andjor IT-induced change 
2. Known Strategic IT Application Areas 
Management intuitions regarding what can be done to enhance 
company products, processes and profitability benefit 
strategically through the use of IT. 
Strategic Purposes of IT: Strategic targets for IT_ 
applications, e.g. customers, suppliers, competitors, 
allies; generic competitive strategies, e.g. massive 
cost-displacement, expansion of market coverage, product 
re-positioning; organizational effectiveness, e.g. 
real-time market information systems, management 
communications support, inter~organizational projects and 
Page D/13 
ventures, personal effectiveness systems. 
Strategic Uses of IT: Automation of office processes; 
automation of factory processes; automation of controls; 
inter-organizational systems; professional support, e.g. 
CAD; automating the client interface; management 
information and/or decision support systems. 
III. PRINCIPAL SOURCES 
Ackoff [1981]; Anderson [1985]; Bates [1985]; Blauman [1987]; 
Bower [1982 (1), 1982(2)]; Bower [1982(1), 1982(2)]; Collins 
[~984]; cymbala [1984]; Daniel [1961]; EDP Analyzer [September, 
1984]; Ghymn & King [1976]; Koutsoyiannis [1979]; Leidecker & 
Bruno [1984]; McKenney & McFarlan [1982, 1983]; Otten (1984]; 




INSTANTIATING THE STRATEGIC OPTION GENERATOR 
The following lists are not, and probably never could be, com-
plete. They are intended only as a starting point for building 
the company's own strategic option generator (first two steps 
only), as described in the Decision Content Component (see Sec-
tion 4.3 and Figure 11). 
I. SUPPLIER 
Supplier's industry - concentration, rate of growth, profit 
levels, relative level of supplier's profit margin, level of 
fixed or storage costs. 
Supplier's product - standardization, differentiation, 
substitutes, price-performance trends, switching costs, relative 
importance to company (cost and use). 
Company-supplier relationship - role of supplier (producer, 
assembler, re-seller, distributor), role of company (assembler, 
re-seller, distributor), relative importance of company's 
business to supplier (revenue, market share). 
Scope for vertical integration - forward by supplier, backward by 
company. 
Competitive information - available to the company about the 
supplier (markets, policies, costs, prices, turnover), to the 
supplier about the company. 
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II. CUSTOMER 
Buyer's industry - concentration, rate of growth, profit levels, 
relative level of supplier's profit margin, level. of fixed or 
storage costs. 
Company's product - standardization, differentiation, sub-
stitutes, price-performance trends, switching costs, relative 
importance to customer (cost and use). 
Company-customer relationship - role of company (producer, 
assembler, re-seller, distributor), role of customer (assembler, 
re-seller, distributor), relative importance of customer's 
business to company (revenue, market share). 
Scope for vertical integration - forward by company, backward by 
customer. 
Competitive information - available to the company about the 
customer (markets, policies, costs, prices, turnover), to the 
customer about the company. 
III. COMPETITOR 
Company's industry - concentration, rate of growth, profit 
levels, relative level of supplier's profit margin, level of 
fixed or storage costs. 
Barriers against new entrants - structural (economies of scale, 
economies of scope, organizational slack, capital requirements), 
product (low-cost standardization, high-cost and complex 
differentiation, price-performance trends, switching costs), 
access to suppliers, access to distribution channels and 
customers. 
Relationships with existing competitors - number, diversity and 
balance of competitors, sources of rivalry, scope for 
• 
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co-operation or collusion, intelligence about competitors, exit 
barriers. 
IV. DIFFERENTIATION - "The Marketing Mix" 
Product - quality, features, options, accessories, installati9n, 
instructions, service, style, brand name, packaging, sizes, 
warranties, product lines, returns. 
Price - flexibility, level, discounts, allowances, payme~t 
period, credit terms, geographic terms. 
Place - channels, market coverage, locations, inventory, 
transport, kinds of middlemen, service levels. 
Promotion - advertising, personal selling, sales promotion, 
publicity, kinds of salespeople. 
V. COST 
Economies of scale. 
Production economies - automation, specialization, saving time, 
reducing inventory levels, altering the capital/labour factor 
intensity ratio, changing short-term and long-term cost curves, 
lowering break-even points, learning curve effects. 
Marketing economies - advertising, large-scale promotion, 
exclusive dealers with service department obligations. 
Managerial economies - specialization and teamwork experience, 
centralization/decentralization, managerial tools and techniques 
for large-scale or for replicated small-scale operations. 
Transport and storage economies - "failures of proportionality" 
(e.g. relatively fewer technicians needed as number of machines 
increases, higher loading factors as scale of plant increases). 
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Pecuniary economies - lower prices for bulk buying, lower cost of 
finance, lower transport rates. 
Economies of scope - by-products, combined products, higher 
loading of fixed factors, re-use of resources, transferable 
skills and knowledge, flexible manufacturing. 
Information economies - data on social, political and economic 
trends, intelligence on poli~ies, costs, prices, sales, etc. of 
the strategic targets. 
Reduction of organizational slack - permitting the company to 
work closer to its "production frontier" by reducing or 
eliminating unnecessarily low prices, excess wages and executive 
compensation, growth of sub-units and services without concern 
for the relation between additional payments and additional 
revenue. 
VI. INNOVATION 
Product - changes in existing products, new products. 
Processes - new ways of resourcing, making, delivering and 
servicing the product, new ways of doing business. 
New understanding of the components of company mission. 
VII. GROWTH 
Organic expansion - existing plant and locations, additional 
plant, new locations. 
Functional - vertical integration, forward or backward. 
Product diversification - enhancing existing products, extending 
the product line, new product lines. 
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Market diversification - increase existing share, enter new 
segments, new geographical locations, IS "spinoffs" to market the 
company's own systems, techniques and skills. 
VIII. ALLIANCE 
Forms of alliance - co-operative agreements, joint ventures, 
equity-linked groups, mergers and acquisitions. 
Reasons for alliance - gain access to resources or deny 
competitor access, lower own or raise competitor's costs, 
increase own or decrease competitor's differentiation, develop or 
imitate innovative products and processes, expand range of 
customer groups and needs satisfied, technologies used and 
functions controlled. 
Kinds of alliance - product, product distribution, product 
development, service, R&D, product support. 
IX. PRINCIPAL SOURCES 
Koutsoyiannis [1979: 127]; McCarthy [1978: 41]; Porter [1985: 
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Number of Returns by CUC Class 
Notes: (1) Total number of companies responding is equal 
to the number of Type C responses, i.e. 28. 
cue 
( 2) See Appendix A for explanation of Membership --
Class and Respondent Type. 
(3) Membership Class A includes one very large 
member with 200 000 employees. 
Members Usable Responses 
-------------- ------------------------------------------------
Respondent Type All Employees IT Employees 
--------------- ------------- ------------
Number Resp. 
Class Polled A B c Tot Rate % Total % Total % 
----- ------ ------ ------ -----
A 44 19 19 22 60 50 411050 94 5232 95 
B 26 3 3 6 12 23 24200 6 295 5 
c 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
------ -----
80 22 22 28 72 35 435250 100 5527 100 
------ ------- --- --- --- --- --- ---
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TABLE 2. 
Number of Returns by Industry 
Noxes: (1) Total number of companies responding is equal 
to the number of Type C responses, i.e. 28. 
(2) See Appendix A for explanation of Membership 
Class and Business Sector. 
CUC Members Usable Responses 
Membership Class All Employees IT Employees 
Business Number Resp. 
Sector Polled A B c Tot Rate % Total % Total % 
-------- ------ ------ ------ -----
Finance 25 11 2 0 13 52 92250 21 3405 62 
Industry 31 2 4 0 6 19 80500 18 661 12 
Oil 5 4 0 0 4 80 12000 3 358 6 
Retail 7 4 0 0 4 57 50500 12 623 11 
Transport 4 1 0 0 1 25 200000 46 480 9 
Mining 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bureau 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
------ -----
80 22 6 0 28 35 435250 100 5527 100 
------ -------- --- --- --- --- --- ---
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TABLE 3 
Number of Returns by Organization Structure 
Notes: (1) Total number of companies responding is equal 
to the number of Type c responses, i.e. 28. 









A = Single unit 
B = Centralized operations, 
decentralized development 
c = Decentralized operations, 
centralized development 
D = Other. 
Company Organization 
single Multiple 
Business Unit Business Units 
------------------- -------------------
IT Organization IT Organization 
A B c D Tot A B c D Tot 
3 0 0 0 3 7 1 2 0 10 
1 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 5 
0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 4 
0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 .. 1 4 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
4 0 0 0 4 15 2 6 1 24 
Page G/5 
TABLE 4 
Employee Ratios by Size of Company ~ 
Note: Employee ranges were chosen to isolate the two 
11outriders11 , one at the low end and the other at 
the high end. 
Total Employees Development Employees 
per IT Employee per Operations Employee 
--------------- -----------------------Number of 
Total Employees Companies Min. Avg. Max. Min. Avg. Max. 
--------------- ---------
Less than 1000 1 2 2 2 0.4 0.4 0.4 
1000 to 2500 6 13 23 50 0.4 1.4 3.4 
2501 to 5000 8 15 34 118 0.3 0.9 1.4 
5001 to 10000 4 36 69 250 0.3 0.9 1.5 
10001 to 100000 8 18 53 149 0.5 1. 0. 2. o· 
Over 100000 1 417 417 417 0.9 0.9 0.9 
--







Employee Ratios by Industry 
The two "outriders" referred to in Table 4 are 
excluded from Table 5. 
Total Employees Development Employees 
Per IT Employee Per Operations Employee 
--------------- -----------------------
Number of 
Companies Min Avg Max Min Avg Max 
---------- ---------
Finance 12 15 29 50 0.3 0.9 3.4 
Industry 6 21 122 250 0.3 0.9 2.2 
Oil 4 13 34 66 0.9 1.4 2.2 
Retail 4. 48 81 149 0.5 1.0 1.8 
Overall 26 13 48 250 0.3 1.0 3.4 
-- --- --- --- --- --- ---
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TABLE 6 
Perceptions of the Internal Planning Environment 
Notes: (1) 21 usable pairs of Types B and c responses 
(2) Dfs = the number of companies in which the B and c 
responses to the question were different. 
Number of Yes Responses 
Business IT --
Qn Attribute No. % No. % Dfs 
12 Formal corporate planning exists 18 86 17 81 5 
13 IT decision making process exists 20 95 16 76 4 
14 Corporate and IT planning interact 19 90 16 76 7 
15 IT costs cycle exceeds 1 year 15 71 15 71 4 
16 IT strategic benefit is measured 13 62 12 57 9 
17 IT expenses grow faster than sales 17 81 10 48 7 
18 Development costs are charged back 16 76 15 71 7 
19 Operations costs are charged back 14 67 15 71 7 
20 Project costs/benefits are evaluated 17 81 11 a1 2 
21 A documented IT strategy exists 19 90 18 86 1 
22 Senior IT steering committee exists 20 95 19 90 3 
23 IT liaison posts exist 15 71 14 67 9 
24 IT R&D/technology posts exist 13 62 10 48 7 
25 Business analysts/IT O&M posts exist 15 71 14 67 5 
26 Hands-on user programmers exist 16 76 17 81 3 
27 Pes are being or will be used widely 17 81 21 100 4 
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TABLE 7 
Perceptions of Strategic Issues Management 
Notes: 
(1) Usable responses: A = 21: B = 19: C = 26. 
(2) Rating = the percentage of useable responses in 
which the item was rated more than 5. 
(3) How Managed = the percentage distribution of the 
scores given to items rated over 5. 
Rating How Managed 
Qn Strategic Issue 
Poorly 
Rsp % > 5 -2 -1 
Well 
0 +1 +2 
28 Disaster and Security Plans A 
B 
c 
29 co-operating with cue, cssA A 
B 
c 
30 Co-operating with SAPO A 
B 
c 
31 Vendor Relations and Supply A 
B 
c 
32 Using IT in Business Strategy A 
B 
c 
33 Measuring the IT Contribution A 
B 
c 
34 Office/Factory Automation A 
B 
c 
35 Better MIS/Decision Support A 
B 
c 






























0 12 24 47 17 
0 7 53 33 7 
0 27 19 31 23 
8 0 42 50 0 
11 11 11 56 11 . 
7 20 40 13 20 
0 11 33 44 12 
0 0 75 25 0 
0 0 50 30 20 
0 0 21 58 21 
0 0 14 57 29 
0 4 27 52 17 
0 7 27 47 19 
0 28 22 44 6 
0 23 27 36 14 
0 38 8 38 16 
12 41 41 6 0 
14 27 23 31 5 
7 13 40 33 7 
0 21 51 21 7 
0 12 47 41 0 
5 15 35 40 5 
0 17 39 38 6 
0 13 21 62 4 
0 0 29 57 14 
0 33 45 ~2 0 
0 18 46 27 9 
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TABLE 7 Cont. 
Perceptions of Strategic Issues Management 
------------------------------------------
Rating How Managed 
------ -------------------
Poorly Well 
Qn Strategic Issue Rsp % > 5 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
------------------------------- ------
37 Exploiting New Technologies A 48 10 20 50 20 0 
B 53 20 20 30 30 0 
c 65 6 24 58 12 0 
38 Developing IT Infrastructure A 43 11 11 56 22 0 
B 53 0 20 30 40 10 
c 69 17 22 44 17 0 
39 Shorter Application Lead Time A 86 0 28 39 28 5 
B 84 6 38 43 13 0 
c 88 0 35 26 39 0 
40 Improving Operational Quality A 100 0 14 24 43 19 
B 95 0 17 22 50 11 
c 96 0 28 32 24 16 
41 Software Development Tools A 81 0 12 35 53 0 
B 84 13 0 50 37 0 
c 88 9 17 30 35 9 
42 Organization Adapted to IT A 90 0 37 32 26 5 
B 63 0 17 66 17 0 
c 69 6 27 50 17 0 
43 Reducing Pai?er Handling A 71 20 20 27 33 0 
B 47 11 22 45 22 0 
c 77 0 20 55 25 0 
44 Managing Data as a Resource A 86 0 28 39 17 16 
B 74 0 14 57 29 0 
c 85 5 23 18 45 9 
45 Applications as a Portfolio A 76 6 19 25 38 12 
B 63 0 0 50 33 17 
c 81 0 24 29 37 10 
46 Promoting End-User Computing A 81 0 18 29 29 24 
B 84 0 19 19 49 13 
c 69 0 6 28 55 11 
47 Buy Rather Than Make Software A 43 0 0 67 33 0 
B 42 0 37 37 13 13 
c 38 10 10 10 60 10 
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TABLE 7 Cont. 
Perceptions of Strategic Issues Management 
------------------------------------------
Rating How Managed 
------ -------------------
Poorly Well 
Qn Strategic Issue Rsp % > 5 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
------------------------------- ------
48 Managing IT Human Resources A 86 6 28 11 so 5 
B 100 5 32 32 26 5 
c 96 0 16 28 40 16 
49 Project Cost/Benefit/Risk A 90 0 53 21 11 15 
B 95 6 43 28 17 6 
c 88 4 26 35 26 9 
50 Measuring IT Effectiveness A 86 6 39 28 22 5 
B 95 0 11 39 39 11 
c 81 10 33 33 14 10 
51 Include IT in Business Plans A 81 0 35 24 24 17 
B 74 7 21 21 51 0 
c 85 14 27 36 18 5 
52 IT Organization and Roles A 86 0 22 39 28 11 
B 63 0 17 33 42 8 
c 77 5 10 40 25 20 
53 Controlling Overall IT Costs A 90 5 32 37 11 15 
B 79 0 13 47 27 13 
c 92 4 0 33 so 13 
54 Learning to Plan IT Strategy A 81 6 18 24 52 0 
B 74 0 14 so 36 0 
c 81 0 14 52 29 5 
55 Learning to Assimilate IT A 71 7 13 27 47 6 
B 74 7 0 64 29 0 
c 77 5 15 45 30' 5 
56 Better Business/IT Dialogue A 90 0 26 26 47 1 
B 89 6 18 58 18 0 
c 88 0 13 44 30 13 
57 Building IT Management Skills A 81 0 24 53 18 5 
B 89 6 24 52 18 0 
c 85 0 14 54 27 5 
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TABLE 8 
Ranking of the Strategic Issues by Importance 
Notes: (1) Table 8 is based on the same data as Table 7. 
(2) Highest rank is 1, lowest is 30. 
(3) In each column, issues are ranked according to the 
average of the ratings (1 to 10) given by that group. 
Qn Strategic Issue 
28 Disaster and Security Plans 
29 co-operating with cue, CSSA 
30 Co-operating with SAPO 
31 Vendor Relations and supply 
32 Using IT in Business Strategy 
33 Measuring the IT Contribution 
34 Office/Factory Automation 
35 Better MIS/Decision Support 
36 Inter-Organizational systems 
37 Exploiting New Technologies 
38 Developing IT Infrastructure 
39 Shorter Application Lead Time 
40 Improving Operational Quality 
41 Software Development Tools 
42 Organization Adapted to IT 
43 Reducing Paper Handling 
44 Managing Data as a Resource 
45 Applications as a Portfolio 
46 Promoting End-user Computing 
47 Buy Rather Than Make Software 
48 Managing IT Human Resources 
49 Project Cost/Benefit/Risk 
50 Measuring IT Effectiveness 
51 Include IT in Business Plans 
52 IT Organization and Roles 
53 Controlling Overall IT Costs 
54 Learning to Plan IT Strategy 
55 Learning to Assimilate IT 
56 Better Business/IT Dialogue 

































































































































































Comparison of American and south African Rankings 
Notes: (1) Source of American rankings: Brancheau & Wetherbe [1987] 
(2) NR = no comparable American ranking. 
(3) Relative questions = the Questions of the present Study 
that appear to correspond most closely to the "Key Issue" 





IS's Role & Contribution 










Data as Corporate Resource 44 










Security and Control 
Packaged Software 













Cooperating with CUC, CSSA 29 
MIS/Decision Support 35 






































































































Perceived Importance of IT Decision Making 
Notes: Number of usable responses: A = 22; B = 21; C = 28. 
Percentage Responses 
Disagree Agree 
Qn Issue Rsp -2 -1 o +1 +2 
62 Survival depends on existing systems A: 
B: 
C: 
63 Survival depends on new systems A: 
B: 
c: 
64 Operational planning is critical A: 
B: 
C: 
65 IT strategy must be long-term A: 
B: 
C: 















5 23 67 
0 52 43 
4 39 46 
14 27 59 
0 43 57 
11 39 42 
5 36 54 
19 33 48 
11 39 39 
0 36 64 
5 29 66 




0 0 32 68 
0 14 29 57 
0 4 29 67 
67 IT does not constrain company goals A: 27 23 23 27 0 
B: 10 29 14 43 4 
C: 18 36 4 39 3 
68 IT can alter company objectives A: 23 36 27 14 0 
B: 10 38 29 14 9 
C: 11 39 4 36 10 
69 Strategic IT decisions must be formal A: 0 
0 
0 
0 9 32 59 
5 19 __ 43 33 
7 4 50 39 
B: 
C: 
70 Build infrastructure before systems A: 
B: 
C: 






0 9 36 55 
0 14 38 48 
4 7 54 35 
0 18 23 36 23 
5 14 19 49 13 
0 25 21 32 22 
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Qn Issue Rsp -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
---------------------------------------
72 Implement IT strategy incrementally A: 18 59 5 14 4 
B: 10 52 0 33 5 
c: 14 68 7 11 0 
73 Involve many people in IT decisions A: 14 55 5 18 8 
B: 19 48 10 19 4 
c: 25 39 18 14 4 
74 Base IT strategy on business strategy A: 0 9 0 --32 59 
B: 0 0 0 43 57 
c: 0 0 4 32 64 
75 Exploit any feasible IT opportunity A: 27 41 9 18 5 
B: 38 33 10 14 5 
C: 43 46 4 7 0 
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TABLE 11 
Perceived Quality of IT Decision Making 




Rsp -2 -1 
Agree 
0 +1 +2 
76 Little done about environment risks A: 
B: 
c: 
77 No business direction to IT planning A: 
B: 
C: 
78 IT managers' poor grasp of business A: 
B: 
c: 
79 Operational systems meet objectives A: 
B: 
c: 
80 All needed systems are in place A: 
B: 
C: 
81 Systems match the jobs they support A: 
B: 
c: 
82 The IT team is stable A: 
B: 
c: 
83 The IT managers are competent A: 
B: 
c: 
84 IT technical staff are competent A: 
B: 
c: 
85 Few systems failures in recent years A: 
B: 
c: 
18 45 18 18 
10 48 24 14 



















































































TABLE 11 Cont. 




Rsp -2 -1 
Agree 
0 +1 +2 
86 Few non-IT people understand IT A: 
B: 
C: 
87 The company's IT lags the industry A: 
B: 
C: 
88 Don't have the skills for IOS A: 
B: 
C: 
89 Satisfactory investment in IT R&D A: 
B: 
C: 
90 IT contribution effectively measured A: 
B: 
C: 






5 59 13 
14 43 29 
0 50 18 
14 36 23 23 
14 67 0 14 
25 46 11-- 11 
23 63 9 5 
10 57 10 19 
21 61 11 7 
5 36 27 23 
5 24 29 38 
11 43 7 36 
14 40 23 23 
0 62 24 14 
14 57 18 11 
9 45 23 23 
5 43 10 43 


















Perceived Decentralization of IT Decision Making 
Notes: (1) Number of usable responses: B = 21: c = 28. 
(2) vc = Very centralized 
C = Somewhat centralized 
B = Balanced 
D = Somewhat decentralized 
VD = Very decentralized. 
Percentage Responses 
Qn Issue 
92 Selecting mainframes 
93 Selecting terminals and PCs 
94 Planning the data comms network 
95 Selecting mainframe software 
96 Selecting application packages 
97 Planning the database 
98 Selecting application systems 
99 Planning application systems 
100 Deciding operational schedules 
101 Establishing access controls 
102 Adapting office systems to IT 
103 Deciding mainframe capacity 
Centr. 
Rsp VC C 
a: 81 5 
C: 89 7 
B: 57 14 
C: 54 32 
B: 43 38 
C: 75 14 
B: 76 10 
C: 86 11 
B: 33 14 
C: 46 18 
B: 52 33 
C: 75 18 
B: 38 33 
C: 32 36 
B: 29 24 
C: 36 36 
B: 52 19 
C: 36 32 
B: 52 29 
C: 64 29 
B: 29 19 
C: 14 39 
B: 76 10 
C: 82 11 
Decentr. 










































































TABLE 12 Cont. 
Perceived Decentralization of IT Decision Making 
Percentage Responses 
Central. Decentral. 
Qn Issue Rsp VC C B D VD 
104 Deciding overall IT cost level B: 43 38 14 5 0 
C: 46 25 29 0 0 
105 Forecasting capacity needs B: 24 38 29 5 5 
C: 54 11 25 7 4 
106 Technology and vendors B: 52 43 0 5 0 
C: 68 21 11 0 0 
107 Formulating overall IT strategy B: 38 24 29 10 0 
C: 50 21 25 4 0 
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TABLE 13 
Awareness of Decision Making tools and Techniques 
Notes: (1) Usable responses: A = 23: B = 21: c = 28 
(2) ? = Never heard of it 
H = Heard of it, but never used it 
T = Tried it, but did not find it useful 
U = Found it moderately useful 
VU = Found it very useful. 
Percentage Responses 
Qn Tool or Technique 
108 Brainstorming 
109 Business strategy model 
110 Business Systems Planning (BSP) 
111 Cost/benefit evaluation model 
112 Critical Success Factors Technique 
113 Environmental scanning 
114 Feasibility studies 
115 Financial modelling 
116 Nolan stages Theory 
Rsp ? H T u 
A: 0 18 0 36 
B: 0 0 5 43 
C: 0 4 4 46 
A: 23 41 0 14 
B: 24 14 0 48 
C: 11 36 4 39 
A: 50 36 5 0 
B: 19 14 14 38 
C: 7 43 18 25 
A: , ~-4 45 
B: .. 19, 19 




A: 50 32 0 9 
B: 33 33 0 0 
C: 11 29 0 32 
A: 32 32 5 14 
B: 33 14 0 38 
C: 39 18 0 29 
A: 0 14 5 18 
B: 5 5 0 48 
C: 0 0 7 46 
A: 5 27 0 36 
B: 5 19 5 43 
C: 0 18 4 43 
A: 77 14 0 5 
B: 67 14 0 19 






























TABLE 13 Cont. 
Awareness of Decision Making tools and Techniques 
-------------------------------------------~-----
Percentage Responses 
Qn Tool or Technique 
117 Nominal Group Technique 
118 PERT, Critical Path, etc. 
119 Porter "strategic forces" 
120 Porter "value chain" analysis 
121 Project management systems 
122 Service level agreements 
123 Strategy set transformation 
124 Tetrarch 
125 Alloway User Needs survey 
127 Application po~tfolio 
Rsp ? H u 
A: 73 14 0 9 
B: 62 33 0 5 
C: 75 11 0 7 
A: 5 23 5 36 
B: 14 5 10 62 
c: 0 11 14 36 
A: 81 9 5 5 
B: 48 33 5 10 
C: 43 29 4 18 
A: 81 19 0 0 
B: 52 29 5 10 
C: 39 32 11 11 
A: 18 27 0 5 
B: 19 14 33 33 
C: 0 11 4 39 
A: 27 18 9 23 
B: 14 29 10 33 
C: 7 18 4 29 
A: 100 0 
B: 90 5 







A: 68 5 5 5 
B: 38 19 24 10 
C: 4 57 11 14 
A: 64 14 9 5 
B: 38 19 24 5 
C: 21 50 14 7 
A: 82 9 5 0 
B: 71 19 0 10 

































TABLE 13 Cont. 




Qn Tool or·Technique Rsp ? H T u w 
----------------------------------------
128 BIAIT A: 100 0 0 0 0 
B: 95 5 0 0 0 
C: 93 7 0 0 0 
129 B+OL+D A: 95 5 0 0 0 
B: 86 10 0 0 5 
C: 82 14 0 4 0 
130 BICS A: 91 9 0 0 0 
B: 81 19 0 0 0 
C: 82 18 0 0 0 
132 Change management processes A: 59 18 0 9 14 
B: 48 19 10 14 10 
C: 14 18 0 25 43 
133 customer Resource Life Cycle A: 91 9 0 0 0 
B: 86 10 5 0 0 
C: 82 11 0 4 4 
134 Hansen Enterprise survey A: 100 0 0 0 0 
B: 90 10 0 0 0 
C: 82 18 0 0 0 
135 EwiM A: 95 5 0 0 0 
. B: 90 5 0 5 0 
C: 68 25 0 4 4 
136 EP/DP A: 90 5 0 5 0 
B: 76 14 0 10 0 
C: 71 21 0 4 4 
137 Innovation management techniques A: 86 9 0 0 5 
B: 81 10 5 0 5 
C: 82 11 0 7 0 
138 McFarlan's Grid A: 77 14 0 5 4 
B: 47 38 5 10 0 
C: 21 32 4 29 14 
139 IS MOD A: 100 0 0 0 0 
B: 81 19 0 0 0 
C: 82 18 0 0 0 
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TABLE 13 Cont. 
Awareness of Decision Making tools and Techniques 
Percentage Responses 
--------------------
Qn Tool or Technique Rsp ? H T u vu 
----------------------------------------
140 Orq. Information Reqmts. Analysis A: 95 0 0 0 5 
B: 86 14 0 0 0 
C: 100 0 0 0 0 
141 Portfolio risk analysis A: 73 18 0 9 0 
B: 52 38 0 10 0 
C: 21 43 4 25 7 
142 Priority setting methods A: 32 14 0 23 31 
B: 38 24 5 14 19 
C: 25 7 4 43 21 
Page G/23 
TABLE 14 
Perceived Success of IT Decision Making 




Rsp -2 -1 
143 Lower costs A: 
B: 
C: 
144 Higher turnover/profit A: 
B: 
C: 
145 Greater product quality A: 
B: 
c: 
146 Good high tech image A: 
B: 
C: 
147 Goals attained A: 
- market share B: 
C: 
148 Goals attained A: 
- company growth B: 
C: 
149 Goals attained A: 
- return on capital B: 
C: 
150 Co-ordination/consensus A: 
B: 
C: 
151 High quality dialogue A: 
strategic B: 
C: 






























































































































TABLE 14 Cont. 
Perceived Success of IT Decision Making 
Percentage Responses 
-----------------------
Very Poor Very Good 
Successful Outcome Rsp -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
---------------------------
153 Quick response to needs A: 0 59 23 18 0 
B: 5 43 42 10 0 
C: 4 32 21 43 0 
154 High quality dialogue A: 9 27 44 18 2 
operational B: 0 52 38 10 0 
C: 4 29 43 21 3 
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TABLE 15 
Perceived Strategic Purposes of IT 
Notes: 
(1) Usable responses;, 
Finance A = 9; B = 9; c = 12 
Industry A = 4; B = 4; c = 6 
Oil A = 3; B = 3; c = 4 
Retail A = 4; B = 3; c = 4 
Transport A = O; B = 1; c = 1 
(2) avg = average of all ratings (1 to 10) 
max = maximum of all ratings (1 to 10) 
rnk = rank according to average ratings. 
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TABLE 15 Cont. 




A B c A B c 
----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Qn Purpose avg max rnk avg max rnk avg max rnlc avg max rnk avg max rnk avg max rnk 
--- --------------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
155 Add value to our product 7.2 10 2 6.9 9 3 7.9 10 6.3 9 5 6.3 8 5 6.5 10 3 
156 Tie customers to us 6.9 10 3 7.1 10 2 7.5 10 2 4.7 6 9 7.3 8 3 6.0 8 5 
157 Become low-cost leader 5.6 10 6 7.8 10 1 7.3 10 3 6.7 8 4 9.0 10 2 4.8 8 6 
158 Integrate forward 3.4 8 12 5.7 9 8 5.5 10 9 5.0 8 8 4.0 10 11 3.8 7 7 
159 Suppliers compete for us 2.4 6 15 5.6 9 9 4.8 10 12 4.3 7 14 2.7 5 14 1.8 5 13 
160 Suppliers conform to us 1.8 6 17 5.8 9 7 4.6 8 14 4.3 8 12 1.3 2 17 1.8 4 14 
161 Ability to switch suppliers 3.1 10 13 4.6 8 13 4.8 10 13 4.3 7 10 3.3 5 12 3.0 5 9 
162 Integrate backward 2.0 4 16 5.0 8 11 4.8 10 11 4.3 8 13 3.0 7 13 1.5 4 16 
163 Distinctive product/image 6.3 10 4 5.9 8 6 7.3 10 4 6.3 10 6 6.7 8 4 7.0 8 2 
164 Organizational effectiveness 7.6 10 1 6.4 10 5 6.9 10 5 7.3 9 2 9.3 10 1 8.0 9 
165 Block existing competitors 5.8 10 5 4.9 7 12 6.8 10 6 3.3 5 16 4.7 8 10 6.3 8 4 
166 Block new entrants: 
minirrun capital required 3.6 9 10 5.0 8 10 5.9 10 8 3.3 5 17 2.3 3 15 1.8 4 11 
167 Block new entrants: 
complexity of product 5.0 10 9 6.4 9 4 6.2 10 7 4.3 6 11 5.3 10 7 1.8 4 12 
168 Block new entrants: 
exclusive alliances 3.6 8 11 3.7 9 16 5.1 10 10 7.0 7 3 5.0 8 9 2.3 4 10 
169 Discourage substitutes: 
integrated products 5.3 10 7 3.8 9 15 4.4 8 16 5.3 8 7 2.3 4 16 3.3 8 8 
170 Discourage substitutes: 
price/performance 5.3 10 8 4.0 9 14 4.5 10 15 8.0 9 1 6.0 10 6 1.5 2 15 
171 Discourage substitutes: 
technology-based alliances 3.0 8 14 2.2 9 17 2.4 8 17 4.3 7 15 5.0 8 8 1.3 2 17 
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A 8 c A 8 c 
----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- -----------
Qn Purpose avg max rnk avg max rnk avg max rnk avg max rnk avg max rnk avg max rnk 
--------------------------- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
155 Add value to our product 5.0 8 6 3.8 8 9 5.7 8 9 5.8 10 6 6.7 8 2 7.0 10 4 
156 Tie customers to us 4.5 8 9 3.0 5 15 5.0 8 12 2S 4 15 3.3 8 11 6.0 8 9 
157 Become low-cost leader 4.8 10 7 3.0 5 17 7.5 10 4 3.8 10 12 1.0 1 17 5.0 9 12 
158 Integrate forward 4.0 8 11 5.0 7 2 6.3 8 6 6.8 8 2 4.7 10 7 4.8 8 14 
159 Suppliers compete for us 3.8 8 12 3.5 5 11 7.8 10 2 5.3 8 7 2.3 5 15 6.3 8 6 
160 Suppliers CGnform to us 6.3 10 3 4.3 6 6 8.2 10 1 5.3 9 8 5.7 8 4 6.3 9 7 
161 Ability to switch suppliers 6.0 10 4 4.0 5 7 7.5 10 3 6.8 9 3 4.7 7 5 5.5 7 11 
162 Integrate backward 6.8 8 2 4.8 8 3 6.2 10 7 6.5 8 4 3.0 6 13 6.3 8 8 
163 Distinctive product/image 5.5 8 5 4.5 8 4 5.2 9 10 7.0 9 1 6.3 9 3 7.0 9 3 
164 Organizational effectiveness 7.3 10 1 6.5 10 1 5.8 10 8 6.5 9 5 7.7 9 1 8.0 9 
165 Block existing competitors 4.3 7 10 3.0 4 16 4.0 9 15 3.3 8 14 4.0 7 9 5.8 8 10 
166 Block new entrants: 
miniiiUil capital required 3.0 5 14 3.3 5 14 4.7 9 13 4.0 8 11 3.0 5 14 4.8 7 13 
167 Block new entrants: 
complexity of product 3.3 6 13 4.0 7 8 4.7 9 14 4.3 8 10 4.3 7 8 6.8 8 5 
168 Block new entrants: 
exclusive alliances 2.8 6 15 3.3 5 12 3.8 9 16 2.0 4 16 2.0 4 16 7.5' 8 2 
169 Discourage substitutes: 
integrated products 2.5 5 16 3.3 5 13 5.2 9 11 3.5 8 13 4.7 7 6 4.8 8 15 
170 Discourage substitutes: 
price/performance 4.5 8 8 4.3 7 5 6.7 10 5 5.3 8 9 3.7 7. 10 3.8 7 17 
171 Discourage substitutes: 




Perceived Strategic Uses of IT 
A = Automation of office processes (Question 174) 
B = Automation of factory processes (Question 175) 
C = Automation of controls (Question 176) 
D = Inter-organizational systems (Question 177) 
E = Professional support (Question 178) 
F = Automating the client interface (Question 179) 
G = Management information/ decision support (Question 180) 
N = Number of usable responses 
"" I 
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TABLE 16 Cont. 
Perceived Strategic Uses of IT 
Finance Oil 
Strategic Purpose Business (B) IT (C) Business (B) IT (C) 
No. of "Votes" Cast No. of "Votes" Cast No. of "Votes" Cast No. of "Votes" Cast 
(N = 8) (N "' 11) (N = 2) CN = 2) 
A B C 0 E f G A 8 C 0 E f G A 8 C 0 E f G A 8 C 0 E f G 
Add value to our product 3 0 0 0 4 5 2 4 0 1 3 5 6 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Tie customers to us 0 2 2 2 0 0 3 4 2 ·0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Become low-cost leader 7 2 4 4 1 0 2 9 2 2 3 4 2 2 0 0 0 1 1. 0 0 0 0 
Integrate forward 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suppliers compete for us 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suppliers conform to us 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ability to switch suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Integrate backward 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Distinctive product/image 0 0 3 3 2 6 0 0 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Organizational effectiveness 6 0 4 3 0 4 10 2 7 2 3 9 2 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 
Block existing competitors 
Block new entrants: 
minimum capital required 
Block new entrants: 
complexity of product 







0 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 2 0 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 4 0 3 2 1 0 1 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
000201010134400000000 0000000 
2 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 
technology-based alliances 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 5 11 25 12 24 18 41 6 16 28 21 33 33 8 3 3 2 0 3 4 3 2 2 1 0 5 3 
== == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == 
/ 
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TABLE 16 Cont. 
Perceived Strategic Uses of IT 
Industry Retail 
Strategic Purpose Business (B) IT (C) Business (B) IT-(C) 
--------------------------- -------------------- -------------------- -------------------- --------------------
No. of nvotes" Cast No. of "Votesn Cast No. of •votes" Cast No. of nvotes" Cast 
(N = 4) (N = 6) (N = 2) (N = 3) 
A B C D E F G A B C D E F G A B C D E F G A B C D E F G 
Add value to our product 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Tie customers to us 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
, Become low-cost leader 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 .1 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 
Integrate forward 0 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suppliers compete for us 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Suppliers confona to us 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ability to switch suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Integrate backward 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Distinctive product/image 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Organizational effectiveness 2 2 2 2 2 3 0 2 2 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 3 
Block existing competitors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Block new entrants: 
minimum capital required 
Block new entrants: 
complexity of product 







0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
technology-based alliances 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 7 4 7 8 6 7 16 6 12 13 4 12 16 1 0 2 2 0 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 8 9 
== == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == == 
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TABLE 17 --------
Reactions to the Questionnaire 
------------------------------
Notes: Usable responses: 
Finance: A = 10; B = 10; c = 13 
Other: A = 12; B = 11; C.= 14 
185 The Task of Filling It In Tedious Interesting 
------------------------- -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Financial Companies A: 20 10 20 50 0 
B: 20 20 30 30 -- 0 
c: 0 38 39 23 0 
Other Companies A: 0 17 50 25 8 
B: 18 27 0 55 0 
c: 7 21 36 36 0 
186 Insights Gained Few Many 
--------------- -2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Financial Companies A: 50 30 10 10 0 
B: 30 10 10 50 0 
C: 31 38 23 8 0 
Other Companies A: 17 25 25 25 8 
B: 36 9 28 27 0 
c: 14 21 29 36 0 
187 Useful as Aide-Memoire Much Little 
---------------------- -2 -1 0 +1 +2 ---
Financial Companies A: 20 0 10 20 50 
B: 0 30 30 10 30 
c: 0 8 38 31 23 
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The Components and Parts of the Framework 
DECISION MAKING CONTEXT: The IT Planning Environment 
Decision Making Dialectical Environmental 
Domains Enquiry Data 
...v 
The Corporate IT Scenario~ 
t ... 
DECISION CONTENT: The Business Vision for IT 
Competitive Organizational IT IT 
Strategy Design Positioning Strategy 
..v 
I The IT Positioning Statement! 
l 
DECISION STRUCTURE: The Target Environment 
IT Human Information Human 
Infrastructure Systems Systems Resources 
J, 
I The Target Environment Architecture! 
~ 
DECISION MAKING PROCESS: Implementing IT Strategy ... 
Organizational Managing the Co-ordination and 
Development Transition Stages Control 
J, 
The Master Transition Plan 
J, 
ORGANIZATIONAL ~ LEARNING: Developing the IT Capability 
Perspectives of Stages of Company Learning and 





The Links of the Framework 
· j The IT Domain I 
> 
I ;I The Business Domain I Type I: 
DECISION MAKING CONTEXT v Dialectic 
Type II: Contingency 
I The IT Domain v !· > 
I The Business Domain I Type I: 
DECISION CONTENT v Dialectic 
Type II: Contingency 
I The It Domain v I > 
I The Business Domain 
. I Type I: 
DECISION STRUCTURE v Dialectic 
Type II: Contingency 
j The IT Domain v I 
> 
I / The Business Domain 
I Type I: 
DECISION MAKING PROCESS v Dialectic 
Type II: Contingency 
I The IT Domain 
' I I > I / The Business Domain v Type I: 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING v Dialectic 
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Realization Architecture 

















Opportunities and Threats 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
critical Success Factors 
I 
v 
INNOVATION ORGANIZATIONAL COMPETITIVE 
STRATEGY 1!11 DESIGN 
I 
Strategic Impacts of IT 




COMPETENCE OF ~ DEVELOPMENT ~~~~ 
THE COMPANY 
I 




lli!!m IT LEARNING lli!!m 
COMPETENCE 




ORGANIZATIONAL - I 
~--------~ I ~----------~ 
Managing IT Strategy 
I 
v 
SUSTAINABLE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
~ The three major congruencies 
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FIGURE 5 
Decision Making Domains 
BUSINESS IT 
A. B. 
OUTSIDE OWNERS DEVELOPERS 
THE 
Commission Systems Build Systems 
SYSTEM and Infrastructure and Infrastructure 
c. D. 
--
INSIDE USERS OPERATORS 
THE 
Use Systems Manage Systems 




Stating. Negating and Restating Assumptions 
STEP 1: SURFACING CURRENT ASSUMPTIONS 
..-- Original ------> Data -------> Current I--
Strategies Assumptions 
STEP 2: DIALECTIC 
r-- Counter <------ Data <------ Negated <-
Strategies Assumptions 
STEP 3: INTEGRATING ASSUMPTIONS 




STEP 4: THE BUSINESS VISION FOR IT 
"Best" <------ Data <------ Acceptable 
Strategy Assumptions 






















Critical Variables: Critical Variables: 
Political, Social & -> Technological Economic Forces Forces 
c. D. 
v 
Critical Variables Critical 
Internal Business ::::::: :-:·::::::; Internal :•:•:• :•:•:•. :•:•:•:•: 
Forces 
IIIII Pressures for IT Solutions 
~ External Environmental Pressures 





































The Uses of IT 
Pressures of 
Change 
The IT Domain 
B 
IT POSITIONING 














































Technology strategy for IT: Aliqrnrent or Inpact 
ALIGNMENI' IT S'IRA'lmY 
IT Technology S 
a strategy t 












t - Ccatpetitive 
i strategy 
c - Organization 
s - capability 










- 1\Jsitionin;J; IT Infrastructure; 
Human Systems; Infonnation 
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strategic pyrposes of IT 
Threat to Company 


















Ceiling on prices 
Differentiation; c 
Purposes of IT in Meeting 
the Threat 
D: Encourage competition 
for company's business; 
reduce switching costs 
c: Enforce "just-in-time" 
scheduling 
S: Threaten backward integra-
tion 
D: Marketing-mix; increase 
buyer switching costs 
C: Low-cost leadership 
S: Forward integration 
D: Differentiate product, 
service, company 
C: Cost effectiveness 
S: Control access to buyers 
D: Marketing-mix; switching 
costs; complex systems 
C: Raise "ante", i.e. need 
for substantial resource 
S: Strategic alliances to 
control market access 
D: Redefine products and 
services 
C: Improve price and 
performance 
s: Strategic alliances for 
diversification 
= Cost; s = Scope 




Strategic Option Generator 
What is the strategic Target? 
Supplier II CUstomer II Competitor 
II 
v 
What is the Generic Strategy? 
Differentiation II Cost II Innovation II Growth Jf Alliance 
II 
v 
What is the Mode? 
·-· 
Competitive - Alignment Entrepreneurial - Impact 
v 
What is the Level of Use? 
Personal II Work Group II Business Unit II Corporate 
II 
v 
What is the Class of Use? 
Automation II Information II Control 
II 
v 
What is the Competitive Advantage? 
Competitive Organizational Synergy 
Position Effectiveness 
Based on Wiseman [1985: 57] 
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FIGURE 12 
The IT Strategy Evaluation Grid 
Strategic L 
impact of o 
existing w 





















BCG: Cash cows 





Key: ITS: Information Technology Strategy 
BLC: Business Life Cycle 
BCG: Boston Consulting Group Matrix 
Adapted from Cash, McFarlan & McKenney [1983: 217] 
and Deshpande & Parasuraman [1986, Fig 6.] 
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FIGURE 13 
Measuring Competitive Advantage through IT 
INTERACTIONS < > RESOURCE 
WITH THE Joint Efforts AND SKILL 
ENVIRONMENT and Effects DEPLOYMENT 
I I 
v v v 






COMPETENCE OF IN IT DECISION 
THE COMPANY MAKING 
t 1~ 
CONGRUENCY --
IT PURPOSES -· IT USES 
I 1 
,v. 
I COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH IT J 
Note: See also Figure 4 
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FIGURE 14 
The Target Environment Architecture 
L Internal View I 
External View I 
I 
The Framework 
IT INFRA- HUMAN INFORMATION HUMAN I 
STRUCTURE SYSTEMS SYSTEMS RESOURCES 1/ 
Customization 
I 
I Internal View v I 





I Internal View v I 





j Internal View v -- I 





The IT Infrastructure 
Operation Forms of Data that Represent Business Information 
Performed 
I II II II I on Data COMPUTATIONAL TEXT IMAGE VOICE 
INPUT/ ---- - -> Virtual Workstation 
OUTPUT 
F== 
COMMUNI- -- - - -> Virtual Network 
CATION 
F 
PROCESSING - - -- -> Virtual Applications Portfolio 
~ 
STORAGE --- - - -- -- -> Virtual Data Model 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT ORGANIZATION 




Business Systems Architecture 
BUSINESS DOMAIN: The Human Systems Part 
Organization • Structures < 
I I 
execute v v use 
Business Business 







1-----> Application ~~ 
· Data 
run I 1 store 
IT 
Infrastructure 
IT DOMAIN: The Information Systems Part 




The Value Chain and Value System 
The Value Chain of a Business Unit --
\ 
A Firm Infrastructure \ 
\ 
\ 
Human Resource Management \ 
1 r 0 \ $upport B \ 
Activities Technology Development J G \ 
I E 0 \ c A I 
Procurement T L I 
v I Sl 
v I 
E I 
Inbound Operations Outbound Marketing Service Sl 
Logistics Logistics & Sales I 
I 
I 
< Primary Activities > 
-· 
The Value System 
Supplier Business Unit Channel Buyer 
Value Chains Value Chain Value Chains Value Chains 
I 
r->1111" >fillij I I I Ill 
I I ~>II II" >fillij IIIII I---> 
I I I I I ~>II II" >fillij lllll 
Upstream Downstream 
<-- Value--> < Valu ... > 
Adapted from Porter & Millar [1985: 151] 
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FIGURE 18 
Strategic Applications Portfolio 
THE IT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Virtual Virtual Virtual Virtual 




STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 








Business Unit . Business Unit 
Support Support 
Activities Activities 
Business Unit Inter- Business Unit 
Internal Business Unit Internal 
Linkages_ Linkages Linkages 
I l I 
Business Unit Business Unit 
Primary Shared Primary 
Activities Activities Activities 
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FIGURE 19 
Strategic IT Decision Making Roles 





Internal Envi . uJ uuc 11t :~:.,. :•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:•::•:•::::::::::::::::::: :•:•:•. 
Directive 
Active 
:::::::::::-:. :·:·:·:·:·:·:. :·:·:·::·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·: :·:·:·:·:·: 























Strategic IT Decision Making Responsibilities 
(Fragment of a Responsibilities Chart) 
GENERIC ROLES II I 








1 2 . . 




. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 
n . . . . . . . . 
Developer 1 . . . . 
2 . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
n . . . . 
: 
Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Adapted from Beckhard & Harris [1977: 78] 
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FIGURE 21 
Strategic IT Decision Making success Criteria 
A. OWNERS 
Externally Valid: Increase 
in turnover, market share, 
margins; decrease in cost of 
value activity or linkage; 
increase in quality of 
service; venture success 
Internally Valid: Managed 
quantity and quality of 
information, communication; 
workgroup efficiency; margin 
per headcount; employee 
skills and morale 
C. USERS 
Externally Valid: increases 
in workgroup and personal 
effectiveness; prompter 
service; higher workshop 
throughput; reduction in 
efficiency variances 
Internally Valid: shorter 
and simpler training needs; 
fewer errors; easier 
supervision; projects 
shorter and more successful 
B. DEVELOPERS 
Externally Valid: Improved 
rates of assimilation and 
development lead times; 
decrease in volume and back-
log of changes --
Internally Valid: Design 
quality; system performance; 
information intensity of work 
process; functionality of the 
application 
D. OPERATORS 
Externally Valid: Better use 
of capacity; improvement in 
service levels agreed and met; 
reduction in spoilt work 
Internally Valid: Better 
machine loading; better 
reliability, availability and 
serviceability; more efficient 
and motivated technical staff; 




'lhe Master Transition Plan 
(Fragment) 
I 





IT Infra- Human Infonnation Human mocESSES 
structure Systems Systems Resource 
Scope: Catpany Business Business Catpany Catpany 
Unit Unit 
I 
I '1hrust 1 
Nane I II 
Timefraloo '1hrust 2 
II 
I II 
II '1hrust 3 
Nane 
Timefrane 
I I II 
I I 
J I ll 
III l'lhrust4 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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FIGURE 23 
IT Management strategy arrl O:mtrols 
•••••••••••••• > CX>RroRATE 
IT 
SCENARIO 
. . . . 
: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 






: : . . Operational Controls 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. 
. . . . ..................................... . . . II 
: Architectural Controls . . ....................................... . 
II 
strategic Controls 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . 





IT managem;mt. strategy 
****** Optional additional doc:::unentaticn 
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FIGURE 24 
Aggregate Classes of Strategic IT Costs 
I I 
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Implementing the Framework in Practice 
PART I: BASIC CONCEPTS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING 
Basic concepts in strategic IT decision making ---





j, continued ••• 
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FIGURE 27 - Continued 
Implementing the Framework in Practice 
PART II: THE STRATEGIC BUSINESS QUESTIONS 
I 
What businesses are we in? 














How can IT be a!plied to improve 






How can IT be applied to 













FIGURE 27 - Continued 
Implementing the Framework in Practice 
I PART III: IT - STRATEGIC PLANNING QUESTIONS 
I 
How can we organize the business 




.Jr ..J/ v - .J.... 
IT HUMAN INFORMATION HUMAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS SYSTEMS RESOURCES 
ARCHITECTURE ARCHITECTURE ARCHITECTURE ARCHITECTURE 
--










FIGURE 27 - Continued 
Implementing the Framework in Practice 
PART IV: IMPLEMENTATION 
I 
How can we develop action plans to 


























Evaluating the Framework for Acceptance 
Information Input Resources Input 
to Strategic IT to Strategic IT E 
Decision Making Decision Making < X 









of strategic IT 
> Decision Making < 
I 









> FRAMEWORK < a 
I 




Outputs of r 
Strategic IT a 
> Decision Making < c 
I 







Impact on the 
Quadrants of 
IT Strategy 
D Evaluation Points 




The Old and the New Perspectives 
TRADITIONAL THE NEW 
PERSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVE 
IT POSITIONING Alignment strategy Impact or alignment 
Competitive mode strategy 
Reactive or preactive Entrepreneurial or 
planning Competitive Mode 
Interactive planning 
MASTER STRATEGY Cost displacement Many generic options 
Process efficiency 
PURPOSES AND Operations & control Competitive strategy 
USES OF IT Management information Organizational design 
Decision support Strategic business 
systems 
-. 
ORIENTATION OF Internal External 
APPLICATIONS Past & present needs Future potentials 
ISSUES OF IT Centralisation & Differentiation & 
ORGANIZATION decentralisation integration 
APPROACHES TO Flowcharts Dialectic 
PROBLEM SOLVING Hierarchies & segments Participation & 
Linear processes & domains 
phase theories Decision packets and 
transition stages 
METHODOLOGIES Closed-system Open-system 
Rational-comprehensive Directed incremental 
or incremental 
PARADIGM User Requirements Mutual Responsibility 
··-
11t AUG 1989 
